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Abstract 
 Gender inequality is a pervasive global phenomenon, particularly in parliamentary 
representation and the political realm as a whole. Previous scholarship looked for 
explanations in the countries’ national development levels, political regimes and electoral 
systems. Some scholars searched for answers at the domestic level within societies’ 
religious and cultural value systems. This dissertation departs from prior research by 
looking beyond the national domestic level into individual party-level explanations for 
women’s political leadership, broadly defined to include their station within parties’ 
decision-making inner structures. A core assumption in this thesis is that political 
institutions, mainly political parties, are the main vehicles – forklifts -- for women’s 
ascendance to political leadership. This dissertation attempts to identify what party-level 
characteristics enhance or impede women’s leadership in political parties, and how these 
characteristics vary across different parties.  
 The theory advanced in this dissertation is that party-level characteristics, 
especially their religiosities and secularisms, influence women’s chances in assuming 
leadership positions within parties’ inner structures. I argue that the root of the 
problematic of women’s leadership lies in party variation in religiosity, which can 
explain variation in women’s shares in parties’ executive and legislative bodies. This is 
premised on a multivocal understanding of religions implying that there is a continuum of 
multiple religiosities and secularisms. Religiosity of political parties refers to the 
religious components on their political platforms or the extent to which religion 
penetrates their political agendas. The core argument in this dissertation is that as 
religiosity in party platforms increases women’s leadership is more likely to fall. This 
implies that in parties with more extensive religious goals women’s leadership is likely to 
prove stunted.  It is my contention that parties with extremist religiosity are less 
accommodating to women’s demands for leadership than parties with more secular and 
civil platforms.  
 The theory of party variation in religiosity and women’s leadership is explored in-
depth and tested in Lebanon as a single country case-study. Political parties are the unit 
of analysis and women’s leadership in political parties is the main dependent variable. 
Female nominations for national parliamentary and local municipal councils are other 
dependent variables. Other party-level characteristics are explored as explanatory 
variables besides religiosity, notably,  institutionalization as indicated by democratic 
procedures in leadership transitions and decentralized decision-making, pluralism in 
religious affiliation of members, and the size of female membership.    
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 I N T R O D U C T I O N 
 
  Gender inequality is a pervasive global phenomenon, particularly inequality in 
political representation. In the last few decades, and, despite attention to women‘s 
participation in public office the gains in female political participation have lagged 
behind women‘ advancement in educational attainment and professional status in the 
private sector.
1
 These gender gaps are most pronounced in developing countries, where 
socio-cultural, demographic and political characteristics are said to impede women‘s 
advancement and political empowerment.
2
 However, the extent of gender gaps varies 
widely across and within countries in the same region and also across different types of 
political parties within the same country. 
 This dissertation aims to identify and explore the factors driving these observed 
phenomena particularly in developing countries such as Lebanon, where women have 
                                               
1  The year 1975 marked the beginning of the Decade for Women declared in the first of four world 
conferences on women organized by the United Nations and held in New Mexico (1975), Copenhagen 
(1980), Nairobi (1985) and Beijing (1995). One indicator is that female participation in non-agricultural 
labor increased from 36% in 1990 to 40% in 2005 (ILO. Women in labour markets: Measuring progress 
and identifying challenges, March 2010, 72). Also, in 32 countries worldwide more women than men are 
now enrolled at the tertiary level. Overall, the rate of female to male enrolment was less than half in 1970 
and now it is nearly 70%. See: UNDP, Human Development Report 1995 (New York: United Nations). 
 
2  It has been established that equal access to education and economic resources are prerequisites not 
only for improving women‘s socio-economic status but also for their political empowerment, notably for 
improved representation in public office (Georgia Duerst-Lahti 2006). Studies suggest that women‘s 
attainment of higher education is instrumental for their advancement to leadership and decision-making 
positions in both the private and public sectors, and for narrowing gender inequalities. The findings of these 
studies show a positive relationship between female educational attainment and women‘s assumption to 
decision-making positions. R. Anker (2005) also concludes that ―…it is precisely the participation of 
women at the highest decision-making levels in political and economic life that can drive the change for 
greater equality between men and women‖. Consistent with theoretical expectations of this work, empirical 
findings show that women‘s economic performance improved along with their educational attainment since 
1975, although their political representation remains low, with wide variation across countries and regions. 
See: United Nations, World Survey 2009: Role of Women in Development; International Labour Office 
(ILO). 2009. Trends in Econometric Models (Geneva: ILO); www.worldbank.org; www.ilo.org (ILO, 
2009); United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM).2010, Progress in the World’s Women 




achieved high levels of education and economic participation. It offers a new explanation 
for women‘s political under-representation. This explanation focuses on political 
parties—the main vehicles for political participation and leadership—and on variations 
across parties in intensity of religiosity. Various scholars posit that some religions are less 
hospitable while others are presumed more tolerant to women‘s advancement. However, 
this work will focus not on distinctions as between religions per se, but on the degree of 
religiosity built into parties‘ political platforms and its impact on women‘s leadership. I 
argue that political parties with lower religiosity—that is to say, more secular parties—
are more likely to have higher female representation in their leadership bodies and on 
their electoral lists than parties whose platforms incorporate higher religiosity. An in-
depth case study of Lebanon will test this theory of party variation in religiosity and 
gauge this and the impact of other party-level characteristics on women‘s political 
leadership. 
A. Motivating Facts 
This section highlights empirical evidence that female representation in decision-
making and leadership positions is lower in the public sector than in the private sector.  It 
also outlines the broad contours of the theory elaborated in this work around the impact 
of religiosity on women‘s leadership. 
1. The Conundrum of Women‘s Political Leadership 
Between 1995 and 2010, the share of women among heads of state and 
government (excluding ruling monarchs and queens) grew only by close to two 




officers (CEOs) grew by five times as much (around ten percent).
3
 During the same 
period, the increase of women occupying ministerial positions was only 3.4 percentage 
points, while the increase in board seats held by women was more than twice as much 
(8.5 percentage points). Table 1.1 provides this data and shows that female parliamentary 
representation, the most common indicator used by researchers for measuring women‘s 
political participation, grew by 7.4 percentage points, only half the increase recorded as 
corporate managers. This suggests that while gains have indeed been made in female 
representation in top level decision-making positions in the public sector, these gains are 
still below those seen in the private sector.
4
   
Table 1.1 Women in decision-making positions in public versus private institutions 
worldwide, 1995-2010 
 
Public Political Leadership (%) Private Sector Leadership (%) 
 1995 2010 1995-2010 
Change 
 1995 2010  1995-
2010 
Change 




5.8 7.7  1.9 Directors & 
executive officers 
(CEOs) 
3.3 13.2 9.9 
Cabinet 
Ministers 
6.1 9.5 3.4 Board seats  6.2 14.7 8.5 
Parliament  
(Lower House) 
11.7 19.1 7.4 Corporate officers  





Sources: Computations by the author based on the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) www.ipu.org database,  
April  2010;  World Wide Guide to Women Leadership www.guide2womenleaders.com update May 10, 
2010; www.cia.gov; www.CNNMoney.com 2000-2009;   United Nations.2010. World Survey 2009: Role of 
Women in Development (New York: United Nations), pp. 22-24; http// laborsat.ilo.org ; Ernst and Young 
sponsored Census of Women in Fortune 500 Corporate Officer and Board Positions (www.ey.com); 
www.fortune500.com; www.infoplease.com  
                                               
3   In 1995, the Fourth World Conference on Women was held in Beijing and the Beijing Platform for 
Action was adopted by all United Nations member States. This is the last world conference on women 
convened by the United Nations. 
 
4  Industrialized countries also see higher representation in the private sector than in the public 
sector, although the gender gaps are narrower than they are worldwide. In 2010, women accounted for 38% 
of CEOs in Fortune 500 companies and firms in the USA, Canada, and Western Europe, compared to 
13.2% worldwide; and 12% of heads of state and governments compared to 7.7% worldwide. Also, women 
occupied 28% of board seats and an equivalent share as corporate managers, but just 29% of ministerial 






Table 1.2 shows that in 2010, the global average for female representation in 
lower houses stood well below parity at 19.1%, with considerable variation across 
regions. This average was highest in the Nordic countries at 42% and lowest in Arab 
states at 10%. This data not only reflect an enduring mismatch between women‘s 
economic and political performances but also wide disparities and lingering inequalities 
in female representation worldwide. 
 
 Table 1.2 Women in Parliaments: World and Regional Averages, 2010 
 
REGION  Women members (%) 
Nordic Countries (NC) 42.1 
OECD Countries 24.9 
Americas 22.2 
North America  21.8 
South America 21.9 
EU Excluding NC 21.9 
Asia 18.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa  18.4 
Non-Arab Muslim-majority  15.6 
Pacific 13.2 
Muslim-majority Countries 12.6 
Arab States 10.1 
WORLD 19.1 
 
Source: Based on the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), accessed on November 30, 2010 (www.ipu.org), 
and computations by author. See, Annex 1.1 to this chapter for definition of regions as per the IPU.  
 
2.  A Theory of Party Variation in Religiosity & Women‘s Leadership 
The theory presented here posits party-level characteristics as the primary factors 
accounting for variations in women‘s leadership. These include, party religiosity, 
institutionalization specifically democratic procedures (leadership transitions and 
decentralized decision-making), as well as female membership, and pluralism as 
indicated by religious affiliations of party members. Religiosity is a core party-level 
characteristic, which is assumed to influence strongly women‘s chances in leadership. It 




religious goals penetrate these agendas. This research moves beyond extant scholarship -
- to a different level of analysis at the domestic level -- by focusing on women‘s first 
level of entry into the political domain: political parties. It examines variation across 
political parties in religiosity as well as other party-specific characteristics to explain the 
share held by women in parties‘ decision-making bodies and on their electoral lists.  
Understanding women‘s advancement within inner party echelons, I argue, is 
important for explaining female parliamentary representation. This has not been 
addressed by studies pitched at the country level.
5
 As feminists and students of political 
parties have argued, political parties can be the principal vehicles for women‘s 
ascendance to leadership positions.
6
 Why some parties are superior vehicles for 
women‘s advancement and leadership is the central question that this research addresses 
and hopes to explain. 
Women‘s leadership refers to the presence of women in the executive and 
legislative decision-making bodies within political parties, on high-level organizational 
committees like supreme councils, politburos, executive and legislative committees. This 
dissertation focuses on women‘s leadership in decision-making bodies within parties. 
This is distinct and different from an analysis that might look to female representation in 
parliaments, the most commonly invoked indicator for women‘s political participation. 
Because ultimate representation in elected office is also dependent on the electoral 
system and voters‘ preferences, it offers an incomplete snapshot of female leadership 
                                               
5   One need only consider the different roles that women play in political parties. For instance, 
women may be leaders of parties or heads of government as in the Christian Democratic Party in Germany 
or in the Labour Party in Britain. However, their role is virtually non-existent in the Taliban in Afghanistan, 
or in the Calvinist Party in the Netherlands (where women were first not allowed to be members and now 
are not allowed to compete for leadership). 
 
6  See, Anne Phillips 1995, Sonia Pitre 2006, Joni Lovenduski and Pippa Norris 1993, Anne 




and may be a noisy signal of party attitudes towards and support for women. Indeed, 
women‘s assumption of leadership positions in parties‘ inner bodies as well as their 
nomination to electoral lists—which may or may not result in electoral victory—are 
important indicators of female political leadership, which cannot be captured by data that 
only counts elected politicians. 
B. Previous Explanations for Female Representation and Leadership 
The analysis of factors influencing women‘s political leadership necessitates 
engagement with the aforementioned scholarship that seeks to explain persistent gender 
inequalities and low levels of female representation in elected public office. Five main 
socio-political explanations have been advanced for the status of women and their 
representation in public office. These include a country‘s development level, political 
regime, electoral system, political culture and religion. 
 Development and modernization theories point to Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) per capita as an indicator of the level of development and economic growth in a 
country.
7
 Feminists and scholars have observed that countries with higher GDP per capita 
supply a higher status for women. They argue that as the country‘s GDP per capita rises, 
the socio-economic and political status of women improves as a result of better 
educational attainment, economic contribution and political representation.
8
 Disparities in 
the status of women are attributed to lower growth and productivity, waste and inefficient 
                                               
7  United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 1995 (New 
York: United Nations); United Nations, World Survey 2009: Role of Women in Development. See also, 
footnote 3 on female representation in industrialized countries (USA, Canada, and Western Europe), whose 
per capita GDP is amongst the highest in the world. 
 
8  United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM).2010, Progress in the World’s Women 
2008/2009 (New York: UNIFEM), on implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); and 





use of scarce resources, which manifest themselves, inter alia, in the ‗feminization of 
poverty,‘ especially in conflict-stricken and poorer countries. Indeed, poverty has a 
differential impact on women because of gender bias resulting in unequal access to 
resources (wealth and land), services (health and education), and opportunities (education 
and employment). This results in lower representation of women in decision-making 
positions and in political leadership in poorer countries. However, more recent studies 
analyzing these phenomena find that GDP per capita alone is not a dispositive factor in 
explaining variations in female representation.
9
  
Indeed, this is also supported by initial analysis undertaken on a non-random 
sample of 80 countries representing 42.6% of the entire universe of existing countries. 
The data set is composed of the 34 advanced, industrialized economies that are members 
of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the five Nordic 
countries, plus all 48 Muslim-majority countries (Arab and non-Arab) countries, for 
which data are available.
10
 On average, countries with higher GDP per capita have higher 
female representation (MPs) and those with lower GDP per capita have lower female 
representation, as Chart 1.1 shows. However, one also observes that there are 
overachievers and underachievers amongst both groups of countries, and variations in the 
middle. For instance, countries with low GDP per capita and high female representation 
                                               
9  R. Anker, Women’s Access to Occupations with Authority, Influence and Decision-making Power 
(Geneva: ILO, 2005), in United Nations. World Survey 2009: Role of Women in Development (New York: 
United Nations, 2010) 
10   Muslim-majority (Arab and non-Arab) countries are of special interest given the role of religiosity 
in this research. They are also developing countries with a variety of political regimes. The OECD 
countries are selected for comparative purposes because they are advanced, higher income democracies and 
are the more secular states. It would be useful to extend this exercise to the whole universe of countries for 





(viz., Rwanda) and some with high per capita but low female representation (viz., 
Luxembourg or Kuwait) or none at all (viz., Qatar, Oman or Saudi Arabia).
11
  

























Therefore, while this relationship matters, there are deviations and wide variations, 
especially in the middle income group, which explanations based on countries‘ income 
levels do not fully explain.
12
  
Other scholars observe that the status of women and female representation is 
higher in democratic than in autocratic and authoritarian regimes.
13
 Steven Fish suggests 
that, ―[t]he station of women may be conditioned by regime type, with more democratic 
                                               
11   The outliers in chart 1.1 are Luxembourg and Qatar. 
 
12
 Rwanda boasts the highest female representation worldwide at 56.3%. It has one of the lowest 
GDP/capita in the world ($800/capita ranking 167/186), with a low Human Development Index (HDI) 
ranking (ranking 167/182. Qatar, Oman and Saudi Arabia have high GDP per capita, yet zero women in 
public office with a Gender Equality Measurement Index (GEM), which measures the status of women, 
among the lowest worldwide. Rwanda may be an outlier among developing countries; and wealth derived 
from oil revenues in the Arab Gulf countries is not the same implied by modernization and development 
theories.  See also, UNDP, Human Development Report 2009 (New York: UNDP). Fatima Sbaity Kassem, 
ed. 2006a. Status of Arab Women Report 2005: History of Women’s movements in the Arab World, (New 
York: United Nations). 
 
13   See, Jennifer Gandhi (2008), Steven Fish (2002), Mark Tessler (2002), and Daniela Donno and 





regimes providing the basis for … higher status for women.‖ (2002: 29-37) Amrita Basu 
also argues that different political regimes offer different opportunities for women in the 
political arena, whether in political participation or representation in public office (2005: 
34). This scholarship maintains that countries characterized by democratic deficits 
impede women‘s advancement and are generally not conducive to female representation. 
Such regimes have a differential impact on women by withholding their rights to 
participate and compete for leadership positions.
14
 In contrast to democracies, non-
democracies are not premised on principles of freedom of expression, contestation, 
transparency, competition, free and fair elections, and equality among all citizens.  
The observed pattern of inherent discriminatory and non-democratic practices is 
manifested in these countries‘ political institutions. This is behind the sub-standard status 
of women and their low representation in public office.  In fact, one observes that almost 
all democracies have high levels of female representation while autocracies invariably 
have lower or no female representation, if they maintain parliaments or similar 
democratic institutions in the first place. There is general support for this argument. The 
majority of high level income democracies have higher levels of female representation 
than in low-income autocracies. However, one also observes that there are countries that 
fall short among the first group (viz., Japan, Ireland, Luxembourg), and super 
overachievers among autocracies with higher income (viz., the UAE) or low income non-
                                               
14
  See: United Nations Development Programme. 2009. Human Development Report (New York: 
United Nations); also, www.womenwatch.org. The Gender Equality Measurement (GEM) and the Gender 
Development Index (GDI), developed by UNDP, depict wide disparities in the status of women, gender 
equality and female representation across all countries, democracies and non-democracies. One wonders 
how much of this is endogenous in the same way that Przeworski et al (2000) link development and 
democracy in that economic development does not necessarily lead to democracy but it sustains it. (See: 
Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi. 2000. Democracy and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge 




democracies (viz., Afghanistan or Bangladesh or Kyrgyzstan).  On average, female 
representation in democracies is higher than in autocracies, as Chart 1.2 clearly shows. 
However, one also observes that there are overachievers among autocratic regimes (viz., 
the United Arab Emirates, Afghanistan, or Tunisia). There are also underachievers among 
democracies or democratizing countries with low female representation (viz., Japan, 
Comoros, or Lebanon). There is also a large group of countries in the middle (medium 
income level and democratizing countries) with unexplained variation in female 
representation. These variations call for explanation which an argument based solely on 

























 Autocracies Non-democracies Democracies
MPs in %; PolityIV: Democracies (+6 to +10); Autocracies (-6 to -10), Democratizing &/or In-transition (+5 to -5)
Chart 1.2 Female MPs by Democracy in 80 Countries
 
A third line of argument is premised on specific electoral systems, quotas for 
women and other tangible affirmative action measures that countries employ, which have 
enhanced the level of female representation. Scholars find that countries employing 
proportional electoral systems maintain higher levels of female representation than mixed 
or majoritarian systems.
15
 Moreover, it makes a difference for female representation 
                                               
15   See, Pippa Norris, Joni Lovenduski, and Ronald Inglehart (1985, 1993, 2000), Miki Kittilson 





whether or not countries have legislated quotas for women, as well as parties‘ use of 
voluntary quotas, and explicit, gender-related candidate rules. The lack of incentives 
offered to parties to nominate women, the size of districts, and the type of electoral lists 
are serious impediments embedded in electoral systems, which are inherently not 
―women-friendly.‖16  Empirical evidence shows that the most ―women-friendly‖ electoral 
system is the party list proportional representation (PR) used by most industrialized 
countries, followed by semi-proportional (STV and MMP) and lastly majoritarian 
systems.
17
 Chart 1.3 demonstrates the superiority of the PR electoral system for female 


























Chart 1.3 Female MPs by Electoral Systems in 80 Countries
 
Under the PR system, each party presents a list of candidates for a multi-member 
electoral district, where voters vote for a party and parties receive seats in proportion to 
their overall share of the vote. This provides incentives for parties to nominate women 
                                               
16 I refer to ‗women-friendly‘ electoral systems as those that improve female representation in public 
office. See also,  Mala N. Htun (2005), Mona Lena Krook (2005), and Drude Dahlerup (2006), Guillaume 
R. Frechette, François Maniquet, and Massimo Morelli (2006). 
 
17  Electoral systems could be Party List Proportional Representation (List PR), Single Transferrable 
Vote (STV), Mixed Membership Proportional (MMP), Two-Round Systems (TRS), First Past the Post 
(FPTP), Single Non-Transferrable Vote (SNTV), Parallel, Bloc Vote (BV), Party Bloc Vote (PBV), or No 




since they do not risk losing seats because of gender-bias. By contrast, in systems like the 
Bloc Vote (BV) where voters vote for candidates instead of political parties, parties are 
not offered any incentives to nominate women. A key feature of electoral systems 
affecting women‘s representation is the use of open or Closed electoral lists. Closed lists 
have specified placement, top rank-ordered or zipper quotas, in which the winning 
candidates are taken from the lists in the order of their position on these electoral lists. If 
the lists are ‗open‘ or ‗free‘ the voters can influence the order of the candidates by 
marking individual preferences. In such voting systems, prejudice or gender bias among 
voters may cause them to favor male over female candidates. Thus, ballot systems that do 
not allow substitution according to candidate attributes such as gender are more favorable 
to women‘s advancement. Therefore, closed electoral lists with rank-ordered or zipped 
lists as articulated in the electoral law, offer women greater chances of electability than 
open electoral lists because they eliminate gender bias and the possibility that women are 
knocked off the lists by voters or replaced by male candidates. There is no chance for 
gender bias.  
In a closely linked argument, scholars point to affirmative action measures, such 
as temporary quotas for women, as critical for improving female representation.
18
 
Scholars maintain that legislated and constitutional quotas (percentage shares or reserved 
seats for candidates) and/or voluntary internal and electoral party quotas are effective. 
                                               
18
  Affirmative action measures merit special consideration given the importance attached to them in 
the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, which specify a minimum of 30% quota for women in all decision-
making levels as a temporary measure. See Mona Lena Krook, ―Politicizing representation: Campaigns for 
candidate gender quotas worldwide‖, PhD dissertation, Department of Political Science, Columbia 
University, 2005; Fatima Sbaity Kassem, ―Building a Common Agenda in West Asia”, in Anita Anand and 
Gouri Salvi, Beijing! UN Fourth World Conference on Women (Women‘s Feature Service: New Delhi: 
India, 1998) ; ISBN 81-90 1005-0-5. See, also Lovenduski and Norris (1993), Norris and Lovenduski 





These increase female representation to a level that will eventually make a difference in 
decision-making (the critical mass theory). In effect, the most effective formula for 
raising female representation is to combine a PR system in  large electoral districts with 
Closed, rank-ordered lists (top-ranking, zipper quotas), with percentage quotas for 
women (www.idea.int).  However, as Norris cogently argues, ―By itself the electoral system 
is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to guarantee women‘s representation. 
Nevertheless, the electoral system functions as a facilitating mechanism, which expedites 
implementation of measures within parties, like affirmative action for female candidates.‖ 
(1999:2). Further, I argue that electoral systems and quotas, while effective in enhancing 
female representation, may be employed by countries irrespective of their GDP per capita 




























AutocraciesNon-Dem.  Democracies Autocracies Non-Dem.  Democracies
(PolityIV: Autocracies (-6 to -10), Democratizing &/or In-transition (+5 to -5); Democracies (+6 to +10)
Chart 1.4 Female MPs by Democracy & PR System in 80 countries
 
 
Thus, in an attempt to explain deviations from the general pattern drawn above, I 
look at the joint influence of GDP per capita, political regimes and electoral systems on 




employing PR systems still produce higher female representation than all other groups of 
countries. However, there are countries within that group also employing PR systems but 
producing much lower female representation (viz., Japan). Income level differences, 
disparities in political regimes or electoral systems do not explain these phenomena. 
There are also variations in the middle and underachievers amongst the OECD countries, 
which cannot be explained, singularly or in combination by any of three variables. Chief 
amongst these is the Nordic countries, which outshine other democracies with high GDP, 
mostly employing PR, Closed lists and voluntary party quotas, and boasting highest 
female representation than all other regions in the world. Consequently, high per capita 
income, democratic regimes and ―women-friendly‖ electoral systems are necessary but 
not sufficient conditions for explaining female representation. However, variations signal 
the presence of other—as of yet un-theorized—explanatory variables for female 
leadership and representation. 
Estimating a regression model which incorporates these three variables, we find 
that while the coefficients on GDP/capita and PR systems are positive and significant, the 
coefficient on democracy is not. However, incorporating in the model dummies for the 
Arab and non-Arab Muslim-majority countries still produces significant coefficients. 
This indicates that GDP/Capita, democracy and electoral systems, included in the 
multivariate regression equation, do not fully explain observed cross-national variation in 
female representation. In fact, the performance of some Arab and non-Arab Muslim-
majority countries on a number of indicators of democracy and women‘s rights including 
female representation has been the subject of interest to scholars who have sought 




different level of analysis than income levels or regimes or PR systems and quotas, in 
religion. Another explanation, which scholars also offer is political culture.
19
  These 
explanations, though, cannot be easily quantified or measured and arguments relating to 
the role of religion and political culture have often relied on case study methods.   
These arguments focus on cultural barriers (traditions, customs, norms and 
conservative values) and entrenched patriarchy in the society. This is reflected in the 
attitudes of party elites who block women‘s access to leadership positions by relying on 
discourses positing that ―women’s place is at home‖ and ―politics-is-a-man’s-business‖, 
following Dahlerup (2006). A political culture argument might explain low female 
representation and leadership in political institutions within the same country or across 
countries with traditional and conservative values.
20
 However, it fails to account for 
variations in female leadership across different parties and institutions that exist within 
the same country, and that share the same political culture, norms, traditions and values. 
In this connection, some scholars find that political explanations are superior to cultural 
ones, which weakens the case for political culture as a sufficient explanation on its own.
21
 
Closely related to a political culture explanation for low female representation is 
the argument built on the salience of religion. Predictions dating back to Voltaire and 
                                               
19   See, Inglehart and Norris 2004, Htun 2005, and Dahlerup 2006 
 
20  Following Pippa Norris (1993), I refer to political culture as ―…the dominant values and attitudes 
towards the role of women in society and in political life. Where traditional values prevail, it might be 
expected that women would be hesitant to pursue a political career, selectors would be hesitant to choose 
them as candidates, and parties would be unwilling to introduce effective gender equality policies‖ 
(Lovenduski and Norris 1993, 312). This allows me to move from patriarchy and culture in the society to 
party variation in political culture vis-à-vis women. Such an understanding is not constant across all parties 
within the same political culture. 
 
21   See also, Adam Przeworski, Jose Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, ―Culture and Democracy‖  in 
World Culture report: Culture, Creativity and Market (Paris: UNESCO, 1998) ; Daniella Donno and Bruce 





Nietzsche suggested that the dominance of religion would wane as societies became 
modernized and less traditional, at which time secularism or ―laïcité‖ would take over.22 
However, historical developments have belied these expectations and secularism has not 
proven inevitable or irreversible. Scholars now note that ―[i]t is obvious that religion has 
not disappeared from the world, nor does it seem likely to do so. … [And], especially… 
in developing societies, we would predict that religion would continue to play an 
important role in politics.‖ These scholars also predict that ―[t]he expanding gap between 
the sacred and the secular societies around the globe will have important consequences 
for world politics, making the role of religion increasingly salient on the global 
agenda.‖23 These conclusions carve out a role for religion in today‘s politics. 
Feminists and social scientists alike have broadly explored the relation between 
religions or religious cultures and female empowerment. Anke Schuster recognizes the 
tension between religion and democracy and the influence of both on the station of 
women. She points out that, ―[r]eligion is frequently the reason for discrimination, 
injustice and exclusion, a marker for social marginalization, which is a central concern of 
multiculturalism.‖ (2007: 2). More specifically, she finds that one of the reasons religion 
is thought to be inimical to liberal-democratic policies is that ―conservative and 
fundamentalist religious groups frequently hold and proclaim opinions that are illiberal. 
One of the most contentious issues in this respect is the attitude of religious groups 
towards the role of women.‖ (2007: 3). Schuster indicates that these religious groups 
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often have affiliated parties that carry their conservative values into politics, adversely 
influencing women‘s prospects for leadership and public office. In this respect, religions 
function not unlike other ideologies in that they provide a unified, structured way of 
seeing the world, affecting the lives and thoughts of adherents, including women. 
Moreover, religious tenets are often conflated with traditions and norms, especially in 
conservative societies, stunting women‘s advancement. In this vein, Tyra Bouhamdan 
argues that, ―[s]ocial and religious history often drives legal traditions to evolve. …, 
gender issues are often primarily dictated by culture (i.e. traditions, customs, norms, 
social identifications, etc.) …‖ (2009: 20).  
Other scholars argue that some world religions (viz., Catholicism, Islam, 
Hinduism, Buddhism, and Judaism) are at least in some ways particularly hostile toward 
women.
24
  The differentiation by religious family suggests that different religions have 
different consequences for female empowerment and leadership and that even the 
influence of the same religion on women is not uniform or a constant. Scholars argue that 
Islam is inherently undemocratic, pointing to the more marginal status of women in some 
Muslim and Arab countries.
25
 Fish specifically maintains that ―the station of women … 
links Islam and the democratic deficit‖ (2002: 29). However, other scholars interested in 
Islam and/or the Arab region question the arguments above and note that it is not Islam 
but ―Arab exceptionalism‖ that should be investigated.26 These scholars argue that Islam 
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25   See, Samuel Huntington (1996), Steven Fish (2002), Jonathan Fox (2006), among others 
 
26  See, Alfred Stepan and Graeme Robertson, ―An Arab More Than Muslim Electoral Gap?‖  
Journal of Democracy (14 July 2003); and their debate, “Arab, Not Muslim, Exceptionalism” Journal of 




is not a bar to women‘s political leadership since in certain non-Arab Muslim-majority 
countries women are heads of state and government. Also, wide variation is observed 
across Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries, with several countries boasting female 
representation above the 19% world average and closer to that in advanced countries.
27
 
This suggests two conclusions. First, Islam by itself does not seem to be a bar to near-
average female parliamentary representation in some Arab and non-Arab Muslim-
majority countries. Second, the low female representation in Arab states must not be 
attributed solely to Islam. Third, there remains a great deal of unexplained variation 
within Muslim-majority, conservative societies, particularly the lower levels in Arab 
countries, begging for an explanatory theory.  
These theories do not necessarily rest on the notion that all religions are 
essentially un-egalitarian.  However, since men continue to dominate the theological 
realm, they exercise a near monopoly over jurisprudence and the interpretation of 
doctrine. As Georgia Duerst-Lahti (2006) argues, many religions have been formally 
structured by men to exclude women from key roles and to retain gendered power 
advantages over women. Thus, according to this view, women‘s advancement to 
leadership positions within formal religious structures was often blocked by the men who 
dominated those spaces (Elin Bjarnergard 2008). By extension, whenever clergymen 
double as party leaders, they also tend to thwart women‘s leadership in the political 
realm. Simultaneously, they have the authority to execute women unfriendly policies at 
                                                                                                                                            
Authoritarianism, and Female Empowerment: What are the linkages?‖ World Politics 56 (July 2004), 582-
607. 
 
27   Wide variations in female representation are depicted across Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries 
ranging between 28-27% in Tunisia and Afghanistan to no representation in Saudi Arabia and Qatar (see 






 While this body of work analyzes party-level characteristics to 
understand female parliamentary representation, it does not explore the influence of party 
variation in religiosity on women‘s presence in leadership and decision-making bodies 
and on parties‘ electoral lists for public office. Thus, arguments which are based on the 
hostility of world religions — particularly Islam to women — do not fully explain 
observed variation in female representation and leadership across Arab and non-Arab 
Muslim-majority countries. However, even among religious countries, there are 
significant variations in female representation. Further, religions can be and are 
continuously being reinterpreted. Therefore, how do we understand and test the role of 
religion in influencing women‘s chances in leadership and public office representation? 
There is also real and profound variation in female representation across different types 
of parties in Arab and non-Arab Muslim-majority countries.  
None of the previous scholarship directly addresses the relationship between 
party variation in religiosity and women‘s leadership in their decision-making bodies. 
However, some scholars identify party-specific factors that explain female 
representations. One broad argument posits that female representation is largely 
influenced by parties‘ formal commitment to gender equality as indicated by affirmative 
action measures including quotas and explicit, gender-specific rules that are transparent 
and allow for accountability. This body of work focuses only on female parliamentary 
representation and looks into the barriers to such representation including political 
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subjected to double jeopardy that of gender bias and religion-related hostility, reducing their chances in 




culture, electoral systems and/or political regimes.
29
 Another broad argument suggests 
that independent variables like institutionalization and placement of parties along the 
political spectrum (left, right, or center) explain female representation.
30
 A third line of 
argument maintains that female representation is influenced by the behaviour of political 
parties as opposed to social movements, especially women‘s movements.31 
In sum, these previous arguments, singularly or combined, can explain and predict 
broadly female representation across countries of different income levels, political 
regimes and employing specific electoral systems and quotas. However, these 
explanations overlook observed variations at the middle and cannot explain the presence 
of extreme cases as in over or underachievers. For instance, most of the five Nordic 
overachievers have social democratic parties and these parties have high shares of female 
legislators. One important observation is that these parties play an important role in 
advancing women and nominating them to public office. Therefore, we should look at the 
type of party for a plausible explanation of variations in female representation, but also in 
providing an answer to my main research question: Why are some parties superior to 
others in enhancing women‘s leadership?  I argue that one may find the explanation for 
female representation in the different types and religiosities of parties functioning within 
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30   See, Teresa Sacchet 2005, Miki Kittilson 1997 
 
31  See:  Amrita Basu 2005 and Miki Kittilson 1997.  Frances Rosenbluth, Rod Salmond and Michael 
F. Thies (2006) argue that the key to female representation lies in welfare state policies that empower 
women economically and create incentives for parties to compete for the female vote by including more 
women in their parliamentary lists and delegations. This line of argument rests on national interests, which 
should prompt and motivate the state and political groups to involve more women in politics. In a close 
vein, other scholars find that, ―…women‘s participation in democratization and development is important, 
and an increased political presence could positively benefit societies.‖ (Rohini Pande and Alexandra 
Cirone, 2009: 7). Elin Bjarnergard (2008) also points to male-domination in parliaments offering an 
argument based on corruption within political parties such as clientelism and vote buying, which impede 




countries. Thus, political parties provide the missing link. Previous theories do not fully 
account for observed variation in women‘s participation, which begs for additional 
explanation, one that examines the primary institutional vehicles for individual 
advancement in the political world—political parties—and highlights the factors that 
determine parties‘ support for women‘s leadership. Further, while some of the extant 
scholarship analyzes party-level characteristics to understand female parliamentary 
representation, including formal commitment to gender equality, it does not explore the 
influence of party variation in religiosity on women‘s presence in leadership and 
decision-making bodies and on parties‘ electoral lists for public office.32 Therefore, an 
alternative theory is needed, one that generates plausible explanations of variation in 
female representation and leadership across political parties within a given polity. This is 
the theory posited in this dissertation. 
C. Debates Motivating a Theory of Party Variation in Religiosity & Women’s 
Leadership  
This dissertation posits that variation in party-level characteristics, particularly in 
the intensity of party religiosity as reflected by political platforms, influences women‘s 
shares in leadership and on electoral lists. It explores the relationship between party 
variation, religiosity and women‘s leadership. It adopts a multivocal understanding of 
religion in that there are many voices within the same religion (Stepan 2001). This 
implies that there are multiple secularisms and religiosities. It follows that the intensity of 
religiosity and degree of secularism embodied by party platforms vary along a continuum 
and not a dichotomy. Varying intensities of religiosity and secularism are expected to 
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have varying impact on women‘s leadership chances. In this section, I address some key 
conceptual questions raised by this undertaking.  
1.  Why Political Parties? 
 Political parties are the main vehicles for women‘s political involvement and 
leadership. Scholars studying political parties and/or female representation accord those 
political institutions a central role as gatekeepers since they recruit, select, and nominate 
candidates for public office.
33
 Political parties provide resources and opportunities and 
create a pool or a critical mass of eligible women for leadership (Pitre 2006). Therefore, I 
argue that these institutions are critical to enhancing or impeding women‘s path to a 
political career. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(IDEA) recognizes the central role that these organizations play in enhancing women‘s 
leadership, reporting that:  
There is a growing realization of the critical role played by political parties in 
democracy building and in the sustainability of democratic institutions. A 
country‘s democratic sustainability is often linked to the state of its political 
parties and its political actors. The quality and capacity of political parties has a 
direct impact on parliamentary performance and organization affecting among 
other things the legislative capacity of members elected, the promotion of equal 
participation and representation of women in politics and the representatives with 
political positions in the parliamentary structures. (IDEA, 2010)  
 
Female representation encompasses women‘s presence in local and national legislatures, 
as well as in executive and judiciary bodies. However, this dissertation holds that a 
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  See Pippa Norris, ―Women’s Legislative Participation in Western Europe” in Sylvia Bashevkin, 
Women and Politics in Western Europe (Great Britain and USA: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1985); Joni 
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complete analysis of the determinants of female leadership ought to begin where women 
most often join the political process, that is, when they join political parties, with a focus 
on the factors that determine their path within those parties. Political regimes, electoral 
and party systems, and political parties themselves, comprise the setting within which 
women‘s prospects for political leadership are conceived and drawn. However, different 
parties offer women different opportunities for leadership. This difference in outcomes is 
what this dissertation sets out to explore by focusing on party variation in religiosity as a 
core explanation for variations in women‘s leadership across different types of political 
parties. 
2. Why Party Religiosity?  
 Much of the research on women in politics finds that secular parties are more 
accommodating to women‘s demands and more tolerant of diversity than religious 
parties.
34
 Mervat Hatem (1994), however, finds that liberalists (secularists) and Islamists 
do not differ in their views with respect to women and their political empowerment. In 
contrast, I argue that different parties offer women different opportunities in their 
political career path. This starts by exploring which parties promote women more to 
leadership positions within their decision-making bodies and which do not. This 
dissertation explores the validity of these opposing arguments by looking at party 
variation in religiosities and secularisms and how it relates to women‘s leadership. 
Towards this end, this work adopts a multivocal understanding of religiosity in that there 
are many voices within the same religion, articulating multiple secularisms and 
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religiosities that are often socially constructed.
35
 This multiplicity of religiosities and 
secularisms is reflected in the extent to which religion penetrates parties‘ political 
agendas. However, in order to be accepted by their communities, some parties declare 
adherence to religious positions as an almost reflexive and, in a sense, self-protective 
measure, while others openly claim secularity or separation between religion and politics. 
For example, parties in some non-Arab Muslim-majority countries such as Senegal, 
Indonesia, Albania, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Malaysia, have each adopted the level of 
secularism that fits its society without risking antagonizing religious authorities. 
Similarly, Safinaz Kazim (1986) finds that, ―In most of the Arab countries, particularly 
those which proclaim Islam as the religion of the state or the leadership, everyone who is 
secular finds a way around using this term.‖ (in Hatem 1994: 674).36 These arguments 
extend to political parties within these countries.
37
 This reality confers value on the study 
of party variation in religiosity as it examines parties‘ political platforms, distinguishing 
public rhetoric from concrete political commitments, actions and behaviour. 
 At the individual level, religiosity may be understood as dogmatic and rigid 
adherence to doctrine. At the aggregate, party level, religious precepts can have important 
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36   This may not apply to the 1960s and 1970s, when the Ba‘athist and Nasserist regimes were openly 
secular, at least initially. 
 
37  For instance, in Indonesia no party would want to be labeled ‗secular‘, as that might cost it the 
votes of religious individuals. The same applies in Senegal, where ‗laïcité‘ is used instead of secular, or in 
Albania where secular is linked to atheism. In certain countries there is a negative connotation to 
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or at least not socially rejected. Amrita Basu (2005) notes that in Pakistan ―…the steady growth of political 
Islam has made many feminists rethink the value of a wholly secular approach that would separate them 
from the large majority of women, for whom religion is central in their daily lives.‖ (Basu, 2005: 15). 
Kazim (1986) holds that secularists in Muslim countries tend to use religious emblems to fend off charges 





influence on attitudes and behavioral patterns of party leaders and party members and 
therefore impact women‘s chances in leadership. This work posits that it is not religion or 
religiosity in individuals per se but the intensity of religiosity in party platforms, or the 
extent to which religious goals and components penetrate political agendas, that is the 
critical determinant of women‘s advancement and their political empowerment, 
representation and leadership.
38
 This is essentially because religious interpretations, 
particularly when clergymen double as party leaders, are then brought to bear on issues 
pertaining to women in parties and their leadership chances. For instance, in a strong 
argument on the role of religion in women‘s lives, Mary Robinson, former President of 
Ireland and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights asserts that, 
We all recognized that if there‘s one overarching issue for women it‘s the way 
that religion can be manipulated to subjugate women. There is of course plenty of 
fodder, in both the Koran and the Bible, for those who seek a theology of 
discrimination. (―Women and Religion‖, New York Times, January 10, 2010) 
 
Furthermore, former USA President Jimmy Carter also asserts that, ―Women are 
prevented from playing a full and equal role in many faiths, creating an environment in 
which violations against women are justified.‖ (Nicolas Kristof, 2009).39  
 Nonetheless, employing a multivocal understanding of religiosity implies that 
there are varying intensities of religiosities and secularisms reflected across different 
party platforms. In other words, religiosities and secularisms are neither constant nor 
uniform across individuals or political parties. Indeed, within any particular religious 
group, different voices and intensities are modulated, from the Islamist Taliban and 
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radical Al-Qaeda schools of thought, to the Christian Calvinists and the Jewish SHAS, to 
the less traditional and more tolerant positions of some parties in Indonesia (e.g. PAN or 
PKB) and in Senegal (e.g. MDRS or RP). Thus, in this analysis, religiosity of parties as 
embodied by their political platforms is the core explanatory variable for variations in 
women‘s leadership. As religiosity varies in parties‘ platforms, women‘s leadership is 
expected to vary accordingly. This yields the following hypothesis:  
H1.  The share of women in decision-making and leadership bodies is likely 
to be higher in parties whose platforms reflect less religiosity (more 
secularism) than in those containing high religiosity (low secularism). 
 
That said democratic procedures and pluralism are other party-level characteristics that 
can enhance women‘s chances in leadership. These relationships are laid out in the 
following section. 
3. Party Variation in Democratic Procedures, Pluralism and Female Membership 
Institutionalization of political parties is seen by many students of political parties 
as one of the basic determinants for their effectiveness in the political arena. The concept 
of institutionalization may be unpacked into its various elements in order to select those 
that influence women‘s leadership. Institutionalization encompasses such elements as 
party organization, centralization and decision-making processes, scope of membership, 
democratic practices in operating procedures, and employment of explicit rules that are 
transparent to permit accountability. In Samuel P. Huntington‘s words, 
―Institutionalization is a process by which organizations and procedures acquire value 
and stability. [It is]…stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior…‖ (in Kenneth Janda 
1980: 19). In the same vein, Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully look at party 




which a practice or organization becomes well established and widely known, if not 
universally accepted.‖ (1995: 1).  Similarly, Janda describes an institutionalized party as 
―…one that is reified in the public mind so that ‗the party‘ exists as a social organization 
apart from its momentary leaders, and this organization demonstrates recurring patterns 
of behaviour valued by those who identify with it.‖ (1980:19).40 
Furthermore, Janda (1980) identifies six criteria to measure institutionalization of 
political institutions, namely year of origin, name changes, organizational discontinuity, 
leadership competition, legislative instability, and electoral instability. Other students of 
political parties identify four measures of a party‘s institutionalization: (1) stability in 
rules and nature of interparty competition or ―patterns of party competition manifest 
regularly‖ using Pedersen‘s  index of electoral volatility41; (2) roots in society and 
linkages between parties, citizens, and organized interests of the constituency or how 
deeply parties penetrate society; (3) legitimacy to electoral processes as indicated by the 
fact that parties and elections are the means of determining who governs; and (4) party 
organization, i.e., when the interests of the party are not subordinated to interests of 
ambitious or charismatic leaders and when the party acquires an independent status and 
value on its own.
42
 This work focuses on facets of institutionalization that are of import to 
women‘s leadership. Democratic practices in parties‘ operating procedures, pluralism in 
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membership, and party age (as distinct from longevity) will each be examined in turn, 
with attention paid to their influence on women‘s leadership. 
(a) Democratic practices (or the lack thereof) in parties‘ operating procedures include 
internal decision-making processes and periodically held competitive elections to transfer 
leadership. Norris and Lovenduski (1995) establish operating procedures as an integral 
part of institutionalization in pragmatic decision-making, while Janda (1980) does the 
same with his focus on transfer of leadership. This study hypothesizes that democratic 
operating procedures are likelier to offer women opportunities for leadership than non-
democratic ones. The assessment herein of party variation will take into account both 
dimensions—democratic practices as reflected by decision-making processes and in 
transfer of leadership. This study also expands the argument that democracies are more 
egalitarian than authoritarian regimes since they offer women more chances for 
advancement to the performance of political parties in terms of women‘s leadership. 
Party institutionalization, measured by democratic practices in operating procedures and 
in leadership transitions, is expected to influence women‘s chances at political leadership, 
whether at the level of parties or on electoral lists for public office. This yields the 
following hypothesis:   
H2. Parties employing democratic practices in their operating procedures, 
particularly in decision-making and transfer of leadership, are more likely to 
enhance women’s leadership than parties that do not employ such practices.   
    
(b) Pluralism in membership: Pluralism is the extent of a party‘s tolerance of 
diversity and its openness to diverse participation without formal restrictions or 
discrimination on the basis of sex, sexual orientation, religious sect, class, ethnicity or 




its membership is inclusive and composed of more than one sect. The presence of women 
and men as well as a mix of different religious sects signals tolerance, diversity, openness 
and dialogue. Parties with plural memberships are expected to attract more women and to 
have a more positive influence on women‘s leadership than parties that are dominated by 
a single religious sect. More pertinently, it is argued that plural parties are more 
accommodating to women‘s demands for leadership than exclusive parties (Kittilson 
1997). Schuster (2007) cites the case of the Calvinist party in the Netherlands, which was 
Closed to women as members until June 2006, and now for leadership in public office.
43
 
Other examples include exclusionary membership of specific religious sects and/or 
affiliations. Scholars studying female representation, argue that the composition of 
membership, whether open or exclusive, influences parties‘ attitude and behavioral 
patterns vis-à-vis women and their political participation.
44
 These arguments set the stage 
for the test implemented herein to measure whether plural parties are likely to have more 
women in their membership and leadership bodies than non-plural parties. The following 
hypothesis was derived from that inquiry: 
H3.  Parties with plural and inclusive membership, open to all regardless of 
religion or gender, are more likely to enhance women’s leadership than parties 
with Closed membership and those dominated by a single sect. 
(c) Does Female Party Membership Matter for Leadership? 
 In studying factors that enhance female representation, Kittilson (1997) highlights 
the potency of women actors and party activists and argues that female party membership 
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influences their share on electoral lists. Nonetheless, she suggests that the huge presence 
of women at the rank-and-file may not be matched by corresponding levels in leadership 
bodies. Similar remarks are offered by Basu that, ―[i]ndeed in all South Asian countries, 
right-wing groups, often ethnic and religious in character, have enormous capacity to 
mobilize women‘s movements while undermining women‘s advancement.‖ (2005: 35). 
Indeed, many parties have special women‘s wings, which potentially marginalize or 
‗ghettoize‘ women and divert them away from ascending to leadership positions in inner 
decision-making bodies.  
 These phenomena have been observed by other scholars studying Islamist and 
other religious parties.
45
 Many of these religious parties are popular social movements 
with broad-based, grassroots constituencies and coordinate with parallel and like-minded 
women‘s groups. These religious and confessional parties draw large numbers of youth—
women and men—into their membership. As discussed earlier, women‘s faith and 
religious convictions drive them to join political parties in large numbers, especially 
when they are poor and in settings of violence and conflict. Indeed, under these settings 
women tend to become more religious than men, which might explain their huge 
presence at the rank-and-file of many religious parties. In fact, women join parties 
voluntarily, while their ascendance to leadership is in the hands of party elites. Given 
this, I do not expect party religiosity to influence women‘s membership as it is expected 
to bear on their leadership chances. Nonetheless, democratic practices and pluralism are 
expected to influence female party membership as they are assumed to impact their 
leadership prospects. This produces a replicate of the hypotheses for women‘s leadership:  
                                               




H2A. Parties employing democratic practices in their operating procedures, 
particularly in decision-making and transfer of leadership, are more likely to 
enhance women’s shares in party membership than parties that do not employ 
such practices. 
H3A. Parties with plural and inclusive membership, open to all regardless of 
religion or gender, are more likely to enhance women’s membership than 
parties with Closed membership and those dominated by a single sect. 
Thus, this research also explores the correlation between female party membership and 
leadership to find out whether female party membership is a prerequisite for and affects 
women‘s leadership, as many scholars argue. As such, female membership is an 
endogenous variable for women‘s leadership, but may also be an intervening variable 
which will be examined in quantitative analysis. This yields the following hypothesis:    
H4.  The share of women in decision-making and leadership bodies is likely to 
increase as their share in party membership expands.  
(d)  Party age: Janda (1980) argues that one of the basic criteria for party 
institutionalization is party age. He looks at older parties as more organized, which 
indicates more stability and political clout. This argument is used by other scholars as a 
party-level characteristic that is more conducive to female representation.
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 I look at 
party-age not as longevity or a causal variable but as a useful proxy for capturing changes 
and shifts in party-level characteristics overtime. More specifically, party-age is a proxy 
in relation to some historical or political watershed, like a civil war or major conflict, 
which may have restructured the party system into pre-conflict and post-conflict parties.  
In this sense, party-age correlates often to conflict and party variation in religiosity.  
Conflict often revives intrinsic identity politics, by which individuals combine 
and mobilize around ascriptive identities like confessional affiliations. This can re-
animate religion as an organizing principle for political behavior, especially of political 
                                               




parties, which entrenches conservative values and favors patriarchy in a manner that is 
not hospitable to women‘s advancement. In effect, research on conflict and the salience 
of religious and ethnic cleavages is well-developed in political science. Jan-Erik Lane 
and Svante O. Ersson (1987) maintain that wars and conflict exacerbate existing social 
cleavages, including those that are religious-based, and create additional ones. Therefore, 
in situations of social distress and tension, conflicts tend to widen and intensify religious 
cleavages, as Norris and Inglehart argue that ―…religiosity persists most strongly among 
vulnerable populations, especially those living in poorer nations, facing personal 
survival-threatening risks‖ and predict that, ―…the religious gap will lead to greater 
ethno- religious conflict and violence‖ (2004: 5 and 241). This may exert a negative 
influence on women‘s leadership within parties in which religiosity is heightened in the 
aftermath of the conflict as a watershed.  In their article on ―Islam, Authoritarianism and 
Female Empowerment: What Are the Linkages?” Donno and Russett call for more 
research on the impact of conflict on women‘s empowerment, which this dissertation 
does, noting that, ―In addition to culture, the effects of other variables –international and 
civil conflict- on both democracy and women‘s rights need to be probed more deeply.‖ 
(2004:602). 
Indeed, wars and conflict tend to have a differential impact on women.
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 In such a 
setting, while some political parties support the status quo or the status quo ante, new 
parties arise or mutate to reflect emerging interests, including heightened religiosities in 
the aftermath of conflict. This translates, inter alia, into variations in attitudes of pre-war 
                                               
47  United Nations: 2000. Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (New York: United 
Nations). Security Council Resolution 1325 was passed unanimously on 31 October 2000. Resolution 
(S/RES/1325) is the first resolution ever passed by the Security Council that specifically addresses the 




and post-war parties‘ vis-à-vis women, otherwise referred to as political culture, which is 
reflected in employment of different and new mobilization strategies during the crucible 
of war than in its aftermath. Theoretically, one would expect that widening religious 
cleavages and heightened religiosity in parties‘ platforms should limit women‘s chances 
in leadership altogether. However, post-war parties, particularly those with non-religious 
platforms, tend to use state of the art modern, women-friendly and more effective 
mobilization strategies than pre-war parties do. This militates against or undercuts and 
limits the adverse influence of heightened religiosity and widened religious cleavages 
obtained during and after conflict.  
Given this, party-age can serve as a proxy, or analytic framework if you will, for 
distinguishing between distinct pre-war, war and post-war party characteristics especially 
their attitude vis-à-vis women‘s  leadership. In this sense, party-age does not count as an 
aspect of party institutionalization. Therefore, by looking at parties that formed along the 
civil war timeline and around heightened social and especially religious cleavages, I can 
examine the expected influence on women‘s leadership. This yields the following 
hypothesis:  
H5.  The proportion of women in party membership and in leadership 
bodies is likely to be higher in post-war parties than in pre-war parties. 
 
D. Methods and Measurement 
This dissertation explores the hypotheses enumerated above by carrying out a 
focused case-study of Lebanon based on data and information collected from a profusion 
of political parties. This approach yields multiple cases within a single controlled setting. 
The advantage of a single country case-study is that since the political regime and 




influence of party-level characteristics, while holding constant these ‗macro‘ features of 
the institutional context. More specifically, this allows for in-depth examination of the 
influence of party variation in religiosity, democratic practices and pluralism on women‘s 
leadership, while holding constant the influence of the political and electoral systems. I 
explore the theory and related hypotheses and analyze the findings qualitatively before 
evaluating and testing them quantitatively. The qualitative analysis is based on data and 
information culled between 2006 and 2009 through 150 interviews with party leaders, 
administrators, and female activists. These mixed research methods are used to test 
expectations specified in the five hypotheses and to estimate a regression model for 
women‘s political leadership based on the country case-study of Lebanon. 
1. Methods: Why a Single Case-Study of Lebanon? 
Lebanon demonstrates the mismatch or discrepancy between women‘s high socio-
economic profile and their low political performance in elected public office. It also 
offers a particularly useful case for exploring party variation in religiosity and its 
influence on women‘s leadership share and their nominations for public office.  
Judged by their educational attainment and economic achievements, Lebanese 
women are among the most qualified in the Arab region. In 2010, female to male gross 
enrolment ratio at the university level stood at 1.2, and 31 % of women (15 years and 
above) are economically active with their share in the labor force standing at 33 % (see, 
www.cas.gov.lb). Of this share, 30 % are administrators, 40% are specialists and 
professionals, and 10% are CEOs and corporate managers in top decision-making and 
leadership positions. However, in the political domain, those highly accomplished women 




councils, and less than 7% in the 2009 government. This dismal performance prompted 
Tyra Bouhamdan to remark that,  
Even in Lebanon, the so-called ‗Switzerland of the Middle East‘, where women 
have more opportunities than men do in the workforce, where modernity is the 
constant social trend, the country is yet to usher in a female political leader, … a 
woman‘s political career remains gravely limited by social, cultural and religious 
norms. (Bouhamdan 2009: 39)    
Since its independence in 1943, Lebanon continues to be one of a very few Arab 
countries with a strong, albeit much interrupted, tradition of competitive elections among 
political parties and blocs. It is ranked second only to Comoros among the 22 Arab 
countries on the democracy and political freedoms scale of Polity IV and Freedom 
House, and close to Senegal, one of the top ranking democratizing non-Arab Muslim-
majority countries, on the Bertelsmann BTI 2010 (see, Annex 1.2 to this chapter).
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Lebanon provides a particularly useful case-study of the influence of party 
religiosity on women‘s leadership. It is an Arab, Muslim-majority, conflict-stricken 
country marked by a 15-year civil war fought along religious lines and marked by 
multiple cross-cutting social cleavages which heighten existing religious cleavages. More 
specifically, the mosaic fabric of Lebanese society—comprised of 18 different religious 
sects—offers a unique laboratory for studying the influence of party variation in 
religiosity on women‘s leadership. Religious communities with larger constituencies 
(viz., Christian Maronites, Muslim Shiites, and Muslim Sunnis) form their own political 
parties and compete fiercely, vying for control and power over the polity. Smaller 
communities struggle for better political representation by allying themselves with 
stronger political blocs. This confessional society is also characterized by wide income 
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disparities and the presence of ethnic minorities (Armenians and Palestinians), which 
have created class and ethnic cleavages in addition to religious ones. The 15-year civil 
war (1975-1990) is a watershed that destabilized the complex fabric of society, deepened 
already-existing social and created new war cleavages. Despite periods of intermittent 
peace, conflict continues to erupt frequently. This exacerbates and reinforces social 
cleavages but especially religious-based ones, which have shaped and structured the 
Lebanese party system into multiple and diverse parties.  
Lebanon also offers great within-country variation across its political parties. The 
Lebanese multiparty system is characterized by more than 80 registered and active 
parties. It comprises a wide range and diversity of competing political parties with a 
variety of platforms. This characteristic, too, is useful for studying and comparing 
multiple parties within a single country.  
2. Measurement and Operationalization of Variables   
This research takes the political party as its unit of analysis. The hypothesis is that 
religious parties of varying religiosities may be less conducive to women‘s political 
leadership than non-religious parties of varying secularisms. The testing of this 
hypothesis requires that we measure and observe the explanatory variables outlined in the 
previous section and that we also gauge the dependent variables below.  
(a) Dependent variables: women in leadership bodies and on electoral lists of 
political parties 
Since the unit of analysis is the political party, I look for variation across parties 
in women‘s percentage shares (i) in leadership of executive and legislative decision-




as candidates and nominees on parties‘ electoral lists for parliament; and (iii) as 
candidates on parties‘ electoral lists for municipal councils. This study deliberately 
excludes from consideration women who were elected members of the legislature and to 
local councils because their election to public office also depends on other factors, 
including the electoral system, voter preferences and voter turnout. Focusing strictly on 
nominations and internal party leadership offers a more direct test of party behavior and 
attitudes towards women‘s leadership.  
(b) Independent Variables: Religiosity, Democratic Procedures, Pluralism, & female 
membership  
 (i) Party religiosity is conceptualized as a continuum. A religiosity scale honors and 
acknowledges the full realm of intensity of religiosities in parties‘ political platforms and 
their influence on women‘s leadership positions within parties‘ inner structures and on 
their electoral lists. Parties are situated along a continuum based on the contents of their 
platforms and their explicit goals rather than whether or not they nominally refer to 
themselves or are viewed as religious or secular parties. Parties are classified by 
religiosity into three generic categories and sub-categories, based on a review of party 
literature and studies. Labeling parties was done after undertaking a thorough content 
analysis of party platforms and extensive consultations with party leaders and their 
advisers, female party officials, scholars and national experts on political parties in 
Lebanon. Parties are labeled: (1) religious parties with varying intensities of religiosity 




extremist, conservative or tolerant;
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 (2) confessional parties with civil and national goals 
and varying degrees of secularisms;
50
 and (3) secular parties that are a-religious (e.g. 
leftist, communist, Marxist, socialist parties). They are coded along a 5-point religiosity 
continuum from those marked by extensive religious components on their agendas as 
higher religiosity to those with fewer or minimal religious contents as lower religiosity. 
(ii)  Democratic practices in operating procedures is measured by data gathered from 
statements by party leaders and administrators and from interviews with female party 
activists conducted over three years (2006-2009) of field research in Lebanon. 
Information on consultation and sharing in decision-making processes within parties is 
used in the qualitative analysis. Data on transfer of leadership covers the term in office 
and periodicity of elections, nominations to office, competitiveness and contestation, as 
well as by-laws ensuring transparency and smoothness of the process.  
(iii) Pluralism in membership is based on data compiled from party leaders, 
administrators, and female activists, especially on their motivations for joining parties. 
Pre-war parties do not maintain computerized databases. Therefore, manual compilation 
from membership registers was undertaken. Religious affiliation in some parties is not 
recorded as evidence that it does not matter for party membership. Thus, guess estimates 
were made because of difficulties in differentiating Christian from Muslim surnames. In 
post-war parties, this data and information was more readily available.
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49  Taliban in Afghanistan; PKS, PKB and Nahdatul-Ulama (NU) in Indonesia; Muslim Brotherhood 
in Egypt or Jordan; Hamas in Palestine and Hizbullah in Lebanon; SHAS in Israel, the Calvinists in the 
Netherlands are just examples of how religiosity might vary across parties.  
 
50  Examples include but are not exclusive of progressive, labor, liberal, and democratic parties of all 
types. 
 





(iv)  Female party membership is operationalized by collecting data on the percentage 
shares of women in party membership. The data was compiled simultaneously with 
religious composition of party membership based on registers of membership. The  
unisex names presented some difficulties and led to some informed official estimates as 
released by pre-war party administrators.  In post-war parties this data is readily 
available.  
(v)  Party-age splits parties along the civil-war timeline: pre-1975 and post-1975. Since 
there are only five parties with religious platforms, war-origin (1975-1990) and post-war 
are considered one group. 
E. Conclusions   
 This dissertation begins by highlighting a puzzling discrepancy between 
women‘s improved socio-economic profile and smaller advances in female 
representation at the political level. Focusing as it has on female parliamentary 
representation, previous scholarship has largely ignored the main vehicle driving 
potential gains for women in the political realm: political parties. This dissertation 
examines the relationship between party-level characteristics and women‘s leadership in 
political parties‘ inner structures and on their electoral lists. Party characteristics reliably 
account for variation in women‘s representation in leadership across parties and on 
parties‘ electoral lists for public office. Particularly relevant as a determinant of 
women‘s leadership is party variation in the intensity of religiosity reflected in the 
political platform. Other explanatory variables include democratic practices in parties‘ 




In sum, this dissertation examines variation in the aforementioned party 
characteristics in order to determine which types of parties are more or less likely to 
advance women to leadership positions within parties. The study focuses on women in 
political parties in Lebanon and investigates whether or not the intensity of religiosity in 
parties‘ platforms influences the potential for women to pursue effective careers in 
political leadership. It hopes to contribute to our understanding of the multiple forces that 
conspire to impede women‘s leadership chances in public representation and the mutable 
role of religion among those forces. 
A Road Map to the Dissertation 
 The dissertation proceeds in six chapters with an epilogue and brief concluding 
remarks. The exposition of the main argument, in this introductory chapter, is followed 
by five chapters, which provide the qualitative and quantitative analysis of women in 18 
relevant political parties. Chapter Two discusses the advantages of exploring the 
hypotheses in a single country case study and the overall research design and data 
collection, with special emphasis on the impact of the 15-year civil war and of social 
cleavages, particularly religious cleavages, on the country‘s party system.  
 Chapter Three examines variation across parties in Lebanon along the key 
independent variable of religiosity. This chapter offers initial indications, from qualitative 
data based on interviews, of whether or not religiosity influences women‘s leadership in 
Lebanon. In this chapter, a gender-sensitive coding of parties is developed to facilitate the 
analysis. This highlights the important role that religiosity and secularism play in 
enhancing or reducing women‘s chances in leadership. In Chapter Four, party variation in 




Preliminary indications based on qualitative information from interviews with party 
leaders and female party activist are examined to gauge their potential influence on 
women‘s membership and leadership chances. Parties are coded in terms of their 
democratic procedures and plural membership for quantitative analysis.  
 Chapter Five provides party variation in magnitude and relative shares of women 
in membership of parties and solicits views of party leaders and female activists – as 
political practitioners -- on party elites‘ attitudes vis-à-vis women‘s leadership in order to 
explain the data produced. It also examines party variation in mobilization strategies and 
modalities, especially religious mobilization and financial incentives that parties employ 
to attract women. This chapter also addresses the role of special women‘s wings as 
mechanisms for mobilizing women, creating a critical mass for leadership or simply for 
electioneering purposes.   
 Finally, Chapter Six responds to the main research question of whether party 
religiosity influences women‘s chances in leadership and can explain variations thereof 
across parties. First, it gives data on the shares of women in parties‘ leadership bodies. 
Then it provides qualitative and quantitative evidence to substantiate the data and support 
the theory of party variation in religiosity and the related five hypotheses. This chapter 
concludes by estimating a model for women‘s leadership, which incorporates party 
religiosity and secularism, democratic practices, pluralism, and female membership. This 
multivariate regression model strongly supports the theory of party variation in religiosity 
and women‘s leadership posited in this dissertation. It demonstrates that a religiosity 




systems, religion or political culture) for explaining a larger range of variation in 
women‘s leadership in parties‘ inner structures.  
 The Epilogue asks whether women can break through. This question is explored 
qualitatively and quantitatively by looking at women as electoral candidates. This 
research shows that the chances for women‘s leadership are improved when women bring 
into parties particular skills and advantages, like local name recognition and mobilization, 
which parties cannot achieve single handedly.  The Epilogue highlights the strategic 
motivations that parties will advance women when it is in their interest to do so, 
including nominating them on their municipal more than parliamentary electoral lists. 
Municipalities, as such, constitute a breakthrough for women into a career in politics, if 
they choose to. The dissertation ends with brief concluding remarks proposing a research 
agenda on women in politics and the building of a global database to facilitate research 
on women in political parties.
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52   A separate and additional work extends the analysis of the role of party religiosity on women‘s 
leadership to a cross-national sample of 330 parties in 26 countries—including Arab and non-Arab 
Muslim-majority countries, as well as five European countries with Christian democratic parties and Israel. 
The theory of party variation in religiosity is also borne out in this cross-national sample, in that women are 
likelier to assume leadership positions in parties with lower religiosity. The correlation between shares of 
women in party membership, leadership and nominations for parliament draw a career path for women in 
politics. It indicates that the ―upstream‖ focus in this theory can determine ‗downstream‘ electoral 
outcomes. This is the subject matter of future research linking female leadership and party nominations to 
electoral outcomes. Preliminary results are shown in the Appendix to this dissertation. This constitutes an 
article, which is being reviewed for publication by the Feminist Formations Journal, published by the 
National Women‘s Studies Association. The raw data covering 26 countries compiled from party 
administrators in 26 countries constitute the nucleus for a global database on women in political parties 
alongside databases built by the IPU on female representation and by the IDEA on gender quotas. Building 
such a database requires high investment and continuous updating. To my knowledge, this comprehensive 
original dataset on women in political parties is not available anywhere else. This dataset provides a 





Annex 1.1 Definition of Regions per the IPU  
 
Americas: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad 
and Tobago, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela 
North America: Canada, Mexico, United States of America   
 
Non-Arab Muslim-majority countries: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia 
& Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Chad, Gambia, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Mali, Nigeria, Niger, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra-Leone, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenstan, 
Uzbekistan  (no data are available on Brunei)      
Arab States : Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United 
Arab Emirates, Yemen 




East Asia: China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, Mongolia, Republic of Korea  
Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan   
South Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka;  
South East Asia: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam  
 
Europe: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, 
Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, 
Tajikistan, The F.Y.R. of Macedonia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, 
Uzbekistan 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): Luxembourg, 
Norway, USA, Switzerland, Netherlands, Ireland, Australia, Canada, Iceland, Denmark, Great 
Britain, Germany, Belgium, Finland, France, Spain, Japan, Italy, New Zealand, Greece, Israel, 
Slovenia, South Korea, Czech Republic, Portugal, Slovakia Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Poland, 
Turkey, Chile, Mexico 
Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden 
European Union: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom  
Pacific: Australia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, New 
Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu 
Sub-Saharan Africa Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa (1), Swaziland, 




Annex 1.2.   Female MPs in Muslim-Majority & OECD Countries by GDP/Capita, 
















ALGERIA 7.7 4477 2 PR CLOSED NO YES 
BAHRAIN 2.5 19641 -7 FPTP OPEN NO NO 
COMOROS 3.0 819 9 TRS OPEN NO NO 
DJIBOUTI 13.8 1382 2 PBV CLOSED YES NO 
EGYPT 1.8 2771 -3 TRS OPEN YES NO 
IRAQ 25.2 2625 -66 PR CLOSED YES NO 
JORDAN 10.8 4435 -3 SNTV OPEN YES NO 
KUWAIT 7.7 32530 -7 BV OPEN NO NO 
LEBANON 3.1 10019 7 BV OPEN NO NO 
LIBYA 7.7 12062 -7 N OPEN NO NO 
MAURITANIA 22.1 1096 -2 TRS CLOSED YES NO 
MOROCCO 10.5 2868 -6 PR OPEN Yes Yes 
OMAN 0 18040 -8 FPTP OPEN NO No 
PALESTINE 13   Parallel CLOSED YES NO 
QATAR 0 74422 -10 N N NO NO 
SAUDIARABIA 0 16641 -10 N N NO NO 
SOMALIA 6.8 600 -77 N OPEN YES NO 
SUDAN 25.6 1642 -4 FPTP CLOSED YES NO 
SYRIA 12.4 2892 -7 BV OPEN NO NO 
TUNISIA 27.6 4160 -4 Parallel Closed NO YES 
UAE 22.5 47406 -8 N OPEN NO NO 
YEMEN 0.3 1230 -2 FPTP OPEN NO Yes 
Non-Arab Muslim-Majority (51%) Countries 
AFGHANISTAN 27.7 560 -66 SNTV CLOSED YES NO 
AZERBAIJAN 16.0 5764 -7 FPTP OPEN   
ALBANIA 16.4 3661 9 MMP CLOSED YES Yes 
BANGLADESH 18.6 640 5 FPTP OPEN YES NO 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
16.7 4157 -66 PR OPEN YES Yes 
BRUNEI … 28340      
BURKINA Faso  15.3 590 0 PR OPEN YES NO 
CHAD 5.2 742 -2 TRS CLOSED   
GAMBIA 7.5 605 -5     
GUINEA  420 -1     
INDONESIA 18.0 2963 8 PR CLOSED YES NO 
IRAN 2.8 4484 -7 TRS OPEN   
KAZAKHSTAN 17.8 8326 -6 Parallel CLOSED NO NO 
KYRGYZTAN 23.3 816 1 TRS CLOSED YES NO 
MALI 10.2 649 7 TRS OPEN NO YES 
NIGERIA 7.0 1324 4 FPTP OPEN   
NIGER 10.0 383 -3 PR Open YES YES 
PAKISTAN 22.2 1049 5 Parallel OPEN YES NO 
SENEGAL 22.7 964 7 Parallel CLOSED Yes Yes 
SIERRA-Leone 13.2 325 7 PR OPEN Yes NO 
TAJIKISTAN 19.0 732 -3 FPTP CLOSED   
TURKEY 9.1 10206 7 PR CLOSED NO Yes 
TURKMENSTAN 16.8 3663 -9 TRS OPEN   






















Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Countries 
LUXEMBOURG 20.0 104390 10 PR CLOSED NO YES 
NORWAY 39.6 84543 10 PR CLOSED NO YES 
USA 16.9 47132 10 FPTP OPEN   
SWITZERLAND 29.0 67074 10 PR CLOSED NO YES 
NETHERLAND 40.7 46418 10 PR CLOSED NO YES 
IRELAND 13.9 45642 10 STV CLOSED   
AUSTRALIA 24.7 54869 10 AV/FPTP CLOSED NO YES 
CANADA 22.1 45888 10 FPTP CLOSED NO YES 
ICELAND 42.9 39563 10 PR CLOSED NO YES 
DENMARK 38.0 55113 10 PR CLOSED NO NO 
UK 22.0 36298 10 FPTP Closed NO YES 
GERMANY 32.8 40512 10 MMP CLOSED NO YES 
BELGIUM 39.3 42596 8 PR CLOSED YES Yes 
FINLAND 40.0 43134 10 PR CLOSED   
FRANCE 18.9 40591 9 TRS CLOSED Yes  Yes 
SPAIN 36.6 29875 10 PR CLOSED YES YES 
JAPAN 11.3 42325 10 Parallel CLOSED No No 
ITALY 21.3 33828 10 PR CLOSED NO YES 
NEWZEALAND 33.6 31588 10 MMP CLOSED NO YES 
GREECE 17.3 27264 10 PR CLOSED Yes YES 
ISRAEL 19.2 27085 10 PR CLOSED NO YES 
SLOVENIA 14.4 23008 10 PR OPEN YES YES 
KOREA,STH 15.6 20165 8 Parallel CLOSED YES YES 
CZECH, REP 22.0 18721 8 PR CLOSED NO YES 
PORTUGAL 27.4 21030 10 PR CLOSED YES NO 
SLOVAK,R 15.3 15906  PR CLOSED NO YES 
HUNGARY 9.1 13210 10 MMP CLOSED NO YES 
ESTONIA 22.8 14416 9 PR CLOSED   
POLAND 20.0 11521 10 PR CLOSED NO YES 
TURKEY 9.1 10206 7 PR CLOSED NO NO 
CHILE 14.2 11587 10 PR CLOSED NO YES 
MEXICO 26.2 9243 8 MMP CLOSED YES YES 
Nordic and Other Advanced countries not members in OECD countries (for reference) 
AUSTRIA 27.9 43723 10 PR CLOSED NO YES 
SWEDEN 45.0 47667 10 PR CLOSED NO YES 
 
Sources: For Female MPs: The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), Women in National Parliaments database, World 
Classification of 188 countries, (www.ipu.org) November 2010. For GDP/Capita (in US$): The World Bank 
database (www.worldbank.org) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) database (www.imf.org) accessed 
December 15, 2010. For democracy scores (Polity IV 2006-2009): The "Polity Score" captures the regime 
authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (least democratic) to +10 (most democratic). Autocracies 
are assigned scores from (-10 to -6) and are coded (0), democracies (+6 to +10) are coded (2); regimes in-between 
(-5 to +5) are coded (1). For electoral systems, electoral lists and quotas for women: the International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Global Database of Quotas for Women (www.quotaproject.org); 
and the IPU, as well as for Palestinian Occupied Territory data (update November 2009).  Acronyms for electoral 
systems based on the IDEA database ( www.idea.int): PR Party list proportional representation; MMP Mixed 
Membership Proportional; FPTP First Past the Post; BV Bloc Vote; Parallel systems; PBV Party Bloc Vote; STV 
Single Transferable Vote; SNTV Single Non-Transferrable Vote; TRS Two-Round Systems; N (no electoral 
system in place). PR systems are coded (1); all others (0). Closed electoral lists are coded (1); Open electoral lists 





 Lebanon in Comparative Perspective 
 
Introduction 
   
The introductory chapter to this dissertation points to a lingering global gender gap in 
female representation in public office relative to their participation in the private sector. This is 
especially observed in developing countries, with wide variations across regions, countries, and 
political parties. Chapter One also poses the conundrum of a mismatch between women‟s high 
socio-economic profile and their low political representation. These observations motivated the 
development of a theory on party variation in religiosity to explain variation in women‟s 
leadership in parties‟ decision-making bodies and on their electoral lists. This dissertation takes 
Lebanon as an in-depth, single country case-study for testing this theory.  
By placing Lebanon in comparative perspective, I address concerns voiced by Donno 
and Russett (2004) who called for more theory and research rooted in focused case studies. The 
advantages of a single case-study in establishing causality and not mere association have been 
emphasized by researchers including Stathis Kalyvas, himself a staunch supporter of multiple 
cases (Kalyvas, 1996:14).  A focused case-study has the advantages of investigating in-depth a 
phenomenon within a controlled socio-political environment, while holding constant 
unmeasured variables that might influence the relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables. Thus, a single case-study can isolate the influence of political parties, the 
independent variable, functioning within one society, on women‟s leadership, the dependent 
variable, while holding constant the political regime and electoral system which may also 
influence women‟s leadership. Hence, one important advantage of single country case studies is 




country studies. This means that with a single case study, it is possible to conduct an analysis 
that controls for contextual variables to a significant degree as well as taking social variables 
into account that may be considered endogenous to the relationships examined in this 
dissertation.    
  This chapter lays out the research design and data collection methods employed in the 
field work to test the theory posited in the dissertation. I look at the multiparty system in 
Lebanon through the lens of religious cleavages and the impact of a 15-year civil war. This 
chapter also offers a socio-economic and political profile of Lebanese women that substantiate 
the mismatch between their high socio-economic qualifications and low political representation. 
It concludes by recapitulating the advantages of taking Lebanon as a single case-study: A 
country marked by multiple social cleavages resulting in an extraordinary profusion of political 
parties with varying intensities of religiosities and secularisms.   
A. Research Design  and Data Collection  
Are political parties the veritable forklifts for women‟s leadership that this thesis states? 
What types of political parties work better for women‟s leadership? What are the party-related 
variables that explain this choice? These are the research questions for which data and 
information are collected. Accurate and reliable data on the share of women in party membership 
and leadership and on electoral lists for public office, however, are rare and, when available, are 
often obsolete.
1
 The paucity of research on women in parties and related sex-disaggregated data 
is highlighted in the official annual reports of the National Commission for Lebanese Women 
                                               
1
  Only rough estimates are available on female party membership in some industrialized countries dating 
back to the last century (Lane and Ersson, 1987). In the Arab countries, female party membership is estimated at 10% 
in Egypt, 2% in Yemen, and 7-8% in Lebanon. (Mousa Shtay, 2004: 144). 




(NCLW), and by researchers and scholars.
2
 These scholars also criticize the failure of political 
scientists to engender their research and address the political participation of women (Shtay, 
2004: 143-144). In the light of the lack of data, the thesis research presented here included the 
collection of an original data set on women in political parties, which was obtained first hand 
from party administrators. To my knowledge, the data is original and unique in its coverage, 
scope and quality.   
The field research covered 18 out of some 80 political parties, which are deemed 
„relevant‟ for the case-study of Lebanon.3 Combined, these 18 relevant parties account for over 
70% of the 128-seat parliament, with each party occupying at least one seat (0.8%) in any of the 
five post-war parliaments (1992, 1996, 2000, 2005, and 2009). The post-war era witnessed the 
birth of new powerful parties, with some parties surviving the civil war, while others becoming 
offshoots of pre-war parties and some defunct.
4
     
Based on questionnaires, information is also gathered from 150 structured and semi-
structured interviews conducted during 2006-2009.
5The author personally conducted all 
interviews with party leaders and their senior advisers, female party activists, parliamentarians 
                                               
2
  National Commission for Lebanese Women (NCLW), Lebanese Report on Implementation of the 
Convention on Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 2006 (Lebanese Republic, 
Beirut) p.50; and 2004 (Lebanese Republic: Beirut), p. 55. See also, Fatima Sbaity Kassem. 2005b. “The Convention 
on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in Arab Countries” (YWCA: Beirut).  
 
3  According to Sartori, relevant parties are those that occupy at least 3 percent of seats in the legislature 
(Sartori, 1976: 122-23). However, in order to get more observations, the threshold is lowered to one seat out of 128 
in any of the post-war parliaments (1992, 1996, 2000, 2005 and 2009).  
 
4 The relevant parties include the Syrian Social National (Qawmi Suri), Arab Renaissance Socialist of 
Lebanon (Ba‟ath), Communist, Progressive Socialist (Ishtiraki), National Bloc (Qutlah), National Liberals (Ahrar), 
Phalanges (Kata‟éb),  Islamic Group (Jama‟a Islamiah) , Unitarian Movement (Tawhid), Islamic Action Front 
(Jabhat Al-Amal), Party of God (Hizbullah), Hope Movement (Amal), Future Movement,  Free Patriotic Movement 
(Tayyar Watani  Hurr), Lebanese Forces, Democratic Renewal  (Tajaddod), and Giants (Marada).  
 
5   See, Annex 1 to the dissertation for the questionnaires. All interviews were conducted in Arabic and audio-
taped by permission of respondents. These were translated into English by the author and are unedited. For the sake 
of anonymity, the names of interviewees are not provided, but only their position and the generic type of the party.  




and scholars. I interviewed 14 party leaders, four of which were clergymen and religious leaders, 
and senior male advisers to these party leaders. I interviewed all six female MPs in the 2005 
parliament, and three out of the four ever female cabinet ministers. I also interviewed the 
majority of women in leadership positions in parties‟ decision-making bodies, including two 
party leaders, one vice-president and two secretaries-general; as well as all current and former 
heads of women‟s wings in 13 (out of 18) parties that house such wings. Lastly, I interviewed a 
sample of 14 female candidates (2.5%) who were on the municipal lists of the 10 out of 18 
parties that nominated women in these elections. In general, party leaders and/or their senior 
advisers selected and referred me directly to female party officials for interviewing. Most of the 
women interviewed are in leadership positions, activists and politically informed, educated and 
professionals (lawyers, physicians, architects, engineers), career and business women, or 
scholars and university professors. Although those highly profiled women interviewed are not 
the whole universe of women in leadership positions, nonetheless they are a representative 
sample. This lends credence to the information they provided and substantiates the findings of 
this research. I am grateful for the openness and welcoming spirit that my interlocutors showed 
and that this research topic received from most party leaders and political activists.  
Notwithstanding the above, this was not an easy or smooth task, given the political 
instability and stringent requirements of few religious parties for granting interviews.  I had to 
submit pro-forma applications specifying the name or position of party official to be interviewed, 
purpose of research, list of questions, personal data with affiliation and official letter of 
introduction. Generally, female officials in extremist and conservative religious parties had to 
obtain prior permission from party leadership for the interview.  Given the high security alert 




granted, or were conducted by phone. Sometimes, interviews with female officials were not 
granted since they are not politically involved. Moreover, access to political elites and leaders is 
extremely difficult, unless this was done by personal referrals or „wasta‟. This was especially 
true during the research period owing to the explosive security situation and attendant political 
concerns preoccupying potential interviewees.  Through various personal and professional 
connections, appointments were secured with party leaders or their senior advisors, male and 
female party officials and parliamentarians. Meetings were held under very tight security 
measures in fortified parliamentary offices, at party headquarters, and in private homes, remote 
safe houses, hotel rooms and other safe havens.  This was necessary as many of the interviewees 
were at risk of assassination during that critical period.
6
  
In addition, obtaining composition of membership by gender and religious sect posed 
another problem, especially in some of the older parties that do not collect information on gender 
or religious affiliation from membership applications and registers. The problem is that, in the 
absence of such registers, compiling data needed on sex-disaggregated membership from names 
of members was a tough task, especially when first names are unisex (e.g., Nidal, Najah, Rida, 
Claude, Nour, Safa, Raja, Amal, Salam, Ismat, Isam, Najat, etc…).7 However, this task was 
easier for distribution by religious sect, since there are typical Muslim and Christian names and 
surnames. 
                                               
6 Preliminary interviews were held during September-October 2006, immediately following the 33-day 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in July 2006. These were followed by three rounds of structured and semi-structured 
interviews in December 2007- January 2008, March-April and July-December 2008; and concluded in June-
September 2009. The interviews were interrupted during 2007 and 2008 because of frequent eruptions of fighting in 
camps, street fighting or long-lasting closures of the city by the opposition. The situation somewhat stabilized 
following the election of Michel Suleiman as President of the Republic in October 2008, but remains volatile to 
date. 
  
7   This problem has also been raised by scholars studying parties in the Netherlands: “In the past most parties 




Information gathered from structured and semi-structured interviews is invaluable in its 
comprehensive coverage of women in political parties as party activists and potential agents of 
change. This information covered types of parties, goals, mobilization strategies, membership 
and operating procedures; as well as their attitude towards women‟s leadership. Such 
information is essential for developing a sensitive classification, labeling and accurate coding of 
political parties in order to test the theory and related hypotheses that this dissertation lays out. 
The rich information culled from interviews also provides insight into the mismatch between 
women‟s high socio-economic profile and their low political representation. In addition, 
information is gathered on the role of party variation in political culture on women‟s leadership, 
or the attitude of party elites vis-à-vis women‟s leadership.8  In this connection, scholars advise 
that “Gathering empirical evidence on how individual attitudes, cultural norms about appropriate 
work for women, and political institutions affect participation is essential…” (Pande and Cirone, 
2009: 7). Heeding their advice, the views of party leaders and female party activists are gauged 
on a basic assumption upon which my theory of party variation in religiosity is premised, 
namely, “Are political parties the main vehicle for women’s political leadership?”  
 The majority of interlocutors support the central role that parties play in promoting 
women‟s leadership, while few others expressed dissenting views.  A five-time elected female 
MP and a cabinet minister maintains that there is no magic formula for women‟s leadership. 
Nonetheless,  
Only political parties can offer women leadership positions. Running as independents is 
not a formula for success. However, women should build alliances with their male 
colleagues in political parties in order to convince decision-makers to introduce 
affirmative action policies. Political expertise is not a degree that one gets, but is acquired 
overtime. At the end of the day, women will be recognized by their presence as leaders. 
 
                                               
8  Following Norris and Inglehart (1993) in comparing egalitarian to traditional parties, they refer to „political 




This echoes the argument that, “…, the only way that (political) institutions will change is 
through the politics of their (women’s) presence” (Anne Phillips, 1995, in Duerst-Lahti, 2006:10). 
Similarly, the International Labour Office (ILO) flag that,  “…, there is no evidence to show that 
once women attain upper levels of management and leadership, attitudes towards them are not 
much different to those towards men.” (ILO, 2004: 2). However, Basu (2005) expresses 
reservations that parties may not be particularly conducive to women‟s leadership, a view shared 
by a religious party leader in that,   
It is not a question of whether or not political parties offer women chances in leadership, 
but whether women impose their presence in politics. Unfortunately, no women did. In 
the Asian Muslim and in western countries women imposed themselves and proved that 
they are good politicians. But, in the Arab countries neither women nor men have a great 
opportunity in politics; this relates to basic human rights and not a gender issue.  
 
 In a similar vein, a female MP questions the viability of political parties as conduits for 
women‟s leadership in that, “Parties fail to train women when they join or provide them with 
opportunities to become leaders and decision-makers, or nominate them for public office.”  
However, another female MP maintains that women‟s opportunities for leadership depend on the 
parties‟ strength, as measured by the number of seats parties occupy in parliament (Lane and 
Ersson 1987). She argues that the party‟s strength will eventually determine how much risk the 
party is willing to undertake by nominating women on their electoral lists. Similarly, a female 
party official points out that, “If parties are strong they can afford to nominate women for public 
office and are more willing to promote them to leadership positions.” Thus, powerful parties 
have less to lose than weaker parties by nominating women to public office.  In effect, “Women 
stand a much better chance of winning in elections if they run within an electoral list of a strong 




 Another line of argument that supports the central role of parties for advancing women‟s 
leadership and representation in public office is that, “Women‟s chances in winning are slim if 
they run as independent nominees.” This argument is corroborated by another female MP who 
stressed that,  
Powerful parties are best placed to include women on their electoral list. Given the 
patriarchal mentality, parties are women‟s only avenue to a career in politics. Men may 
accept to compete with women in business and employment but they will not cede their 
seats to them willingly in parliament. Therefore, if women run without support of parties 
as independents, their chances in winning are nil.   
 
Indeed, female candidates who ran as independents all failed. But, this is common elsewhere not 
only in Lebanon. However, these failed candidates were either not supported by their parties or 
were not party members. In either case, their failure as independent candidates provides support 
to the assumption that political parties are essential for women‟s leadership.  
 In the first instance, a female MP candidate expressed her disappointment that she ran 
twice for elections and in both instances her party did not support her because, “Parties are not 
committed to gender equality and do not take any measures to ensure it. Otherwise, we should 
have seen more women on their electoral lists.” Similar sentiments are expressed by other failed 
female candidates. Few argue that civil society may be an alternative route for women‟s 
leadership, while raising the issue of tokenism and effective leadership: 
Women in parliament are not equipped for legislation, because parties fail to prepare 
them. They are seat-warmers. Civil society works better for women‟s leadership, as the 
cases of female ministers rising from NGOs attest to in Jordan and Kuwait. Political 
parties should have the political will to empower women and to ally with civil society in 
that endeavour. 
 
This echoes the argument by Basu (2005) that women‟s movements are an alternative to political 
parties, provided they build alliances with political parties and have leverage as pressure groups. 




Parties are not the only vehicle for female representation and leadership. State 
intervention by legislating affirmative action and gender quotas may be combined with 
parties‟ support for women. Municipalities work for women, because family networks 
and tribal affiliations are more essential than parties‟ support. Civil society is women‟s 
forte, they are active, visible and experienced. This has worked for women in Europe and 
the USA as well as in Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Kuwait. So, why not in Lebanon? 
 
In the second instance, a female municipal candidate studied political parties and remarked that, 
“Being a political activist from the South, I am exposed to the ideologies of Hizbullah, Amal, 
Ba‟ath and the Syrian Social parties. I am appalled by their disregard for women, despite their 
rhetoric, and decided not to join any.”  Despite this aversion to parties, she accepts to be on their 
electoral list, which lends further support to the assumption that political parties are, in fact, the 
main vehicles for women‟s leadership. Another political activist while conceding that, “Parties 
are the only avenue for women‟s leadership,” she suggests that women establish all-female parties 
emulating the few in the USA, the Netherlands, Ukraine, Jordan, and Syria, among others, She 
also highlighted the importance of establishing networks to exchange good practices in this 
domain. However, the experience of all-female parties is not altogether encouraging. Such 
exclusively female parties marginalize women instead of advancing them, a process which 
feminists would undoubtedly argue against. Indeed, women need to work with the flow and not 
oppose it.   
With few dissenting views proposing alternatives, statements of interviewees support the 
assumption that political parties are the main vehicles for women‟s leadership, as also widely 
documented in scholarly and feminist literature. The following section provides an overview of 
the salient features of political parties in Lebanon. 
B. Political Parties: An Overview 
 
 “Lebanon is a mix of fabrics, sects, convictions, contradictions, cleavages, and 




describes the multi-religious fabric of society marked by a multiparty system formed around 
multiple social cleavages. Scholars note that social cleavages shape and structure a party system 
and reflect the degree of society‟s cohesiveness and homogeneity (Almond and Verba 1965, 
Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Lane and Ersson 1987).
9
 Political parties forming around these 
cleavages mark how closely they are linked to local communities and to the society at large, and 
explain how they function within these segmented societies. However, these scholars also argue 
that such cleavages are central for a meaningful functioning of democracies and for party 
competition (Almond and Verba 1965, Dahl 1965 and 1982). In Lebanon, these cleavages are 
reflected in some 80 active and diverse types of parties, but with 18 „relevant‟ parties competing 
and vying for power and control.  The diversity and profusion in the multiparty system has been 
recognized by politicians, clergymen, scholars and political scientists studying the roots of 
political instability and perpetual conflict in the country.
10
 In this vein, a Lebanese scholar 
remarks that,  
…, [T]he most apparent characteristic of the Lebanese party-system is diversity in 
features, multiplicity in numbers and complexity in classification. The party-system is 
endowed with many parties with differences and disparities in their inner workings, 
organizational structures, and ideologies. (Shtay, 2004: 130) 
    
This multiparty system features a handful of powerful parties and several minor ones 
that do not stand a chance unless they join political blocs and coalitions for electioneering 
                                               
9  Cleavages may be segmental like racial, linguistic, and religious (Eckstein: 1966). They may be cultural (young-
old, urban-rural, traditional-modern, authoritarian-libertarian), or socio-economic as in class, status, role, and gender 
(Flanagan, 1963:64). Eckstein (1966) lists sex, tribe, race, region, rural-urban, young-old, language, religion, as well 
as differences in values, norms, and belief systems, as social cleavages (in Lane and Ersson, 1987:41). 
10  See also, Mohamad Sha‟ya, 2006, “Why are we divided when faced with existential questions?” ( An-
Nahar, August 31, 2006); Patriarch Georges Khodr, “Lebanese politics and the Clergymen” (An.Nahar May 3, 
2008);  Former Prime Minister Salim El-Hoss, 2008, “We are all Sectarian” (As-Safir, June 24, 2008); Sami Efeish, 
2006 “ Confessional imbalance ensures instability in Lebanon” (An-Nahar, September 18, 2006); Raghid El-Solh, 
“Consociational Democracy in Lebanon: Competition or Consensus”, 2008 (Issam Fares Center for Lebanon, 
Beirut); Mas‟oud El-Daher, “Towards a serious confrontation with sectarian discourse in Lebanon” (As Safir, April 
26, 2008). 




purposes. The impact of social cleavages is depicted by measuring the strength or fragmentation 
of the party system. Laakso and Taagepera developed an index for the “effective” number of 
parties within a party system, which takes into account their relative size and measures their 
strength in terms of the proportion of seats they occupy in the legislature.11 They suggest that, 
“The number of effective parties is the number of hypothetical equal-size parties that would 
have the same total effect on fractionalization of the system as have equal parties of unequal 
size.” (1979: 2). This is useful for comparative purposes, as the effective number of parties is a 
frequent operationalization for the fractionalization and segmentation of party systems. 
Accordingly, the Lebanese parliament is effectively a 4.9 party system with a fractionalization 
index of 0.94, which is borderline high, since anything above 5.0 is high (Laakso and 
Taagepera, 1979: 24). This reflects the wide disparities in relative sizes and strengths of parties 
as only a handful of the 18 relevant parties wield power. It also reveals a high degree of 
fragmentation permeating the Lebanese legislature, as a result of the multi-social and religious 
cleavages.   
The majority of parties in Lebanon are confessional, single-sect dominated, with civil, 
national, and/or religious orientations. They rally around leaders from the same dominant sect 
and few have plural membership. Their labels vary depending on self-definition (self-location), 
declared objectives and programmatic orientations. These parties may not fully conform to the 
standards or classical features and common nuances and norms of parties in as far as 
institutionalization, ideologies and/or the mixture of religious and secular components in their 
                                               
11  The effective number of parties is calculated by dividing one by the sum of squares of shares occupied by 
the relevant parties (i.e. occupying at least 1% of seats in current parliament):  Ns = 1/∑p2.  The fractionalization 
index is the complement of the number of effective parties, calculated as 1-1/N. (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979: 8, 
24). The number of parties equals the effective number of parties only when all parties have equal strength. In any 
other case, the effective number of parties is lower than the actual number of parties. For instance, the number of 
effective parties in some parliamentary systems stood at (2.1) in India, (2.4) in Austria, (3.2) in Germany, (3.6) in 




political platforms. The intensity of religiosity and degree of secularism of these parties is 
denoted by examining their political platforms and determining the extent to which religious and 
secular components penetrate their agendas. However, one finds across the party-system in 
Lebanon not only multiple religiosities but also multiple secularisms.
12
 For instance, a female 
activist notes that, “We established non-denominational kindergartens, as models for children in 
the South. These were approved by Hizbullah, which indicates that even in the most religious 
parties, one finds secularist tendencies.” This is testimony of the prevalence of multiple 
secularisms and religiosities in Lebanon. It also demonstrates that efforts continue to be exerted 
to bridge religious cleavages in Lebanon.  
Some confessional parties maintain a religious denominational identity but declare non-
religious objectives, while pushing for civil goals and national sovereignty. They generally lack a 
political ideology per se and their outreach ranges from limited territorial to less than wide 
national control. In this sense, parties in Lebanon may look after the interests of one of the 18 
religious communities, but not after the whole population with its multi-denominational 
affiliations. This aggregation of confessional parties is what makes up the Lebanese Republic, as 
a party leader states that, 
Lebanon is a confederation of 18 religious communities, each concerned with its own 
identity and survival as enclaves. It is a federation of minorities that govern by 
proportional confessional representation within a consociational political system. Unlike 
other Arab countries, Lebanon is a civil and secular not a religious state. It boasts a 
tolerant constitution stipulating freedom of religious convictions, expression and 
practices.  
 
                                               
12   Indeed, the resurgence of a rich debate on the sacred and secular recognized the fluidity of the relationship 
and highlights the persistence, permanence, centrality and complexity of religiosity in secular lives. The theory that 
secularism will overtake religiosity with the advent of modernism in industrial and post-industrial societies is being 
called into question. Scholars and social scientists (viz., Stepan, Norris, Inglehart) are revisiting and rethinking 
theories of secularisms and religiosities, and their connection with the political, social and cultural spheres. See also, 
Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. 2004. Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (New York: 
Cambridge University Press). For more details, see the introductory chapter for a detailed discussion of the secularism 




In this connection, a leader of Maronite-dominated party points out that religious cleavages also 
prevail in other Arab countries (Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, and Egypt) that have 
Christian minorities but Islam is the state religion. However, they are not as intense or conflict-
bearing as in Lebanon. He adds that, “Lebanon is the only Arab country which does not impose 
one religion on all its citizens. Moreover, the confessional quota reveals the importance of 
religion in society. It governs the social and public life as well as political and party systems.”  
This testimony is substantively significant in that religion and politics in Lebanon are intertwined 
with no evidence of clear separation between the two. Beyond the confessional identity which 
brings the constituents together, the locomotive or driving force behind the formation of these 
parties lies in self-serving interests of political leaders for electoral power, patronage and 
clientelism. Feudal or “rentier” type clientilistic behaviour keeps the party in the political arena, 
as the leader uses his affluence for vote-buying or offering financial and in-kind incentives to 
secure higher voter turnout. In this respect, capitalizing on a common confessional identity for 
electoral purposes is a classic case in political parties, as scholars point out that, “One‟s religious 
identity provided a cue that oriented voters toward political parties, and helped define one‟s 
ideological position on the political spectrum.” (Norris and Inglehart, 2004: 228).  
Based on information gathered from party leaders and administrators as well as 
observations of national scholars, most political parties remain tools in the hands of their leaders, 
which may be a cause for alarm regarding the democratic process in their operating procedures. 
These democratic deficits are prevalent in leadership transfers, especially when the founder or 
current leader of the party passes away or is assassinated, or when the leaders‟ term in office 
expires. In such instances, the party‟s by-laws are magically amended and approved by the party‟s 




and/or a religious leader. In other instances, the leader may be ceremoniously re-elected or wins 
by acclamation, since no one dares to run against him.  Or, leadership becomes a legacy as it is 
passed on to a family member, often a male. Democratic practices are also compromised when 
hierarchical and obsolete mechanisms lead to concentration of decision-making in the hands of 
few political elites. The fact that the majority of political parties suffer from democratic deficits 
and autocratic leadership does not augur well for women‟s chances in political leadership. In 
contrast, in the case of parties with secular platforms and leftist orientations, religion is confined 
to the private sphere. Their imported ideologies guide their mission statements and political 
agendas. These parties enjoy plural membership, hold periodic competitive elections to transfer 
leadership, and employ decentralization in the decision-making processes.  
Further, there is a variety of religious parties that uphold the Islamic Shari‟a and the 
doctrine in their political platforms and use politics to achieve religious and politico-religious 
goals, which may vary in line with the intensity of religiosity in their political agendas. The 
relationship between the state and religious leadership ebbs and flows, as a party leader explains 
that, “The multi-religious composition of society is not the major problem. It is the implicit 
understanding between strong religious leaders and a weak state to maintain the status quo 
because it is in their mutual interest.”13 In this vein, scholars point out that, “In Lebanon, where 
the state incorporated the religious/ethnic heterogeneity of society in its formal structure, the 
government relinquished matters of family and personal status to religious authorities of the 
various communities.” (Deniz Kandiyoti, 1991: 12)  Another researcher finds that, “…  in 
                                               
13 The Jonathan Fox Religion and State (RAS) index on religion-state regulation assigns a high score of 22 to 
Lebanon, equivalent to that of France and India (Kunkler: 2009). This high level of cooperation between the state and 
religious authorities begs the question of whether such cooperation is attained consciously through efforts of the willing, 
or the government is coerced into accepting the status quo in order to ensure stability and security. The political situation 
in Lebanon is in continuous flux. There is a lot of muscle-flexing and “not-so-peaceful” status as the July 2006, June 
2007, and May 2008 events demonstrate. A case in point is Hizbullah‟s maintenance of a fully armed militia within the 
boundaries of the state, reflecting a state within a state situation akin to that existing before the eruption of the civil war 




religiously pluralist systems, like Lebanon, Palestine and to a lesser extent Israel, religious 
leaders often institutionalize traditional norms and values which, … are often contrary to gender 
equality…” (Bouhamdan, 2009:18).  Therefore, such implicit cooperation-cooptation between 
religious leaders and the state may not work in favor of women‟s advancement or their 
leadership chances since religious leaders will have the upper hand in deciding the station and 
lives of women. As discussed earlier, women‟s chances in leadership are limited overall, but I 
argue that they are infinitesimal in parties whose platforms contain religious components. For 
instance, these parties with religious platforms occupy around one-fifth of parliamentary seats in 
the 2009 parliament and are all-male, which reflects the potential influence they have on 
women‟s leadership and provides initial support to the theory of party variation in religiosity and 
women‟s leadership. 
Notwithstanding these observations, information gathered from interviewees reveals that 
religious leaders of Muslim-oriented parties, like other party leaders, will support women‟s 
leadership when it is in their interest to do so. If supporting women improves their public image 
or voter turnout, religious leaders relax their conservative stance or overlook the doctrine. This 
somewhat contradicts the argument that, “While Islamists are not at all committed to the liberal 
process, secularists are only committed to it if liberalization does not dislodge them from their 
position of power.” (Hatem, 1994: 676)14 But, in such instances one is hard pressed to stress that 
it is common for parties to employ „strategic maneuverings‟, in this case supporting women‟s 
leadership, if it is in their interests to do so (Clark and Schwedler, 2003). Therefore, women 
aspiring to leadership must identify where parties‟ interests lie and strategize accordingly; a 
behaviour that may lead to favourable outcomes and breakthroughs. This is exactly why the 
                                               
14   Mervat Hatem, “Egyptian Discourses on Gender and political liberalization: Do secularists and Islamists 





interaction between religious cleavages and the diversity of political parties in Lebanon constitute 
an interesting and compelling case for in-depth examination to probe their influence on women‟s 
leadership.  
 In the following section, I look at women‟s high socio-economic profile and examine the 
mismatch with their low political representation.  
C. A Socio-Economic & Political Profile of Women  
The mismatch between women‟s high socio-economic profile and their low parliamentary 
representation in Lebanon is the puzzle that motivated this research. Lebanese women acquired 
suffrage rights in 1952, ahead of many Arab countries. A number of articles in the personal status 
and family legal codes were amended to ensure equality between women and men. Despite this, 
there is still a wide gap between the de jure existence of laws and legislation on the books and their 
de facto application particularly the family and personal status codes as well as nationality law.  
The Lebanese population is estimated at 3.8 millions, of which 51% are women. It is 
composed of 18 Christian and Muslim sects, which have proportional representation in parliament 
in line with a confessional quota.
15
 As indicator of the sensitivity of this issue, the last population 
census was conducted in 1932, before Lebanon gained its independence in 1943. The 1989 Ta‟if 
Accords resolved the controversy over who has majority population, when the major political 
blocs reached a common understanding to add 30 seats to parliament and split the 128 seats 
equally between Christians and Muslims.
16
 
                                               
15    www.cas.gov.lb (Lebanese official site of the Central Administration of Statistics); Lebanese National 
Commission for Women (LNCW), statistical database www.lcnw.org.lb  
16     Unofficial estimates show that Christians, Muslim Shiites, and Muslim Sunnis are each one-third 
of the populations. Other estimates point to around 60 % Muslims (Shiite, Sunni, Druze, and Alawites), and 39 % 
Christians (Maronite, Catholic including Armenians, Orthodox, Chaldean, Assyrian, Copt and Protestant) and one 
percent other religious sects including Jews. These sources estimate around four million Lebanese in the Diaspora, 





In the educational domain, females recorded higher enrolment rates than males at all levels 
(www.cas.org.lb ). Female to male enrolment ratio stood at 1.2, so that more women than men are 
enrolled at the university level. Statistics show that 9% of women graduated in business 
administration, 24 % in medicine and engineering including agricultural engineering, and 20 % in 
law.  In the economic domain, almost 31 % of Lebanese women (15 years and above) are 
economically active, comprising 33 % of the labour force, of which, 30 % are administrators, 39% 
are specialists and professionals, and 9% executives, decision-makers and managers in the private 
sector. Women are also elected presidents and members of executive committees in professional 
associations (pharmacists, engineers, and lawyers‟ order). See table 2.1 here below. 





Economic Participation, 2008 
(Rates; % shares of total) 
Political Participation, 2010 























































Sources: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Arab Human Development Report 2005: towards the 
Rise of Women in the Arab Countries (New York, 2006); p. 307-308 for female economic activity; United Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), Status of Arab women Report 2005: History of Arab 
Women’s Movements (ESCWA, Beirut) E/ESCWA/ECW/2005/1 (in Arabic) for share of women in labor force; 
Ministry of Justice for data on judges; Central Administration for Statistics official website www.cas.gov.lb (last 
update April 2010); and  National Commission for Lebanese Women (NCLW) database  (www.nclw.org.lb), for all 
other data. There is a two-year lag in published statistics (see, 2008 Statistical Yearbook).  
 
However, in the political domain, those highly accomplished women occupy a meager 3.1 % of 
elected parliamentary seats, 4.7% of elected seats in municipalities, and 6.7 % of the government 
positions for which incumbents are appointed after consultations with major political blocs and 
                                               
17  One of the two female ministers is carrying the finance portfolio, as minister of Finance, a ministry of 




parties. For the first time, a female minister carries the finance portfolio, which bodes well for 
women in political leadership.   
The exception lies in the judiciary, where women represent 37% of the judiciary corps. 
As shown above, 20% of women graduated in law, which buoys the supply side of the equation. 
Women join the Institute of Higher Judiciary Studies and sit for gender-blind, competitive, 
qualifying exams and they pass in large numbers. The relatively high ratio of women in the 
judiciary is among the highest in the region. This is largely attributed to the gender-blind exams 
which inject meritocratic features into that particular system. Moreover, in the mid 1980s during 
the civil war, a large number of female judges were assigned to replace massive (forced) 
resignations by male judges because of large-scale corruption. However, positions at the supreme 
courts are by appointment and subject to confessional quotas. Women constitute 18 % of the 
Administrative Court (the Consultative or Shoura Council) and 17% of the State Supreme Court; 
while there are no women in the Constitutional Council. Moreover, all family litigations go to 
confessional religious courts, where only the Protestant and Armenian Orthodox courts have 
women.
18
 Thus, there is no civil family court.  
What is puzzling is that while Lebanese women are quite accomplished in education and 
economic terms, they are severely underrepresented in the public sphere in comparative 
perspective to other Arab countries. At tertiary level, female to male gross enrolment ratio is 
higher in Lebanon (1.2) than in most Arab countries, except for Qatar and Kuwait.
19
  See, table 
2.2 here below. 
                                               
18   This is similar to the situation in Israel, which is also characterized by religious pluralism. In both of these 
countries, civil marriages are not allowed and civil courts do not perform such functions. Therefore, couples have to 
go elsewhere, mostly to Cyprus, to obtain a civil marriage certificate which they can then register at home.     
19   In Oman and Bahrain, this high ratio may be explained by the fact that men often travel abroad to study 
(so are not counted in national universities enrollment), or are employed by public sector with lucrative salaries and 































Female/male ratio  
(Range in %) 
2.72-2.20 1.20-1.05 0.97-0.80 0.78-0.72 0.52-0.20 
Sources: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), Status 
of Arab Women 2005: History of Women’s Movements in the Arab World 
(E/ESCWA/ECW/2005/1), Beirut, 2005 (in Arabic); based on ESCWA statistical database 
compiled from national sources.  
 
Table 2.3 also shows that the share of Lebanese women in the labour force (33%) surpasses most 
Arab countries except the agricultural-based Comoros, Mauritania, Somalia and Morocco.21  
However, using wage employment in the non-agricultural sector, Lebanese women rank at the 
top.
22
     
Table 2.3   Arab Countries: Women in the Labour Force 
 




























Share of women 
(%) 
43 35-30 28-20 18-13 29 
Sources: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), Status of Arab Women 
2005: History of Women’s Movements in the Arab World (E/ESCWA/ECW/2005/1), Beirut, 2005 (in Arabic); based 
on ESCWA statistical database compiled from national sources.  
 
                                               
20   There are 22 League of Arab States (LAS). These are Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, 
Lebanon, Libya, Jordan, Kuwait, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, 
Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.  Data are not available on female to male enrolment ratios in 
Algeria, Somalia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).  
 
21   Paradoxically, the highest rate for women‟s labor force participation is depicted in the least developed 
countries, where women traditionally work in the agricultural sector.      
 
22   World Bank, Gender Stats: June 2009; and ESCWA, “Women‟s Control Over Economic Resources and 
Access to Financial Resources”, study prepared for ESCWA by Mona Chemali  Khalaf  (United Nations, New 
York), 2009. 
 





Yet, in terms of female representation, as table 2.4 shows, female representation in Lebanon is 
less than in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Algeria and Jordan, which ranked lower in education and 
economic participation. 
Table 2.4   Arab countries: Women in parliaments, 2010 
 






























Percent of women MPs (%) 27.6 - 22.1 18.9 - 12.4 10.5  –  6.4 3.1 – 0.3 0.0 
Source:  International Parliamentary Union (IPU) www.ipu.org, updated 28 February 2010 
Indeed, Lebanon displays all the features and trappings of an enabling environment for 
women‟s political leadership. However, empirical evidence demonstrates that female 
representation in Lebanon is lower than in most Arab countries of comparable educational and 
economic levels, as well as in many non-Arab Muslim-majority countries (see, Annex 1.2 in 
chapter One). This is corroborated by the findings of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) 
serving as international observers in 2009 parliamentary elections and remarking that,  
The level of women's representation in Lebanon's Parliament falls below international 
norms. Even within the Arab world, Lebanon has one of the lowest levels of women's 
political participation. …But as other electoral reforms are pursued, consideration should 
be given to the best means to increase women's political representation as elected 
officials, in political party leadership, in the government, and as election administrators. 
(National Development Institute (NDI) 2009: 54)   
 
  In addition, one observes that women in the Lebanese legislature are mostly those 
“garbed in black” denoting that they are in a state of mourning for the accidental loss, natural 
death, imprisonment or assassination of a husband, father or brother.
24
  As also a researcher 
explains that, “…[T]he country is yet to usher in a female political leader or Member of 
                                               
24  The International Foundation of Electoral Systems (IFES) also stated that “Lebanese women 
parliamentarians have been branded as the women „dressed in black‟.” (Electoral Reform Lebanon, “A Quota for 




Parliament, who is not a wife, the sister, the daughter or the mother of a prominent political 
martyr. Without blood ties to male political icons, a woman‟s political career remains gravely 
limited by social, cultural and religious norms.” (Bouhamdan 2009: 39). Indeed, with a single 
exception in 2000 and 2005 parliaments, all other female MPs join the council as widows, sisters, 
or daughters of martyred political leaders, as also the NDI 2009 observes. However, this is not sui 
generis to Lebanon. Denise Baer (2006) suggests seven types of political recruitment for women, 
namely, institutional, sponsored, lateral, widow, proxy, movement, and dynastic. As such, women 
in politics are informal proxies and tokens.  
  Table 2.5 shows that between 1953 and 1972 or before the civil war erupted, the majority 
of female candidates (93%) belonged to the widows and dynastic political families‟ category. The 
pattern shifted in the period of the post-war elections (1992-2009) during which 74% of female 
candidates were nominated by political parties (including those „women-garbed-in-black‟).25  
Table 2.5 Lebanon: Female candidates in parliamentary elections 
1953-1972 and 1992-2009 (cumulative, in %) 
Category 1953-1972 1992-2009 1992-2009 
   Won Lost 
Widows/ Dynastic 93 0 0 0 




0 74  100 0 
Independent 0 21 0 81  
(100%) 










Source: Based on statistics in Mona Mrad, “Political participation of Women in Lebanon”, paper presented 
to the Conference on Women and Politics, Tunis, July 2001 (unpublished, mimeographed, in Arabic); 
www.nclw.org.lb; Lebanese Parliament, International Foundation of Electoral Systems (IFES); and Baer‟s 
(2006) categories. 
 
                                               
25   It is also difficult for men to run for elections if they do not come from a political family or are not 
supported by a political party. However, women suffer from the double jeopardy of gender bias and dire need for 
patronage without which their chances in leadership remain slim. 
 





Most of the women when they first run for elections are widows or belong to the dynastic 
category. In subsequent rounds, they are nominated by powerful parties because they are 
winners. In other words, there is congruence between these two categories in that their belonging 
to the women “garbed-in-black” category or to a political family serves as an entry point for 
women into public office. Overtime, those female MPs gained political maturity and are not 
anymore „tokens‟ but became decision-makers and legislators. However, which of these 
categories offers women more chances in winning? Table 2.5 shows that 100% of women who 
were nominated by political parties (who also belong to the widows/dynastic category), won in 
elections. However, none of the women who ran as independents or were supported by the 
women‟s movement made it to the parliament to date. The inefficacy of these avenues for 
women‟s political leadership may also be observed in other countries.27 These findings support 
the core assumption in this thesis that political parties are the main vehicles for women‟s 
leadership. Given that parties select and nominate winners, the central question is which type 
offers women more chances for leadership: parties with extensive or minimal religious 
platforms? 
To sum up, measured by regional standards, progress achieved by Lebanese women in 
academic and professional achievements in the private sector is not matched by their political 
representation in public office, except to some extent in the judiciary. This mismatch 
demonstrates why Lebanon offers a particularly useful, albeit puzzling showcase of women‟s 
political leadership. The diversity in competing political parties provides the opportunity to 
                                               
27  A study on a sample of 74 Yemeni female candidates, who ran for elections in 2003 and 2006, showed that 
64 percent of the candidates were party members while 36 percent ran as independents. The findings show that 62 
percent of the party members won in elections, while only 8 percent of independents made it to parliament. 
Freidreck Eibert Stifung Foundation, Breaking the Stereotypes: Yemeni Female Candidates in Eelections (Al-Majed 
for Publishing Co. LTD, Sana‟a, 2008). Unfortunately, the study focused on women candidates and did not provide 




examine multiple cases within one single case-study, while controlling for the effects of political 
and electoral systems. The prevalence of varying intensities of religiosity and secularism on 
parties‟ platforms offers good grounds for exploring the hypothesis that parties with higher 
religiosity are less likely than parties with lower religiosity to enhance women‟s chances in 
leadership. The following section makes the case for Lebanon in comparative perspective. 
D. The Case for Lebanon: Religious Cleavages, Political Parties & Women’s 
Leadership      
Lebanon is a small country with a multi-religious society. It has the largest Christian 
population among the predominantly other Muslim Arab countries.
28
 This demographic 
characteristic has significant implications on conflict as a result of fierce competition among the 
three major communities, Christian Maronites, Muslim Shiites and Muslim Sunnis, for control 
and power over the polity.  It is also marked by multiple cross-cutting cleavages, producing class 
disparities due to uneven income distribution, gender disequilibria, and wider religious cleavages 
instigating conflict and political instability. These cleavages drowned the country in a 15-year 
civil war, a watershed which heightened religious extremism and exacerbated religious and class 
cleavages. As a result, political parties mushroomed, forming around these cleavages and 
attracting poor and deprived communities where religious extremism thrives, mostly in South 
and North-West Lebanon, the birth place of most religious parties. This phenomenon is not sui 
generis to Lebanon as scholars establish:    
We believe that the importance of religiosity persists most strongly among vulnerable 
populations, especially those living in poorer nations, facing personal survival-
threatening risks. We argue that feelings of vulnerability to physical, societal, and 
personal risks are a key factor driving religiosity… Societies where people‟s daily lives 
                                               
28  There are Christian minorities in Syria, Jordan, Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, and Sudan. In Lebanon, the 
Christians were majority. However, immigration increased as a result of the civil war and Christians are estimated to 





are shaped by the threat of poverty… and …death, remain as religious today as centuries 




In this context, scholars observe that, “ …religion is a more salient independent variable among 
women than among men, apparently because women are more religious… the higher level of 
religiosity among women helps to account for their greater conservatism relative to men.” (Mark 
Tessler 2004: 4; Jelen and Wilcox, 1994: 1171-1186) Indeed, this phenomenon is also observed 
in conflict-stricken Lebanon where poor women are often more religious than poor men. 
Research and studies point out that, wars, civil strife and armed conflict have a differential 




This diversity in political parties is useful for testing a theory of party variation in 
religiosity and in which the influence of one political regime and one electoral system is 
controlled.
31
 Further, despite an assumption of homogeneity because of a common language, 
history and culture, there are slight nuances, which offer a fertile ground for studying party 
variation in political culture. In this connection, a Lebanese sociologist remarks that, “Lebanon 
has a very complex, diverse and global culture, influenced by Western culture, Arab satellite 
                                               
29   They point to exceptions in the case of Bin laden who is extremely rich but fanatically religious (Norris 
and Inglehart 2004: 5).  
30
  United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia. 2004. Women and Peace, (Beirut: 
ESCWA); Fatima Sbaity Kassem. 2006b. “Where are Iraqi Women? International instruments and conventions on 
gender discrimination”, in Gender Justice in Iraq, 2006, (DePaul University College of Law: USA); 2006c. “Arab 
Women and political leadership” (Academy for Educational Development (AED): Washington DC); 2005a. 
"Beijing +10: Arab Women at a Glance Achievements, Gaps and Challenges”, (Woodrow Wilson Centre for 
Scholars: Washington DC). See also, United Nations annual  report(s) on implementation of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1325, adopted in 2000 (New York: United Nations); see also,  www.womenwatch; Donno and Russett 
“Islam, Authoritarianism and Female Empowerment: What Are the Linkages?”, 2004, p 602, Lane and Ersson 
(1987); Norris and Inglehart (2004).  
 
31  An electoral system based on list proportional representation or List (PR), associated with large electoral 
districts and closed rank-order electoral lists, combined with gender quotas especially reserved seats, offers women 
more chances in public office than other types of electoral systems. In Lebanon, the bloc vote (BV) electoral system, 





channels, the Koran, the Bible; …” (The Media Line, February 9, 2010).  Thus, Lebanon is 
particularly useful for examining the impact of religious cleavages on the party system and 
exploring interlinkages with party variation in religiosity and women‟s leadership.  
There is a host of examples of social and religious cleavages that are at the root of 
conflict and political stability around the world and as such demonstrate their relevance to the 
structure of political systems, party-formation, and in turn to a study of women‟s leadership 
therein.
32
 Lebanon is a case in point.
33
 It presents a show case with its multi-religious society, 
and the plethora of a diversity of political parties forming around multiple social cleavages, 
especially conflict-bearing religious-based ones.
34
 Therefore, religious cleavages are at the root 
of conflict that led to a 15-year civil war, which heightened religious extremism and are 
assumed to have intensified party religiosity, thereby severely impeding women‟s chances in 
leadership. In other words, in a conflict-stricken country like Lebanon marked by multiple 
cross-cutting cleavages and a dominance of religious-based ones, widening religious cleavages 
may thwart women‟s advancement and stunt their leadership prospects in political parties. 
Conflicts reinforce cleavages that mobilize religion and, hence, reduce the potential for women 
                                               
32
 In Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium, among others, one finds ethno-linguistic cleavages. 
Religious cleavages have emerged in Denmark, France and England with the influx of Muslim immigrants. In 
Pakistan and India there are religious and ethnic cleavages. The cast system in India is especially unfavorable for 
Muslim women from a lower cast. Religious extremism and gender segregation in Afghanistan have created a 
schism in the society. In Ireland, South Africa, Rwanda, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are conflict-
bearing racial and ethnic cleavages, which led to “ethnic cleansing”, apartheid, and other war atrocities. In the Arab 
countries, which enjoy a common language, religion, race and cultural heritage, one perceives also conflict-bearing 
ethnic, linguistic, and religious cleavages  between minorities (Kurds, Armenians, Berbers, Christians and Copts, 
Assyrians, Druze, Alawites) and  a majority of Arab Muslims e.g. in  Morocco and the Western Sahara, Egypt, Iraq, 
Bahrain, Sudan and Somalia, as well as Lebanon. 
 
33   Scholars note that, “…the more pronounced the social cleavages are, the less stable is the political system.” 
(Lane and Ersson, 1987: 39-40, 93, 315). Similarly, Norris and Inglehart (2004) argue that some cleavages are 
behind the fragmentation of society and thus threaten its wellbeing and stability, especially religious cleavages 
which are conflict-bearing.  Other scholars argue that cleavages are essential for democracy (Almond and Verba 
1965, Dahl 1965 and 1982). 
 
34 Civil conflict has also been attributed to Palestinian refugees and Syrian troops (which left in 2005), unlike 





to break through the glass ceiling into leadership positions within parties. This is why conflict 
and cleavages are relevant to a study of party variation in religiosity and women‟s leadership.35  
Additionally, Lebanon is the only Arab country which has a tradition of holding 
competitive elections-- although this was interrupted during the 15-year civil war. 
36
 Until 1975, 
Lebanon was the only Arab country that was ever close to being ranked as a „democracy‟ by 
credible international standards
37
.  For instance, up to 1975, the Freedom House (Gatskil index) 
gave Lebanon a score of „3‟ (partly free) on a 7-point scale where 1 is highest and 7 lowest for 
civil liberties and political freedoms. Nonetheless, due to reasons of “stateness”, or not having 
monopoly over the legitimate use of force and the presence of foreign armies on its soil during the 
15-year civil war, Lebanon‟s ranking on the democracy scale dropped and has not regained its 
standing since then. Notwithstanding this setback, in 1992 Lebanon resumed holding 
parliamentary elections every four years and municipal elections every six years with parties 
competing freely in these elections. Further, the last round of elections, held in June 2009, was 
labeled as „free and fair‟ by international observers, which boosted its ranking on the civil 
liberties scale.
38
 For instance, the BTI 2010 assigned Lebanon a 6.25 score on the 10-point 
                                               
35
 Gender cleavages are not conflict-bearing, so far. But, they are relevant to a study of women‟s leadership 
in a majority-Muslim country, where political culture is conflated with religious doctrine and Islamic Shari‟a.   
 
36  The Lebanese also suffer from external threats from neighboring Syria for intervention in internal politics 
and Israel for assault. This has accentuated political instability. In effect, Lebanon scored +5 in 1974 on Ted Gurr‟s 
Polity IV index for democracy on a 21-point scale from +10 to 0 to -10. In 2004, Polity IV index for Lebanon was -
66, denoting the political instability and dysfunctional democracy prevailing.  During 2005-2008, Polity IV index 
registered an improvement for Lebanon up to +7 on the Democracy score.  The Freedom House Index (1-7 point 
scale) for three consecutive years (2006-2008) assigned a score of 5 for Lebanon, which improved on the democracy 
scale by one point in 2009.  
 
37  Ted Gurr‟s Polity IV, Freedom House Index, and the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 2010.   
 
38  According to Freedom House‟s “Freedom in the World 2010”, Lebanon‟s rank improved from 4 to 3 on 
account of “noteworthy gains” in civil liberties. Moreover, the Austrian-based Global Democracy Ranking cited 
Lebanon as the second most improved democratizing developing country in the world after Nepal, and the most 





democracy scale (from 1 lowest to 10 highest). This score is higher than most Arab countries 
(scoring between 3 and 4) and closer to the non-Arab Muslim-majority Senegal (6.30) and 
Indonesia (7.00), considered by comparativist along with India as the best democracies in the 
developing world. In addition, Polity IV also gave top ranking on its democracy scale to Lebanon 
among other Arab countries second only to Comoros (Annex 1.2). Moreover, in its Global Report 
2009, Polity IV classified Lebanon‟s regime type as a „democracy‟, although it is still in the 
process of democratization and lacks several essential elements qualifying it as such. The above 
lends support and adds credence to the choice of Lebanon as a case-study for testing the theory 
posited in this dissertation on the role of political parties in advancing women‟s political 
representation and the influence of religiosity/secularism in that process.  
Thus, the Lebanese demographics, a 15-year civil war, multiple social and widening 
religious cleavages, a party system of diverse competing and multiple parties, and an acceptable 
rating on political freedoms and democracy scales of international credible standards make 
Lebanon a particularly useful case study for testing the theory posited in this dissertation. More 
specifically, it demonstrates how conflict-bearing religious cleavages, which widen sectarian 
schisms and heighten religious extremism, intensify party religiosity and reduce women‟s 
chances in political leadership.  
Conclusions  
Lebanon‟s mosaic and diverse society of 18 religious communities is marked with 
multiple cross-cutting social and religious cleavages that shape and structure its political and 
party system. Its multiparty system is composed of diverse types of powerful religious and not so 
religious political parties that vie for power, control, and for electoral prowess. Lebanon is the 




parties performing within a single country under the same political and electoral systems provide 
a useful setting for comparative analysis. A single country case-study shows variations in 
women‟s leadership, the dependent variable, while holding constant the potential influence of 
political regime and electoral system, to isolate the influence of party variation in religiosity, the 
independent variable. Lebanon demonstrates the interlinkages between multiple social cleavages 
(viz., religious, class, ethnic, war), party-formation in a widely diversified complex party-system 
with a conflict-stricken society, and women‟s leadership.   
Lebanon demonstrates the mismatch between women‟s high socio-economic profile and 
their low political performance in elected public office. It also offers a particularly useful case 
for exploring party variation in religiosity and its influence on women's shares in leadership and 
their nominations for public office. The structural aspects, the very nature of the Lebanese 
political system reflected in political parties – as opposed to a mix of socio-economic and 
cultural factors – might account to some degree for the constraints and barriers to better political 
performance and more leadership opportunities for women. By privileging confessionally-
identified actors and constituencies, some political institutions give religious and conservative 
cultural values a backdoor entry, erecting an indirect barrier to women‟s presence. This is 
exacerbated under conditions of conflict or in post-conflict situations. It is not so much that 
religious values contrary to women‟s advancement infuse Lebanese society directly and account 
entirely for women‟s limited ascension to positions of power. Instead, those values are 
incorporated into the political skeleton of confessionally-defined political parties and wield their 
influence from there. This thesis attempts to explain the counter-intuitive Lebanese disconnect 
between high socio-economic indicators relating to women and low political presence of women 




Can party variation in religiosity explain women‟s leadership? The following chapter 
looks at party variation in religiosity along the civil war timeline through the lens of parties‟ 
attitudes vis-à-vis women‟s leadership. The diversity in parties‟ political platforms constitutes 
the basis for developing a classification, which is sensitive to depicting distinct party-level 






Party Variation in Religiosity & the Civil War    
  
Little in-depth research has been undertaken to date on women‘s leadership in political 
parties, particularly on interlinkages with religiosity in party platforms.
1
 This dissertation aims to 
narrow this gap. In this chapter, I explore party variation in religiosity -- under a setting of 
conflict-bearing religious cleavages widened by a 15-year civil war in Lebanon -- and explain 
how I classify, label and code party variation.
2
  
This chapter is organized in three sections. At the outset, I look at religiosity in party 
platforms as a core explanatory variable of women‘s leadership. Religiosity refers to the 
religious components on party platforms or the extent to which religion penetrates their agendas. 
Section A differentiates between ‗religion‘ as influencing women‘s social life, and ‗religiosity‘ 
as affecting their political life and leadership chances within party structures. Section B focuses 
on how widening   religious cleavages, exacerbated by the 15-year civil war, reshaped and 
restructured the party system. In section C, a classification for parties which is sensitive to 
varying religiosities and secularisms on their platforms is developed. Parties are labeled and 
coded along a 5-point religiosity continuum that best captures varying intensities of religiosities 
and secularisms. This lays the ground work for the qualitative analysis and later on for testing 
using quantitative tools of analysis.  
                                               
1  Basu exclaims that, ―What becomes striking is the dearth of scholarship on these relations (between women 
and parties) on the one hand, and their political significance on the other.‖ (Basu, 2005:33). See, among others, 
Amal Saad-Ghorayeb (2002) and Lara Deeb (2006) on Hizbullah in Lebanon; Laurie Brand (1998), Mounira 
Charrad (2001), Schwedler and Clark (2003), and Carrie Wickham (2002), Mervat Hatem (1994) on women in 
Islamic parties in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Egypt, respectively; reports (2004-2009) by the  National 
Commission for Lebanese Women (NCLW) to UN-CEDAW Committee;  www.nclw.org.lb  
 






Political science is rich with definitions of political parties, description of their functions, 
forms, and goals.
3
 For instance, Alan Ware looks at a political party as, ―…, an institution that 
(a) seeks influence in a state, often by attempting to occupy positions in government, and (b) 
usually consists of more than one single interest in the society and so to some degree attempts to 
‗aggregate interests‘.‖ (1987: 5). Similarly, LaPalombara & Weiner (1966a) define political 
parties as ―…, organized collectivities oriented towards the pursuit of some combination of the 
goal of electoral success and the end of political effectiveness or the capacity of parties to have 
an impact upon government policy-making.‖ (in Lane and Ersson, 1987: 96-97). Moreover, 
Blondel (1969: 221) describes parties as, ―… multiform and are at the cross-roads between the 
institutional and behavioural aspects of politics.‖ (in Lane and Ersson, 1987: 94). Pippa Norris, 
one of the few scholars who link parties to female representation, highlights that,  
Political parties serve vital functions as one of the main linkages between citizens and 
government: structuring electoral choice, recruiting legislative candidates, providing a 
legislative agenda in government. Parties provide a range of opportunities for women to 
participate in political life from the political booth to local meetings, the conference 
platform, legislature and cabinet. (Lovenduski and Norris, 1993: 308)  
 
Political parties in Lebanon fit the general descriptions given above, albeit with slight 
nuances. They form around interests of specific communities and as such fail to aggregate 
interests nationwide. They also pursue specific goals and undertake similar functions, especially 
as gatekeepers in selecting and nominating for public office. This highlights that while political 
parties in Lebanon do not fully conform to the standard models of parties, nonetheless they are 
not sui generis. However, some scholars argue that Lebanese parties have their own specificities 
especially in the aftermath of the civil war, and as such diverge from the norm; while others 
                                               






concur with the view advocated in this dissertation that they are not sui generis.
4
 Such a 
conclusion is valuable when studying single country case-studies because this allows for 
generalization of findings and predicting parties‘ behaviour vis-à-vis women‘s political 
leadership in the future. Nonetheless, parties are the main vehicles for women‘s leadership. 
However, what party-level features enhance or impede women‘s leadership? In the following 
section, I explore party variation in religiosity as a core explanatory variable of women‘s 
leadership in decision-making bodies. 
A. Party Variation in Religiosity & Women’s Leadership 
In Lebanon, a Muslim-majority country with a large proportion of Christians, religion 
and religious affiliation play an important role in politics. Religion is inextricably intertwined 
with politics. In effect, ‗religion is politics‘ in that the state combines government and civil 
society and no one has the right to deprive any citizen of his/her political orientations, be it 
religious or non-religious, unless it affects the safety and freedom of others (Harik 2001: 321-
322).
5
 Indeed, separating religion from politics does not imply separating religion from the 
society and people. However, when people are religiously committed and at the same time they 
                                               
4   See: Antoine Messara, Partis et Forces politiques au Liban: Renouveau et engagement , 1997 (Lebanese 
Foundation for Permanent Civil Peace and Konrad Adenauer Stiffung, Beirut); Farid El-Khazen,  Political parties in 
Lebanon: limits of democratic party experience , 2002 (Lebanese Center for Studies, Beirut), 70-77 and 148-151,in 
Arabic; George Adib Karam, Political Parties of the Lebanese and their associations, 2003 (Dar Annahar Publishing, 
Beirut), 184-186, in Arabic; Shawkat Shtei, Lebanese Political Parties: Readings in experiences, 2004 (Arab 
Diffusion Intishar publishing: Beirut), in Arabic; Sofia Saadeh, The Quest For Citizenship In Post Taef Lebanon, 
2007 (Sade Publishers, Beirut); Raghid El-Solh, ―Laws governing Political parties‖, study prepared for the United 
nations Development Program (UNDP),Rabat, 2006 (in Arabic); Hassan Krayem, ―Political parties and Electoral 
Systems in Lebanon and Israel: Interactive Reinforcement‖, American University of Beirut, 2006; Fawwaz 
Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon: From the Imarah  to Taef Accord, 2008 ( Riad El-Rayyes Books 
S.A,R.L., Beirut), in Arabic.     
 
5  Iliya Harik argues in Democracy and the challenges of modernization: Between East and West (2001), that, 
―The majority of Muslim countries have a secular constitution, while retaining some manifestations of religiosity 
that do not violate secularism. There are diversity and degrees of secularisms even in more advanced Western 
democracies. It is not at all possible to separate fully religion from the state or the state from religion. Combining 
religion and politics is a matter of realization and perception and not a contextual matter. In my view, this is akin to 
realizing full democracy without state intervention, or laissez-faire without managing trade, or complete 
implementation of Marxism, socialism and communism. This has never been witnessed to date in any country. So, 





are in decision-making positions, they tend to follow their faith and convictions also in 
legislative decisions. I argue that as such, this influences their attitudes towards women‘s 
leadership prospects. In this vein, a national scholar also remarks that,  
… [S]ecularism…eliminates elitism in religious decisions but does not eliminate its 
religiosity. Therefore, when religion matters to people, one tends to see a mutual 
reinforcement between society and the political system that affects public affairs. This is 
why contemporary Islamists face a dilemma between the principle of representation and 
the Shari‘a law in government. (Fouad Khoury in Harik, 2001: 255).  
 
Similarly, Schuster argues that,  
…conservative and fundamentalist religious groups take part in politics on the basis of 
their faith, sometimes even seeking to make the public order conform to the ordinances of 
faith. … One of the most contentious issues ….is the attitude of religious groups towards 




In the first round of interviews in my field research, I solicited my informants‘ views on 
the role that ‗religion‘ plays in party politics but especially on women‘s leadership. I sought their 
views as political practitioners in order to substantiate my hypothesis that ‗religiosity not 
‗religion‘ in party platforms influences women‘s ascendance to leadership. In other words, I 
wanted to see if they also make the same distinction that I do between religion and religiosity or 
between individual religiosity affecting women‘s social life and party religiosity affecting their 
political life and leadership. The leader of a party with a religious platform responds that, 
―Religious extremism and not religion is the barrier to women‘s leadership, along with 
patriarchy, traditions and customs. However, women are not fit for or interested in politics. 
Politics is for men and God wants women to stay at home.‖   
                                               
6  Anke Schuster, ―Religious Political Parties: A Gap in Multicultural Theories‖, Paper submitted for the 
Workshop ―Multiculturalism and Moral Conflict‖, University of Durham, 21-23 March 2007). Shuster argues that, 
―Religion is frequently the reason for discrimination, injustice and exclusion, a marker for social marginalization. 
…religion is often believed to be inimical to liberal-democratic policies. …, conservative and fundamentalist 
religious groups frequently hold and proclaim opinions that are illiberal.‖ She refers to two definitions for religion: 
religion is primarily a matter of individual conscience which is no variant than moral belief (Amy Gutmann); and, 





This religious leader, who doubles as a party leader, sees ‗religion‘ as distinct from religious 
‗extremism‘, implying that extremism is a more intense level of religious commitment than 
‗religion‘ per se. Thus, his statement substantiates the correctness of the conceptual framework 
upon which my theory is built. However, he also employs the patriarchal discourse of ‗politic-is-
men’s-business‘ (see, Dahlerup 2006). More importantly, he invokes God‘s ultimate authority to 
confine women at home. This is also perceived by scholars studying religious parties in that,  
What is truly distinctive at least about Christianity, Islam and Judaism, though never 
theorized outside of religious science, is the reference of religious groups to the higher 
authority of God. Maybe, and certainly in the eye of the believer, this is what makes 
religion special: the reference to a higher, transcendental truth; what, if any, normative 




The statement of the religious leader also shows that such a party headed by a clergyman who 
exhibits this conservative attitude, is unlikely to advance women to leadership positions. 
Responses of other religious leaders reveal similar views in defending religion but also pointing 
to religious extremism and built-in barriers in the doctrine as well as in society which prevent 
women from assuming leadership. For instance, another religious leader states that, ―Islamist 
extremist movements, like ours, do not approve of women‘s leadership; while moderate 
movements like the Islamic Brotherhood allow women to assume leadership and even nominate 
them to office.‖ Such statements do not only exhibit attitudes that block women from leadership 
but also show that there is party variation in religiosity which imports on women‘s leadership.  
Further, a female official in a party with civil goals but single-sect membership highlights 
cross-party differences and asserts that,  
In religious parties and in confessional but not religious parties, religion has no influence 
on women‘s leadership, since all members belong to the same sect. In secular and leftist 
parties, religion is a private matter. It is not religion and religious affiliation but religious 
extremism, traditions and patriarchy that block women‘s leadership. Religious affiliation 
                                               
7  See, Anke Schuster, ―Religious Political Parties: A Gap in Multicultural Theories‖, Paper submitted for the 





not ‗religion‘ limits women‘s chances in public office only because of the confessional 
quota stipulated in the electoral law. Do not blame religion for women‘s low 
representation.  
 
This statement provides a simple and useful classification of parties into secular, leftist, religious 
and confessional parties depending on the contents of party goals. Other party officials also refer 
to ‗religion‘ as synonymous to individual religiosity and ‗religious commitment‘, which is 
reflected in religious practices (rituals) or belonging to a specific sect cum religious affiliation 
and identity.
8
  Several interviewees in religious parties also stress that, while their parties give 
predominance to religion, their doctrine is no bar to women‘s leadership. However, sometimes 
the responses of interviewees from parties with religious platforms are diplomatic and strategic. 
Nonetheless, this indicates that party elites are aware of what they are expected to say but the 
situation of women in these parties and their actions to enhance it are limited whether by the 
Shari‘a in their platforms or by patriarchy in society or both. These responses differentiate 
between religion cum religious affiliation and religious extremism as a variant of individual 
religiosity and commitment or adherence to the doctrine.  They show that religious extremism is 
a variant of the intensity of party religiosity.  
Statements by other interviewees provide insight on how, as politicians, they conceive of 
‗religion‘ and whether it influences party politics and women‘s leadership. For instance, the only 
woman in the politburo of a party with a religious platform stresses that ‗religion‘ drives the 
party‘s political agenda and is paramount in its platform. Nevertheless, it is not a barrier to 
women‘s leadership and her presence in the party‘s politburo attests to this:  
Religion plays a very important role in the party‘s culture in as far as values, norms, 
practices and convictions are concerned. Religious doctrine informs our political agenda, 
                                               
8   As a reminder, I should note that the interviews were conducted in Arabic and translated by the author into 
English without formal editing. I also use generic or self-identified party labels given by informants until a 
classification of parties is developed. The names of party officials interviewed are kept anonymous, unless 





since Islam guides our social and political life. This party is a religious but not extremist 
party. We are open and tolerant to other religions. Religion is not a deterrent to women‘s 
leadership. I am the perfect example!  
 
Echoing this line of argument, another female official in a religious party also emphasizes that, 
Our religious convictions and values guide our activities. Religion matters but it has 
nothing to do with women‘s chances for leadership. The dismal situation of women in 
Afghanistan is not because of religion but because of religious extremism of the Taliban. 
Islam is being misinterpreted and accused for women‘s poor lot. This should be set 
straight.  
 
Other interviewees also raise the issue of religious interpretation as influencing women‘s 
leadership. For instance, the senior adviser to a religious leader emphasizes that, ―Islamic Shari‘a 
is the only guide to governing the country. You do not need anything else. It is open to 
interpretation and is for all places and times.‖ This implies that the doctrine plays a dominant 
role not only in the party‘s platform but is also expected to play that role in governance. For 
instance, a party elite points out that ―Some parties have religious goals and aim to change the 
political system in accordance with these goals; i.e. they use politics to serve their religious 
goals. These are the religious parties.‖ In this connection, the second top-ranking official in 
Hizbullah, Sheikh Naim Qassem, invokes ‗Wilayat Al-Faqih‘ in interpreting the Shari‘a. This 
also highlights the tension between religious extremism and moderation on the one hand, and 
modernization on the other. He states that this tension may be resolved by ―…settling for the 
centralism of the Jurist-Theologian, who lays down the general rules for the nation of Islam.‖ 
(2005: 225).  These rules are comprehensive and by necessity, impact women and the level of 
their political participation within party echelons and in public office. Therefore, how the 
doctrine is interpreted and by whom is of great import to women‘s leadership within parties 
whose platforms contain numerous religious components. More specifically, in parties with 





Interpretations of the doctrine may vary across these parties and this may influence women‘s 
leadership accordingly. Enlightened clerics, who are open to Ijtihad, offer women-friendly 
interpretations of the Shari‘a, while conservative and extremist clergymen do not. This invariably 
affects women‘s chances in leadership as reflected in responses of party elites and/or those 
entrusted with interpreting the doctrine. In this connection, a female party official asserts that,  
One of the misconceptions is that religion prevents women from assuming leadership 
positions. The truth is that it is not religion but religious parties that do not offer women 
any incentives and do not have policies to promote women to leadership positions, unlike 
pluralist and secular parties like Tayyar. 
   
Indeed, the leader of a party with ‗Salafi platform, himself a cleric, invokes that women‘s 
leadership would be a violation of the Shari‘a and explains that,  
Religion is an obstacle to women‘s political leadership. Women cannot lead men. This 
would be violating the Shari‘a and the principle of ‗Al-Qiwama‘.9 Moreover, women are 
physically weaker and more emotional than men. This makes men wiser and better 
leaders. Women are aware of the shortcomings they are born with. They are meant to 
serve men and stay at home for their families. They do not tolerate the hard work of 
rough politics, a man‘s job.  
 
Effectively, this statement is not in defense of women or their right to leadership. It is 
representative of how the clergy interpret the Shari‘a and may conflate it with patriarchy. This 
demonstrates how the clergymen resort to religious (violating Shari‘a) and patriarchal (‗politics-
is-a-man’s-business‘) discourses to block women from leadership. In this sense, religious 
doctrine as enshrined in party platforms defines a religiosity that can create boundaries blocking 
women from assuming leadership positions in decision-making and policy-making bodies. The 
                                               
9  "Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has given the one more (strength) than 
the other, and because they support them from their means. Therefore the righteous women are devoutly obedient, 
and guard in (the husband's) absence what Allah would have them guard. As to those women on whose part ye fear 
disloyalty and ill-conduct, admonish them (first), (next), refuse to share their beds, (and last) beat them (lightly); but 
if they return to obedience, seek not against them means (of annoyance)… " The Book of Women 4.34 Translated 





interview responses are testimonies to the influence of religiosity on attitudes towards women‘s 
leadership. The attitudes of these party elites do not augur well for women‘s leadership.  
Furthermore, examining the text of Qassem‘s book, ―Hizbullah: The Story from Within‖ 
(Qassem 2005) shows that there is only one reference to women. This is made in connection with 
civil and mixed religious marriages, which are disallowed in Islam. He also refers to ‗women‘ in 
a footnote criticizing the banning of headscarves in French public schools. This explains why the 
‗Index‘ to the book does not carry a single reference to ‗women‘. However, the book dedicates a 
whole section to ―Recruiting Young Men with Imam Hussein (PBUH) as a Role Model‖ (2005: 
43-47).
10
 This indicates that women‘s concerns remain peripheral and do not figure on party 
platforms and their political agendas, which supports the impressions gained from responses of 
other officials that women‘s leadership is not factored into religious parties‘ concerns. These 
statements indicate that leaders of parties with religious platforms are not supportive of women‘s 
leadership on religious and patriarchal grounds. What is also revealing is that women in most of 
these parties do not seem to seek leadership positions on similar religious and traditional 
grounds. If the doctrine incorporated on party platforms is interpreted to imply that women 
should not lead, it is unlikely that such parties will advance women to leadership positions or that 
women will demand it, as also scholars find and I expect to substantiate.
11
 This information 
provides initial indications that religiosity in party platforms, not religion per se, may influence 
women‘s party leadership. 
                                               
10  PBUH stands for ‗Peace Be Upon Him‘ 
 
11
   Scholars also find that, ―Where traditional attitudes prevail it might be expected that women would be 
hesitant to pursue a political career, selectors would be reluctant to choose them as candidates, and parties would be 
unwilling to introduce effective gender equality policies. In contrast, in egalitarian cultures we would expect the 
goal of gender equality to be widely shared by all parties across the political spectrum.‖ (Lovenduski and Norris, 





Turning to parties with secular, leftist, and civil platforms, I pose the same question on 
whether religion is a barrier to women‘s leadership, in order to find out whether the distinction 
between religion and religiosity is valid. In general, responses also substantiate that it is party 
religiosity not religion per se or individual religiosity that influences women‘s leadership. 
Several party leaders and elites stress that religion is a private matter and that their religious 
affiliation is simply an identity that does not influence the goals of the party or women‘s 
leadership. An elite in a Christian-dominated party with a civil-secular platform remarks that,  
Religion is central as a value system for the society and for the party. But, we do not have 
religious goals and we do not want to change the political system. We are pluralist, 
democratic, modern, and tolerant of diversity. We encourage women‘s leadership 
irrespective of religious affiliation. 
 
Similarly, a senior adviser to the leader of a Muslim-dominated party with a civil-secular 
platform stresses that,  
Personally, I am a practicing but not ‗fanatic‘ Muslim.12 The party separates between 
religion or religious affiliation and personal religious commitment and religiosity as 
opposed to its religion-free political agenda. Leadership positions are competitive and 
determined by internal rules and by-laws not by religious convictions, as in religious 
parties.  
 
In the same vein, a party leader stresses that, ―Religion is a private matter. We do not have any 
religious goals, although our membership hails from one sect, which might lead some to think 
that we do. Women‘s leadership is by seniority, competition and availability of posts.‖ Further, 
an official in a party with leftist tendencies flags that, ―Religion plays a significant role in 
politics. Our party considers it cultural heritage and we are anti-religion in politics. Promotions 
are based solely on merit and performance not on religious affiliation.‖ As further evidence that 
religion is a private matter, several interviewees point out that application forms to join the party 
                                               






and membership cards do not carry slots for religious affiliation or gender, as the words of this 
party leader denote: 
We do not include the religious sect or gender on the application forms or on membership 
cards. This is one of the problems that we face during elections, because the electoral 
system is based on confessional affiliation and it is important to know the sect of 





In comparative perspective and as further evidence, a female MP representing a party 
with a civil platform asserts that, ―Had I been a member in a religious party, I would have had 
much more difficulties in assuming political leadership in the party and in public office, than in 
my own party.‖ Also, as a senior female official in a leftist party points out, ―Sectarianism 
interferes with the social and political life of citizens. I would not have made it to this high-level 
decision-making position in a religious party.‖ Indeed, she was elected the first-ever female vice-
president of the Communist party in summer 2009. However, some distinctions set parties with 
leftist tendencies apart from the others in this group, in as far as religiosity relates to women‘s 
leadership. In leftist parties, religion is not relevant for any of the functions undertaken by the 
party or for decisions pertaining to women‘s leadership. In parties with civil goals and 
confessional membership -- dominated by a single sect-- religion is an ‗identity‘ and a 
mobilization tool for electioneering purposes. However, religion cum religious commitment, as 
in practicing rituals in everyday life, remains confined to the private sphere. Their religious 
affiliation, however, represents their identity in politics, given the confessional quotas in the 
                                               
13   Indeed, for certain parties, I had to go through lists of membership manually in order to compute party 
membership by gender and religious affiliation, as essential for determining plural and female membership. This 
was problematic since not all names and surnames are typical of Muslims and Christians and also there are unisex 
names (e.g., Nidal, Najah, Rida, Claude, Nour, Safa, Raja, Amal, Salam, Ismat, Isam, Najat, etc…). The issue of 
gender-blind membership applications has also been raised in studying political parties in the Netherlands: ―In the 





electoral law. Religious components in their platforms, albeit varying across this group of 
parties, remain at a minimum. 
Thus, elites in parties with secular, leftist and civil or national platforms do not deny the 
importance of religion in their personal lives but distinguish religion from religious goals in party 
agendas and from their own political orientations. They assert that neither religious convictions 
nor religious affiliation steer women away from leadership positions in these parties. Responses 
of female and male officials in these parties are consistent in that religion is a private matter, and 
religious commitment does not influence women‘s chances in leadership, since party platforms 
do not contain specific religious goals. These statements reflect a more receptive attitude towards 
women‘s leadership than that perceived by officials in parties with religious platforms. These 
responses are valuable in that they differentiate between religion in personal lives and religious 
components on party platforms, which I refer to as religiosity.  
Responses of party officials substantiate the conception that religiosity, not religion per 
se as distinguished from religious extremism, influences and may produce variations across 
parties in women‘s leadership. Information gleaned shows that there is an association between 
women‘s leadership and religiosity and secularism in party platforms. These statements point to 
limited chances for women in parties whose platforms contain expansive, religious components 
with multiple references to the religious doctrine in their programmatic agendas.  This 
substantiates the argument that parties with religious platforms exhibit dictatorial and 
authoritarian tendencies, which renders them less hospitable to women‘s leadership than parties 
with leftist, secular or civil platforms. This information enriches our understanding of how 
‗religiosity‘ is perceived by various parties and that there are multiple secularisms and 





gathered from party officials supports the claim that party religiosity is a plausible explanatory 
variable for women‘s leadership. In the following section, I examine the impact of the 15-year 
civil war (1975-1990) on widening religious cleavages, which restructured the party system. This 
is reflected in membership and attitudinal shifts vis-à-vis a political role for women across pre-
war, war-origin and post-war parties.  
B. The Civil War, Religious Cleavages & Attitudinal Shifts Across Parties       
In 1989, the Tai‘f Accord put an end to the 15-year ‗sectarian‘ civil war that rocked the 
country‘s political and social stability since 1975.14 During the civil war, Christian-dominated 
and Muslim-dominated parties built militias and held arms against each other. Despite the 
cessation of armed hostilities in 1990, political instability lingered with the continued presence of 
foreign armies on Lebanese soil (Arab troops and the Syrian army), militias other than the 
Lebanese army, and threats from neighbouring Israel. The civil war widened religious cleavages, 
which restructured the party system and profoundly influenced the contents of party platforms, 
although this was not uniform in terms of religiosities. Furthermore, it created new parties with a 
whole different attitude towards the role of women than that of pre-war parties, which this 
section examines by looking at responses of party elites and female activist.  
Thus, the civil war exacerbated existing social cleavages (religious, class, ethnic, and 
gender). It reproduced these same cleavages with wider magnitudes around which new post-war 
parties formed.  Several pre-war parties and war-origin (militias) either transformed or became 
                                               
14  The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines sectarian as ―of, reflecting to, or characteristic of a sect or 
sectarian.‖ The Free Online Dictionary adds ―Adhering or confined to the dogmatic limits of a sect or denomination; 
partisan.‖ The civil war was labeled as sectarian because it pitted Muslims and Christians against each other. It is 
also referred to as a confessional war.  The second top-ranking official in Hizbullah states that, ―Sectarianism, 
…,represents the association of individuals with particular sect due to birth as such and therefore being partial to that 
sect for the mere fact of belonging to it. This is akin to familial, tribal or regional fanaticism, the difference being in 







 The polarization of religious cleavages restructured the party system and manifested 
itself in mushrooming of parties, many with single-sect confessional dominations and others with 
religious platforms.
16
  In fact, confessional identities strengthened in the post-war era relative to 
the pre-war era.
17
 For instance, national scholars find that, secular, leftist and national parties 
with non-sectarian tendencies flourished in the pre-1975 era (El-Khazen, 2002:44-45).
18
 
However, after the war this changed, as a party elite reports that, ―The majority of parties are 
confessional, but may not be religious parties. Their membership is dominated by one sect, or 
one of the two religions. These do not have religious goals and claim to be secular (laique), 
separating religion from political goals. There are also progressive and leftist parties who are 
fully secular‖. Indeed, the number of active parties reached around 80 by 2010 as opposed to 15 
in the pre-war period and around 26 political groups and parties by 1997, or after the war broke 
in 1975.
19
 However, these parties are not all relevant and their political agendas are of varying 
agendas and religiosities. The impact of widening religious cleavages on party platforms is not 
                                               
15   These parties include the Labour, Socialist, Arab Nationalist, and Arab Ba‘ath Socialist (or renaissance), 
which split into Iraqi and Syrian chapters, and the Nasserites Murabitoun, a Muslim-Sunni militia supported by the 
armed Palestinians in refugee camps. A number of these parties became irrelevant, obsolete or defunct. In fact, pre-
war Muslim-dominated militias and parties disbanded or became defunct in the post-war period. 
  
16   Tessler also finds that, ―Islam plays a critical role in shaping political culture… Islam has become 
increasingly influential in Arab culture and political life during the last quarter-century‖ (Tessler, 2002: 2).  This 
situation manifested itself in a mushrooming of popular religious parties of Islamic orientations.  
 
17  Religious cleavages widened between Muslims and Christians, as well as Sunnis and Shiites. Class 
cleavages deepened with an increasingly disappearing middle class, which widened the gap between the poor and 
deprived Shiites in the South and Sunnis in North with other communities. Ethnic cleavages also emerged between 
the Palestinian Sunni refugees and Lebanese Christians, although with Armenians these cleavages remain docile. 
Gender inequalities were accentuated by wider religious cleavages and the war has a differential impact on women 
than men.  
 
18   David R. Smock and Andrey C. Smock. 1975. The Politics of Pluralism: A Comparative Study of Lebanon 
and Ghana (New York: Elsevier) pp. 109-151 
 
19   See, among others, Antoine Messara. 1998. Partis et forces politiques au Liban: Renouveau et engagement 
(Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Germany and The Lebanese Foundation for Permanent Civil Peace, Beirut); 279-282 
(in French and Arabic); see also Fawwaz Traboulsi. 2008. A History of Modern Lebanon From Imara to the Taef 





uniform. This is more visible in parties with religious platforms, while some of the other parties 
are more concerned with maintaining a religious identity than a religious platform.  
 Cessation of hostilities in 1990 saw the leftist parties (viz., Communist, Arab Socialist, 
and Syrian Social; as well as Progressive Socialist), lose power, a large portion of their 
constituencies, and diminished pluralism. This coincided with the end of the Cold War when 
Communism lost ground and when leftist ideologies were marginalized worldwide or rendered 
obsolete by rapid systemic and global changes.  A similar fate hit the Christian-dominated parties 
(Phalanges, National Bloc, and National Liberals), as they lost ground to former militias, notably 
to Hizbullah and to a lesser extent to Amal, as well as the Free Patriotic (Tayyar). These militias 
transformed in the post-war era into full fledged parties along with newly emerging popular 
movements like the Future (Mustaqbal). At the same time, new parties emerged (viz., Lebanese 
Forces) as offshoots of former militarized parties (viz., Kata‘éb), or formed around socio-
religious cleavages (viz., Wa‘ad and the Giants). Most of the pre-war parties with religious 
platforms also lost relevance, except for one, the Sunni-dominated Jama‘a Islamiah. The 
sectarian civil war saw three militias cum resistance movements forming, notably two Shiite-
dominated (Amal and Hizbullah) and one Sunni-dominated (Jabhat Al-Amal Al-Islami). These 
joined the electoral process and became fully fledged parties after the war. Several Sunni parties 
with religious platforms formed, but only one Sunni-dominated party, the Unitarian Tawhid 
party, an offshoot of the Jama‘a Islamiah, is relevant.20  (See, table 3.1 for the 18 parties).  
 Therefore, the pre-war era saw the golden age of non-confessional (leftist, secular, Arab 
national and national) parties with plural membership, which shrank nationwide after the war. In 
                                               
20   In effect, there were several offshoots of Al-Qaeda (e.g. Soldiers of Islam, Jund El-Islam, Fath-el-Islam, 
and others), which are not relevant or were silenced in 2007 by the Lebanese Army in Nahr-El-Bared Palestinian 
Camp North of Lebanon. There is also the Sunni-dominated, Al-Ahbash party, which provides social and welfare 






this context, the senior adviser to the leader of a pre-war progressive party offers a succinct 
description:   
In the post-1943 independence era, political parties were formed along ideological lines, 
nurtured by the Arab-Israeli conflict, and influenced by regional and international trends 
like Arab nationalism, socialism, communism and Marxism. During the 15-year civil 
war, parties became militarized along confessional lines: Maronites, Sunnis, and Shiites. 
The end of civil war coincided with breakdown of USSR and end of Cold War, with 
leftist and Marxist parties, as well as many others barely surviving, but with lost power 
and plural membership. After the Ta‘if Accord in 1989, these parties shed their arms and 
transformed into fully-fledged parties and new powerful parties formed. Some took the 
religious road while others combined civil goals with a confessional identity. 
 
Similar testimonies are given by other interlocutors encapsulating the impact of widening 
religious cleavages on the party system. For instance, a female party activist observes that,  
Before the war, the party was more pluralist and much less sectarian than it is now. After 
the war, the tendency for those most affected by the civil war, including the poor and 
women, was to step behind their religious sects for protection. The war turned people 
into extremists and into sectarian communities, and enclaves within which they sought 
refuge and security that their government failed to provide.    
 
These sectarian cleavages are observed not only across parties and individuals but also among 
children, as a female party activist cites that, ―When I asked my neighbor‘s ten-year old son why 
he is wearing a huge cross, I was appalled to hear his response that ‗it is better than being 
mistaken for a Muslim Shiite‘. It is unfortunate how sectarian and extremists even our children 
have become after the war.‖  Thus, while the civil war revived religious cleavages and nurtured 
sectarian tendencies, it influenced attitudes of individuals but also parties in a manner that 
imports on women‘s role in politics.  
Thus, the watershed of the civil war restructured the party system and redefined party-
level characteristics, including their religiosity levels. The post-war era saw parties emerge with 
a whole new approach to mobilizing women distinct from pre-war parties. Therefore, not only 





towards women‘s political involvement across parties. These attitudes are independent of and 
separate from party religiosity, understood as religious goals on party platforms. It is inevitable, 
however, that individual - cum personal- religiosity of party elites, especially when they are also 
clergymen, would not map on party political culture.
21
 In order to capture these attitudinal shifts, 
parties are split along the 1975 civil war timeline into pre-war (pre-1974), war-origin and post-
war (thereafter, post-war parties). Splitting these parties by party-age should not be construed as 
a causal variable but only as a rough proxy for capturing unobserved changes in parties‘ attitudes 
vis-à-vis women‘s political involvement. In an effort to evaluate how attitudinal shifts in political 
culture are correlated with the war experience and might have affected women‘s leadership 
across parties, I seek the views of multiple respondents. In general, the pre-war parties are 
viewed as more traditional and less receptive towards women‘s leadership than war and post-war 
parties. In the following paragraphs I examine the statements of party officials describing or 
reflecting on party elites‘ attitudes towards women‘s leadership across pre-war, war and post-war 
parties of various political platforms and goals.  
1. Pre-war versus post-war parties with leftist, secular and civil platforms   
(a) Pre-war parties with leftist, secular and civil platforms 
In the post-war period, surviving pre-war parties dominated by a single sect are often led 
by patrons (Zai‘m) and older generation, traditional and conservative party elites who set 
stringent, gender-blind rules. These party leaders, while nominally gender-blind are also not very 
supportive of women, as reflected in their political agendas where women‘s concerns are not 
visible. Indeed, these parties‘ interests do not include advancing women but focus on party 
survival or their confessional community‘s existence. This may partially explain a less receptive 
                                               
21   For the concept of political culture, refer to chapter One. See also, Norris 1993, Sartori 1976, and Janda 
1970 and 1980, among others, on how party-level characteristics shape the behaviour and overall performance of 





attitude towards women‘s leadership in these parties than in leftist-oriented parties. In addition, 
the lack of openings for women is also linked to the decline in these parties‘ membership 
compared to the pre-war period, as several informants note. In such a setting, the leader of a pre-
war Christian-dominated party remarks that,  
We are fighting for our existence and working under very strenuous circumstances. These 
are not normal times for all political parties and the political system as a whole. It is an 
era of survival and not reconstruction and building; and of course not for women. Their 
demands for leadership are not a priority on our agendas!  
 
Moreover, the leader of another Christian-dominated party stresses that, ―We are not willing to 
change our convictions to suit the situation and become more flexible. However, why should we, 
when women‘s priorities are not in politics?‖  Similar sentiments are expressed by leaders and 
party elites in other pre-war Christian-dominated parties, as this response shows:      
It is true that there is nothing in the Charter to encourage women to join or to promote 
them to leadership positions. However, if women were as qualified as they claim and 
politically mature or active, nothing prevents them from running for leadership posts. 
But, women are their own enemies. They are the problem not the Party!  
 
Other party elites stress that, ―There is no discrimination against women in the party. We have a 
meritocratic system, where everyone must compete for leadership. Unfortunately, women are not 
committed to party politics or dedicated to attending its meetings as men are.‖  This response is 
representative of other pre-war party leaders and elites, which reflects a ‗gender-neutral‘ 
approach and a ‗hands-off‘ stance or what I see as ‗laissez faire‘ attitude towards women‘s 
leadership. Another common alibi employed by party elites is that, ―Only few women are 
eligible, interested or qualified for leadership!‖ This refers to absence of a ‗critical mass of 
women‘, which these parties use for not promoting women to leadership positions. However, as 
shown earlier, there is no shortage of high-profiled and qualified women in Lebanon, which 





patriarchal stance towards women‘s leadership. Such arguments offered by party elites assume 
that all men in politics possess the requisite skills, merit and competence for effective leadership, 
while women do not. This is an unsubstantiated assumption (see, also Dahlerup 2006). This is 
further substantiated by the response of a female activist pointing to the society‘s attitude 
regarding women in politics. She flags that patriarchy is being reproduced in party elites‘ 
attitudes towards women, especially when they are of an older and more traditional generation. 
She adds that, ―The society does not look favorably upon women in political parties. It continues 
to be male-dominated and patriarchal, despite the fact that some women are highly qualified.‖ To 
demonstrate the point about the society, a female activist cites that, ―Women in leftist and 
communist parties, particularly coming from conservative and religious communities, prefer to 
remain anonymous. Their affiliation with these agnostic parties jeopardizes their personal lives 
and their careers.‖22  
 Furthermore, when responses of female party activists in pre-war parties are pitted 
against those of their male colleagues, similar voices and views are heard.  There is congruence 
in views reflecting a traditional stance towards women. Female activists in these parties echo the 
traditional and conservative views, ‗gender neutrality‘ and ‗hands-off‘ arguments of their 
colleagues. This is especially pronounced when counter-intuitively women fend off charges of 
deliberate discrimination against them. For instance, a female party activist defends her party‘s 
stance towards women in that, 
The Party believes in gender equality and in promoting women to leadership posts. The 
civil war has put us 20 years behind and put women in a political coma. During the war, 
women were more interested in the safety and survival of their families than politics. 
Women are less interested in politics or politically motivated than men. They lack the 
requisite skills for decision-making or leadership. This patriarchal society doesn‘t accept 
women as leaders.  
                                               
22   This respondent was not at liberty to provide contact information of other women to be interviewed for this 






Thus, the traditional and conservative attitudes of most pre-war parties with civil and secular 
platforms not only prevail but are accentuated in the post-war era. However, this was not 
uniform across all pre-war parties. Examining the attitudes of elites in leftist parties, marked by 
modern-ness and egalitarianism, gives the impression that they are more receptive to women‘s 
leadership than other pre-war parties. Indeed, a female activist stresses that, ―This is a leftist 
party where women are given equal opportunities as men to assume leadership positions. Merit 
and competence are basic determinants for decision-making posts. Men are generally supportive 
of women‘s leadership.‖ However, leftist parties lost their modern-ness because they are being 
led by traditional elites, whose attitudes became less favorable towards women‘s leadership. In 
this respect, a female activist states that, ―The traditionalism of older members surfaced after the 
war as they directed their attention to sectarian and confessional issues. It is a pity that our 
enlightened Christian and Muslim members failed to re-build liberal institutions that are 
modern, egalitarian, and secular.‖  Similarly, another female activist testifies that,  
The party lost some of its openness and tolerance after the civil war. Its overall 
performance slipped into traditional, conservatism, with decision-making centralized in 
the hands of a few and a personalized leadership. This caused overall membership to 
dwindle, including the share of women in membership and leadership. In this post-war 
era, the party‘s main concerns are existential and survival; women‘s advancement did not 
emerge as a priority.  
 
In a similar vein, a scholar and political scientist describes this transformation in the post-war 
era as,  
The party‘s motto is, ‗Our women are men and our men are strong men‘. In the pre-war 
era, the party had mixed male-female membership at a time when segregation was the 
norm. It provided a rare chance for liberating women in a conservative and traditional 
society. In the post-war era, the party was taken over by traditional men and its liberal 
and modern stance was lost, especially vis-à-vis women‘ leadership. Patriarchy and 






This regression or attitudinal shift from modern-ness into sectarianism and traditionalism 
instigated several women to withdraw from leftist parties, as this female activist explains:   
I believed in this secular, leftist socialist party, because it is premised on separation 
between religion and politics. Before the war, the party was more open, pluralist, 
egalitarian, and liberal. In the post-war era, it veered off track into traditionalism, 
conservatism and sectarian politics, relinquishing its egalitarian ideology. 
  
 These statements reflect shifts, if not regression, in the attitude of pre-war leftist parties in 
the post-war period from modern-ness into traditionalism, conservatism and sectarianism. These 
shifts marred their egalitarian stance towards women and influenced their plural membership. It 
is worthwhile noting that none of the male officials interviewed from pre-war leftist parties raise 
this important issue. They do not observe this shift. Women do. In this respect, several scholars 
find that incentives of party elites affect the rules set-up to encourage women and enhance their 
leadership prospects.
23
 Shrinking membership in pre-war parties leaves older generation party 
elites in charge. This may explain a more traditional and conservative stance towards women‘s 
leadership in pre-war compared to post-war parties.    
(b) Post-war parties with secular and civil platforms 
Post-war parties with secular and civil platforms appear to be more flexible, 
accommodating and supportive of women and their leadership, as a party leader boasts that, ―We 
are modern, liberal and committed to gender equality. This is explicit in our charter and not 
rhetoric. Our actions speak for themselves, as evidenced by presence of many women in our 
decision-making and policy-making bodies as full partners.‖ In this group of post-war parties, 
leaders and elites shy away from being labeled ‗religious‘ parties. They self-locate as 
―Definitely, secular with no religious goals.‖ These elites point out that their parties ―Target all 
citizens without discrimination or gender-bias.‖ They explain that the party ―introduced special 
                                               





measures for ensuring that women are promoted to leadership positions. This is why we attract 
more women to our parties.‖  
Similar testimonies are offered by elites in other post-war parties with secular and civil 
agendas and with confessional membership, exhibiting more favorable and ‗women-friendly‘ 
attitude towards women‘s leadership. Several interviewees point to their charters and mission 
statements as evidence of being ‗women-friendly‘. One of the party elite notes that, ―The charter 
and by-laws attest to the party‘s commitment to women‘s empowerment. Indeed, we are modern 
and tolerant. We empower women and encourage their ascendance to leadership.‖ Another 
leader stresses that, ―The mission statement explicitly mentions that the party offers women 
equal opportunities as men for leadership and specifies the special measures it takes towards that 
end.‖ A case in point is offered by a party leader who cites that, ―If there is a tie in elections 
between equally qualified women and men, we give preference to women. This empowers 
women and creates a critical mass for leadership.‖ Thus, this hospitable attitude towards 
women‘s leadership is supported by concrete measures. It shows clearly the distinct differences 
which set them apart from their pre-war counterpart parties.  
Thus, pre-war parties with confessional membership tend to rely upon a ‗laissez-faire‘ or 
‗hands-off‘ approach for women‘s leadership such that market forces will correct (gender) 
anomalies and produce the requisite equilibrium (gender balance). In this scenario, these parties 
expect that meritocracy will eventually place women in leadership positions without special 
measures and assistance. By contrast, post-war parties are willing to intervene, manage the trade-
off between supply and demand for women‘s leadership, in order to create more opportunities 





that post-war parties with secular and civil goals are more receptive to women‘s leadership than 
pre-war parties. 
2. Pre-war versus post-war parties with religious platforms 
The civil war led to the emergence of several Christian and Muslim militias. None of the 
five Christian militias –with their offshoots- which transformed into parties and remained 
‗relevant‘ carry expansive religious platforms. In contrast, all five of the Muslim militias –with 
their offshoots-- which transformed into parties and are relevant, have religious platforms.
24
 
There are a few pre-war but minor parties with religious platforms but these are not relevant.
25
  
Widening religious cleavages after the war increased the number of relevant parties with 
religious platforms fivefold.
26
 The attitude of elites towards women‘s leadership in these parties 
is more complex than in secular parties with leftist goals or civil parties with confessional 
membership. In order to extract information, I asked party officials about the parties‘ policies 
towards women‘s leadership and whether they perceive any changes in the post-war compared to 
pre-war period.  
The 15-year civil war and prevailing political instability in Lebanon intensified 
authoritarian, dictatorial and undemocratic tendencies among parties with religious platforms, 
especially those that wield power and use it to their advantage.  Information gathered from party 
officials reveals that differences in attitudes vis-à-vis-women are observed between Sunni-
dominated and Shiite-dominated religious parties more than between pre and post-war parties. 
                                               
24   To recapitulate, these include the Sunni-dominated Unitarian (Al-Tawhid) formed in the post-war period, 
an offshoot of a pre-war party; and two Shiite-dominated, namely, the Hope Movement (Amal) and the Party of God 
(Hizbullah). There is also one pre-war Sunni-dominated party (Jama‘a Islamiah). See, table 3.1, page 107.  
 
25   In effect, there were several offshoots of Al-Qaeda (e.g. Soldiers of Islam, Jund El-Islam) which were 
silenced in 2007 by the Lebanese Army in Nahr-El-Bared Palestinian Camp North of Lebanon. 
 






Sunni-dominated parties are the least hospitable to women‘s leadership. This is linked to 
authoritarianism that permeates theocratic parties but also to the fact that ‗Ijtihad‘ or 
interpretation of the Shari‘a is still open amongst Shiites. How the Shari‘a is interpreted by party 
elites affects their attitude towards women and may pose a real danger for their political 
involvement.
27
 The response of an elite in a pre-war religious party demonstrates this attitude, 
―Women are our mothers, daughters and sisters and must be cherished at all times. Their main 
functions lie in the women‘s department to provide social services to families of fighters and the 
needy in the community.‖ This statement reflects a patronizing attitude, which confines women 
home and to the traditional ‗female-labeled‘ tasks of providing social and welfare services. 
Similar views are offered by elites in Sunni-dominated religious parties.  
Similar sentiments, albeit less extremist, are encapsulated in responses of party elites 
from Shiite-dominated parties. These leaders and elites, as shown earlier, have token women in 
their top echelons as a symbol of the modern. For instance, a male MP from a war-origin party 
empathizes with the ―weaker sex‘ lest they are overloaded beyond their physical and 
psychological capabilities.‖ He stresses that, ―Women are already juggling multiple tasks on top 
of caring for their families. It is not fair to overload them beyond their physical capacities. Their 
place is not in politics but at home.‖  In general, these parties‘ policies also do not encourage 
women to take the lead and prefer to work them in social services and electioneering purposes 
via women‘s wings.  
However, some parties are more tolerant towards women‘s leadership than Sunni-
dominated and other Shiite-dominated parties. One party (Amal) is not headed by a clergyman 
and is apparently more enlightened and encouraging to women‘s leadership. A female official 
                                               
27   See, chapter One for a discussion of authoritarianism and women‘s advancement and scholarly debates on 
these relationship by Huntington 1995, Tessler 2002, Fish 2002, Stepan and Robertson 2004, Donno and Russett 





from that party points to a perceptible change in the attitude of party elites towards women in the 
post-war era. She cites that,  
After the war, our party seems to be more tolerant and receptive to new ideas. For 
instance, I did not dare raise issues dealing with women‘s demands for leadership before 
the war or even five years ago. But, now I feel confident and comfortable in raising them 
in meetings. This is indicative of fast-track transformation, a continuing process of 
change. 
 
This female official recognizes that there is transformation and capitalizes on it by lobbying to 
improve women‘s share in leadership positions, an effort that eventually bears fruit. At a 
minimum, this shows party variation in attitudes of party elites‘ vis-à-vis women within the 
group of parties with religious platforms. Such information is valuable in that it provides initial 
guidelines and indicators on the varying intensities of religiosity across religious parties‘ 
platforms. This is a step forward towards labeling and coding parties by religiosity on their 
platforms.    
 To sum up, this section describes how the 15-year civil war exacerbated social but 
especially religious cleavages, which reshaped the party system. This is reflected in the 
mushrooming of parties of varying religiosities, but also in attitudinal shifts towards women 
across pre-war, war-origin and post-war parties. Indeed, the civil war did not only widen 
religious cleavages but created a new set of post-war parties with a whole different ‗women-
friendly‘ approach towards mobilizing women into politics. This women-friendly attitude 
differentiated them from pre-war more traditional parties. Party variation in attitudes towards 
women‘s leadership -- political culture -- reflects the political dynamics, and the ramifications 
of the civil war on the party system. Party-age offers a sensitive framework for studying 
attitudinal shifts vis-à-vis women‘s political involvement across pre-war and post-war parties. 





than war and post-war parties. This implies that women‘s chances in leadership are more likely 
to be adversely affected in pre-war than in post-war parties, with variations within each 
category. There is also diversity and difference in parties‘ attitudes towards women‘s 
leadership within each group. Before the civil war, pre-war leftist parties were modern and 
egalitarianism. In the post-war period, they underwent an attitudinal shift as they regressed into 
a traditional and conservative mode similar to that observed in other pre-war parties with 
secular and civil platforms. Post-war parties with secular and civil platforms reveal a receptive 
and women-friendly stance towards women‘s leadership. Parties with religious platforms 
exhibit conservative and hostile or non-receptive attitudes toward women‘s leadership, which is 
more pronounced in Sunni-dominated than in Shiite-dominated parties.  
Moreover, the polarization of religious cleavages after the civil war may lead one to 
expect that women‘s chances in leadership in the post-war period should diminish. Responses of 
interviewees denote the contrary. The post-war period saw post-war parties emerge with women-
friendly attitudes that pre-war parties did not match. These responses indicate that the pre-war 
parties, especially those with single sect domination that survived the civil-war and remained 
relevant are resistant to change. They are set in their own ways like ―old wine in new bottles‖. 
Pre-war parties are less accommodating and receptive than war and post-war parties to women‘s 
leadership, even among parties with religious platforms. Finally, the testimonies of party 
officials and the information they provided paves the ground work for the most complex task of 
classifying, labeling and coding parties by religiosity in the following section. 
C. Classifying, Labeling & Coding Parties by Religiosity  
Several interviewees stress that the civil war widened religious cleavages and 





towards women. Widening religious cleavages also created separate enclaves across various 
religious communities focusing on religious affiliation as an identity. As observed earlier, these 
cleavages are reflected in the mushrooming of diverse types of parties with confessional and 
single-sect domination. Some of those parties incorporate religious doctrine into their platforms, 
while others with civil and secular agendas treat religion as a private matter. I used the 
opportunity of the interviews in order to generate a coding system for religiosity that is sensitive 
to the conceptions that practitioners themselves use. In order to gauge how these politicians 
understood both their party and its differences from others, I asked them how they describe and 
classify their parties.  
1. Classifying parties into three generic categories: secular, confessional, and religious 
 Examining the responses of party officials reveals the complexity of developing a 
classification that captures the intensity of religiosity in party platforms. Views offered by 
interlocutors or national scholars dismiss a left-right or religious-secular divide but also 
highlight the complex process of developing a realistic classification of parties in Lebanon. 
Noting these difficulties, a leader of a pre-war progressive party remarks that,  
Classifying Lebanese parties is complex, since there are no left or right parties. There are 
confessional parties with civil, national or religious orientations, which confuse secular 
with religious parties. However, by looking at their agendas, you can separate them. 
Religious parties are sectarian and anti-secular in which religion acts supreme. These do 
not separate their religious from political goals. Secular parties do not have religious 
objectives. Some are pluralist, but few are democratic. I believe in separating religion 
from politics, but I am skeptical that a religious-secular divide is not realistic.  
  
Scholars also recognize the blurred line that separates religiosity from secularism, but 
also that, ―…, the traditional unidimensional Left/Right ideological continuum may be too 
simple to describe how ideology affects women‘s representation.‖ (Kittilson, 1979: 4)28  
                                               
28   A similar conclusion is reached in studying parties in Western Europe that, ―The standard approach to the 





Statements of party leaders and elites as well as female party activist did not only dismiss a left-
right dichotomy but also highlight that party platforms carry varying religiosities. Programmatic 
orientations and goals are indicators of party religiosity, which is also central for labeling and 
coding parties by religiosity.  
Even the most committed secularists in Lebanon do not give up their confessional 
identity. The intertwining of religion and politics in Lebanon is a fact that all interviewees 
recognize. Therefore, it is imperative for the sustainability of multiple secularisms in Lebanon to 
do so by remaining within the realm of religious and confessional politics.
29
 Secularism and 
religiosity co-exist in varying proportions on parties‘ agendas. This is why a continuum of 
multiple religiosities and secularisms is adopted to capture party variation in religiosity. The 
realization that there are varying religiosities guides the process of classifying parties away from 
a right left or religious secular divide and along a continuum of religiosities and secularisms. A 
female in a post-war party alludes to this duality between confessionalism and secularism by 
stating that, ―This is a secular party with a civil intonation and confessional domination. A 
secular party calls for separation between religion and politics, while a civil party may have 
religious orientations.  
These nuances highlight that religion is a private matter but it also organizes the party 
along secular interests.‖  These distinctions are worthwhile noting in examining how parties with 
religious platforms self-identify.  In his book on Hizbullah, Sheikh Qassem self-locates the party 
as an ‗ideological and not a sectarian party‘, where members join because of their allegiance to 
the doctrine and not to the religious sect they belong to. He explains that,   
                                                                                                                                            
right-left model is too crude to capture crucial distinctions between party ideologies and party practices…‖ (Lane & 
Ersson, 1987: 131 
 
29






There is quite a difference between a sectarian, confessional confederacy and a 
systematic, doctrinal one. The first draws its disciples based on the influence of birth and 
belonging irrespective of substance, while the second is founded on conviction and 
commitment, and harbours a set of guidelines as to moral and practical execution. 
(Qassem, 2005: 33). 
 
However, irrespective of semantics and motivations for joining the party, membership in 
Hizbullah is strictly limited to Muslim Shiites or those who convert and adopt Shi‘ism. Sheikh 
Qassem defends the party‘s goal in establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon. He explains that,   
Such a project is the natural expression of allegiance for any committed Muslim holding on 
to Islamic conviction and persuaded by its code. It represents the ultimate justice to which 
man aspires. However, we seek here to detail the difference between the intellectual vision 
and its practical manifestation, where in the first we summon the creation of an Islamic 
state and encourage others to adopt it as the supreme representation of human happiness; 
while on the second, practical level, we recognize that such development requires a proper 
foundation that accommodates the creation of the state. 
30
  (Qassem, 2005: 30) 
 
However, he stresses that there is no compulsion in Islam, leaving it in the hands of the Lebanese 
to decide whether or not to establish an Islamic state: 
We confirm our conviction in Islam as a tenet and system, both intellectual and 
legislative, calling on all to learn of it and abide by its code. And we summon the people 
to adopt it and commit to its instructions, at the individual, political and social levels. 
Where the freedom of choosing a governing system is attributed to our people in 
Lebanon, they will not find a better alternative to Islam. Hence, we call for the 
implementation of the Islamic system based on direct and free choice of the people, and 
not through forceful imposition as may be assumed by some. (Qassem, 2005:31) 
 
This demonstrates, in no uncertain terms, that Hizbullah‘s ultimate goal is to establish an Islamic 
state in Lebanon when it becomes timely to do so. 
31
  Such religious goals aim to change the 
political system, an indication of the intensity of religiosity in the party platform, which is useful 
for labeling and coding parties.  
                                               
30   A similar argument was advanced by Rachid Al-Ghannoushi, a major Islamic leader in Tunisia, in an 
interview conducted by Alfred Stepan: ―… that the ideal form of government would be an Islamic government. He 
acknowledged that in the modern pluralist world it is extremely difficult to achieve this ideal.‖ (Stepan, 2001: 235). 
      
31  Interviews with the Secretary-General of Hizbullah or his deputy were not granted because of the security 
situation following the July 2006 war. However, his book “Hizbullah: The Story from Within”, provided some 





This information is invaluable in that it distinguishes between parties with confessional 
membership: some have religious while others have civil platforms. In the latter, religious 
affiliation is an identity and religion is confined to the private sphere but programmatic 
orientations are civil and national. In the former, party platforms have religious components. 
Parties that self-identify as civil or secular and nationalist are often confessionally dominated, 
but keep religion in the private realm while retaining it as an identity. They market themselves 
away from confessionalism by claiming secularity in order to distance themselves from being 
labeled ‗religious parties‘. In post-war Lebanon, it is a stigma for civil and confessional parties to 
be labeled ‗religious‘ based only on confessionally-dominated membership, especially with the 
negative connotation attached to ‗extremists‘ in the aftermath of the civil war. Even, Hizbullah, 




Further, confessional parties maintain strong links with their confessional constituencies 
and identify with their religious affiliation and sect. This religious affiliation is not only an 
identity, but it is also a ticket to amass voters from the same religious denomination. Voting 
behavior is a case in point, as some scholars suggest that, ―…, one‘s religious identity provided a 
cue that oriented voters toward political parties, and helped define one‘s ideological position on 
the political spectrum.‖ (Norris and Inglehart, 2004:228). For instance, it is considered an act of 
treason to the sect if someone votes outside her/his religious sect, or for the party that represents 
that sect, or declares support for the party of another sect, religious or non-religious. Several 
                                               
32   It has been suggested that the ulterior motive is that Shiites will get a bigger share of the political pie, since 
they outnumber other communities in Lebanon (An-Nahar, 25 and 30 July 2009). When Hizbullah published its 
political platform in April 2009, it was also pointed out that, ―The document calls for the abolition of sectarian 
politics and enactment of a new election law… in order to emphasize the group‘s priorities … to attract optimal 
representation and perhaps even a majority in parliament…. This will advance Hizbullah toward its fundamental 







scholars have addressed this contentious issue especially after the July 2006 Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon.
33
 This denotes that these parties are protective of their constituencies, controlling of 
their allegiances, and less tolerant to diversity or differences in opinion. 
 The views of other party officials point to a preference for separating religion from 
political agendas but recognize that this is a difficult goal. In this context, a male MP states that,  
This party functions within a confessional society but has civil goals.  It pursues a 
bottom-up approach to instill secularism at the grassroots level. But, this is a difficult 
task. Secularism is like democracy, cannot be imported or imposed from the top. Both 
should be woven into the fabric of society early on.  
 
What is a certainty, however, is that religion will always be an integral component of the 
political and party system.
34
 This is explained by the leader of a post-war party:  
Parties form around one religious sect, rally around a leader or founder from that sect, 
and their membership is dominated by that same single sect. Since parties form along 
confessional lines instead of socio-economic or political ideologies, any classification 
into left, right or center of the political spectrum or religious-secular divide becomes 
meaningless in a country like Lebanon.  
 
 This leader concludes by proposing a listing of parties in terms of their agendas and 
memberships. For instance, in the South, Hizbullah and Amal are dominated by Muslim Shiites. 
In the North and Mount Lebanon, the Giants (Marada) and Free Patriotic (Tayyar) parties are 
dominated by Christian Maronites. In the Shouf district, parties are Druze-dominated, while in 
Beirut, the Future is Sunni-dominated. In the post-war era, the closest to a concept of a secular 
                                               
33
   See, Op-Eds and articles debating this issue by Lebanese scholars and political scientists, viz., Mona 
Fayyad, and responses by Sami Efeish, among others, in An-Nahar daily, July and September 2006, various issues.    
 
34   In a society marred by wide conflict-bearing religious cleavages, individuals are born, raised and registered 
into one of the 18 confessional communities. In this society, secularism and religiosity carry different connotations. 
Indeed, religious affiliations and identities matter more to constituencies as an organizing principle and in 
‗aggregating interests‘ of religious communities than left-right, economic, political or other ideologies. Therefore, an 
objective of full secularism starting at the grassroots is utopian in a country like Lebanon, where secularism is 
socially constructed but not imposed. Nevertheless, efforts to separate religion from politics continue. A new civil 
society movement composed of male and female scholars and political activists was established in May 2010 calling 






party is Tajaddod, given its plural membership and non-religious platform. However, in the pre-
war era, Al-Kutlah was a secular and plural party until its founder went into exile in France 
during the civil war. This party, like all the pre-war leftist parties, lost clout in the wake of the 
civil war. This enumeration of relevant and powerful parties in terms of their agendas and 
memberships lays down the foundations of a framework for classifying and labeling these 
parties. (Table 3.1 lists the 18 relevant parties) 
There is consensus among scholars, political activists and practitioners (interviewees) on 
the presence of a continuum of multiple secularisms and religiosities, which rules out left-right 
or religious-secular dichotomies. I extend the multivocal approach to religion, which this 
dissertation adopts, from the individual to institutional level of political parties.
35
 Such a 
spectrum of religiosities and secularisms in party platforms produces party variation in religiosity 
and offers a working basis for classifying, labeling and coding parties to capture variation in 
women‘s leadership. The statements of party officials so far guided the process of grouping 
parties into three generic categories: (1) secular and a-religious, (2) civil-secularism and 
confessional (hereafter civil-confessional), and (3) religious with varying religiosities (hereafter 
religious). Parties with religious platforms are split into three sub-categories upon examining 
their platforms and determining the extent to which religion penetrates each of their agendas. In 
the following section, the process of labeling and coding of parties is described. 
2. Labeling and coding parties 
 The process of coding parties on a spectrum of religiosity and secularism is based on 
content analysis of mission statements, charters, and more specifically, political platforms. 
Content analysis of party platforms revealed a host of goals ranging from secular, leftist, national 
                                               
35  I am aware that religiosity of individuals, especially when in leadership and decision-making positions, 
would necessarily influence their attitude towards women‘s leadership. Therefore, an element of subjectivity in 





and civil to religious objectives which aim to change the political system in line with religious 
doctrine. In addition, the literature on parties and different ways of classifying them was 
extensively reviewed, with a special focus on researchers studying parties in Lebanon. Moreover, 
in an initial phase of the field research I posed questions to party leaders and elites on how they 
classify their parties. This information was also essential for developing a preliminary 
classification to propose to party leaders and female activists during the second and third round 
of structured and semi-structured interviews. I sought their views, as politicians and 
practitioners, on labeling and coding parties and refined the classification based on the data and 
information they offered, or on the adjustments they proposed. The process of consultation with 
party leaders, male and female party activists, national experts and scholars was conducted over 
the three-year field research. During 2006-2009, the process of labeling and coding parties was 
transparent and underwent several adjustments and refinements until consensus was reached.  
  Several interviewees note that secular parties with leftist orientations contain no religious 
goals. Indeed, a female activist in a pre-war leftist party stresses that, 
I do not practice any religious rituals. I cannot carry two faiths and have double 
allegiance. My faith lies in the ideology of the party that I belong to and I am at peace 
with myself. I have no choice of being born as a Christian. This is the main problem in 
Lebanon: the interference of religion and confessionalism with our social and political 
lives. 
  
 Thus, the three pre-war leftist parties (Communist, Baath and Syrian Social) have the least 
religiosity among the other parties. However, their being anti-religion did not prevent these 
parties from building alliances with strong religious parties in the post-war era. This was 
essential to survive and for strategic and electoral reasons.   
The second generic category includes those parties whose platforms contain a mixture of 





community. These parties include religious affiliation concerns in their agendas but they do not 
aim to change the political system to match their confessional concerns. They are merely issues 
of survival, especially for parties whose membership is dominated by, but not limited to, a 
Christian majority. The Muslim-dominated confessional party (Mustaqbal) does not have any 
concerns and qualms in this respect, since Lebanon is a Muslim-majority country, after all. In an 
attempt to compare goals and agendas even within the same category, a female party activist 
points out that,  
The Kata‘éb, Marada, or Lebanese Forces tend to have more religious components in 
their platforms than the Tayyar or Wa‘ad. Also, Mustaqbal has less religiosity than the 
extremist Jama‘a Islamiah, where there are no women in leadership. These are extremely 
conservative, especially the Sunni Islamist parties, closer to the ‗Wahabi‘ in Saudi 
Arabia.   
 
Taking this comparison in stride, one would further split the nine post-war civil-confessional 
parties into different religiosities, as this respondent suggests. However, reverting to the content 
analysis of their platforms, consulting with other party elites and scholars, and also noting that 
there are only 18 parties, these parties are retained within the same category. Another female 
activist states that,  
Civil-confessional parties are premised on religious value system but have a civil 
agenda. They are pluralist, tolerant, democratic and gender-sensitive. Secular parties are 
not religious at all, but lapsed into traditionalism after the war. Religious parties are 
conservative and look at the doctrine as a political and social contract.   
 
Moreover, officials in a couple of Christian-dominated parties highlight that they start their 
meetings with prayer and that their party logo carries the cross. In addition, their platform is 
guided by Christian values while their main concern is to exist as a community in Lebanon. A 
case in point is the testimony of a female official in one of these parties: 
I am committed to Christianity before politics. The party is existential and our priority is 
protecting Christians in Lebanon and the Middle East. This takes precedence over other 





statement which is premised on Christian values. We pledge to defend our religion when 
we join and start our meetings with prayers. Maintaining our Christian identity is our 
concern.
36
   
 
 Essentially, these parties do not aim to change the political system, but they definitely have few 
religious-related goals. Therefore, this category is labeled civil-confessional parties and 
assigned a coding on the religiosity scale less than that assigned to secular parties, because of 
their concerns about maintaining their confessional identity qua goal of existence as a religious 
community.     
 The third generic category is parties with religious platforms and varying religiosities. 
Three of these parties are led by clergymen. They are Sunni-dominated and incorporate the 
doctrine in their platforms. These parties are guided by the doctrine in their social and political 
lives. Their ultimate goal and objective is to change the political system into an Islamic state and 
to be governed by the Shari‘a, which they consider as all one needs for governance. For them, 
Islam is the solution and the only path. These parties are not open to ‗Ijtihad‘ or interpreting the 
Shari‘a. They stick to the letter and verse of the Shari‘a and are ultra-conservative in 
interpreting the doctrine. They are Salafists by self-location. These are labeled religious 
extremists and are assigned the code of highest religiosity.  
 The second sub-category of religious party comprises only one party, the Shiite-
dominated Hizbullah. This party is headed by a clergy who is charismatic and well versed in 
jurisprudence. The party‘s platform also incorporates the doctrine and aims for an Islamic state 
in Lebanon. However, the party‘s goals have undergone several transformations overtime, 
which point that such a goal is untimely and cannot be imposed on the people of Lebanon. This 
has to come by choice since there is no compulsion in Islam and the time in Lebanon is not ripe 
                                               
36  Content analysis of party platform shows that there are no religious goals pertaining to state politics, except 
protecting their interests and preserving their identity as Christians. The leader self-identified his party as a secular 





for fulfilling the goal of an Islamic state. This also implies that while the party is guided by the 
doctrine, it is also open to interpretations that allow them to enter politics and be tolerant to 
differences by allying with Christian-dominated parties. Based on their own self-location and 
placement among the religious parties, they are labeled as conservative but not extremist. They 
are assigned a score of less religiosity than the extremist parties.  
  The third and last sub-category of parties with religious platforms is the Shiite-
dominated Amal. This party is the only religious party led by a political leader who is not a 
clergyman, which really ties in with the assumption that elites‘ attitudes flow into party 
platforms. In this vein, a female activist in civil-confessional Maronite-dominated party states 
that, ―Parties with strong bonds to religion and where the cleric and politician are collapsed into 
one, religious tenets affect politics and take precedence over democratic and egalitarian values.‖ 
The political platform of this party is guided by a doctrine with religious components but has 
also secular goals of governance. Conforming to the correct religious path is a main religious 
goal but there is no indication of imposing an Islamic state on Lebanon, or on all Lebanese 
citizens irrespective of their religious affiliation. Accordingly, this party is labeled as religious 
but tolerant and assigned a coding in religiosity lower than the conservative but not extremist 
religious parties but higher than civil-confessional parties.      
 For comparative purposes in labeling these parties, I refer to Anke Schuster (2007) who 
distinguishes between religious, fundamentalist and denominational-mass parties adopting party 
typologies suggested by Gunther and Diamond (2001: 22):  
The fundamentalist parties seek to reorganize state and society around strict reading of 
religious doctrinal principles, while denominational-mass parties are pluralist and 
incremental in their agenda. For fundamentalist parties, there is litt le or no room for 
conflicting interpretations of the religious norms and scriptures that serve as the basis of 
the party‘s program and of the laws that it seeks to impose on all the society. … In this 





religious norms are imposed on all citizens within the polity irrespective of their own 
personal religious beliefs. (Schuster 2007: 20-21) 
 
Shuster explains why denominational-mass parties, like the Dutch CDA or the German CDU, are 
not a problem for democracy unlike religious fundamentalist parties, like the Dutch SGP, which 
potentially are. Denominational-mass parties are equivalent to those labeled ‗confessional but 
civil secularism‘. Religious fundamentalist parties are parallel to those labeled religious 
extremists in that they aim to impose their religious beliefs on all citizens. This distinguishes 
them from ‘religious conservative, but not extremist‘ in that the latter try to convert others by 
convincing them and not by coercion since there is no compulsion in Islam (see, Qassem 2005).  
In addition, they are open to re-interpretation of the doctrine and at times are willing to overlook 
the Shari‘a if it is in their political interest to do so and for strategic maneuverings. 
    Coding parties by religiosity was a continuous process throughout the research period. It 
was essentially a heuristic exercise in which I turned to my interviewees not only for 
consultation but also as a spring board. The labeling and coding of these 18 parties passed 
through several phases in order to revisit and refine the coding in line with statements of 
interviewees or suggestions from politicians and national experts. However, in as much as 
possible, this process was transparent, realistic and sensitive to varying intensities of religiosity. 
In fact, it was finalized by consensus with party leaders and activists. This is critical and crucial 
for the qualitative analysis and quantitative testing of the theory by estimating a regression 
model for women‘s leadership with which the dissertation concludes.  
 Given the above, secular and a-religious parties with leftist tendencies do not have 
perceptible religious components in their platforms and are thus assigned a score of ‗5‘ (highest 
degree of secularism and lowest intensity of religiosity). Civil-confessional parties maintain a 





parties are assigned a score of ‗4‘, lower score on secularism than secular a-religious, but also 
lower on the religiosity scale than religious parties. The generic broad category of religious 
parties is broken down into three labels according to the extent that religious goals penetrate 
their political agendas. These are religious extremists assigned a score of ‗1‘, conservative but 
not extremists assigned a score of ‗2‘, and tolerant religiosities assigned a score of ‗3‘in terms of 
the intensity of religiosity in their platforms.  Table 3.1 gives a 2x5 matrix of the 18 relevant 
parties that occupy at least one percent of the 128 parliamentary seats in any of the five post-war 
elections (1992, 1996, 2000, 2005 and 2009).  
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In a society marred by wide conflict-bearing religious cleavages, individuals are born, 
raised and registered into one of the 18 confessional communities. In this society, secularism and 
religiosity carry different connotations. Indeed, religious affiliations and identities matter more to 
constituencies as an organizing principle and in ‗aggregating interests‘ of religious communities 
than left-right, economic, political or other ideologies.  Therefore, an objective of full secularism 
starting at the grassroots is, at a minimum, utopian in a country like Lebanon where secularism is 
socially constructed but not imposed.
37
  
Based on information gathered from interviewees, the most significant finding in this 
chapter is that religiosity –not religion per se—is seen at the root of variations across parties in 
women‘s leadership. The testimonies indicate that variation in intensity of religiosity appear to 
be a core variable for explaining women‘s leadership in parties‘ decision-making bodies. 
Information and data show that the 15-year civil war (1975-1990) widened religious cleavages, 
and restructured the party system into multiple parties of varying intensities of religiosity and 
secularism. This is also reflected in attitudinal shifts vis-à-vis women‘s role across pre-war, war-
origin and post-war parties. The influence of widening religious cleavages on heightening 
extremism is not uniform across parties.  
In religious parties, this intensified religiosity and negatively influenced their elites‘ 
attitude vis-à-vis women‘s leadership. For example, a more tolerant attitude transpires towards 
women‘s leadership in Amal, which bodes better for women‘s leadership than in Hizbullah. In 
Hizbullah, strict adherence to religious doctrine is highlighted and women‘s leadership is not 
accorded priority. Party leaders and elites employ patriarchal and doctrinal discourses, viz., that 
                                               
37  Nevertheless, efforts to separate religion from politics continue. A new civil society movement composed 
of male and female scholars and political activists was established in May 2010 calling for secularization and freeing 





‗politics-is-men’s-business‘, women cannot lead men as stipulated in ‗Al-Qiwama‘, and that 
‗women’s-place-is-home‘. However, since 1982, Hizbullah‘s political agenda has been 
undergoing transformation, a process that continues to date pointing to change in intensity of 
religiosity on their platforms overtime.
38
 Such transformations are common in the lifetime of 
political parties, as in the case of the Christian Democratic parties in Europe (Kalyvas 1996). 
Transformation or rather adaptation to social change is raised by a female activist in a pre-war 
leftist party, reflecting on her personal experience with Hizbullah:  
I was teaching sciences and math to prepare girls and boys for the high school 
governmental exam in a segregated school of Hizbullah. One tool of instruction required 
girls and boys to mix. The students were apprehensive and sought approval from 
Hizbullah. To my surprise, this was given and justified as a learning process. Based on 
this example, I believe that eventually Hizbullah will advance women. 
 
These religious parties are well organized, hierarchical, strongly integrated, and popular with 
huge membership, including of women. Scholars studying Christian democratic parties in the 
1980s, remark that except for the OVP in Austria and the ARP in the Netherlands, ―Most 
religious parties are weakly integrated: the organization and the position of the party leadership 
is weak and there is not always a homogeneous behaviour within the party.‖ (Lane & Ersson, 
1987:121) Two decades later, Kalyvas argues that,  
Christian Democracy has always had strong integrative capacities by virtue of its 
(religiously inspired) political ideology. Precisely because Christian Democracy relied on 
religion as the foundations of their political message … religion is the foundational 
element of confessional parties, the core element of their identity; …, their religious 
appeal turned these parties into highly heterogeneous coalitions of interest groups united 
only by their initial adherence to religion. (Kalyvas, 2009: 4, 10).  
 
 Therefore, parties with religious platforms have varying religiosities that appear to 
influence women‘s leadership. In secular parties with leftist orientations, pluralism shrank but 
                                               
38   In 1982, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary-General of Hizbullah, declared in a public speech that the 
objective of Hizbullah is to establish an Islamic State in Lebanon. ‗Sayyed‘ refers to those who are -or claim to be- 





was not lost, but this did not dilute their egalitarian attitude towards women. In the post-war era, 
new parties with civil goals and confessional membership emerged which are more receptive 
towards women‘s leadership. This chapter concludes by labeling parties into extremists, 
conservative and tolerant religiosities, confessional with civil secularism and secular a-religious. 
They are coded by the intensity of religiosity on their platforms along a 5-point religiosity 
continuum with ‗1‘ for highest religiosity and ‗5‘ for lowest religiosity. The next chapter 
examines pluralism and democratic procedures as potential variables for explaining women‘s 




Party Variation in Democratic Practices & Pluralism  
 
Based on interviews with party leaders and female party activists, the preceding chapter 
established that religiosity in party platforms is a potential core explanatory variable for 
women‟s leadership.  While party officials interviewed do not see that religion is inimically 
hostile to women, many point to the chilling effects of religiosity (and extremism) on the 
opportunities for women to advance to leadership positions. This provided the ground work for 
classifying, labeling and coding the 18 relevant parties in Lebanon. Parties are labeled as 
religious extremists, religious conservative but not extremists, religious but tolerant; 
confessional but civil secularism, and secular a-religious. The chapter also looked at the impact 
of the 15-year civil war on widening religious cleavages which restructured the party system. 
This is reflected in mushrooming of parties with confessional and single-sect memberships as 
well as membership and attitudinal shifts vis-à-vis the role of women and their political 
involvement across pre-war, war and post-war parties.   
This chapter explores other party-level characteristics that may influence women‟s 
leadership besides the level of religiosity in their platforms and whether the party was 
established before, during or after the civil war. It is organized in two sections. The first section 
looks at democratic practices in operating procedures, specifically in the transfer of leadership 
and in decision-making processes. The second section examines multi-religious pluralism in the 
composition of party membership. The information gathered from interviewees is used to 
establish whether parties‟ pluralism and democratic procedures are viewed by politicians in 
Lebanon as factors that can explain variations in women‟s membership and leadership 
prospects.
 
  Finally, the in-depth interview responses are also used as a preliminary check of the 
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hypotheses -- to see whether individuals actively engaged in parties see a link between 
democracy, pluralism, and outcomes for women.
1
   
  A. Democratic Practices in Operating Procedures  
Scholars maintain that the level of parties‟ institutionalization (e.g., party-age, 
organizational structure, internal rules, membership, operating procedures and practices, links to 
society) influences female parliamentary representation.
2
 Guided by this scholarship, I look at 
parties that employ democratic practices in the transfer of leadership and decision-making to find 
out whether these practices influence female party membership and enhance their leadership 
prospects. Democratic practices imply granting equal opportunity to all members to compete for 
any position and at any level.
 3
 I expect that parties employing democratic procedures enhance 
female membership and leadership more than parties that do not employ these procedures 
(hypothesis H2); and examine whether my informants also find this. In order, though, to assess 
whether this theory finds support among the party leaders, female members and activists 
included in my survey, I analyze their responses to the question “Do you find that democratic 
procedures enhance women’s membership and leadership chances?”  
 A female activist and political scientist in a civil-confessional party that sees itself as 
democratic lists democratic procedures and other elements of import to women‟s leadership:   
First and foremost, secularism is at the top of the list since once religion (Christianity or 
Islam) enters into the formula it is automatically associated with patriarchy, which is the 
major barrier to women‟s leadership.  Second, institutionalization, and the presence of 
                                                   
1  For a conceptualization of pluralism in party membership and democratic procedures, refer to chapter One. 
 
2    See, Lovenduski and Norris 1995, Kittilson 1997, Tessler 2002, among others. 
 
3  For detailed theoretical justification, see chapter One. For instance, Basu suggests that, “In general, the 
stronger democratic institutions and practices are, the greater the opportunities this affords to women to achieve 
representation through the party system.” (2005: 34). Thus, more in-depth research is needed to study how different 
operating procedures within parties influence women‟s leadership (See also, Fish 2002, Donno and Russett 2004, 
Norris and Lovenduski 1993, Basu 2005, and Deeb 2006, among others). 
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explicit, clear, transparent, replicable rules which allow for accountability are critical. 
Third, democratic procedures that include competitive elections, consultative decision-
making, and meritocratic promotion system are free of gender bias or nepotism. 
 
In this connection, a female activist in a pre-war secular, leftist, democratic and pluralist party 
critically remarks that, 
Parties marked by democratic deficits and in which the consultative process in decision-
making is weak do not work well for women‟s leadership. This is mainly because women 
are not given equal opportunities in recruitment, selection, promotion, and nomination to 
office.  
 
Another respondent, a former female MP candidate from an Islamist party asserts that,  
Men block women from leadership positions, especially in religious parties. If 
democracy is practiced instead of being proclaimed, women would have had a greater 
chance of assuming leadership. In effect, the democratic deficit in Islamist parties is the 




   
 These statements indicate that democratic practices are recognized by respondents as factors of 
import for women‟s leadership. These politicians and activists, who are also scholars, are 
reporting from their own vantage points. They are both in top leadership positions, which is 
reassuring because it substantiates my theoretical expectations.  
Information from party by-laws, supported by party administrators, provides data on the 
process of leadership transition and on the composition of membership by religious affiliation 
(plural or otherwise). However, in the case of decision-making, information is based solely on 
statements of party leaders and female activists. In the following paragraphs, I examine 
separately transfer of leadership and decision-making practices in the inner working of political 
parties.   
1.  Transfer of leadership 
                                                   
4   In effect, interviews conducted with women in many religious parties had to be cleared by party leadership, 
which reflects democratic deficits and authoritarianism permeating some of these parties. They control women -- 




One indicator of democratic practices is the smooth, peaceful and competitive process by 
which leadership is transferred among party elites. In this context, Tessler notes that, “ 
Institutional and process considerations call attention to the need for mechanisms that make 
political leaders accountable to those they govern, including free, competitive, and regular 
elections.” (2002: 337).   
Data on transfer of leadership cover the term in office and periodicity of elections, 
nominations to office, competitiveness and contestation, as well as by-laws ensuring 
transparency and smoothness of the process. Information from party by-laws and party 
administrators is used to evaluate the composition of membership by religious affiliation (plural 
or otherwise) and the process of leadership transitions. Information gathered from these sources 
shows that only five out of the 18 relevant parties pursue democratic process in leadership 
transitions. More precisely, in the three pre-war secular a-religious (Communist, Syrian Social 
and Baath) and two of the Sunni-dominated religious extremist parties (Islamic Group and 
Islamic Action), leadership is transferred in accordance with due democratic process via periodic 
and competitive elections as stipulated in the by-laws. Leadership in the other parties is 
personalized. In civil-confessional and in most religious parties, the same leaders are voted again 
and again into office, violating or amending the by-laws in the process. In these cases, no one 
dares to run against the current leader. The same leaders are either automatically renewed or they 
continue to lead by acclamation. More often than not, leadership in these parties is simply 
inherited as a family heirloom or as head of a religious sect. Party leaders are generally the 
feudal lords (Zai‟m, political boss or patron, charismatic leader) of the district where the party 
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initially formed. In most of these cases, party leadership is but a reflection of the prevalence of 
confessional identity over democratic process in leadership transitions.
5
   
 How does democratic process in leadership transitions affect women‟s chances in 
advancement and promotion to leadership? Responses of some female interviewees in post-war 
civil-confessional parties point to a gap between de jure by-laws and de facto practices. Even in 
parties that claim pursuit of due democratic process in leadership transfers – as in holding regular 
elections and open nominations for others to compete -- there is built-in gender-bias and/or fear 
of rocking the establishment, or both. In other words, women are afraid of antagonizing the 
current leader by running against him.  For example, a female activist in a civil-confessional 
party justifies that, “Women have not managed to build alliances and are not supported by the 
party‟s rules and by-laws. It may be against the conventional wisdom to run for the top post.” 
This female activist implies that women have (a) to build alliances with men in the party to 
secure their support if they run for top position(s); and (b) that the party by-laws must include 
special measures to ensure that women are guaranteed opportunity in this process. To 
corroborate her statement, the only female Secretary-General in a post-war civil-confessional 
party states that, 
I have a dream to lead the party one day. But, I know that I will have limited support not 
because I am a woman, but because the party unanimously elected the son of the 
assassinated founder of the party as the leader. He is young, driven, and performing well. 
However, in order to influence decision-making, women should be visible and impose 
their presence.   
This supports the argument of Anne Phillips‟ (1995) that “…the only way that institutions will 
change is through the politics of their (women’s) presence (in Duerst-Lahti, 2006:10). Opinions 
of other interlocutors differ from this female activist. For instance, a female activist in a civil-
                                                   
5  For instance, the by-laws of a war-origin religious conservative but not extremist party were amended to re-
elect the current leader, who took office after the assassination of his predecessor.  
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confessional party remarks that, “There is no need to run against our leader, especially since he is 
young, liberal, modern, tolerant and above all charismatic. Continuity in leadership outweighs 
change.” She does not feel right about rocking a boat, which is on track. However, she is aware 
that nothing should prevent women from competing for top position(s) since democratic 
procedures in the party are in place. Therefore, this may be a matter of personal choice by 
women but not a failure of democratic process.  
In contrast, a female party activist in a pre-war secular party musters her courage to run 
against the current male leader. In so doing, she is making a statement that competition is open to 
all and that democratic process in the party is not a failure. She stresses that, “I am determined to 
run for leadership of the party, although I have slim chances of winning. But, I want to make a 
statement. Women constitute a good proportion of the party‟s membership and they deserve 
more representation in leadership positions.” Indeed, she ran in party elections during summer 
2010 and she is now vice president of the Communist Party. Another case in point is that in a 
post-war civil-confessional party, a female was elected as president of the party and ran the party 
for eleven years until her husband was released from prison in the post-war period. Although this 
demonstrates that the transition process did not block a female candidate, this episode may still 
count as an instance of a within-family leadership transition, rather than as a transparent and 
rule-guided process. However, when she was interviewed, she sang the praises of democratic 
process in the party and how she ran the party for eleven years and the difficulties she faced as a 
woman until she imposed her presence „a-la-Phillips‟.  
Nevertheless, impressions gained from responses of party leaders and female activists 
indicate that democratic procedures in leadership transitions are viewed as a factor explaining 
women‟s prospects and that sometimes the absence of open competition for party leadership has 
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deterred women from seeking top posts. Are women involved in the decision-making process? 
The following section addresses this issue to see whether women‟s involvement or lack of it can 
explain party behaviour towards their chances for leadership.    
2. Decision-making process 
Political parties may have a centralized or decentralized system of decision-making. 
Scholars suggest that, “It may make a difference whether the party is centralized, whether it has 
close connections with interest organizations of various kinds, and how large its membership is.” 
(Lane and Ersson, 1987:96)  However, Kittilson (1997) maintains that centralization – seen as 
decisions taken centrally but not necessarily by top elites only -- is better for women‟s 
leadership. Other scholars argue – and I share their views-- that decentralization in decision-
making works better for women‟s leadership because it involves consultation, allows 
contestation and freedom of expression.
6
 I refer to centralization or decentralization in decision-
making as the „how‟ and „by whom‟ not as to „where‟ decisions are taken within the parties‟ 
organizational structure. In other words, if this process is centralized in the hands of a few elites 
at the top or decentralized via a consultative process in which women are involved. In the 
previous section, parties are categorized as democratic or not, on the basis of the process of how 
                                                   
6  The United Nations provides guidelines for policy-makers in democratizing and conflict-stricken areas to 
empower women and promote leadership in political parties. This checklist includes the following queries: “(1) 
Have the constitution, manifesto, policies and structures of each political party incorporated gender equality and 
women‟s empowerment objectives to ensure equal representation and participation of women and men in decision-
making at all levels? (2) Do the procedures to select candidates for decision-making positions within the party 
structures, as well as nomination to presidential, parliamentary, provincial and local government positions, allow for 
gender equality between women and men? Are the party leadership and nomination structures democratic, 
transparent, gender balanced and gender sensitive? (3) Do the political parties have programmes to ensure an 
increased number of women in party decision-making structures at all levels and for the nomination to parliamentary 
provincial and local councils so that a minimum target of at least 30% of women in such bodies is achieved? (4) Do 
political parties include commitments to promote gender equality as a priority issue in their manifestos and 
campaign platforms?  (5) Do political parties have awareness raising, training and capacity building programmes, 
specifically for women members, aimed at enhancing their capacities and competences? (6) Have the political 
parties set norms and standards aimed at promoting the position of women …?” (United Nations Office of the 
Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI), Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs (DESA), “Women and Electoral Resource Guide: Enhancing Women’s Participation in Electoral Processes 
in Post-conflict Countries” (New York: United Nations), 2004:. 3. See, Lovenduski and Norris 1993.   
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leadership is transferred.  I also examine the process – decentralized or centralized-- by which 
decisions are taken within the inner workings of parties; and whether women see that this affects 
their leadership prospects. Both of these indicators of democratic procedures are coded for 
quantitative testing. 
 Responses of interviewees describing whether the process of decision-making is 
centralized or decentralized and whether women are involved provides data on the inner 
workings of the 18 relevant parties in this respect. Twelve out of the 18 relevant parties pursue 
decentralized decision-making in which women are involved. These include all four secular 
parties (Communist, Syrian Social and Baath, and Tajaddod), and eight of the nine civil-
confessional parties (except National Liberals). However, all five parties with religious platforms 
do not involve women in the decision-making process.
7
  
The following discussion relates to democratic procedures, especially how few elites in 
some parties continue to hold the decision-making powers within their hands, although this may 
favor women‟s leadership. For example, a female activist in a civil-confessional party reports 
that, “The party leader wanted more women in leadership positions. So, he encouraged those 
who are qualified to run for executive office. I ran but when I did not win, he appointed me to the 
council.”  Another case in point is the one-time appointment of six women to leadership 
positions by the leader of a religious but tolerant party, just before elections. This was hailed by 
the media, but feminists and political observers are skeptical that such a step will not be 
sustained since it did not follow due process and is not institutionalized. The leader of a pre-war 
secular party criticizes such decisions in that, “This was only to improve the image in the public 
                                                   
7  The situation in these religious parties does not support the findings of Mervat Hatem (1994) in her 
research on Islamist parties in Egypt that there is no difference between liberal and Islamist parties with respect to 
women‟s leadership. But, it somewhat supports Fish‟s argument if extended from political regimes to political 
parties, since one sees less women in leadership positions in these parties. Although other studies show that some 
Islamist parties have women at their helm in Pakistan, Bangladesh or Malaysia (Basu 2005), as well as in Morocco 
or Algeria (Charrad 1998). See, also detailed discussion on authoritarianism in religious parties in chapter One. 
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eye in view of forthcoming elections. If the party is committed to empowering women, the rules 
and by-laws should be amended, and an internal quota for women introduced after consultations. 
This will enhance women‟s share in leadership bodies.” Despite the fact that the share of women 
in leadership increased, the leader‟s action was taken unilaterally without due democratic process 
of consultation and outside of party by-laws. This is what Clark refers to as „strategic 
maneuverings‟ to advance women for purposes other than empowering them and for discrete 
objectives (Schwedler and Clark, 2003: 303).   
 Such decisions do not augur well for women‟s leadership, since these decisions are not 
transformed into explicit or replicable rules, and do not allow for accountability (Lovenduski and 
Norris 1993: 215). Similar criticisms of what scholars refer to as „benevolent autocracy‟ are 
expressed by political observers highlighting the risks to democratic procedures of such unilateral 
decision-making.
8
 In comparison and for purposes of demonstrating how decentralized and 
transparent decision-making favors women‟s advancement, the leader of a pre-war secular party 
reports that, 
The legislative body of the communist party proposed to nominate at least one woman in 
each electoral list of the party. Towards this end, and after thorough consultation, the by-
laws were amended to ensure adequate representation of the youth and women.  
In order to find out whether women are involved in the decision-making process and in 
which parties they are more likely to do so, I asked party officials the question “Are women 
involved in the decision-making process within the party?”  A female deputy officer of public 
relations department in a conservative religious party states as a matter of fact   that, “In our 
                                                   
8
   Scholars note that, “…, if party leaders are sympathetic to the need to promote gender equality, for example 
if they want to appeal to women voters, then they have considerable power to do so. Through patronage party 
leaders can improve the position of women in party lists or place them in good constituencies. As a result under the 
system of „benevolent autocracy‟ women can be promoted relatively quickly although without institutional 
safeguards the gains can be quickly reversed. … Since the process is not rule-governed, changing the rules will not 
change the outcomes. (Lovenduski & Norris, 1993: 323) 
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society, men take decisions alone without taking women‟s opinion. So, why should you expect 
this to be different in political parties?” Also, the head of another women‟s wing in a religious 
extremist party remarks that, 
As women, we do not deal with politics but leave this to men in the party. They are the 
political decision-makers. Women do not share in political decision-making. We are 
happy providing social services and religious advocacy. There is no coordination at all 
with men in the party, except maybe during elections when we receive our assignments. 
We are essential to amass women‟s votes, which men cannot do in conservative religious 
communities.  
Further, the head of the women‟s wing in a religious extremist party reports that, “Women do not 
share in the decision-making process and are not members in leadership bodies. They convey 
demands to the leader by phone or in writing without imposing them or contesting his decisions. 
He is the decision-maker.” A similar attestation is given by a female in another religious 
extremist party who states that, “Women are not consulted on nominations or any political 
decisions. But, our most valuable contribution is in elections. If our opinion is solicited, we 
communicate our views in writing to the leadership or to the decision-making committee.” The 
resolve to communicate by „remote control‟ and without direct consultation or contestation 
reflects the centralization of decision-making process in these religious extremist parties. In most 
of these parties, as a female official explains, “The leader consults with us on women‟s issues, 
which are low priority and on social issues but not on political policies. In other words, in 
matters of „soft‟ not „hard‟ politics.” Similarly, the head of a women‟s wing in a religious 
conservative party explains that, “Women are not members in decision-making bodies. We are 
consulted „as needed‟ and on social matters, but not in politics. Political decisions are considered 
men‟s specialization and are beyond women‟s capabilities.”  
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In general, most female officials in religious parties accept this marginalization in 
decision-making. Some even blame women for this situation, as the head of women‟s wing in a 
religious extremist party justifies that,  
Women lack political awareness and are not equipped to share in decision-making. For 
example, during elections women are handed the ballot and they just drop it in the box 
without questioning. Moreover, how do you expect them to share in important decisions 
when their mobility is restricted, especially in conservative communities? Decisions are 
taken at the top in this party by the leader without consultation with men or women.   
In contrast, however, women in the religious tolerant party (viz., Amal) are taking a more 
assertive stance, as the head of the women‟s wing points out that, “Women do not share in 
decision-making, especially not in important national decisions. But, we complained to the party 
leader requesting that women should share in decision-making and in leadership.” This position 
demonstrates that even amongst parties with religious platforms, women‟s views differ and 
reflect a less passive attitude towards their own status within the party. They are not as passive as 
those in extremist and conservative religious parties.  
Having examined the involvement of women in the decision-making process within 
extremist, conservative, and tolerant religious parties, I now turn to secular and civil-
confessional parties. The views of female activists in these relatively more democratic and/or 
decentralized in decision-making processes are also solicited to see whether they find that their 
involvement in the decision-making process does indeed enhance their leadership chances. For 
instance, the head of a women‟s wing in a post-war civil-confessional party where women are 
involved in decision-making at all levels, firmly states that,  
As members in decision-making bodies, women share in all decisions, soft and hard 
politics. The leader himself is a feminist and a democrat and makes it a point to consult 
with women. Democratic practices in decision-making are essential because they offer 




Similarly, a female party activist in another pre-war civil-confessional party with decentralized 
decision-making re-iterates that,  
Democratic practices are explicit in the party‟s by-laws and are manifest in its operating 
procedures, especially in consultation, dialogue and contestation. Once women are in 
leadership positions, they share in all decisions. These democratic practices raise 
women‟s political maturity and build a critical mass of women, which enhances their 
prospects for leadership and for public office.  
 
In a slightly different line of argument but still to drive the point that democratic practices work 
for women‟s leadership, a female interviewee argues that Christian-dominated parties pursue 
more democratic process than Muslim-dominated parties. She belongs to a civil-confessional 
party that involves women in the decision-making process, and she is reflecting how this 
translates into more opportunities for women in leadership. She justifies her position by stating 
that, “Christians do not discriminate against women. We follow democratic process in selection, 
election, and decision-making. This explains why there are more women in leadership and in 
decision-making positions in Christian than in Muslim parties and countries.”  
These representative statements reveal that in secular and civil-confessional parties the 
influence of democratic practices in decision-making and transfer of leadership on women‟s 
leadership is broadly recognized. In practice, there is party variation in women‟s involvement in 
decision-making across parties. In secular and civil-confessional parties, women are more likely 
to share in decision-making and to be effective. In extremist, conservative and tolerant religious 
parties, women do not share in the decision-making process. However, in extremist and 
conservative religious parties, women are more accepting and passive about it, while in the 
religious tolerant party (Amal), women are assertive and demand to share. This demonstrates that 
democratic process in decision-making might bear an influence on women‟s chances in 
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leadership. Women are prepared to attest that democratic practices have been important for their 
ability to advance and are an important part of opening party politics to women. 
What is also revealing is the comparison in responses of female and male interviewees, 
especially in parties with religious platforms. One finds congruence in attitudes but also the use 
of rhetoric in comparing the responses of party leaders and elites in religious parties to those of 
female officials on the decisions-making process. For instance, the leader of a religious extremist 
party states that, “Democratic practices in Islam are by shoura and consultation as stipulated in 
the doctrine. We consult with women in the party only as needed.”  Similar emphasis on the 
doctrine and shoura is given by another leader of another religious extremist party,  
Democracy in decision-making originated in Islam not in the West. The Koran dictates 
that,  „Make your daily decisions by consultation and shoura‟, but also „do not let women 
run your affairs‟. As for women, they belong at home where their role is more effective. 
In the party, they are consulted as needed on social and women‟s issues but they cannot 
lead men. This violates the Shari‟a. 
Similar views are offered by leaders and their senior advisers in other religious parties. The 
views of leaders and male elites do not essentially differ from the reality described and accepted 
by female officials in these parties. However, whether these views are de facto put in practice or 
remain in the normative realm, I argue, may explain at least part of the variation in women‟s 
leadership –or lack thereof- across these parties. One should be cautious that statements of party 
elites or women in leadership positions may sometimes be strategic in that they say what they 
think they should say in order to project a better image of the party. This is especially the case 
for female activists and elites in parties with extremist and conservative religious platforms.  
These officials declare, rhetorically, that their parties‟ inner workings follow Shoura and 
consultative process, which implies that women ought to be involved.  
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However, information culled from female activists reveals that heads of women‟s wings 
in conservative religious parties are ex-officio but non-voting members in decision-making 
bodies. They are not even members of decision-making bodies in religious extremist parties. 
This situation has severe ramifications on women‟s chances in leadership.  For instance, the only 
female in the politburo of a religious conservative party asserts that, “In my capacity as a 
politburo member, I share in decision-making. This is not the case in other Islamist parties where 
heads of women‟s wings are ex-officio non-voting members in decision-making bodies. This is 
also the case in my party. However, once women are in leadership positions, they impose their 
presence and their marginalization ceases.” This statement corroborates the „women‟s presence‟ 
argument, cited earlier (Phillips 1995). But, I find that some authoritarian religious parties are 
listening. Also, even if this solitary case is in the politburo of a religious conservative party, how 
effective can she be in an all-male politburo? This raises the issue of tokenism with respect to 
women‟s representation in these women-unfriendly environments. In this respect, the head of the 
women‟s wing in a religious conservative party states that, “I am a member of the executive 
council but have no voting power.” This intervention demonstrates the subordinate role that 
women‟s wings have in the decision-making process within religious parties. Indeed, the views 
of party leaders and their male advisers in religious parties reveal a circumscribed role for 
women in the decision-making process in comparison to those in secular and post-war civil-
confessional parties. The heads of women‟s wings in pre-war secular and post-war civil-
confessional parties are full-fledged voting members in decision-making and policy-making 
bodies.  
In sum, data gathered from party administrators and by-laws show that in five out of the 
18 relevant parties, leadership transitions follow democratic procedures of open and fair 
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competition. In decision-making, information from party officials reveals that 12 out of the 18 
relevant parties have decentralized decision-making. These two indicators of democratic 
practices are combined into one variable and coded on a 3-point scale: Three parties that pursue 
democratic practices in both leadership transition and decision-making are assigned a score of 
„2‟. Eleven parties which are democratic in one of the two indicators are assigned a score of „1‟. 
Four parties with democratic deficits on both counts are assigned a score of „0‟. This coding is 
essential for running the qualitative tests in chapter Six (see, Annex 6.1 on coding by party-level 
characteristics). 
 B. Pluralism in Composition of Membership   
 Pluralism implies tolerance to diversity and refers to inclusiveness in membership 
without formal restrictions or discrimination on the basis of gender, sect, or ethnicity. The party 
is said to be plural when the composition of its membership is multi-religious or when it is not 
confined to a single sect. Other scholars also consider composition of membership as affecting 
parties‟ overall performance and attitude especially towards women.9 This section explores 
pluralism as an explanatory variable for female party membership and whether pluralism also 
influences their prospects for leadership. I expect party pluralism in membership to attract 
women and plural parties to enhance women‟s leadership more than single-sect parties 
(hypothesis H3).  
 Information on the composition of membership was gathered from party administrators. 
As mentioned earlier, this data was difficult to obtain, because pre-war parties did not maintain a 
computerized database to facilitate retrieval of such information. Moreover, in the pre-war 
period, information on party membership was considered confidential. However, thanks to the 
                                                   
9   Kittilson 1997, Lovenduski and Norris 1993 and 1995, and Inglehart & Norris 2004, among others 
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receptiveness of party administrators, I was given access to party records and registers and was 
assisted by party personnel to compile the data manually. Religious affiliation in some parties is 
not recorded as evidence that it does not matter for party membership. Thus, guess estimates had 
to taken because of unisex names for female membership and difficulties in differentiating 
Christian from Muslim surnames. In post-war parties, this data and information was more readily 
available. The information gathered shows that there are seven out of the 18 relevant parties that 
have plural membership. There are four secular parties (viz., Communist, Syrian Social National, 
and the Arab Socialist Ba‟ath; as well as Tajaddod), and three civil-confessional parties (viz., 
Progressive Socialist, Tayyar and Future). All three pre-war secular parties with leftist tendencies 
have plural membership, although the diversity in membership, in terms of variety of sects, 
shrunk after the war. Post-war secular parties like the Democratic Renewal party (Tajaddod) 
have plural membership, which was set by its founding members who profiled and invited 
women and men to join the party. 
10
 Despite gender balance and confessional representation, 
such a selective process renders the party elitist, closed and exclusive. This elicited criticism 
among political circles, as a female scholar remarks that, “Pluralism is a plus and encourages 
women to join such parties. The Tajaddod, however, is a sham, because its sole objective is 
promoting the founder and current leader (a Maronite Christian) to public office and the 
presidency. The party is elitist and exclusive.” 
 In addition, data compiled indicate that the majority of political parties in Lebanon are 
confessionally-dominated. Some parties are dominated by a single sect with membership 
exclusive to that sect and denied to all others unless they convert, as several interviewees noted 
                                                   
10  Other pluralist parties are the National Secular Democratic Party, and Democratic Left, or the Civil Centre 





and as also clear from these parties‟ by-laws. This group comprises all parties with religious 
platforms. Membership in pre-war, war and post-war religious parties is exclusive to one sect, 
either to Muslim Sunnis or Shiites.
11
 Pre-war and post-war Sunni-dominated religious extremist 
parties like the Islamic Group (Jama‟a Islamiah), the Unitarian Movement (Al-Tawhid), and the 
Islamic Action Front (Jabhat Al-„Amal) have strong links to the Sunni community in the North. 
War-origin Shiite-dominated religious conservative and tolerant parties are powerful. The Party 
of God (Hizbullah) and Hope Movement (Amal), for instance, have vast memberships -- 
including women -- strong ties to society, and a stronghold over the Shiite community in the 
South. 
 By definition, civil-confessional parties are dominated by a single sect, albeit 
membership is open to other sects. In other words, there is nothing in the by-laws preventing 
people of other confessional denominations from joining civil-confessional parties. These 
include parties dominated by Druze (Progressive Socialist), Christian-Maronites (viz., Tayyar), 
and Muslim-Sunnis (viz., Future). However, these parties have members from other religious 
affiliations and sects. The other pre-war and post-war Maronite-dominated parties (Kata‟éb, 
Kutlah, Ahrar, Wa‟ad, Quwwat, and Marada) are open to other sects. Unlike religious parties 
whose membership is exclusive and closed to a single sect, membership in civil-confessional 
parties is open to other sects without the need to convert to the dominant sect. This is simply 
because for these parties religious affiliation is an identity and is not a religious goal. Civil-
confessional parties that do not have plural membership are evidence of religious cleavages, 
fragmentation and existence of separate islands and religious communities within the Lebanese 
society and polity.  
                                                   
11  The Sunni-dominated Islamic Welfare Projects Association (Al-Ahbash) or the Christian Democratic 




 Indeed, widening religious cleavages also saw party memberships shift from pre-war 
secular to post-war religious parties. This watershed strengthened confessional identities in such 
a manner that people tended to join parties of their own sect and/or religious affiliation, thereby 
reducing pluralism nationwide. This process was hardest on the pre-war leftist parties that saw 
membership and pluralism in their membership decline. Such a fate was shared by several pre-
war civil-confessional Christian and Druze dominated parties. In this respect, a senior official 
remarks that, “Pluralist membership shrank after the war in parties of secular and civil 
orientations, which discouraged women from joining these parties.”  Similar analysis is offered 
by pre-war civil-confessional parties (viz., Kata‟éb and Ahrar). Similarly, a leader of a pre-war 
civil-confessional party states that, “The plural character of the party was lost after the civil war 
as membership became largely dominated by Maronites. Membership from different sects 
dwindled, as did the number of women willing to join the party.”  The statements of several 
party leaders and female activists link the widening religious cleavages in the aftermath of the 
civil war and the loss of plural character in parties‟ membership to women‟s party membership 
and their leadership prospects. For instance, a leader of a pre-war civil-confessional party 
stresses that,  
The civil war saw growing religious extremism, ethnicities and racism but also shrinking 
pluralism. This is reflected not only in the society but also in its parties in which the 
multi-religious mix in membership declined. There are now less Shiites, Sunnis or Druze 
in our party, but also fewer women joining and more who left after the war. Women are 
attracted by open, transparent, pluralist and inclusive environment.   
 In this setting, Christians felt a fear of being marginalized, as a minority amongst 
Muslim-majorities. This resulted in increased immigration but also loss of pluralism and more 
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membership shifts in parties.
12
 A case in point is reported by another female activist who notes 
that heightened extremism also affected Muslims and they withdrew from membership of 
Christian-dominated parties, which adversely influenced pluralism therein. She explains that,  
Religious extremism increased after the war, especially among Muslim as opposed to 
more tolerant Christian members. Muslims in this Christian-dominated party became a 
minority and withdrew. The decline in pluralism discouraged other women from joining 
and the rise in fundamentalism chased them away into their own communities.  
 
In a similar comparison, a female activist in another post-war civil-confessional party observes, 
however, that religious extremism hit Christians and Muslims equally. Christian-dominated 
parties are attracting more Christians, which is undermining these parties‟ plural membership. 
Similar sentiments and fears are raised by a female activist in a pre-war civil-confessional party. 
She notes that the sectarian and confessional discourse, which emerged strongly and intensified 
in the post-war era, threatens the mere existence of Christians, as a minority amongst the 
Muslim-majority in Lebanon. She states that, 
The discourse about the existential status of Christians in Lebanon emerged strongly 
after the war, which strengthened extremism and confessionalism. Preserving the 
identity and existence of Christians in Lebanon is a major concern. Pluralism is suffering 
in the process, which is bridged by building alliances with Muslim Shiites. However, 
this loss of pluralism does not influence women‟s leadership.   
 
The response of this female official may be justified, since she observes that the loss of pluralism 
after the war did not change the party‟s policies towards women‟s leadership. This is because 
membership in the party now hails from a single-sect, Maronites only. It is not because pluralism 
does not count, but because it does not exist anymore. However, this did not change women‟s 
                                                   
12  In an article entitled “Christians tempted to emigrate as Lebanon grows increasingly ‘Islamized’”, Josie 
Ensor, Center for Arab Christian Research and Documentation (CEDRAC), notes that Christians who constituted 
50% in Lebanon are down to 34%: One-third left during the civil war and over 70,000 fled in July 2006 Israeli 
invasion. A poll (Information International) shows that half of the Maronites are considering emigrating because of 
Hizbullah. Similar situations are witnessed among other Arab Christians in Iraq, Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Jordan, and 
Palestine, which prompted Pope Benedict XVI to call for a special Synod of Bishops in October 2010.  He cites an 
enlightened Christian patriarch who remarks that “Lebanon has always been a bastion of religious tolerance, but 
now is moving toward a model of „Islamization‟ seen in Iraq and Egypt.” (Daily Star, September 29, 2009).   
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chances in leadership but changed the composition of the party‟s membership and the share of 
non-Maronite members, particularly women.  
 Thus, in general, the impressions gained from the statements by party leaders and female 
activists, particularly in secular and civil-confessional parties, reveal that pluralism is an attribute 
that parties care to maintain and/or regain. In order to find out whether party leaders and female 
activists also find – as hypothesized -- that pluralism influences female party membership and 
leadership, I examine their responses to the question -- Does pluralism matter for women’s 
membership and leadership in parties?  
 Several party officials stress that pluralism attracts more women to join parties, which 
raises their share in membership. For example, a female activist in a post-war civil-confessional 
party states that,  
Pluralist parties, although Christian-dominated, are definitely more attractive to women. 
Once they join, their leadership prospects are enhanced in plural parties. Indeed, we have 
huge female membership and women‟s share in our leadership bodies is good. Our 
members include Christians from all sects and even veiled Muslim women, who joined 
in large numbers because of our openness and pluralism.  
 
A similar supportive testimony is offered by a female, who is the chef de cabinet of the leader in 
the same plural party, stressing that,  
Our Christian-dominated party is liberal, modern, tolerant to diversity, and pluralist. 
These party characteristics encourage women to join in large numbers. In fact, female 
membership has grown immensely and is close to that in Hizbullah. Pluralism is 
synonymous to religious tolerance and this is attractive to women in politics. We have 
high shares of women in leadership. 
 
These are strong testaments of the influence of pluralism on both, female membership and their 
leadership prospects. Another female activist in a post-war civil-confessional party not only 
expressed support for pluralism, but also broadened the concept of pluralism to include minority 
groups. She suggests that, “Pluralism implies tolerance to religious diversity. But, this should 
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also encompass openness and tolerance to homosexuals and lesbians, which enlarges the scope 
and attracts more women to join. Such plural and open parties, by definition, are more receptive 
to women‟s leadership.” These views are shared by a Christian female in leadership position in a 
Druze-dominated pre-war civil-confessional party, who states that,  
The plural character and disposition of our party continues to attract women from other 
sects, though in less proportions after the war. Pluralism in the party has attracted 
women from all sects, Christians, Sunnis, Shiites and Druze, because they are 
recognized as equals, irrespective of their religious affiliation. I am a Christian in 
leadership position in a Druze-dominated party. Isn‟t this ample evidence that pluralism 
matters for women‟s leadership?  
 
These statements provide evidence that, despite the waning of pluralism in the aftermath of the 
civil war, this party-level characteristic continues to be recognized as an attribute that women 
factor into their consideration in joining parties and has, indeed, enhanced their ascendance to 
leadership posts.  
 Responses of other party officials, especially those from single-sect and/or 
confessionally-dominated parties, reflect ambivalence about the influence of pluralism on 
membership and, in turn on leadership. For instance, a female activist in a post-war civil-
confessional party that is not plural observes that,  
Individuals tend to join parties of their own confessional sect. They must be very 
courageous to join a party outside their own faith (e.g. a Muslim to join a Christian-
dominated party, or vice-versa). Therefore, I do not see a case for pluralism as a factor 
influencing women‟s membership or their leadership prospects, at least, not in a 
confessional society as Lebanon. 
 
Similarly, a female activist in a post-war secular a-religious and plural party highlights, that 
while pluralism is important, its significance is essentially a factor of individual religiosity. She 
explains that, “In principle, pluralism may be attractive to women who are less religious and 
more secular. However, women who are religiously committed may identify with and join 
parties formed along their own sect. In this case, pluralism does not influence their choice of a 
136 
 
party.” This statement is important in that it shows that personal preferences – as religious 
commitment – in some instances motivate women‟s political involvement more than pluralism, 
while the contrary is true in the case of women who are more secularly-inclined. This view is 
corroborated by a female official in pre-war Sunni-dominated not plural religious extremist party 
stating that, “Pluralism in membership is not a must for women, since religion is not a barrier to 
women in religious parties. Religious commitment and conviction is much more attractive to 
women than pluralism for party membership.” This respondent also suggests that pluralism is not 
relevant for women in parties dominated by a single-sect. These statements link women‟s 
membership and leadership to parties‟ pluralism and religiosity but mainly to women‟s religious 
affiliation and their personal religious convictions and preferences. In this case, pluralism seems 
to be a function of women‟s own religious affiliation. These respondents do not deny that 
pluralism is important for parties that are not single-sect or confessionally dominated. However, 
they say it is not relevant in single-sect dominated parties where all members hail from the same 
sect, and in turn may not influence leadership prospects. More precisely, pluralism is attractive 
but can be trumped by religious conviction for women who are religious. Women may join such 
parties out of conviction, but this doesn't mean they will be promoted to leadership transitions.   
 A third category of responses point out that pluralism matters to female party 
membership but is not relevant for their ascendance to leadership. For instance, a female MP in a 
post-war secular pluralist party remarks that “Pluralism in political parties attracts more women 
to join as members. But, whether this leads to leadership positions depends upon the type of 
party, its by-laws as well as party elites.” Similarly, a female activist in a pre-war secular leftist 
party that boasts plural membership who sees that,  
Pluralism and inclusiveness in parties encourage women to join and become politically 
active. This is because plural parties do not discriminate against women on the basis of 
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religious or sectarian affiliation, which provides a women-friendly environment for 
political involvement. As for leadership, this is a different equation. 
  
Also, a senior adviser to the leader of a post-war civil-confessional Sunni-dominated party notes 
that,  
Around one-fourth of the party membership is from other religious sects. The party‟s 
openness, tolerance to diversity, and pluralism are at the root of its popularity among 
women. However, their assumption of leadership positions depends upon merit, 
performance, and fair competition.      
These statements highlight that while pluralism increases female membership, it is not an entry 
ticket into leadership bodies.   
 A fourth category of responses from officials in religious parties also support pluralism, 
in theory, but among sects within the same religious domination. All these parties do not have 
plural membership, as mentioned above, but they have a different conception or variant of 
pluralism. The leader of a post-war Sunni-dominated religious extremist party stresses that his 
party is plural in that,  
The party‟s membership is Sunnis and „Alawites‟. For me, this is the pluralism that 
attracts women and men. As for tolerance to diversity and openness, I am a Sufi Muslim 




Apparently, this is a different conception of pluralism, which may not reflect tolerance to 
diversity and openness to dialogue. In practice, pluralism is not relevant to religious parties since 
these parties are exclusive and closed to single-sect membership, despite their claims otherwise. 
They are open to other sects once applicants convert and commit to their religious and political 
platforms. For instance, a female in a religious tolerant party remarks that, “Pluralism in thought 
and ideology enriches the party in all its forms. Confessional pluralism is okay, but only if it 
                                                   
13   „Alawites‟ are a separate sub-sect within the Sunni sect. But, this clergy being a salafist and religious 
extremist, he does not consider them as such. There are minor differences in jurisprudence and in religious rituals 
and practices.  
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does not contradict the main religious goals of the party.”  In this vein, a female official in a pre-
war religious extremist party responds that,  
Pluralism represents openness, tolerance and enlightenment. These are essential 
prerequisites for spreading the religious thought and for recruiting other women. Other 
sects are welcome to join and we are willing to teach them the correct doctrine. This is 
how we understand pluralism and how we apply it. 
  
These statements reveal a de jure support for pluralism but not a de facto one. Resorting to a 
different line of argument on the relevance of pluralism, a senior adviser to the leader of a 
religious conservative party explains that,  
The Party is open to all those who believe in its ideology and are committed to its goals. 
We are open to all sects, all classes, the poor and rich, and all those who believe in our 
cause.  However, only Shiites and those who believe in our ideology can join the party. 
The others can join the Saraya of resistance.  
Moreover, in laying out the party‟s membership rules, the second-top ranking official in 
Hizbullah, Sheikh Qassem, stresses that,  
This does not mean that other groups or individuals would be denied commitment to the 
objectives and organizational setup of the Party, nor allegiance to its trajectory. This is 
so given that the participation of some Shi‟is in Hizbullah was the result of doctrinal and 
not confessional allegiance, as many other Party members do not follow the sectarian 
element – thus rendering the common ground doctrinal as opposed to confessional. 
(Qassem, 2005: 33) 
 
This declaration of openness to diversity and pluralism is oxymoron, since membership is 
contingent upon full commitment (including converting) to the tenets of Shi‟ism, which in effect 
closes the main body of the party to Shiites and puts a hold on any claim of pluralism. This is 
also evidenced in the statement of another senior official who stresses that applicants must be 
committed to the religious goals of the party in order to be accepted as members. He states that, 
“There are applicants for membership who have been declined because they did not pass the 
basic criteria of religious commitment. Those who are interested but are not believers in our 
religious thought and ideology can always join as supporters to our resistance movement.”  
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Turning to a similar reasoning, a female official in another Shiite-dominated religious but 
tolerant party suggests that, 
The party has a Shiite majority and leadership. In fact, we had more Christians and 
Sunnis from the South when Imam Musa El-Sadr founded the Party. This pluralism is 
lost after the war. Nonetheless, there are no rules that prevent other sects from joining 
the party, except commitment to our goals and values.  
 As these statements demonstrate, religious parties view pluralism, in theory and 
normative terms, as an attribute that they care to project since it improves their image in the 
public eye. They see pluralism as a mobilization and recruitment tool, especially of women, but 
not for leadership. This tension between reality and perceptions is reflected in a statement by a 
female party official in that, 
Contrary to public view and common misconceptions, Hizbullah is a democratic party, 
where we enjoy freedom of expression and contestation. There is pluralism in the party‟s 
resistance wing, Al-Saraya. We also are open and tolerant as evidenced from our 
alliances with parties of other religious sects (e.g. Christians of Tayyar). This 
demonstrates our pluralism, openness, and tolerance to diversity.  
This begs the question of the meaning and implications of pluralism in a single-sect religious 
party, which represents a contradiction in terms. In contrast to parties with secular and civil-
confessional platforms, the majority of religious parties will acknowledge that pluralism is 
attractive to women but will argue that it does not matter for their leadership prospects. Indeed, 
religious parties compensate for their plural-deficient membership via building alliances with 
parties whose membership is dominated by other religious sects.
14
 This also serves, however, as 
evidence that pluralism is considered a welcome attribute even in these parties.   
In broad strokes, then, the party officials interviewed are supportive of the proposition 
that pluralism influences female party membership, although there are mixed views on how this 
might affect women‟s leadership opportunities. More specifically, secular a-religious and civil-
                                                   
14  There are currently two major competing political blocs in Lebanon, each of which is composed of various 
Christian and Muslim factions. Thus, ensuring that at a minimum the coalitions have a pluralist composition. 
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confessional parties view that pluralism attracts more women to membership, which paves the 
road for leadership. Officials of these parties provide empirical accounts that pluralism attracts 
more women to join and assume leadership positions. At the same time, while several religious 
parties, in principle, support pluralism for membership, they see it as irrelevant for women‟s 
leadership. Some political leaders and female party activists, I must admit, say what they think 
should be said and what they see as strategic in projecting an acceptable image. In general, party 
officials from these plural-deficient parties downplayed or even denied the importance of 
pluralism for membership, given that they are single-sect parties and that the only way that 
members of different sects will be admitted if they convert, which by itself is oxymoron. The 
importance given to pluralism by many informants, however, even amongst some in parties with 
religious platforms, supports my expectation that pluralism attracts women to join parties. The 
presence of these women is likely to influence their leadership prospects in parties‟ decision-
making bodies. These findings guide the quantitative research in chapter Six.  
In sum, returning to factors theorized to affect women‟s leadership, the insights gained 
from many party officials support the expectation that democratic practices in transfer of 
leadership and decision-making bear on women‟s leadership chances.  Parties employing 
democratic process offer women equal opportunities to compete for all positions, which bode 
well for their ascendance to leadership. The majority of responses from party leaders and female 
activists point to the centrality of democratic practices in operating procedures in enhancing 
women‟s chances in leadership. This justifies consideration of democratic practices, as well as 
pluralism, as potential explanatory factors for women‟s leadership in political parties.  
 These statements reflect the negative influence of conflict on religiosity and pluralism as 
these factors relate to women‟s membership and in turn on their leadership prospects. The 
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analysis offered by pre-war parties with secular and civil platforms and plural membership 
supports the assumption that parties‟ pluralism is attractive to women and as such influences 
their leadership prospects. In effect, shrinking pluralism in pre-war parties is attributed to 
membership shifts to powerful war-origin religious and post-war civil-confessional parties, as 
shown earlier. All these factors combined to thwart attempts to regain lost pluralism and 
membership, including of women. That conflict has negative implications on widening religious-
based cleavages and heightening extremist tendencies is by no means sui generis to Lebanon. 
However, this phenomenon appears to bear a negative influence on plural membership of parties. 
This is evidenced by the mushrooming of confessionally-dominated and single-sect membership 
parties in the post-war era, which is hypothesized to influence women‟s membership and their 
leadership chances. The following chapter addresses female membership as another potential 
variable in explaining women‟s leadership. The chapter focuses on party variation in 






Female Membership & Party Mobilization   
 
The preceding chapters explore whether party variation in religiosity, democratic procedures 
in leadership transitions and decision-making, and pluralism in membership could explain variation 
in female membership and leadership across parties. In these chapters, the views of politicians in 
Lebanese parties on the role of these factors are solicited and initial evidence of their effect on 
women‘s leadership is drawn. In the early exposition of the theory, I argue that democratic practices 
and pluralism influence female party membership, which in turn affects women‘s leadership. Within 
this conceptual framework and the understandings gained, I expect that female party membership 
increases in parties employing democratic procedures and whose membership is plural. However, I 
do not expect the intensity of religiosity on party platforms to influence female membership. This is 
premised on the fact that women tend to join parties voluntarily and by choice, motivated by their 
personal interests and preferences, while their ascendance to leadership is in the hands of party elites. 
Further, information gleaned indicates that the post-war era saw a new set of parties emerge with a 
whole new outlook to the role of women in politics. Indeed, elites in post war secular and civil-
confessional parties exhibit a more receptive attitude towards women than most pre-war parties. 
These parties are more traditional, less modern and women-friendly than their counterpart post-war 
parties. Even some of the religious parties, like Amal, are relatively more receptive to women than 
pre-war religious extremist parties. However, many post-war parties seek women as members but 
may not be ‗women-friendly‘. Therefore, in general, pre-war parties are less geared to mobilizing and 
involving women than post-war parties. Therefore, I expect female membership to be higher in post-
war than in pre-war parties (H5).
1
 
                                               




This chapter provides data on female party membership in the 18 relevant parties and presents 
information drawn from the statements of party leaders and female party activists on the subject of 
membership to see if those statements support my theoretical expectations.
2
 Party variation in 
mobilization strategies is examined from answers of interviewees to questions on the motivations of 
parties for mobilizing women, and the modalities and mechanisms they employ in this process. The 
chapter proceeds in three sections. The introductory paragraphs report data on female party 
membership. Section A examines party variation in motivations for mobilizing women by focusing 
on (1) public image enhancements, and (2) the special contributions that women make. Section B lays 
out the modalities that parties employ in targeting women with particular attention to (1) religious 
mobilization, and (2) in-kind and financial incentives. Section C addresses the effectiveness of 
special women‘s wings in (1) recruiting women and increasing their share in party membership; (2) 
creating a critical mass of women for leadership; and (3) amassing women‘s votes for elections.  
Finally, this chapter explores the likely effect of female membership on women‘s leadership, 
studying particularly the role of women‘s wings as a mechanism for marginalizing women in political 
parties.    
 Female party membership is presented graphically in charts 5.1 to 5.9 (next pages). Chart 5.1 
shows that, on average, the share of female membership in post-war parties is higher than in pre-war 
parties, as hypothesized (H5). A difference of means test is significant across pre-war and war/post-
war parties (17.2 compared to 34.8, respectively). Given that there is a small number of relevant 
parties (n=18), the five relevant religious parties (extremist, conservative, and tolerant) are collapsed 
into one religious group in charts 5.3 (see, table 3.1 in chapter Three and Annex 6.1 in chapter Six on 
coding party-level variables.  
                                               
2   Data on female membership are obtained from party administrators and elites in the 18 relevant parties based on 
a questionnaire (see, Annex 1 to dissertation). In addition, manual compilation from registers of parties was undertaken in 



































Pre-War War & Post-War
Chart 5.1 Female Membership by Party-Age
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 Religious incl. Extremist, Conservative & Tolerant Parties
Chart 5.3 Female Membership by Party-Religiosity



































Pre-War War & Post-War
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
('1' Extremist; '2' Conservative; '3' Tolerant; '4' Civil-Confessional; '5' Secular)
Chart 5.4 Female Membership by Party-Age & Party-Religiosity
   
Chart 5.2 shows that, female membership is highest in the war-origin conservative but not extremist 
religious party. Chart 5.3 shows that, on average, the share of women in membership of the group of 
religious parties is higher than it is in civil-confessional and secular parties. This is also confirmed in 
chart 5.4 which looks at these variations by party-age. Among the pre-war parties, average female 
membership is higher in religious extremist parties than in other categories. There are no conservative 
and tolerant parties in the pre-war period. Amongst the war and post-war parties, Hizbullah, the only 
conservative religious party, has the highest membership, followed by the group of post-war civil-
confessional parties. In chart 5.5, average female membership in slightly higher in post-war civil-




female membership reveal that most religious parties, both those established prior to the civil war and 

































Pre-War War & Post-War
Religious Civil-Conf. Secular Religious Civil-Conf. Secular
('Religious': Extremist, Conservative & Tolerant Parties)
Chart 5.5 Female Membership by Party-Age & Party-Religiosity










































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
































Dem. Deficit Leadership or decentralization Democratic
Chart 5.7 Female Membership by Party Democratic Practices































Chart 5.8 Female Membership by Party Pluralism
            
However, female membership is highest in Tayyar (51%) followed closely by Marada and Hizbullah 
(50%): two civil-confessional parties (Tayyar and Marada), and a conservative but not extremist 
religious party (Hizbullah). This is despite the fact that these parties have low (4) as well as high (2) 
scores on religiosity; and two parties are marked by plural and democratic deficits. Further, female 
membership is higher in Shiite-dominated than in Sunni-dominated religious parties, an observation 
that requires further examination. Large female membership in religious parties is a common 
                                               
3   Party ID codes are: Communists (1), Syrian Social (2), Phalanges (3), National Bloc (4), Baath (5), Progressive 
Socialist (6), Liberals (7), Islamic Group (8), Hope (9), Unitarian (10), Hizbullah (11), Wa‘ad (12), Renewal (13), Tayyar 




phenomenon observed by several scholars studying these parties in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh 
and India, as well as in Algeria, Yemen, Jordan, Egypt, among others.
4
 
Charts 5.7 and 5.8 show that, on average, female membership is highest in parties marked by 
deficits in democracy and pluralism.
5
  Parties that are democratic on both indicators, leadership 
transitions and decision-making, have significantly smaller average share of female membership than 
other parties.  Further, the difference in means for pluralism on female membership shows that it is 
not significant (28.2 for single-sect parties and 24.9 for multi-religious membership parties). 
Moreover, female membership is higher in parties with higher religiosity and deficits in democratic 
practices and pluralism as well as those with lower religiosity but employ democratic process in 
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4   See, among others, Janine Astrid Clark and Jillian Schwedler, ―Who Opened the Window? Women’s Activism in 
Islamist Parties‖, in Comparative Politics (Vol. 35.3, April 2003); Janine Clark, ―Women in Islamist parties: The case of 
Jordan’s Islamic Action Front‖, in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Arab Reform Bulletin (July 2004); and , 
Amrita Basu, ―Women, Political parties and Social Movements in South Asia‖, Occasional paper 5 (United Nations 
Research In statute for Social Development (UNRISD), July 2005).  
 
5   Parties are coded ‗2‘ when they employ democratic practices in leadership transitions and in decision-making. 
They are assigned ‗1‘ when they employ one of these two indicators; and ‗0‘ when they are not democratic in both 




These initial results are not consistent with the hypotheses H2A and H3A.  In order to explain 
these unanticipated results, additional information will be sought from party officials and given in the 
following sections. 
A. Motivations: Pre-war & post-war parties 
 
Total membership, including women, in pre-war secular a-religious parties dwindled and their 
pluralism shrank in the aftermath of the civil war. Widening religious cleavages in the post-war era 
split the population into separate enclaves and isolated islands of different religious communities.
6
 
This is reflected in memberships shifting from weakened pre-war secular parties to stronger and/or 
affluent war-origin religious conservative (Hizbullah) and tolerant (Amal) parties. Many women, 
especially the poor and deprived, turned to religion and took refuge in parties of their own sects.  This 
provides a partial explanation for the lower female membership in pre-war secular parties compared 
to war and post-war religious parties.
7
   
On the supply side of female party membership, information gathered from female party 
activists, shows that women are motivated to join parties for a plethora of different reasons. Women 
join secular leftist parties owing to ideology, pluralism, democratic practices, family affiliations, 
community allegiance, women‘s rights and social equity issues, as well as the charisma of leadership. 
They join civil-confessional parties because they are politically driven by national sovereignty, 
existentialism, and preservation of their confessional identities, whether Muslim or Christian. In these 
parties, women have political ambitions and are assertive in demanding leadership positions. In 
contrast, women, especially the poor and deprived, join religious parties because of their faith and 
                                               
6  Until 1990, Beirut was split into East for Christians and West for Muslims, as well as the rest of the country, 
which restricted mobility of citizens for fear of assassinations on the basis of religious identity.   
 
7   Since pre-war secular parties did not maintain records of party membership in the pre-war period, it will be 
difficult to confirm whether they had higher female membership before the civil war. As mentioned earlier, this was prior 
to the age of computerized databases. Also, party membership was kept confidential for security purposes, and women‘s 




religious convictions. Therefore, a different class of women is seen in religious than in secular and 
civil-confessional parties. In the latter, women tend to be more educated and politically mature. 
Moreover, women in religious parties articulate minimal interest in politics per se, while conceding 
that it is a man‘s turf and that the society is not yet ready for women in leadership!  To demonstrate 
this, a female in a religious party cites that,‖ [I] lived in a poor and deprived area in the South. I 
joined the party because religion is the solution, the key to justice and fairness. It held promise of 
change to improve the quality of our lives as the marginalized and oppressed poor in the South.‖8   
However, on the demand side of the equation, parties mobilize women in order to face 
competition, avoid risk of loss in elections or extinction, and ensure party stability and strength 
(measured by the number of parliamentary seats). Mobilization themes in Lebanon shift in response 
to political events, particularly a watershed like the civil war. In the pre-war era, ideological 
mobilization prevailed and was effective. Several pre-war parties adopted imported leftist, secular 
and egalitarian ideologies premised on Marxism, communism, socialism and Arab adaptations 
thereof (viz., Ba‘athism, Nasserism, and Arab Nationalism). Most of these parties address women‘s 
issues especially emancipation and acquisition of full rights. This attracts women to join these parties, 
as several older generation of female activists point out: ―[I] joined this party in the early 1960s. I 
was attracted to the party‘s leftist ideology and democratic stance, especially its egalitarian goals 
which include women‘s liberalization and equality with men. The party was a mix of all religions not 
like now.‖ Another female official cites, ―[I] joined the party after attending several lectures in the 
party on Marx and Engels. I embraced leftist ideologies and their egalitarian principles and values, 
especially women‘s rights.‖  Also, an old timer states that, ―The party represented all my dreams of 
                                               
8   This phenomenon is also reflected in scholarly observations that,  ― … more vulnerable social sectors within any 
given society, such as the poor, the elderly, those with lower education and literacy, and women, will be more 





eliminating discrimination against women and poverty. I felt deeply about these issues and the party 
addressed them.‖   
During the civil war, militarized parties were preoccupied with resistance but also their 
survival as specific confessional communities. Parties mobilized women to provide social and relief 
services. In the post-war era, these existential themes are re-enforced by widening religious 
cleavages, building a civil state, and maintaining national sovereignty in the face of prolonged Syrian 
sponsorship (until 2005) and ongoing threats from neighbouring Israel. Parties wanted to establish a 
strong foothold in their local communities by expanding membership into untapped and marginalized 
groups. Women provided that special niche. Several interviewees highlight that parties also mobilize 
women to enhance the parties‘ public image and for the special contributions that women make. 
These two motivations are addressed in the next paragraphs.     
1. Women enhance public image 
Parties mobilize women to expand membership but also to enhance their public image, as 
several party officials stress. This enhances the parties‘ marketability and competitiveness, thereby 
increasing voter turnout, the ultimate goal of electorally competitive parties. As a female MP from a 
post-war civil-confessional party remarks,  
Parties are aware that women‘s presence improves their public image and their electoral 
success. Women are also aware that parties use them as bait for recruiting other women. 
Parties often use rhetoric in their public speeches, like claiming that women‘s rights are on 
their agenda. This is merely window-dressing for public consumption. They need women.  
 
In this context, scholars refer to three strategies that parties use to demonstrate their responsiveness to 
female representation, namely, rhetorical, affirmative action and positive discrimination strategies 
(Norris and Lovenduski, 1993:8). However, the use of this rhetoric does not go unnoticed by the 
media or political observers. A case in point is that in the process of consultations to form a new 30-




whether these parties are serious in empowering women or this is a ploy and ‗strategic maneuvering‘ 
to gain more female supporters?
9
 This cogent criticism fell on deaf ears, since only two women are in 
the 2009 cabinet, one of them without a portfolio. However, the flip side is that this demonstrates that 
parties realize that women‘s presence, even symbolically, is welcome and useful as a tool to fight 
competition. In this respect, scholars also find that parties in Canada and the USA ceased to be 
inherently opposed to women and even to ‗feminism‘ ―…when they saw the potential for electoral 
benefits.‖ Young describes this pattern of parties‘ responsiveness as ―co-optation … in an effort to 
mask or soften the party‘s stance on these issues.‖(Lisa Young, 2000: 26). This is basically using 
women to improve parties‘ public image and amass votes. For instance, parties with religious 
platforms frequently organize large conventions and gatherings in which women have huge presence. 
These events receive wide national, regional and international multi-media coverage. Only religious 
parties employ such tactics, which may indicate that the use of women in these fora is part of a 
rhetorical campaign even though the party does not hold a deep-seated commitment to advancing 
women.
10
 These contradictory but intriguing impressions prompted posing the question ―Does the 
presence of women improve the party’s image?” to solicit the views of party leaders and female party 
activists in this regard.  
 Some leaders in religious parties deny that they target women for public image 
enhancements, while others stress that by showing-off that there are many women in their parties 
they are sending a message to the West that Islam advances women. However, in either case, women 
are considered a ‗symbol of the modern‘ and as such their presence brings in added value to the party. 
For instance, the leader of a pre-war religious extremist party remarks defensively that,  
                                               
9  As.Safir, September 9, 2009 (Arabic daily)    
 
10   See chapter Three for evidence that several leaders and elites are ‗anti-women-as-leaders‘ and are less likely to 




Gender equality is a Western-oriented and politically motivated concept. After 9/11, they 
started linking the situation of women to Islam and to Islamist parties. In fact, we invite 
women to attend these conventions to raise their political awareness. This has nothing to do 
with improving our image in the media. We really do not need women to do that for us! 
 
Similarly, the leader of a war-origin religious extremist party shows his dismay in that this is a 
―western‖ concept and that religious parties do not ‗use‘ women for political motivations. He stresses 
that as full-fledged party members, women attend these conventions.
11
  
Examining responses of female officials in religious parties provides insight and a more 
nuanced perspective than that offered by party leaders.
12
 A female official who heads public relations 
in a war-origin religious tolerant party responds that,  
This is true. Women attract more women to join and improve the image of the party. 
However, the huge presence of women in these conventions is also a message to the West 
that Islam is not an obstacle to women‘s political activism. In effect, we sent a strong 
message via the international media when veiled women sat side by side with men in the 
demonstration tents, which closed downtown Beirut for nine-months during 2006-2007. The 
media was intrigued by the overwhelming presence of women.  
  
Such statements highlight the keen interest of these parties on improving their image 
nationally and internationally, albeit for different reasons. At the international level, they aim to 
correct misperceptions about linking Islam to the status of women. At the national level, their main 
concern is recruiting more women to ensure higher voter turnout. In this context, the former head of 
women‘s wing in the party elaborates that,  
Religious parties use women to improve their image, but also take special measures to attract 
them. They transport them in large numbers to sites of congregations and public conventions 
from the South to Dahiyeh in Beirut. They arrange for women to appear on TV talk shows to 
demonstrate that the party is modern and tolerant. They delegate them to represent them in 
meetings. This is a powerful and effective marketing tool. But this is also window-dressing.  
                                               
11   Similar reactions by the clerics on western concepts are common as Basu observes in Bangladesh that, ―…, there 
has been the growth of organizations of Muslim clerics … that have attacked what they deem to be Westernized …‖ 
(Basu, 2005: 35). 
 
12   As discussed in chapter Two, females interviewed were referred by party leaders and/or party elites. These were 
selected because they are in leadership positions or in senior levels. In general, these female activists hold first level 
university degrees and are professionals, or business and career women of high socio-economic profile. These women are 





In this vein, the head of the women‘s wing in a post-war religious extremist party explains that, 
The huge presence of women in conventions improves the party‘s image. The party is killing 
two birds with one stone: improving its electoral chances and sending a message to the West, 
that the party is modern, open-minded and tolerant. In effect, women are summoned to these 
conventions. I wonder, if transportation were not ensured, will there such huge presence?  
 
As one may surmise, this female party official is critical of these parties‘ behaviour and 
cautions that women‘s presence might not hold if transportation were not offered. Nonetheless, she is 
justifying it in terms of countering western stereotypes. Some party officials also justify this 
behaviour in terms of women‘s empowerment for the public good. A female activist in a post-war 
civil-confessional party sees that,  
It is true that these parties ensure women‘s huge presence in these conventions, because this 
improves their image. However, they are keen on transmitting to the West that the party is 
building women‘s capabilities and politically empowering them. The positive side is that the 
leader recognizes that by empowering women, he is elevating the whole community. Maybe 
this is why women are committed to this party.  
 
Thus, explanations along this line are shared by female activists in secular and civil-confessional 
parties that are staunch allies of religious parties, which highlight that being in a political coalition 
might color party officials‘ views for strategic reasons. Similarly, the head of the women‘s wing in a 
pre-war secular a-religious party also justifies the actions of their powerful allies in that,  
The huge presence of women in popular conventions improves the parties‘ marketability, 
because it projects a modern and tolerant image. This is also a message to the West that 
Muslim women are not confined to their homes and are politically involved. This exposure 
has raised women‘s political awareness, but has not yet empowered them.   
 
Hence, several female interviewees offer strategically and politically informed explanations, while 
others conceive of these public declarations of women‘s empowerment as rhetoric and strategic 
maneuvers for elections. Nonetheless, the fact that women are placed in public display is an 
indication that these religious parties recognize that women‘s presence and visibility are valuable for 




Paradoxically, however, a female head of the media sector in a post-war civil-confessional 
party argues that the overwhelming presence of women in these conventions may produce unintended 
consequences. She explains that, ―Instead of appreciating the huge participation of women in these 
conventions, the international media looks at them as a mockery and theatrically staged by religious 
parties to convey a false message to the West about the parties‘ inclusiveness and tolerance.‖ Another 
female activist in a pre-war civil-confessional party also observes that, ―Definitely, women sitting in 
the front rows project a better image for any party. But, segregation in religious parties‘ conventions 
makes women stand out. They are especially conspicuous in their black chadors. I am not sure this 
projects a good image.‖  
Other party officials generalize that women‘s presence at any level would, by necessity, 
improve the image of all parties, religious or secular or civil-confessional. A female activist in a post-
war secular party maintains that all and not only religious parties use women for ‗window-dressing‘ 
whenever it is in their interest to do so: 
Many parties consider the presence of women an indicator of modernity and openness. They 
delegate women, invite them to public gatherings, and nominate them for local councils. 
Women increase parties‘ visibility and up their marketability in elections. But, what are 
parties offering women in return? This is window-dressing at little cost, without formal 
commitment. Sure, women are an added value to parties. 
 
In this vein, a female activist in a pre-war civil-confessional party with progressive socialist 
orientations also observes that, ―Indeed, all parties use women for window dressing and projecting a 
liberal, tolerant and modern image. In reality, however, none of these parties is committed to gender 
equality.‖ Even when the allegations are denied, the impact on the media cannot be disregarded or 
dismissed. Parties recognize that women‘s presence carries weight. This motivates parties target 
women in their mobilization strategies.  




Parties also target women because of the special contributions they make. In this respect, the 
leader of a post-war religious extremist party remarks that, in addition to their central role as mothers, 
daughters, sisters and wives, ―Women may be more committed religiously than men. They are also 
more dependable and less corruptible. We have observed this fact over the years.‖ This statement is 
testimony that religious parties see that women have value added but in their social not political 
contributions to the party.  
Leaders and elites in secular and post-war civil-confessional parties also point to women‘s 
special contributions, as a party leader notes that, ―Women bring into the party a new perspective and 
a breath of fresh hope for peace in the country.‖ Similarly, another senior official responds that, 
―Women bring into the party dynamisms that men do not possess. They are more serious, committed, 
and more effective in serving society.‖ Another leader states that, ―Women bring a new perspective 
into politics. They are sharp and skilled negotiators, patient, less aggressive and confrontational than 
men. They are an asset.‖  The leader of a post-war civil-confessional party flags other contributions:  
Women are less corrupt, more driven and committed than men. Men work in return for 
material reward, and when they don‘t get it, they leave the party. Women are willing to work 
towards achieving the goals irrespective of rewards. Women work harder to stand up to the 
challenge and expectations.  
 
 Similar testimonies of women‘s special contributions are offered by leaders and party elites 
in post-war secular and civil-confessional parties. These views essentialize women and go against 
the grain of the gender paradigm in that gender roles are socially constructed and dynamic. 
Nevertheless, these are corroborated by scholarly findings as a party elite points out that, ―Studies 
have shown that women‘s corruptibility is much less than that of men. Women‘s role is central to the 




women are less corruptible than men, then this is an asset.
13
  Others also indicate that women are 
also skilled in fund-raising, organizing social events and providing social and welfare services.  
 Several party elites recognize the valuable contributions that women bring into party politics, 
including patience, tolerance, dialogue, negotiation skills, drive and dedication.
14
  These statements 
reflect that parties gain from women‘s presence. In fact, this links to statements about empowering 
women for the public good, cited earlier. Women share these views as a female activist in a post-war 
secular party flags that, ―It is in the interest of the party and the nation to have women on board. The 
society is missing out if women are not politically involved. Women are an added value to the 
functioning of political parties.‖ These are supported by the findings of scholarly research. From 
economists‘ vantage point, parties and politicians will seek women out when they realize that it is in 
their interest to do so, especially when women‘s contributions to the economy become substantial. 
(Frances Rosenbluth, Rob Salmond and Michael F. Thies, 2006: 165-189). Of course, this is 
contingent upon women being given equal opportunity in party politics but also given an equal 
opportunity to choose.   
3. Interpretations & partial explanations of variation in female party membership 
The ―raison d‘être‖ of militarized parties in defending their confessional constituencies ceased 
to exist at the end of the civil war in 1990. Widening religious cleavages heightened confessionalism, 
reduced pluralism, reshuffled party memberships, and limited outreach. This triggered the need for 
                                               
13  The issue of women and corruption has received attention from many scholars (Elin Bjaarnegard 2008, and 
Rohini Pande and Alexandra Cirone 2009, among others). There are also studies carried out by international organizations 
on the Grameen Bank, which was established in Bangladesh by the Nobel Prize laureate, Mohamad Yunis, showing that 
95 percent of poor women who received micro-credit loans repaid them. These studies support the claim that women are 
less corruptible than men; although there is a risk that this essentializes both, women and men. More on women and 
corruption can be seen in the Epilogue. 
  
14
   These views tally with the scholarly findings that, ―…, the social marginalization of women may remove 
distinctive voices and influences from politics. Some political psychologists have found that women are superior to men 





parties to search for new electoral niches among marginalized groups and untapped strata within 
given confessional and religious communities. Women offered this special niche and were a perfect 
target. It is a common mobilization strategy among parties –to look for new electoral niches-- as 
scholars observe:  
Parties use a number of strategies to reduce the risk of a negative electoral development, 
ending in organizational extinction. Parties search for electoral niches at a certain level of 
electoral support. … Political parties try to identify key groups on whose continuous support 
they hope to rely (Campbell et al,. 1960; Converse, 1966). These core groups often have 
special social characteristics defining the social niche of the party. … Parties propose 
measures that could attract marginal voters … (Lane & Ersson, 1987; p. 96). 
  
More precisely, the post-war period saw memberships shift from pre-war secular leftist to 
war-origin religious conservative and tolerant parties, especially to Hizbullah and Amal.
15
 Pre-war 
parties exerted concerted efforts to regain their membership and pluralism, by mapping local and 
remote areas and also targeting women. Recruiting campaigns by many parties were undertaken to 
reach out to different communities. In this context, a female official in a post-war civil-confessional 
Muslim-dominated party cites that, ―The party leader strategized to expand plural membership by 
targeting women. He dispatched Christians to Christian-majority regions. Being a Christian and in 
leadership position in a Muslim-dominated party encouraged other Christian women to join. This had 
a domino effect on their family members as well.‖ These factors increased competition among 
parties, especially since they are targeting the same group, women. Similar strategies targeting 
women in different religious communities to expand plural membership were undertaken by other 
parties. For instance, the head of a women‘s wing in pre-war secular party describes that, ―After the 
war, my main task was to recruit more women from different sects to fight extremism and 
sectarianism. I dispatched Christians and Muslims to their respective communities and vice-versa in a 
                                               
15  The Lebanese Resistance Front, which fought along the borders during the civil war, was composed of most 





heuristic attempt to regain pluralism. This always attracts women.‖ In the first case, a Christian to a 
Christian community demonstrates openness and tolerance of a Muslim-dominated party. In the 
second strategy, a Christian to a Muslim region or vice-versa is evidence that the party is still plural, 
despite heightened confessionalism. However, the data show that the former strategy was more 
successful than the latter. Thus, while pre-war secular parties employ leftist mobilization ideologies 
in recruitment, this had mixed results in the face of entrenched and widening religious cleavages and 
fierce competition. Female membership dwindled and shrank in the post-war era and is much lower 
than in other parties (see charts 5.1 to 5.9). In addition, an important factor is that the more powerful 
and affluent post-war parties -- besides employing ideological or religious mobilization—offer other 
incentives to attract women, some of which are discussed in the following sections.  
In sum, this section has given special attention to the electoral advantages of public image 
enhancements, and the special contributions that women make, which motivate parties to target 
women in their mobilization strategies. All parties found in women a special electoral niche and 
targeted them in their mobilization strategies. This increased competition translated into higher 
female membership in post-war parties, as hypothesized (H5). War-origin and post-war religious 
parties target women to enhance their public image but also employ other mobilization modalities. 
These modalities increase female membership as evidenced by the presence of women at the 
grassroots and in popular conventions. Examining party motivations for targeting women provides 
rich information and insight into probable explanations for variations in female membership across 
parties. These findings show that, on average, the lowest shares of female membership in secular a-
religious parties despite their plural membership and democratic practices, and the highest shares in 
religious parties with plural and democratic deficits. These results are not consistent with the 




membership. Women‘s use for public image enhancements and their special contributions provide 
partial explanation of variations in female party membership. The following section sheds light on 
additional explanations.  
B. Modalities: Religious Mobilization, In-Kind & Financial Incentives   
 Statements by female party officials on motivations for joining parties reveal that ideological 
(viz., parties with secular and leftist platforms) and religious mobilization (parties with religious 
platforms), are employed to attract women. As shown above, ideological mobilization employed by 
pre-war secular a-religious parties brought limited success, while religious mobilization brought huge 
female membership. In this section, information is sought on modalities, tools and tactics that various 
parties employ in targeting women. These might explain observed variations in outcome and justify 
why some of my expectations, particularly the influence of pluralism and democratic practices on 
women‘s membership are not borne out. Thus, the question, ―What are the modalities and tactics that 
parties employ in mobilizing women?‖ is posed to party leaders and female party activists to gather 
information in this respect. First, religious mobilization tools and tactics employed by religious 
parties are addressed. Then, in-kind and financial incentives offered by affluent parties are examined.   
1. Religious mobilization, tactics and tools  
In the post-war era, religious mobilization gained momentum and attracted more people to 
join parties with religious platforms than ideological mobilization did for secular and leftist parties, as 
responses of party officials reveal. Other researchers studying Lebanon also observe that, ―…religion 
emerged as a mobilizing factor for Lebanese Shi‘is in response to the failures of the left, the success 
of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and the Israeli invasions and occupation of Lebanon.‖ (Deeb, 
2006:6). Similar findings on religiously pluralist systems, like Lebanon and Israel, point out that, 




participation in the state apparatus often becomes dependent upon their association with or adherence 
to religious values and norms.‖ (Bouhamdan, 2009: 19). In these settings, more women tend to join 
religious parties. 
Indeed, religious mobilization is powerful and most effective in recruiting women, as 
evidenced by their sizeable shares in religious parties. This is especially depicted in the conservative 
religious party, Hizbullah, which boasts a membership that is 50 percent female. As discussed earlier, 
in the wake of the civil war atrocities, many women, including the poor, turned to religion. They 
joined religious parties seeking spiritual support and refuge in religion, as a female official observes 
that, ―Religious mobilization is attracting young women, because of the violence they have seen in 
wars. They find that their salvation lies in religion. Spiritual and moral incentives are paramount to 
material and financial incentives.‖16 Another female official in a religious conservative party 
highlights that the secret of the effectiveness of these religious mobilization tools lies in that often 
women are more religious than men and under difficult situations turn to religion as the solution.
17
 
She adds that, ―Religious mobilization attracts women to these parties because religion promises 
women better life and reward in the afterlife. This is why we see huge presence of women at the 
grassroots.‖ Thus, religious mobilization attracts more women because they tend to be more religious 
than men. This is  corroborated by scholarly findings that, ―… religion is a more salient independent 
variable among women than among men, apparently because women are more religious and are thus 
more likely to be influenced by the teachings of their religion, as they understand it.‖ (Tessler, 
2002:8).  Indeed, when women join parties with religious platforms they tend to be more conservative 
                                               
16   Other researchers have shown that ―… men hold attitudes that are more conducive to authoritarianism. …, that 
men have a stronger ―social dominance‖ orientation than women; women are generally less comfortable with hierarchy 
and inequality… women tend to be more averse to extremism and violence in politics.‖ (Fish, 2002: 30-31) 
 
17   Tessler also finds that, ―In all probability, women are discontent with the socioeconomic status quo, more so 




and traditional than men (see, also Tessler, 2002: 4). Testimonies by several female officials in 
religious extremist and conservative parties corroborate this view, as well as those from other parties. 
In this context, a female party activist from a secular party observes that,   
During the war, we used ideological mobilization and publicized our political platform via 
fact-finding missions, disseminating information, writing flyers and distributing them door-
to-door and even car-to-car. After the war, we are fighting growing extremism and 
confessionalism by targeting the youth and women. Imagine, young women who wore 
bathing suits before the war are now wearing veils and chadors. Society is transformed.  
 
This may explain women‘s massive presence at the grassroots in many religious parties. In this sense, 
religious leaders, doubling as party leaders, are in a position to provide not only spiritual, moral and 
religious support but also more control over the social and political lives of their followers, especially 
women. In this connection, Kandiyoti also argues that, 
…it is no accident that Zia ul-Haq‘s ―Islamisation‖ package took women as its prime target.  
Establishing Islamic credentials through retrogressive legislation primarily affecting women 
was a logical step in a context where the control of women and their appropriate conduct had 
long been used to demarcate the identity and boundaries of the Muslim community. 
(Kandiyoti, 1991: 6)  
 
  The above sheds light on the rush of women into political parties with religious platforms. 
Turning to religion as the solution to violence, class and poverty problems is not surprising especially 
when the state does not provide and when religious authorities or groups take on board social welfare 
and serve as social safety nets. Indeed, women join religious parties as a recluse. However, this is 
sustained via various tools and incentives that religious parties offer to feed the soul and body. When 
these elements are combined, one finds an influx of supporters, especially women, in parties with 
religious platforms that are not found in secular a-religious parties. In my view, this is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for justifying the huge share of women in party membership, especially that 




 However, the justification that a female MP representing a post-war civil-confessional party 
offers may be plausible in that, ―In practice, religious parties are smart because they employ 
traditional tools in a resourceful and creative manner to mobilize more women.‖ One of these tools is 
providing religious guidance and counseling to women by women. Until only recently, religious 
counseling and advocacy was done by men. Therefore, this is a new task entrusted to women. A 
female in a pre-war religious extremist party describes that, ―Before the war, only men were religious 
preachers. After the war, women are also carrying this missionary torch to recruit Muslim women and 
guide them to piety; but, also to convert Christian women to Islam. This is what the Christian 
missionaries did in Lebanon.‖   
 Religious counseling is extensively used by most religious parties. It is offered by women 
who are religious scholars and well versed in jurisprudence, with explicit missionary but also 
mobilization goals. They are dispatched by party leaders to teach the Shari‘a during social events 
organized by women at their homes, in parties‘ headquarters and branches, or in special spaces 
allocated for women in mosques. When asked whether there are any statistics on female counselors, 
and whether the contents of religious lectures are cleared beforehand, a leader of a pre-war religious 
extremist party responds that, ―We do not have any statistics on the number of female counselors but 
they are numerous in the Islamic movement. They double as recruitment officers and guide other 
women to join the right path.‖  He adds, however, that the party does not clear the contents of these 
lectures but Dar-El-Fatwa does.
18
  A female counselor asserts that, ―No one clears these lectures. 
Dar-El-Fatwa guides us and provides the topics we should discuss. There is an Arab network of 
religious counselors to exchange lectures and to disseminate them. Sometimes, they are aired on Arab 
satellites.‖ These religious counseling tools are supported by the state, since some of these guidance 
                                               
18  Dar-El-Fatwa is the official government body entrusted with Shari‘a interpretations and administers the religious 




counselors are on Dar-El-Fatwa payroll, as party leaders and female counselors report. The post-war 
period saw more women attending these events, as a female counselor reports:   
[I] started giving religious lessons to women on a voluntary basis and without any financial 
remuneration, first at homes of family, friends and neighbors. As their number increased, the 
party convinced the Sheikh to allocate special spaces in mosques not only for praying but also 
for giving these counseling sessions. Thus, special space, specific times, entrance and exit for 
women were assigned. But, even the space in mosques became small since more women 
showed up. Then, the party rented out special conference halls.  
In this connection, the head of a women‘s wing in a post-war religious extremist party highlights that, 
―The party relies heavily on religious counselors as recruitment agents, because this has a ripple 
effect on their husbands and families, friends and neighbors. In fact, religious advocacy has 
effectively increased female party membership.‖  
These testimonies indicate that religious counseling proved to be an effective tool for 
enhancing female membership in most religious parties. Another tool, which the religious counselors 
mentioned is allocating special areas for women to pray in mosques. Several female interviewees 
report that in the post-war period, women complained to leaders of Sunni-dominated parties that they 
wish to pray in mosques on Fridays or during Ramadan, as women do in Shiite mosques. This 
practice is not common for women but it is also not prohibited, since in the Pilgrimage to Mecca 
women and men walk and pray side by side. In their view, this is discriminatory and limits them from 
fully practicing their religious rituals. The leaders skillfully negotiated with official government 
clerics (Muftis, Imams and Sheikhs) to allocate special spaces for women to pray in mosques. This 
raised criticism in conservative communities, as a party leader of a religious extremist party remarks 
that, ―Allocating special areas for women to pray in mosques is a ―Bid‘ah‖ in Islam. Women should 
pray in their homes and not in mosques with men.‖19 Thus, by accommodating women‘s requests, 
party leaders provided additional incentives for women to join parties. They demonstrated that the 
                                               




party is resourceful in finding solutions and attending to their concerns. In a sense, this co-optation 
brought favorable results.  
Another tool that religious parties employ in recruiting women is match-making, which is 
spearheaded by women‘s wings in emulating similar programs run via the Internet.20 The head of the 
women‘s wing in a post-war religious extremist party describes this process: ―We search for pious 
women and match them with party officials. As an incentive to the males, the party covers wedding 
and post-wedding expenses. This attracts more women to join the party and is particularly effective 
among poor, single and widowed women.‖ There are other forms of popular forms besides match-
making advocated by parties besides the traditional one, like the ‗Urfi‘ and ‘Misyar‘ marriages.21 
These arrangements are convenient in periods of war and conflict and attract widows and older single 
women. Hence, these women end up joining religious parties that offer such options and services. 
This may provide additional explanation for the higher shares of female membership in some parties 
with extensive religious platforms.  
Thus, allocating special areas in mosques, providing religious counseling and match-making 
find fertile grounds amongst women as recruitment tactics and tools. Such needs-based enticements 
demonstrate how religious parties are employing traditional tools in a resourceful and creative 
manner to attract women. These findings explain why, on average, the level of female membership in 
                                               
20  This is common in Arab countries (e.g. Egypt, the UAE, Tunisia), where NGOs are especially set-up for match-
making.   
 
21   ‗Urfi‘  (‗Muta‘h‘ or pleasure) marriage is one without an official contract. Couples just repeat their vows in the 
presence of two witnesses and sign a contract in duplicate. This absolves the man from legal financial responsibilities in 
case of separation or if there are kids. This is not recognized by Shari‘a laws. This may be of a fixed or prolonged 
duration. ‗Misyar‘ is  a traveler‘s marriage, which is popular in the rich Gulf countries. It is officially recognized to 
sanction extra-marital sexual relations. Both partners give up their rights willingly and continue to live separately. 
Therefore, it is temporary and may be dissolved at any time without any obligations like alimony or other conditions. Urfi 
marriage is more common amongst the Shiites and Misyar amongst the conservative Sunnis. Urfi marriage is close to a 




religious parties is sizeable. Indeed, this phenomenon is common in religious parties of other 
countries, as the findings of several scholars show.
22
 
2.  In-kind and financial incentives 
Various tools are also employed by parties in the post-war era in comparison with the war 
period. These are succinctly summarized by a female activist in a war-origin religious tolerant party:  
During the civil war, patriotism and resistance attracted women to join warring parties. 
However, parties also offered in-kind and financial incentives in terms of clientilistic favors 
such as employment and job placements, and provision of health, social and educational 
services; but, also money enticing women to veil. In the post-war period, new tactics 
emerged targeting university students and especially women. However, our party faced 
severe competition in attracting women to join, especially from Hizbullah. They are affluent, 
use modern tools and offer financial incentives to lure women.  
 
The issue of ‗money for veiling‘ will be investigated later in this section. The respondent, however, 
indicates that religious affluent parties also resort to in-kind and financial incentives in order to attract 
women. However, these incentives are offered by all affluent parties, as a former female minister 
stresses that, ―Motivated by clientilistic, ideological and electoral purposes, not only religious parties 
but all rich parties employ financial incentives to attract members, including women who are easy 
targets when poor.‖ She adds that, ―In-kind and financial incentives come in a package, which 
includes monthly allowances, provision of educational, social and health services, employment, and 
even low-cost housing facilities.‖ The importance of these incentives cannot be underestimated 
because they are offered directly to women. In this regard, a female activist in a civil-confessional 
party remarks that, ―Ideology and religious conviction combined with financial incentives are 
powerful tools to attract women, especially the poor and deprived. In Hizbullah, for instance, males 
go to the resistance front, while women are given all sorts of compensations including financial 
                                               
22    See, Hatem 1994, Brand 1998, Charrad 2001, Kandiyoti 1991 and 2002, Tessler 2002, Clark and Schwedler 
2003, and Basu 2005, on parties in Algeria, Morocco, Palestine, Jordan, Egypt, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and 




security for the husband when he returns from combat.‖ A female activist in a pre-war a-religious 
secular party describes that,  
In the 1980s, resistance mobilized us into the party. After the war, our party became too 
traditional, lost clout, outreach and membership to more affluent parties like Hizbullah. Such 
parties not only employ religious mobilization, but combine this with other incentives that 
our party cannot match like jobs, social, health, education, and housing services to attract 
new members. They even give women monthly allowances if they wear the veil.  
 
Again, this statement refers to ‗money for veiling‘ as one of the effective financial tools offered by 
religious parties. This is examined in the following paragraphs after addressing in-kind incentives.   
(a) In-kind incentives 
Affluent post-war civil-confessional parties employ in-kind incentives to attract young men 
and women. For instance, one of these parties established a scholarship fund for higher education of 
all Lebanese young men and women, without discrimination on the basis of sect or gender.
23
 This 
created a wide base of highly educated youth who later joined the party. Such long-term needs-based 
mobilization tools are smart and pro-active, but have a lagged effect. Affluent parties also offer short-
term in-kind incentives with immediate effects, including provision of social services, setting-up 
educational and health facilities and mobile infirmaries with fully equipped dispensaries to cater to all 
citizens without discrimination on the basis of sect, gender or region. In addition, as a female activist 
in a post-war civil-confessional party reports that, ―Affluent parties distribute staple food items such 
as oil, wheat, sugar and rice, and clothing; build low-cost housing complexes, and offer employment 
opportunities, targeting the poor and deprived.‖ One wonders what makes such tools effective in 
Lebanon.  
The impact of the civil war and the Arab-Israeli regional conflict on Lebanon together with 
the adverse effects of globalization has increased poverty, especially among women. The number of 
                                               
23   This benefited some 300,000 young men and women from all religious affiliations. However, distribution of 




female headed households has more than tripled in Lebanon after the war (UN-ESCWA, 2006). 
These females are the poorest of the poor in the population, what is referred to as the ―feminization of 
poverty‖ syndrome in post-conflict areas. Poor women are the main beneficiaries from food staples, 
social and health-care services and other in-kind incentives. Indeed, these poor women become 
vehement supporters of their benevolent providers. Moreover, such in-kind incentives fill in the 
vacuum left by the state for not providing a safety net. In this context, a female MP who is also a 
minister observes that,‖ Parties fill in the vacuum left by the state by providing such services, which 
guarantees their votes.‖  
In contrast, responses of officials from pre-war parties show that they tend to use traditional 
tools and techniques; while post-war parties employ more modern, state-of-the art tools. They show 
more resourcefulness in targeting women. These include, inter alia, nationwide recruitment fairs and 
public gatherings, town-hall meetings, recruitment drives at universities and women‘s dormitories, 
and women‘s non-governmental organizations (NGOs); as well as vast use of all forms of multimedia 
communications including the internet, web sites and blogs, newspapers, audio-visual broadcasting, 
pamphlets, and dissemination of door-to-door flyers. These tools have succeeded in securing higher 
female membership in post-war parties, while pre-war secular and civil-confessional parties have 
lagged behind, as charts 5.1 to 5.9 show.  
(b) Financial incentives: Money for veiling 
 Statements by interviewees also show that in-kind and financial incentives are extensively 
used by affluent parties. Other financial incentives to ensure electoral success include vote-buying as 
a female MP candidate points that, ―In 2009 elections, women constituted 61 percent of voter turnout. 
This is why mobilizing women using any means at parties‘ disposal including financial incentives 




conditions of fierce competition, in-kind and financial incentives, including ‗money for veiling‘ or 
vote-buying, can attract women to join particular parties. Further, the statement of a female minister 
reveals that such incentives are most effective in conflict-stricken Lebanon, with widening class 
cleavages and increasing poverty especially among women. She stresses that, ―Financial incentives 
are part of a package of social and educational services to needy people including women. What is 
unique, however, is that this is contingent upon women veiling, which explains the phenomenon of 
veiled women in the post-war era.‖ Thus, poverty hits women in conflicts and wars, which in turn 
makes them more religious, as discussed earlier, and of which religious parties take double 
advantage. However, while concurring with the other statements, the head of women‘s NGO in a pre-
war secular party cautions that, ―Poverty and deprivation force women to accept money for veiling, 
job placements and basic services to ensure their families‘ livelihood. However, I am afraid that the 
minute the flow of money stops, women will unveil and recipients will revolt against their donors.‖  
She is being cynical but cautions that women will unveil when the flow of funds stop, based on 
precedence and especially unfortunate events in 2007. 
24
  
 Several female officials in extremist and conservative religious parties stress that spiritual 
gains are paramount to material gains and that they joined these parties for the public good not for 
personal gains. These statements also point to an ethical controversy in parties‘ use of in-kind and 
financial incentives to lure women to join these parties. This issue is more contentious and acute in 
the case of ‗money for veiling‘.25 This may explain the surge of veiled women in the post-war period, 
                                               
24   A case in point is the 2007 clashes of Fatah-El-Islam with the Lebanese army of Nahr-el-Bared Palestinian 
refugee camp in Tripoli, North Lebanon.   
 
25  The issue of February 7, 2010 of the French magazine Paris Match reports that two men disguised as women 
wearing the ―burqa‖ robbed a bank. In a veil-hostile setting, the article highlights that the veil is used as camouflage for 
criminal acts. Similar incidents are reported in Jordan and Lebanon, where veiled women stopped cars, while men 
committed crimes as kidnapping, abducting or stealing. The hazards of veiling are also raised in connection with official 
exams or voting in elections, where personal identification is concealed (pictures showing only eyes). In this connection, 




which substantiates the high share of female membership in religious parties. In fact, several female 
interviewees point out that, the post-war period saw a phenomenal rise in the number of veiled 
women. There are no statistics to substantiate these observations or compare the number of veiled 
women before and after the civil war. However, looking at the huge share of women in membership 
of religious parties –where all women are in fact veiled --, calls for further exploration into the 
‗money for veiling‘ syndrome. 
 ‗Money for veiling‘ as a tool is generally administered by female religious counselors and 
proved especially effective among the poor and less educated women in remote areas, as they report. 
In this context, a female official in a religious extremist party explains that, ―Through religious 
counselors, the party offers women monthly allowances when they veil and join the party.‖ Many 
officials in religious extremist and conservative parties argue that while there is no compulsion in 
Islam, ―Veiling is not a matter of choice for women. It is stipulated in the Shari‘a.‖26 This argument 
justifies the possibility that, ―in order to guide them into the right path for their own salvation, there is 
no problem in enticing them to veil by offering money in return.‖ In order to ascertain whether such a 
toll is indeed employed by religious parties, I posed the question ―Did religious parties offer women 
‘money for veiling”? Since responses by officials in other parties may be construed as defamatory 
                                                                                                                                                   
acceptable for women to vote because they would have to reveal their faces to a stranger to be photographed for their 
voter registration card. Aware of this potentially pivotal role female voters might play in elections, Islah officials urged 
the party‘s (elected) spiritual leader, ... - to issue a fatwa  stating that it was acceptable for women to be photographed in 
order to vote. They need to mobilize voters and win seats to enable the party to realize its goals, they argued, far outweigh 
other concerns.‖ (Clark and Schwedler, 2003: 300). Anecdotal evidence also denote that a woman running for ‗Mukhtar‘ 
(registrar) post in 1998 municipal elections in Lebanon did not post her picture (because she is veiled) but that of her 
husband  with the following caption ‗vote for my wife‘. She won the post.‖           
26
  In this connection, Qassem of Hizbullah stated that, ―Western democracies have often failed the test of freedom 
of expression, as when some students wearing headscarves were denied enrolment in French and … public schools under 
the pretext that such dress is a demonstration of religious ceremony that challenges the traditions of Western society. This 
was done despite the knowledge that this dress code is a part of the faith and not a form of competition for a slogan. They 
also failed to recognize the freedom of the other when they stood up to the Islamic movements in Algeria and some other 
countries, discrediting their elections under the pretext of an impending Islamic danger.‖ (Qassem, 2005: 212). Also, in an 
article ―SOS Fantomes‖ on interviews with veiled women in France (Statistics estimate that around 1,900,000 women are 




from competing parties or unsubstantiated rumors, the focus is on responses of leaders and female 
officials in religious parties.  
 Some leaders of religious parties argue that since unveiled women cannot be party members, 
there is no ethical problem in offering them ‗money for veiling‘, while others justify this on 
theological grounds. For example, the leader of a post-war Sunni-dominated religious extremist party, 
an offshoot of a pre-war extremist party, who is a cleric, argues that,  
We must use any tool at our disposal, even money, to convince people to commit to Islam. 
There is no problem in offering financial incentives to women to veil. This tool was used by 
the Prophet himself. We even buy them the veil and offer their husbands jobs. This is not 
only ethical but also in the spirit of religion. However, we do not put conditions or force 
women to veil. It is their choice, since there is no compulsion in Islam. 
  
This statement confirms that religious parties employ ‗money for veiling‘ and provides ethical and 
religious grounds in that ‗the ends justify the means‘. Similarly, a female official in a pre-war 
religious extremist party justifies that, ―Some rich parties resort to this tool in order to guide women 
to the right path and convince them to join the party, especially in poor and deprived North and South 
Lebanon.‖ A religious counselor in a post-war Sunni-dominated extremist party cautions that,  
During the war, women received financial incentives from parties like Al-Ahbash and 
Hizbullah, for veiling (Hijab) and for wearing the (Jilbab) or chador. Secondary school 
students in the Shiite Dahiyeh of Beirut receive until today a monthly allowance of LL 
350,000 ($200) for veiling and LL 450,000 ($300) for the chador. However, I am confident 
that once these monthly allowances stop, the girls will most likely unveil and withdraw from 
these parties.   
 
This response provides monetary evidence that women receive ‗money for veiling‘. It also echoes the 
concerns voiced by the head of a women‘s NGO in a secular party that once the flow of money stops, 
women will unveil. Another female official in a post-war religious tolerant party quotes that, ―During 
and after the civil war, financial incentives were paid to women for veiling (around $500/month).‖ 
Other female officials also cite that ‗money for veiling‘ compensations ranged between $300 and 




However, I should stress that none of the females interviewed -- all veiled-- report that they 
received ‗money for veiling‘, while others stated that others may have done so. For instance, a female 
official in a religious tolerant party states that, ―There is no religious connotation attached to wearing 
the veil. It is a statement. Therefore, nothing prevents parties from paying and prevents women from 
receiving money for veiling. I cannot vouch except for myself.‖ Similarly, a female official in a post-
war religious extremist party states that, ―I heard about money for veiling but have not seen it in my 
party.‖ In other words, these responses are confirming the use of ‗money for veiling‘ but only in the 
case of other parties. Also, she looks at the veil as a statement and not as stipulated by the Shari‘a, 
which carries a different connotation for pious people. This implies that officials in religious tolerant 
parties do not deny the use of this tool as officials in conservative and extremist parties do. The leader 
of a pre-war extremist party refutes the allegation:   
This is not true! Women are veiled because of their religious convictions and not for money. 
Women in Hizbullah and Amal are all veiled. However, as a party, Amal is by far less 
religiously committed than Hizbullah. We are on top of the list in religious commitment. Yes, 
these parties have funds but they use them as in-kind incentives and not for veiling their 
women. Also, all Shiite girls should veil when they are nine and Sunni girls by twelve.
27
 
   
Similarly, a female official in a pre-war religious extremist party states that,  
We do not have funds to entice women to veil and we do not need to use such a tool. Suffice 
it to say that in some Muslim countries, unveiled women are abducted, or acid water thrown 
on their faces, and are forbidden from entering religious shrines and mosques. These 
practices violate the Shari‘a. There is no compulsion or coercion in Islam. If women receive 
money to wear the veil or the Islamic dress, they tend to remove it once funds stop flowing. 
We are veiled out of conviction and not for financial gains. 
 
In this vein, a religious counselor remarks that, ―Islamists parties, like Al-Ahbash, do not need to pay 
pious women for veiling. Most of their female members are veiled as wives of Salafis who aim for an 
                                               
27   Such statements support the coding that I used for the religiosity of parties, which is essential for testing my 




Islamic country.‖28  Indeed, when I approached the leader of a post-war religious extremist party with 
this question, he was offended and considered mere asking is absurd. Similar denials are encapsulated 
in statements of female officials in various religious parties. The most vehement reactions came from 
affluent parties like Hizbullah that indeed can afford to use ‗money for veiling‘ as a tool to increase 
female membership and voters‘ support. A female official in that party categorically denies that, 
―Hizbullah never pays money to women for veiling. We also do not accept unveiled women or 
employ them if they veil for that purpose. Women must be committed to the party and its religious 
platform in order to be accepted as members. Other parties might accept, but we do not!‖  
 Similar denials also came from officials in non-affluent religious parties. For instance, in a 
telephone interview with the leader of a war-origin extremist party, he stresses that, ―My party is not 
rich and does not need to pay for women to veil. All our women are veiled.‖29 Some officials also 
noted that these may be rumors. A female in a pre-war religious extremist party responds that, ―These 
are rumors. We are not a rich party. I am the first young woman in Beirut who wore the veil in the 
1960s, when all were unveiled. Women wear the Hijab out of religious conviction and not for 
money.‖ There is no way of substantiating her claim. Finally, a female official in a religious 
conservative party argues that, ―Women must be convinced not paid to veil. It is easy to unveil by 
removing the pin, but very difficult for a believer to do so.‖ This female is essentially echoing what 
others said that a woman who veils for money will unveil easily when the flow of money stops. There 
must be no compulsion in Islam. Therefore, whether or not ‗money for veiling‘ is employed by 
                                               
28  This statement contradicts an earlier one confirming that Al-Ahbash paid women for veiling during the war. She 
adds that, ―One cannot meet with these women or interview them without permission of their husbands or party leaders; 
even then it is doubtful that permission is granted.‖ However, Al-Ahbash is not a ‗relevant‘ party for this research.   
 
29  I tried to schedule an appointment with him and with female members in the women‘s wing. His response was 
that, ―women are not involved in politics and are all religious counselors.‖ This highlights the extent of women‘s 




parties, women should have the freedom of choice and not coerced to veil for joining parties under 
the pretext of conviction and piety.  
The bulk of responses of party officials support that religious affluent parties employ ‗money 
for veiling‘ as a mobilization tool. However, officials from extremist and conservative religious 
parties denied the use of this tool and some branded it as ‗rumors‘, non-committal, and/or defamatory 
propaganda. What is interesting is that many female officials in tolerant religious parties did not deny 
its use. I should note that ‗money for veiling‘ is linked to Hizbullah, as the affluent party. Thus, there 
is some evidence that financial inducements for veiling have been offered to women. However, there 
is no clear admission by party leaders, except in one case who justified its use on religious grounds. 
There is no iron clad proof that affluent parties employ ‗money for veiling‘ to mobilize women. What 
this tells us, however, is that religious parties, as other political parties, are willing to go to any length 
to guarantee electoral success and strength, going by ‗the means justify the ends‘. ‗Money for 
veiling‘, if employed, is an effective tool, especially for poor women. Poverty is a fertile ground for 
the provision of financial and in-kind incentives, because women become ‗captive‘ of the continued 
flow of material support in return for their votes. This is particularly effective when topped by vote-
buying, as some party officials note.  
To recap, the data show that, on average, female membership in war and post-war parties is 
higher than in pre-war parties. Parties employ modern and state-of-the-art techniques, and offer in-
kind and financial incentives to recruit women. The variety of mobilization tools and smart tactics 
(financial incentives, social services, religious counseling, arranged marriages, aggressive recruitment 
sprees) bore fruit and succeeded where efforts of pre-war secular parties lagged behind. Some post-
war civil-confessional and religious parties show more resourcefulness in mobilizing women than 




largely due to the traditional tools they employ but more importantly to fierce competition from 
affluent parties offering in-kind and financial incentives. This is evidenced by wide disparities 
between the shares of women in pre-war secular and civil-confessional parties and post-war civil-
confessional and religious parties. These findings are against expectations given that secular parties 
are characterized by pluralism and democratic procedures, while religious parties have plural and 
democratic deficits. These combined factors explain the higher shares of female membership in war 
and post-war than in pre-war parties, as hypothesized. 
Many parties target women in poor and deprived districts. In-kind and financial incentives 
explain the high female membership in post-war civil-confessional parties and in war and post-war 
religious parties. Religious and ideological mobilizations are the building blocks for enhancing 
female membership. Religious commitment, religious counseling and advocacy, in-kind (social, 
heath and educational services) and other financial incentives including the potential use of ‗money 
for veiling‘, help in explaining the sizeable shares of female membership of religious parties. These 
external party tools are avenues that political parties utilize to mobilize and recruit women. Political 
parties also employ internal mechanisms –like women‘s wings- for recruiting women to join their 
parties.   Women‘s wings are being examined because they are hypothesized as the link from female 
membership to female leadership. These mechanisms are set-up to recruit women. Studying the role 
of women‘s wings is essential for exploring the association between female membership and 
leadership. The following section addresses the role and functions of women‘s wings, and their 
effectiveness in mobilizing women and creating a critical mass for leadership.  
C. Mechanisms for Mobilization: Women’s Wings  
 
 Women‘s wings are arms of parties and a central mechanism for mobilizing women. The 




are either set-up within parties‘ inner structures or externally as autonomous, parallel women‘s 
organizations (NGOs). Information, obtained from party administrators, shows that out of the 18 
relevant parties, only five parties (post-war secular and civil-confessional) do not maintain women‘s 
wings. All five religious and eight civil-confessional parties do. Similar patterns are perceived among 
some progressive and religious parties in Western democracies in the mid-twentieth century. For 
instance, the communist and leftist parties did not have separate women‘s wings, while Catholic and 
protestant parties did, with varying programmatic orientations. More specifically,   
In the religious parties separate organizations for women were formed… In general the 
women‘s organizations have been, and still are, an important factor in the process of getting 
more women involved in party politics…. Their main aims were to educate women politically 
and to mobilize them into becoming party members. Now the women‘s wings are much more 
concerned with party policies on gender equality. .. Currently the most important goal is to 
increase the number of party delegates. (Lovenduski and Norris, 1993:210-211). 
 
 Political parties establish women‘s wings as recruitment mechanisms, but as importantly –
albeit implicitly-- as electioneering machineries to amass the female vote. Some parties envisage that 
these wings create a critical mass of women for leadership. Women‘s wings address women‘s issues 
within the party but also organize social events, raise funds through welfare and charity work, and 
provide social and relief services, as needed.  Some scholars hold that,  
Political parties have a greater propensity to respond to gender-related demands when a 
number of structural, institutional and agency factors are in place. … Political parties that 
have an internal organization of women that is well coordinated, and which are able to 
mobilize resources, tend to respond better to women‘s demands.‖ (Sacchet, 2005: 9)  
  
This statement highlights that women‘s wings engender parties and increase their receptiveness to 
women‘s demands. However, other scholars argue that, ―…, the introduction of separate, ―parallel‖ 
women‘s sectors reflects the efforts of party leaders to ghettoize women‘s activities rather than 
envision meaningful gender equality within the party.‖ (Clark and Schwedler, 2003: 302).  Similarly, 




Most political parties have women‘s wings that mobilize women to vote during elections. 
Whether, these increase women‘s involvement with party politics is another matter. Women‘s 
wings allow parties to ―ghettoize‖ women and women‘s issues; … Even when parties have 
neglected women‘s interests, they have profited from employing gendered imagery, drawing 
on women‘s votes and using women in electioneering. (Basu, 2005: 14, 33) 
 
From my vantage point, I find that women‘s wings are useful in the short-term as temporary 
mechanisms to place women‘s issues on parties‘ agendas and to lobby for leadership positions. The 
effectiveness of these wings is enhanced only when they are supported by leadership, led at the 
highest levels and not by junior officials, and share in the decision-making process.
30
 However, more 
often than not, this is not the case. These wings marginalize women instead of creating a critical mass 
for leadership. Moreover, the extent to which they are effective as recruiting, electioneering and 
empowering mechanisms is dependent upon the salient features of parties that maintain them.  
 This section explores the effectiveness of women‘s wings in (1) increasing female 
membership, (2) amassing the female vote, and (3) creating a critical mass of women for leadership. 
Information gleaned from the first two rounds of interviews pointed to a significant role that women‘s 
wings play in women‘s membership and leadership. Based on this, a third round of 58 interviews was 
conducted during 2008-2009.  The question ―Are women’s wings effective mobilization 
mechanisms?” was posed  to heads of women‘s wings in the 13 out of the 18 relevant parties that 
maintain these entities, as well as to party leaders and other female party activists. Responses of 
interviewees are expected to supply additional explanations for observed variation in female 
membership across parties. Moreover, female membership is expected to influence women‘s 
leadership. Since women‘s wings are the main mechanism for recruiting women, it is important to 
examine their role in this respect.    
                                               
30   See: Fatima Sbaity Kassem, 2005. "Beijing + 10: Arab Women at a Glance Achievements, Gaps and 




 At the outset, the views of female activists are solicited and then these views are compared 
with those of party leaders.  In the pre-war era, the feminist discourse attracted women to join secular 
parties with leftist orientations, which was largely accomplished via women‘s wings. During the civil 
war, militarization and violence drove many women away from parties. They turned to relief work 
and assumed new roles within more modern post-war parties including lobbying for women‘s rights 
and demanding leadership positions.
31
   As several interviewees observe, female membership in pre-
war secular and civil-confessional parties declined after the war. This prompted them to look for 
ways to recruit women. This included setting up women‘s wings, as a female activist reports that,  
In the post-war period, the women‘s sector exerted efforts to mobilize women in addition to 
its traditional role of providing family support, eliminating discrimination against women and 
empowering them. Unfortunately, it failed to increase female membership or to be 
instrumental in elections. 
 
She concludes that, ―It takes much more than women‘s wings to empower women. It requires more 
assertiveness by women, as well as political will and special measures by party elites to prepare 
women for leadership positions.‖ Another female activist suggests that, ―Women‘s wings outlived 
their utility overtime and must be dismantled, especially since they failed to increase female 
membership.‖ Moreover, some female activists see that, ―Women‘s wings place them in a small box 
and throw that box in a corner, which separates them from real politics.‖  
                                               
31
   This is comparable to the new roles that women assumed in the USA after World War I, when the welfare state 
extended benefits to veterans and to women, which led to expanding the franchise for women in the 1920s. Women got 
organized and lobbied for new policies. As pressure groups, they were able to push the government to adopt public social 
policies for women and families. Skocpol finds that,  ―Acting in pursuit of their career interests, and engaged in conflicts 
or alliances with one another, political leaders try to use existing governmental and party organizations to devise and 
implement policies that will attract support of various groups…. In the 1920s American women built voluntary 
associations and engaged in the ‗municipal housekeeping‘ and proposed public social policies. They believed that their 
moral and educational styles of political practice could help clean up political corruption in the USA. … Women built 
parallel organizations to male-dominated ones. They were more organized and could spread a policy idea quickly. They 
served as pressure groups and lobbied for their demands. The USA government … separately administered benefits and 
protection for women…‖  (Theda Skocpol, 1992. Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social policy 





 The views on women‘s wings of female officials in pre-war secular and in post-war civil-
confessional parties are similar. The female secretary-general of a post-war civil-confessional party 
justifies not having a women‘s wing because, ―These wings frame women and marginalize them 
instead of empowering them.‖ A female activist takes a strong stand and submits a proposal to 
dismantle them, which was approved but implementation postponed until after the 2009 elections. 
She states that, ―We have to meet and liaise with women‘s wings in religious parties. These are our 
allies in elections.‖ The heads of women‘s wings in other parties also voiced their concerns about 
marginalizing women and indicated that these wings ought to be dismantled. This trend is 
increasingly emerging among post-war civil-confessional parties. In this context, a female MP 
remarks that, ―Women‘s wings are effective in mobilizing women before and during elections. 
However, it is indisputable that they marginalize women. They are ineffective in empowering them. 
They must be dismantled.‖  Also, a female official remarks that, ―Women‘s wings keep women 
outside the decision-making circles. As such, women remain tokens in decision-making, but they are 
effective in increasing female membership.‖ Moreover, a female party official explains that,  
Women‘s wings provide relief during conflict and are effective in recruiting women, 
indoctrinating them and guaranteeing the female vote. However, these parallel entities isolate 
women and dilute their demands for leadership. They really marginalize women and do not 
empower them. They are only effective in recruiting women and in elections, which can be 
accomplished from within the party. They should be dismantled and the party leader agrees.  
 
This is analogous to the description of women‘s wings in the early European parties that,  
… [T]hese sections were peripheral to the power structure of the party and did not provide a 
route for women into positions of political influence. …, since positions of influence in 
parties were scarce, parties did not want to make it easy for women to enter these positions. 
This would have created conflict with the existing hierarchies, and that conflict could be 
avoided by admitting women only as ‗second-class participants‘. …, because they were 
usually denied positions of influence, women had little incentive to become involved in 
parties. (Ware, 1996: 81)   
 




Parties deliberately want to keep women in a separate corner and women‘s wings are just 
perfect for this. Men do not want to have to compete with women for the limited leadership 
positions. Also, men still consider politics to be a man‘s turf and women are trespassing. The 
only advantage is that these wings are good for recruiting women and for elections. 
 
 The views of female officials in pre-war secular and post-war civil-confessional parties 
converge. These stress that such mechanisms marginalize rather than empower women. Many 
advocate dismantling them in order to limit their adverse effects on women‘s chances in leadership. 
These views are also shared by leaders and elites in these parties. Responses of party leaders are along 
the same wave length as those of female officials. For instance, the leader of a pre-war secular party 
responds that they already took the drastic measure of dismantling the women‘s wing since, ―It is 
ineffective in raising female membership and amassing votes in elections.‖ He adds that, 
―Competition is severe and other parties appear to be more attractive to women and offer them more 
chances in leadership. Maybe, by mainstreaming women‘s issues, more women will be encouraged to 
join. We should do better by emulation!‖ This information on the ineffectiveness of women‘s wings 
provides additional explanation for the low shares of female membership in pre-war secular parties. 
Another party leader states that,  
The women‘s wing is instrumental in mobilizing women and in amassing the female vote in 
elections. However, we have seen that it is not as effective in creating a critical mass of 
women for leadership. It marginalizes women and keeps them away from party politics. We 
are deliberating dismantling it after the elections.   
 
Leaders and senior advisers in other parties re-iterate the same intentions. However, such radical 
measures are postponed until after elections for, ―Strategic alliances with our allies in religious 
parties‖. Another party leader informs that, ―The party already dismantled the women‘s wing because 
women demanded that and they felt it marginalizes them. However, it is effective as a mobilization 
and electioneering mechanism.‖ He adds that, ―In effect, by dismantling the women‘s wing, a critical 




studying women‘s wings in western democracies in the mid-twentieth century find that they were also 
concerned with mobilization and elections more than with female leadership and representation 
(Lovenduski and Norris 1993). Adopting a linear approach to development, one perceives that post-
war secular and civil-confessional parties characterized with lower religiosity, democratic practices 
and/or plural membership, are ‗avant guardiste‘ in that they aim to be more effective in creating a 
critical mass of women. In fact, responses of party leaders converge with those of female officials in 
post-war secular and civil-confessional parties. 
 Indeed, some pre-war secular and post-war civil-confessional parties dismantled women‘s 
wings in response to proposals by female officials and their lobbying efforts with party elites. Other 
parties are deliberating such an action and have to postpone due to strategic alliances with religious 
parties. These statements also inform us that women‘s wings in post-war civil-confessional parties are 
effective mechanisms for recruiting women and amassing their votes for elections, which explains the 
higher shares of female membership in these parties. The majority of post-war secular and civil-
confessional parties, however, perceive that women‘s wings marginalize women.  
 In pre-war civil-confessional parties, heads of women‘s wings maintain that they should be 
retained because they are effective mechanisms for recruitment and for elections. Female officials list 
their achievements in that, ―The women‘s wing has succeeded in recruiting more women, 
coordinating activities with our allies in religious parties like fund raising, organizing social events, 
and running campaigns for elections.‖ Some argue that women‘s wings cater to all generations of 
female members, address women‘s issues and help in representing parties in conferences and 
meetings on women‘s issues. The head of the women‘s wing explains that, ―Younger female 
members prefer to work within professional and specialized sectors, while older members are more 




doable and female membership increased.  A female activist justifies retaining women‘s wings 
because, ―We are still in a patriarchal society. Women‘s wings are needed. They do not marginalize 
women but cater to their needs, build their political capabilities, and empower them. They offer 
women the choice to be as involved in politics as they want.‖ Another female official highlights that 
developed countries also maintain them and this is why they should be retained;  
Even in developed countries, parties maintain special women‘s wings, ministries for women 
and equal opportunities, or other forms of national machineries for women. We should 
emulate these practices because they succeeded in empowering women and improving female 
representations. 
  
Similarly, interviewees from religious parties also see that women‘s wings are effective. The 
head of women‘s wing in a religious tolerant party stresses that, ―Women‘s wings are not only 
mechanisms for recruiting women, but are excellent electoral machineries. They spearhead electoral 
committees at the district level and work efficiently during elections.‖ Another female official notes 
that, ―We do not only recruit women but we are extremely effective during elections. These are our 
main function, whether publicized or not!‖ Furthermore, the head of the women‘s wing in a pre-war 
religious extremist party reports that in the 2009 elections,  
The women‘s section mapped prospective voters, estimated their number and paid them visits 
to discuss their needs and the party‘s electoral platform. I also represented the party on TV 
talk shows to show that women are politically active and empowered and publicize our role in 
running the electoral campaign for the party. We arranged to transport female voters to ballot 
sites and monitored elections. Our role is very effective, especially that women are 60% of 
voter turnout.  
 
This key role that female party officials and women play in elections is recognized by the National 
Democratic Institute (NDI) as international observers of elections in Lebanon. More specifically, the 
NDI stated in its 2009 report that, ―Despite the decrease in the number of parliamentary seats they 
occupy, women were active in other parts of the electoral process, serving as poll workers (for the 




confessional, secular and religious parties report similar testimonies on the role of women‘s wings in 
2009 elections. The high voter turnout of women (over 61%) demonstrates the key role that women‘s 
wings of competing parties played in 2009 elections. 
 In general, the views of leaders in religious parties and their male advisers on women‘s wings 
also converge with those of female party officials. For instance, the leader of a pre-war religious 
extremist party stresses that, ―the most important task of women‘s wings is recruiting women, 
employing religious mobilization and helping the party during elections.‖ However, some party 
leaders tend to boast that these wings empower women and to downplay the role they serve as 
recruitment and election mechanisms. In this respect, a senior adviser to the leader of a religious 
conservative but not extremist party explains that,  
Our women‘s association is creating a critical mass of women for leadership starting at 
middle management. We have women heading their own sectors and, as such, they have an 
informal influence on the party‘s decisions. We have very few women at the top but this 
should definitely improve overtime. 
 
To corroborate these positive views, the head of the women‘s wing in a post-war religious 
conservative party maintains that, ―Women‘s wings are essential and effective mechanisms for 
recruitment, education and bringing more women to the ballots. They do not marginalize women, but 
empower them. This is the only way that women can become politically active, given the segregation 
between women and men.‖ These statements carry hope that eventually women‘s wings will have 
sufficient influence to lobby and push for women‘s leadership. Therefore, consensus among religious 
parties is to maintain their women‘s wings, given the segregation between women and men. 
Women‘s wings are effective in mobilizing women, guiding them in the right religious path, and in 
amassing their votes during elections. The large share of female membership in religious parties   




 Therefore, women‘s wings in the 13 out of the 18 parties which maintain them are formally 
established to mobilize women, but also to serve as ―electioneering‖ machineries. The effectiveness 
of women‘s wings is examined in (1) mobilizing women, (2) creating a critical mass of women for 
leadership, and (3) amassing female vote during elections. Post-war civil-confessional parties attest to 
their effectiveness in increasing female membership and in amassing the female vote. They are 
generally regarded of limited effectiveness in creating a critical mass of women for leadership, 
especially by parties that dismantled them or plan to do that. This is not specific to parties in Lebanon 
as scholars studying religious and Islamist parties in Arab and non-Arab countries attest to similar 
dynamics.
32
 Unlike officials in secular and civil-confessional parties, interviewees from religious 
parties see them as effective tools in fulfilling all the three goals for which they are established.  They 
claim that these units may also become more effective in creating a critical mass of women for 
leadership in the future. In this connection, one may wonder why women‘s wings succeeded in some 
parties but failed in others in increasing female membership. This requires further investigation, 
which falls outside the scope of this dissertation, since political parties are the unit of analysis. 
Conclusions  
Data show that female membership is higher in post-war than in pre-war parties, as 
hypothesized. On average, the share of female membership is higher in post-war civil-confessional 
parties with lower religiosity, plural membership and democratic decision-making. Female membership 
is also higher in war and post-war religious parties of higher religiosity, and with plural and democratic 
deficits, than in pre-war secular parties with lower religiosity, more pluralism and democratic 
procedures. These results are not consistent with the hypotheses H2A and H3A. On the one hand, 
affluent post-war civil-confessional and religious parties targeting women, especially the poor, tend to 
employ effective mobilization strategies, modalities (financial and in-kind incentives), and mechanisms 
                                               




(women‘s wings). On the other hand, pre-war secular and civil-confessional parties are disadvantaged 
because of fierce competition from affluent parties, shifting memberships and shrinking pluralism after 
the war. Further, women‘s wings play a central role as mobilization and electioneering machineries, but 
are frequently seen as inimical to women‘s prospects for leadership within a party. In this context, I 
note Basu‘s findings that religious parties have an ―enormous capacity to mobilize women‘s 
movements while undermining women‘s advancement.‖  (Basu, 2005: 35). Does female party 





Chapter Six  
Does Party Religiosity Explain Women’s Leadership? 
 
In the previous chapters, I advanced an original theory of party variation in religiosity 
that parties with lower religiosity are more likely to enhance women‘s leadership than parties 
with higher religiosity. This chapter presents qualitative and quantitative analysis to support this 
theory in that religiosity is a core explanation for variation in women‘s leadership across parties. 
It is organized in three sections. Section A provides data on women in leadership bodies of the 
18 relevant parties and compares women‘s shares in leadership to their shares in party 
membership. This data on women in parties are substantiated by views of party elites reflecting 
their attitudes towards women‘s leadership. The intensity of religiosity on party platforms maps 
onto attitudes of party elites, qua political culture vis-à-vis women‘s leadership. These views are 
pitched against those of female party activists, especially on which parties work better for female 
leadership. Section B examines the mismatch between the high female membership and low 
leadership in religious parties and tests whether female party membership matters for leadership. 
Section C concludes by estimating a multivariate regression model for women‘s leadership in 
Lebanon. As expected, religiosity is a core explanatory variable for variations in women‘s 
leadership across five categories of parties of varying religiosities. This provides strong 
statistical support to the theory of party variation in religiosity and women‘s leadership. 
A. Women in Leadership Bodies of Political Parties  
Data compiled from party administrators on female leadership by party-age and party-
religiosity are presented in charts 6.1 to 6.6 (next pages). These bar charts provide initial 
evidence in support of the theory of party variation in religiosity and women‘s leadership. The 




Chart 6.1 shows that female leadership is higher in post-war than in pre-war parties, with the 

























Pre-War War & Post-War
Chart 6.1 Female Leadership by Party-Age




























Extremist Conservative Tolerant Civil-Confessional Secular
Chart 6.2 Female Leadership by Party-Religiosity
    
As discussed earlier, in the post-war era, transformations and attitudinal shifts of party elites 
towards the role of women in parties and their political involvement are observed. In general, 
post-war parties are more tolerant and receptive to women‘s leadership than pre-war parties. 
Women‘s share in leadership bodies of all religious extremist parties (scoring 1 on the religiosity 
scale) are the lowest across parties. Women are non-existent in pre-war extremist parties and 
their shares in post-war extremist parties are infinitesimal, as charts 6.2 and 6.4 clearly show. 
Female leadership is highest in secular parties, on average, but especially in post-war secular 
parties (scoring 5 on the religiosity scale). Moreover, female leadership in post-war (war-origin) 
religious parties, especially the Shiite-dominated Amal of tolerant religiosity (scoring 3) is 
higher than in other religious parties. (See, Annex 6.1 for coding of parties and Annex 6.2 for the 
hypotheses). 
Impressions gained from interviews reveal an ultra-conservative stance in Sunni-
dominated religious extremist parties compared to post-war Shiite-dominated conservative and 





as the intensity of religiosity rises as in religious extremist parties, the share of women in 
leadership falls to infinitesimal levels (see, charts 6.3 to 6.5). 
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Chart  6.3 Female Leadership by Party-Religiosity
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Chart 6.5 Female Leadership by Party-Age & Party-Religioisty
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Dem. Deficit Leadership or Decision-making Democratic
Chart  6.7 Female Leadership by Party Democratic Practices


























Chart 6.8 Female Leadership by Party Pluralism
 
                                               
1   Party ID codes in Chart 6.6 are: Communists (1), Syrian Social (2), Phalanges (3), National Bloc (4), Baath 
(5), Progressive Socialist (6), Liberals (7), Islamic Group (8), Hope (9), Unitarian (10), Hizbullah (11), Wa‘ad (12), 





Chart 6.6 shows female leadership in each of the 18 relevant parties (see table 3.1 p. 107 and 
Annex 6.1 for a list of parties with religiosity scores).   
Charts 6.7 and 6.8 show that as parties employ more democratic practices (leadership 
transitions and decision-making) and as parties become more plural the share of women in 
leadership rises, as hypothesized (H2 and H3). In fact, difference in means is significant between 
plural (14.2) and non-plural (7.8) female membership. Women‘s leadership in parties employing 
leadership transitions and decision-making, or are democratic in both counts, or in either one of 
these indicators appears to be close, on average. However, chart 6.9 does not establish an upward 
sloping positive and linear correlation between female membership and leadership, as anticipated 
(H4). This is initial indication that female membership does not matter for women‘s leadership, 
particularly in parties with religious platforms. Chart 6.10 shows that, on average, the highest 
shares of female leadership are in secular parties of lowest religiosity (5 score), with 
decentralized decision-making and plural membership. These post-war secular parties are closely 
followed by civil-confessional parties (4 score) with plural membership and democratic 
procedures in involving women in decision-making. This provides initial support to the theory 
and related hypotheses posited in this thesis. 
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Pre-war civil-confessional parties, also have lower religiosity, but are characterized by plural and 
democratic deficit in transfer of leadership and decision-making. This partially explains why pre-
war parties have lower shares of women in leadership than their post-war counterparts. Thus, the 
lowest shares for women‘s leadership are seen in religious parties with higher religiosity, and 
deficits in democratic procedures and plural membership. 
The question ―Which parties work better for women’s leadership?‖ is posed to gauge the 
views of party elites (leaders and their senior advisers) on women‘s leadership.2  Table 6.1 
presents a summary of responses offered by elites in each of the five party categories.     
Table 6.1  Which Parties Work Better for Women’s Leadership? 
(Responses of party leaders & senior advisers) 
 Pre-war Parties 
Pre-1975 
War & Post-war Parties 
Post-1975 
Secular a-religious Secular leftist but not religious parties 
But: political culture and patriarchy 
Secular pluralist but not religious 
parties 
 
Civil-confessional Civil-confessional but not religious 
parties 
But: political culture and patriarchy  
Secular and civil-confessional parties 





Religious parties are equal to or better 
than secular parties  
But, women cannot lead men, this 
violates Shari‘a (doctrine)  
Plus political culture and patriarchy 
Secular same as religious parties;  
But: Political culture and patriarchy  
 
One observes that leaders and elites in religious parties justify the low proportion of 
women‘s leadership by referring to external factors or deny the problem altogether. In fact, they 
attribute this situation to patriarchy and culture, or invoke the Shari‘a in that women cannot lead 
men. Similar views on patriarchy and culture are offered by some elites from pre-war secular and 
civil-confessional parties. These also stress that there are no internal structural obstacles to 
                                               
2  A third round of interviews was conducted during summer 2009. In addition to addressing specific issues 
raised during the first and second rounds which required further examination, I consulted with party leaders, female 




women‘s leadership but that women should be more interested, politically mature and prove 
themselves by competing with men. In contrast, elites from post-war secular or civil-confessional 
parties boast their support by focusing on differences with religious parties towards women‘s 
leadership. In fact, these parties, of lower religiosity and higher secularism, exhibit a more 
‗women-friendly‘ attitude towards women‘s leadership than pre-war civil-confessional or any of 
the religious parties. Several indicated that they are taking formal and concrete measures or made 
proposals to adopt affirmative action measures (e.g. internal party quotas) for enhancing 
women‘s leadership.  
Leaders and elites in eleven out of the 18 relevant parties confirmed that they have 
recommended, adopted, or are in the process of introducing voluntary internal party quotas for 
women. Some of these parties considered these measures within a restructuring exercise. These 
parties include all four secular and five post-war civil-confessional parties as well as two pre-war 
civil-confessional parties (Kata‘éb and Progressive Socialist). This leaves out two pre-war civil-
confessional (Liberals and Al-Kutlah) and all five religious parties (see, table 3.1 for list of 
tables).     
Several party elites in secular and civil-confessional parties are critical of the status of 
women in parties with religious platforms by way of comparison with their own parties. For 
instance, a leader remarks that, ―Religious parties are dogmatic and hostile to women‘s 
leadership. They are run by dictat. How do you want women to become leaders there?‖ Secular 
and post-war civil-confessional parties boast that the presence of women in their leadership 
bodies is a symbol of being modern (see also, Dahlerup, 2006: 295). In this connection, the 
leader of a post-war civil-confessional party also remarks that,  
Religious parties will never give women leadership posts. They give a conservative 




forward-looking. They encourage women to compete for leadership and are willing to 
adopt internal party quotas to increase their share in top positions.  
 
Another party leader also remarks that, ―Our actions speak for themselves. We are gender 
sensitive and we are serious about gender equality. We have the highest shares of women in 
leadership bodies.‖ Similar views are given by party elites of ‗avant guardiste‘ secular and post-
war civil-confessional parties. They employ gender-sensitive terminology such as gender roles, 
gender equality, and commitment to gender. This reflects a gender-sensitive and women-friendly 
political culture, which bodes well for women‘s leadership.3 This disposition to modern 
paradigms and a feminist discourse is attractive to women, especially that this holds the promise 
for promotions.  
Looking next at the religious parties, Sunni-dominated, ultra-conservative extremist 
parties are seen as less hospitable toward women‘s leadership than Shiite-dominated parties.4 In 
this respect, a leader of a pre-war religious extremist party states that ―We have more important 
business in these odd times than to worry about women in leadership positions when people are 
being assassinated and killed every day.‖ Further, religious extremist parties invariably invoke 
the doctrine and any action that violates the Shari‘a, especially ‗Al-Qiwama‘.5  For instance, the 
leader of an extremist religious party states that, 
                                               
3   As mentioned earlier, all interviews were conducted in Arabic and translated into English by the author 
without formal editing. Interviews were audio-taped by permission. In general, female interviewees were referred by 
party elites and were in leadership and decision-making positions within their respective parties. They were mostly 
career women and professionals of good standing in their communities.   
 
4   Scholars also find that, Christian religious parties (viz. SGP, GPV and RPF) ―… are openly against women 
participating in the public sphere…‖ (Lovenduski and Norris, 1993:210)  
 
5
  "Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has given the one more (strength) than 
the other, and because they support them from their means. Therefore the righteous women are devoutly obedient, 
and guard in (the husband's) absence what Allah would have them guard. As to those women on whose part ye fear 
disloyalty and ill-conduct, admonish them (first), (next), refuse to share their beds, (and last) beat them (lightly); but 
if they return to obedience, seek not against them means (of annoyance):... " The Book of Women 4.34 Translated 





First, our society is patriarchal. Men do not approve of women‘s presence in politics. 
Second, it is mentioned in the ―Hadeeth‖6 that no community ‗Ummah‘ will ever succeed 
if led by a woman. Third, if women relinquish their domestic duties and join the labor 
force, families break, and the society will become dysfunctional. 
 
In this vein, a senior adviser to the leader warns that, ―Women‘s place is at home. But, once they 
step out, they will not be able to discharge their multiple roles effectively. Eventually, there will 
be a trade-off at the expense of family welfare.‖  Similarly, a senior adviser in an extremist party 
also stresses that there is a difference between women in civil society and their work in politics:  
Women lead NGOs but cannot become leaders in politics. When women moved beyond 
their God-given roles and worked like men, the society became dysfunctional, as studies 
show. Look at the West. Women‘s place is at home as God dictated. They are not fit for 
leadership because of menopause, mood swings and emotional imbalances. They should 
leave the hard domain of politics to men! 
 
Several leaders and male advisers highlight that women are satisfied and make no 
demands for leadership. And, if they run for office, the party will not support them. As this 
leader of an extremist party explained that, ―Women comprise one-third of membership, but we 
have no women in leadership. The party was against a female member who defied the rules and 
ran for parliamentary elections, because this is against Koran. There is no place for women in 
hard politics.‖7 In general, elites in religious parties see that all parties, irrespective of their 
platforms, offer women the same chances in leadership. In this context, a male MP in a war-
origin religious conservative party remarks that, ―Politics is for men. But, it is customs and 
traditions that keep women at home for domestic and family duties. There is no difference 
between religious and other parties at all with respect to women‘s leadership.‖ Further, a leader 
                                               
6  The Prophet‘s views on controversial issues are sought by his disciples. These are recorded and his 
responses are revered as sacrosanct judgments on specific issues that are sometimes contested by the Ulama and 
learned clerics. 
 
7  She is the only female Islamist from a pre-war religious extremist party to ever run for office. Instead of 
supporting her, the party nominated the leader, her husband, which forced her to withdraw from the race and the 
party. She ran again as independent but did not win. She is the President of a religious Sunni University. She does 
not come from a political family but her husband is the founder and leader of the party. This phenomenon   is widely 




in an extremist party argues that, ―by keeping women at home to take care of their families, we 
are relieving them from the heavy burden of politics and protecting them from fierce 
competition.‖ This attitude is condescending and reflects poorly on women‘s capabilities in 
meeting the challenges of a political career.  
 However, as several party elites in religious extremist and conservative parties point out 
that, ―We are bound by built-in barriers in the doctrine, which prevent women from leading men. 
This is why secular parties offer women more chances in leadership than Islamist parties.‖  In 
addition, the statement by the leader of another extremist religious party highlights that, ―Islamist 
extremist movements, like ours, do not approve of women‘s political leadership; while moderate 
movements like the Islamic Brotherhood allow women to assume leadership and even nominate 
them to office.‖  Voiced by the leader of an extremist party, this statement carries weight not 
only because it demonstrates that indeed there are multiple religiosities with varying influence on 
women‘s leadership but also it supports the theory of party variation in religiosity. These 
responses show that even party leaders and advisors, who are expected to support the reputation 
of their own parties, will sometimes acknowledge that their religious framing constrains the roles 
they can give to women. Similarly, one of the party elites stresses that,  
Muslim women are veiled and should not mix with men. This is ‗haram‘, forbidden by 
Shari‘a. But, above all they cannot lead men as this violates the Shari‘a. Moreover, 
politics is for men and their place is at home. I do not advise women to join secular 
parties, because only Islamist parties can secure happiness in the afterlife.  
 
Testimonies of elites in religious extremist parties provide evidence that women‘s chances in 
leadership bodies within parties of higher religiosity are very limited indeed. These conservative 
views, which support the conceptual framework of the theory advanced, are not close by any 
measure to notions of gender equality or concepts embraced by a gender paradigm. Statements of 




in pre-war civil-confessional parties reflect convergence on patriarchy and cultural barriers as 
table 6.1 shows.  
Similarly, views of party elites in pre-war civil-confessional parties are also traditional 
towards women‘s leadership. As one of the leaders in a pre-war civil-confessional party remarks 
that, ―Even if we want to promote women to leadership positions, we do not have a sufficient 
number of women who are willing and able to assume leadership positions.‖ Nonetheless, a party 
leader sounds optimistic that, ―Despite patriarchy and the hostile attitude of men towards 
women‘s leadership, snatching away their rightful positions, once women prove themselves, 
male members will accept them.‖ This echoes the arguments in favor of ‗the politics of presence‘ 
(Phillips 1995) but also points to a vicious circle of the ‗chicken and egg‘. How can women 
prove themselves in politics if they are not given the chance to do so? These parties emphasize 
that entrenched patriarchy and overarching cultural barriers justify the lower shares of women in 
their leadership bodies. Thus, while political culture cannot be measured and is not a variable in 
this theory, nevertheless it is a mechanism that embodies and translates into measurable terms 
how religiosity affects the shares of women in leadership bodies. The impressions gained from 
examining these views reinforce the link between party elites‘ attitudes, party religiosity and 
women‘s leadership. This shows how religiosity is connected to party political culture. 
In order to get a complete picture of which parties work more for women‘s leadership, 
the views of female party activists, all heads of women‘s wings, MPs, ministers, and municipal 
candidates are also solicited. Few female party activists see that religious parties offer women 
chances in leadership; while the large majority views secular and civil-confessional parties as 
offering women more chances in leadership. Moreover, many female officials from parties with 




work best for women‘s leadership. This is indicative that, while female officials – especially in 
parties with extremist and conservative religiosities – do not complain about their position, 
nonetheless they recognize that civil-confessional and more secular parties work better for 
women‘s leadership than parties with high religiosity. However, few female activists from the 
more secular parties see that religious parties work for women. This can be explained by the fact 
that often political coalitions influence interviewees‘ replies. This is more pronounced coming 
from members in weaker secular parties that are in alliance with stronger, affluent religious 
parties. Notwithstanding this, the impressions gained are that the majority of female party 
activists see that parties with lower religiosity offer women more chances for leadership than all 
others. 
 More specifically, a female official in a pre-war secular party sees that, ―Secular, leftist, 
pluralist, democratic parties give women more chances in leadership than other parties. These 
parties are premised on liberal and egalitarian ideologies, progressive thought, and are modern.‖  
Indeed, and reinforcing this perception, during summer 2010, the Communist party elected for 
the first time, a female vice-president. In contrast, a female official in a post-war religious 
extremist party responds that, ―Women‘s leadership is at the same low level across all parties, 
Christian or Muslim parties. Maybe, women in secular leftist parties have a better chance in 
leadership because these do not have religious goals.‖ Coming from a female in a religious 
extremist party, this statement emphasizes party goals as a decisive factor in advancing women 
to leadership positions. Similarly, a female in leadership position in a religious but tolerant party 
remarks that, ―Women have negligible chances for leadership in all parties. But, their chances 




unites them but is not a barrier to their leadership.‖ In a similar vein, a female official predicts 
that, 
Women‘s chances for leadership are least in religious extremist parties, then in pluralist 
and democratic parties with secular and civil orientation. These parties recognize 
women‘s merit and competence. We are hopeful if women prove themselves overtime, 
we will reach the all-male supreme council.  
 
Moreover, a young female MP, who led a post-war civil-confessional party for eleven years, 
emphasizes that, ―Secular parties with civil goals are, by far, more open and accommodating to 
women‘s leadership than religious parties. I led this party for eleven years and created a critical 
mass of women for leadership. Now women occupy 25% of leadership positions.‖ Another 
official summarizes that,  
Religious parties offer women least chances for leadership, with Shiite-dominated 
relatively better than Sunni-dominated parties. These parties might promote women for 
public consumption or strategic ‗artificial‘ reasons but not to advance women. In this 
case, women remain tokens but not decision-makers. Finally, secular and modern civil 
parties like Tayyar and Future offer women best chances for leadership.  
 
These statements are representative of the views of female officials in different party categories. 
These show convergence that secular and civil-confessional parties offer women more chances in 
leadership than other categories, albeit due to different reasons, as the following paragraphs 
indicate.  
 Interviews with other female officials in extremist and conservative religious parties give 
the impression that they are content and are not complaining or demanding to ascend to 
leadership positions. A few officials are bold and venture to voice their personal opinions – albeit 
rarely—but this also gives the impression that they are saying what they think they should say 
and not what is actually taking place within the inner structures of these parties. For instance, the 




extremist cases like Afghanistan or Saudi Arabia to highlight that in Hizbullah she is an example 
of how women rise to leadership. She states that, 
Some religious extremist parties bar women from leadership. There are no pure secular 
parties but only confessional communities around which parties form and where 
patriarchy prevails. In our party, decision-making is by ‗Shoura‘ or consultation, which 
paves the road for more women to assume leadership, when and if they are ready. I am 
the example.  
 
But, she is a solitary, single example. Nonetheless, her statement reflects that Shari‘a is no bar to 
women‘s leadership but it is the intensity of religiosity in parties that strongly influences 
women‘s chances in leadership. Such a testimony is very important especially that it is coming 
from a female in leadership position in one of the conservative religious parties. Others stress 
that there is a seniority system in Hizbullah and women are promoted from the ranks to middle 
management then to leadership positions: ―Hizbullah has never stopped anyone from demanding 
leadership positions. But, women have to summon their courage to do so.‖ 
Statements by other female officials in religious parties, however, justify their middle-
level managerial positions, just as party elites do, by also employing discourses that ‗women’s 
place is at home‘ and that ‗politics is a man’s business‘, but above all invoking the Shari‘a. For 
instance, a female official in a post-war religious extremist party argues that, ―In Islam women 
are not allowed to lead men by Al-Qiwama. So, how do you expect pious women to violate the 
doctrine and aspire to leadership positions?‖8 Another female official in a religious extremist 
party stresses that, ―Women should leave politics to men. Our tasks are to provide social 
services, religious advocacy and guidance, and gather women‘s votes in elections.‖ Similarly, a 
                                               
8   Findings of other scholars on this issue support my impressions (Basu 2005, Sacchet 2005). However, 
some scholars find that, ―…, Islamist women‘s struggle for voice within their own political parties illustrates not an 
exceptional case, but a more generalizeable phenomenon of intraparty mobilization within an environment of 
changing political opportunity structures.  (Clark & Schwedler, 2003: 309). I only heard these voices and demands 





female in post-war religious conservative party also insists that, ―In our party, women prefer to 
stay in second or third level roles, as recipients and followers not as leaders. However, I believe 
that secular and leftist or civil parties offer women more chances in leadership than our parties. 
Such parties build women‘s political capacities.‖9 Along these lines, a female official in another 
pre-war religious extremist party sees that, ―Even if women were given the chance, they remain 
followers. Let us face it: Women have no place in politics. That is why Islamist parties do not 
offer women leadership positions.‖ More often than not, female officials in these parties echo the 
views of party elites. For instance, a female in a religious conservative party states that,  
Despite the fact that our women work very hard, our chances in leadership remain slim 
because of the Shari‘a. In Hizbullah, the Koran is our guide and salvation, but we are not 
extremist parties here. They are Wahabi like Saudi Arabia, where women‘s chances in 
leadership are nil.   
 
Another female official remarks that, ―If women are assertive and impose themselves as they do 
in parties like the secular Syrian Social party, they will be promoted on meritocratic grounds. 
These are the parties that offer women more chances for leadership. Our parties are interested in 
wider welfare issues. I am not here for leadership but to serve society and my religion.‖  
Indeed, responses by other female officials also reveal that women in religious parties 
prefer to remain on the receiving end and accept a passive role in politics as dictated by the 
doctrine. For example, some officials in extremist religious parties recognize that, ―Women‘s 
chances in leadership are limited in all religious parties, especially in extremist Salafis, like ours. 
However, I have no problem and no leadership ambitions at all, since I believe that religious 
commitment is essential and I work for Islam as the solution and right path.‖  Nonetheless, others 
highlight that, ―If the party finds that it is in its interest to promote women to leadership or to 
                                               
9   Indeed, few parties require members to enroll in political formation institutes attached to their parties and to 
take competitive examinations for acceptance and promotions. The Lebanese Forces Party has a university and 




nominate them to public office, they will comply with the party‘s orders; otherwise they are 
content and have no ambitions.‖ Therefore, if it is for ‗strategic maneuvering‖, a religious party 
is willing to reinterpret the doctrine, slide over the principle of ‗Al-Qiwama‘ and promote 
women. 
However, I wonder whether had women been more assertive, would the results have been 
different? The findings of scholars studying women in religious parties show that there is a 
pattern in that women are not empowered or visible in leadership bodies within religious 
parties.
10
 In this context, a female official in a civil-confessional party remarks that, ―Women 
have a much more difficult and thorny route in religious parties. Nonetheless, parties with 
religious platforms may decide to promote women to leadership or nominate them on their lists 
to compete with other parties, but definitely not to empower them.‖ These impressions are also 
corroborated by findings of scholars studying Islamist parties in Jordan and Yemen in that, 
―Women‘s presence in the councils has not, thus far, resulted in an influential or vocal role for 
women in the party.‖ (Clark & Schwedler, 2003: 309). In effect, a female scholar explains this 
phenomenon in that,  
For women in religious parties, spiritual returns and the public good not personal gains 
are sufficient. They go by a different set of values than women in secular and civil-
confessional parties. These are governed by religious convictions without any 
expectations of rewards and recognition. However, women in other parties work for 
material gains and personal recognition and rewards.   
 
To a certain extent, differences in value systems, religious commitment and adherence to Shari‘a 
may explain the reluctance of female officials in most religious parties in demanding recognition 
and leadership positions. However, there are more mundane factors suppressing women‘s 
demands for leadership in religious parties. These include in-kind and financial incentives that 
women receive from affluent parties, which may explain their silence -- rather passiveness – in 
                                               




asking for leadership.  Indeed, a female official remarks that, ―Financial and in-kind incentives 
that religious parties offer poor women can explain why women are passive and accept their 
inferior position within the party.‖ Nonetheless, providing further in-depth analysis based on 
values systems, a female in a post-war civil-confessional party states that, ―Value systems 
change imperceptibly but are contextual. Parties, including those with religious platforms, 
transform overtime to reflect the political situation within which they function and their attitude 
towards women‘s leadership will eventually change. Religious parties will promote women when 
it is in their interest to do so, by-passing jurisprudence for political gains.‖  In the same vein, a 
female MP in a civil-confessional party maintains that, ―Religious and other parties offer women 
leadership positions when it is in their interest to do so.  Parties function along ‗the ends justify 




Notwithstanding the views expressed by female officials in extremist and conservative 
religious parties, there are a few dissenting voices that conceive of a light at the end of the 
tunnel. In effect, as a female official in a tolerant religious party notes that, ―The Shari‘a must be 
interpreted in favor of women. Any interpretation that puts women back home leads to 
inefficient use of human resources. This is not in the interest of the country.‖ For instance, 
another female official in the tolerant religious party, Amal, notes that, ―If our Islamist party is 
led by a young, religious leader who is enlightened, educated, and open-minded, women will 
move to leadership levels. I am willing to run for leadership positions as long as my husband 
                                               
11  In Jordan 2003 elections, a religious extremist party nominated a female, which raised criticism but also did 
not raise hopes for female representation. Clark argues that, ―While Musini‘s candidacy was a landmark for IAF 
women it does not ensure an expanded role for women in the party in the future. So long as ideological contention 
over women‘s roles continues to exist within IAF, the party‘s leaders will avoid creating a firm policy that could 
provoke further divisions among the rank-and-file. Instead, the leadership will continue to balance ideology with 
pragmatism, evaluating women‘s participation on a case-by-case basis and advancing women when strategically 




approves.‖ This statement reflects that attitudes of party elites are crucial for women‘s leadership 
and that some women in tolerant parties are more aspiring to leadership positions than those in 
conservative and extremist parties. Indeed, except for Amal, the leaders of other religious parties 
are all clergymen. The fact that they are clerics as well as leaders of religious parties does not 
only influence the intensity of religiosity on party platforms but also tunes their attitudes toward 
women‘s leadership --qua political culture. The responses of female activists in the only tolerant 
party in the sample surveyed, Amal with lower religiosity (scoring 3) substantiate the conceptual 
link between female leadership and party variation in religiosity. Indeed, the inter-linkage 
between party elites, party religiosities, and women‘s leadership is also cogently expressed by a 
female activist in civil-confessional Maronite-dominated party in that, ―Parties with strong bonds 
to religion and where the cleric and politician are collapsed into one, offer women less chances 
in leadership than other parties. In these parties, religious tenets affect politics and take 
precedence over democratic and egalitarian values.‖ Another female activist argues that the 
religious value system shapes parties‘ attitude towards women‘s leadership. She justifies the 
choices she makes on the following grounds:  
Women‘s chances in leadership are highest in civil-confessional parties, which are 
premised on religious value system but have a civil agenda. They are pluralist, tolerant, 
democratic and gender-sensitive. Secular parties got caught after the war between their 
liberal, leftist ideologies and traditional values. Women‘s chances in these parties are, in 
principle, good, but shrinking due to competition. Lastly, women‘s chances are least 
likely in religious parties because these are conservative, discriminatory, consider 
women inferior to men, and are anti-women‘s leadership.   
 
 Furthermore, several female activists in civil-confessional parties also observe that 
Christian-dominated parties offer women more chances in leadership than Muslim-dominated 
parties. This observation is worthwhile exploring. In fact, scholars studying parties in Western 




multi-religious society, like Lebanon composed of 18 religious sects, where cultural differences 
may still arise between Christians and Muslims, and even between Muslim Shiites and Muslim 
Sunnis.
12
 Indeed, different religions may impact the society in different ways as scholars suggest: 
Besides the influence on the party system and the government it has been assumed that 
religion has special effects on the development of society. … It seems possible to 
demonstrate that different religions are coupled with differences in attitudes to the 
development of society.‖ (Lane and Ersson 1978: 56).   
 
Extending this argument to women invokes ‗modern-ness‘ versus ‗traditionalism‘ between 
Christians and Muslims, and ‗conservatism‘ versus ‗tolerance‘ between Muslim Sunnis and 
Shiites, especially for women. In this vein, a female official states that,  
Islam looks at women as second class citizens and inferior to men. Our parties offer 
women more chances in leadership than Muslim-dominated non-religious parties, like 
Future. Religious parties like Hizbullah are less progressive and more conservative. They 
have one woman in their politburo and have never nominated women to parliament.  
 
Similar views are offered by another female activist who sees that, ―Christian-dominated parties 
(viz., Giants, Lebanese Forces, Wa‘ad, and Tayyar) actually promote women more than the 
Muslim-dominated Mustaqbal.‖  Other female activists maintain that confessional affiliation 
may be more relevant to women‘s leadership than different religions, since even amongst parties 
within the same confessional denomination there are variations that influence women‘s 
leadership. A female official points out few cases in point in that,  
The Kata‘éb, Marada, or Lebanese Forces tend to have more religious components in 
their platforms than the Tayyar or Wa‘ad. The latter parties have more women in 
leadership positions than the other civil-confessional parties. Also, Mustaqbal has less 
religiosity than the extremist Jama‘a Islamiah. Islamist extremist parties do not have 
women in leadership. These are extremely conservative, especially the Sunni Islamist 
parties, closer to the ‗Wahabi‘ in Saudi Arabia.   
 
These views are substantiated by data in chart 6.6. However, these also add insight on 
how religion is indeed multivocal and how party‘s political culture and elites‘ attitudes towards 
                                               
12  See, Max Weber (1965), Lane and Ersson (1987) on culture and religion; and Brian Barry (2000), Laurie 




women‘s leadership vary with religiosity, even within the same religious family. This 
substantiates the theoretical framework of party variation in religiosity posited and tested here. 
There is, however, a correlation between the degree of religiosity and major religious traditions. 
Indeed, parties with higher religiosity are all Muslim-dominated. Further, Christian-dominated 
parties outnumber Muslim-dominated parties within the group labeled civil-confessional parties 
and coded with lower religiosity (scoring 4). Moreover, the share of women in leadership bodies 
of the affluent Muslim-dominated party, Future (Al-Mustaqbal), is half of that of the powerful 
Christian-dominated party, Free Patriotic Movement (Tayyar). This information relates party 
religiosity to party elites‘ attitudes towards women‘s leadership as observed through the lens of 
Christianity versus Islam. The correlation is not complete, though, and the intensity of religiosity 
has an independent effect even within separate religious families.  Thus, even within Muslim or 
Christian-dominated parties, as religiosity declines women‘s leadership rises. In fact, the issues 
of political culture and party elites‘ attitudes vis-à-vis women‘s leadership map out very closely 
to religiosity. 
 Other issues raised by female officials shed light and increase our understanding of the 
mechanisms and factors that result in high shares of female leadership in some parties but not in 
others. For instance, the female chef de cabinet in the Tayyar, a post-war civil-confessional 
Christian-dominated party, emphasizes that, ―Religious parties have theocratic and dictatorial 
tendencies which block women from leadership, while democratic parties offer women better 
chances.‖ Further, statements of officials from post-war secular and civil-confessional parties, 
especially those employing democratic procedures at least in decision-making and have plural 
membership, highlight the positive impact of these two factors on parties‘ political culture. 




and women-friendly political culture than pre-war civil-confessional and all religious parties, as 
chapter Four has shown and as data in charts 6.7 and 6.8 show. However, manifestations of 
democratic practices do not seem to be prevalent in most religious parties and these parties have 
lower shares of women in leadership, as charts 6.7 and 6.10 have shown.  
 In pitting the statements of party leaders against those of female party activists, one finds 
in general a disjuncture between the normative statements of party elites and the reality described 
by females, or between the de jure and de facto. Some leaders directly rebut a cultural and 
patriarchal explanation for women‘s leadership in political parties. Apart from religious parties, 
pre-war parties attribute the low share of women in leadership bodies to cultural barriers; while 
post-war parties encourage women and plan to introduce internal quotas to enhance their already 
relatively higher shares in leadership bodies.  For instance, even a female activist in a civil-
confessional party offers a cultural explanation for the shares of women in leadership bodies: 
Patriarchy prevails and is reflected in political parties. Even in modern and ‗avant 
guardiste‘ parties like ours, women continue to be tasked with secondary and supportive 
roles, while men remain at the helm even if they are not as qualified. I am always 
appointed secretary of the executive committee, although I do all the work, while the 
chief gets all the credit. I resigned and complained because I felt slighted. Although the 
party leader is a feminist, he is surrounded by senior advisers who are sexists and 
threatened by qualified and competent women.   
 
In a similar vein, a female official in another post-war civil-confessional party argues 
that, ―Discrimination against women prevails even in the most hospitable of parties. Men receive 
preferential treatment irrespective of qualifications and competence; while more stringent 
eligibility requirements are imposed on women attesting to prevalence of patriarchy and a sexist 




are not nominated or elected to leadership positions. Parties demand that women must be 100% 
perfect, while they settle for less in the case of men.‖ 13  
Responses of female officials also reflect variation in parties‘ political culture and the 
observed influence on their chances in leadership. The attitude of post-war secular and civil-
confessional parties towards women‘s leadership is more welcoming than that of pre-war and all 
religious parties. These party variations in political culture vis-à-vis women‘s leadership may 
partly explain why post-war civil-confessional parties have higher shares of women in leadership 
than pre-war and post-war religious parties due to what I refer to as an ‗anti-women-as-leaders‘ 
attitude. Moreover, the ultra-conservative stance and hostile attitude of pre-war religious 
extremist parties explains the absence of women from their leadership bodies. The share of 
women in leadership bodies of the war-origin conservative but not extremist religious party is 
slightly higher, albeit still infinitesimal. However, in the war-origin tolerant religious party, 
women‘s share in leadership is visibly larger as party religiosity falls. Statements of pre-war 
civil-confessional as well as pre-war, war and post-war religious parties, flag patriarchy and 
cultural explanations, and religious doctrine in the case of religious parties, for the low share of 
women in their leadership bodies.   
What do these statements imply for the hypothesis presented and tested in this thesis?‖ 
These responses highlight that, parties with religious agendas – as other parties-- may be willing 
to promote women for strategic reasons employing an ‗ends justify the means‘ justification. 
Moreover, parties use women to enhance their image or their special contributions for electoral 
success. This means that parties recognize the value added presence of women in parties. 
However, the puzzle is that these parties do not advance women but women do not complain.  
                                               
13   Dahlerup also argues that, ―… Stigmatization of political women …are based on double standards (women 
are seen as tokens as if the men in politics were never that), and the femininity of women politicians is questioned – 




This section has shown that religiosity is observed by female party activists and to some extent 
by leaders and elites especially in secular and post-war civil-confessional parties, to affect party 
attitudes and the likelihood of support to women‘s advancement. On the one hand, leaders of 
pre-war secular and civil-confessional parties stress that women have equal chances for 
leadership in all parties, because they face the same cultural and patriarchal barriers. Party elites 
in pre-war, war-origin and post-war religious parties invoke the Shari‘a and the principle of ‗Al-
Qiwama‘ as well as ‗women’s place is at home’ and ‗politics-is-a man’s-business‘ discourses to 
disqualify women from leadership.
14
 In contrast, leaders of post-war secular and civil-
confessional parties see that their parties offer women more leadership chances, which is 
reflected in the higher shares in leadership bodies. On the other hand, female officials in 
religious parties agree that party religiosity influences women‘s leadership. Some highlight that 
there is variation in parties‘ religiosities and accordingly different leadership chances. 
Originating from women in religious parties, such testimonies carry weight in support of the 
theory of party variation in religiosity. Some interlocutors also raised the issue of parties‘ 
interests as driving women‘s chances in leadership even if this implies re-interpreting the 
doctrine. Data on shares of women in leadership bodies across parties show that as religiosity 
increases women‘s shares in leadership fall. These shares are infinitesimal in religious extremist 
parties lending support to the main hypothesis.  
In sum, statements of interviewees support the conceptualization that party religiosity 
influences women‘s leadership. The impressions gained from responses point to the link between 
                                               
14  In Jordan religious extremist parties also block women from leadership as Clark cites that, ―…, the 
Executive Bureau took a strong stance against Jordan‘s new electoral quota system for women, arguing that quotas 
violate the principle of equality articulated by Islam. …, the IAF (Islamic Action Front) nominated Musini (a 
female member of Shoura Council) for purely strategic reasons, over the objections of party members who declared 
her candidacy ‘haram’ (prohibited by Islam). (Clark, 2004: 7).  




elites‘ attitudes, party religiosity and women‘s ascendance to leadership positions. Leaders and 
elites of parties with higher religiosity, especially in extremist parties, appear to be against 
advancing women. In contrast, leaders and elites in secular and post-war civil-confessional 
parties indicate that they are more likely to do that.  What is intriguing is that the huge female 
membership in religious parties does not translate into meaningful representation in leadership 
bodies, contrary to theoretical expectations. The following section examines this puzzle.   
B. Does Female Membership Matter for Party Leadership? 
The qualitative findings in the previous section raise the issue whether female 
membership matters for party leadership. This section responds to this query. Comparing charts 
5.1 to 5.9 on female membership (chapter Five) to charts 6.1 to 6.10 on female leadership show 
that the shares of female membership and leadership in post-war secular and civil-confessional 
parties support the hypotheses (see, H2 and H3A, H4 and H5 in chapter Five). However, the 
corresponding shares in religious parties do not. Rather, these shares point to a mismatch 
between membership and leadership, which is more pronounced in religious conservative parties 
with higher religiosity combined with plural and democratic deficits. These parties have huge 
female membership in the rank and file but infinitesimal shares of women in leadership bodies, 
with these parties seeing a huge female ‗presence‘ that does not seem to impose itself (Phillips, 
1995). This phenomenon may come as no surprise, since other scholars find a similar pattern in 
religious popular parties (Basu 2005, Clark and Schwedler 2003, among others). Nonetheless, 
this mismatch is against my theoretical expectations and the findings of Kittilson 1997, 
Lovenduski and Norris 1995, that higher female membership is correlated with higher 





Female officials in extremist and conservative religious parties do not demand leadership 
unlike those in religious tolerant parties, as shown above. In this context, the head of women‘s 
wing clarifies that, ―Religious commitment attracts women to join Hizbullah or other religious 
parties. They do not join because of ambitions for leadership. This is against the Shari‘a. As 
believers, we do not seek or demand leadership posts.‖  Another female official notes that, 
―Women in Hizbullah do not feel marginalized and do not complain. Pious women are better off 
when not in politics. Their chances in leadership are limited in other parties, including in secular 
parties.‖ Similar views are expressed by other female officials in extremist and conservative 
religious parties. For instance, a female official in charge of the public relations and media 
stresses that, ―I do not consider that I am short-changed or slighted. I joined the party because of 
my religious convictions and not for personal gains or political ambitions.‖ The head of the 
women‘s wing in a pre-war religious extremist party explains that, 
Women join parties much later than men. Therefore, it is normal to see more men in 
leadership positions than women who are not politically mature. Moreover, politics is 
not a woman‘s domain since they work on social issues only. Why don‘t you pose these 
questions to my husband? He is the party leader.    
 
Such replies demonstrate that even when they are in leadership positions, women in extremist 




 In contrast, female activists in other parties are demanding leadership positions, 
proposing measures in that direction, but also recognize that more effort is needed to attain these 
positions. For instance, a female activist in a pre-war secular party maintains that, ―Unless 
women get organized in balancing their multiple tasks and men share domestic duties, the active 
involvement of married women in parties will be jeopardized during a period in their life cycle 
                                               
15   As mentioned earlier, the majority of heads of women‘s wings in religious parties of varying religiosities 




when they are raising a family.‖ However, a female activist cautions that, ―Even if there is 
partnership in the family, the share of women in leadership might not increase, irrespective of the 
share of married women in parties‘ membership.‖ She concludes that, ―We cannot claim that 
being married is an obstacle to leadership. Some women have the ambition, interest, or drive for 
political leadership. But, women are part of this patriarchal society. They often reproduce it and 
willingly allow men to remain the decision-makers.‖ Indeed, several party leaders in pre-war 
civil-confessional parties express skepticism that, ―even if women are politically active, once 
they get married and start forming a family their involvement declines.‖ These statements raise 
certain issues about leadership in that women (1) should be interested in politics, (2) must get 
organized to handle their multi-tasks; (3) their activity follows a life-cycle pattern; and (4) should 
be assertive in demanding leadership posts. In this vein, a female activist explains that, ―The fact 
that women‘s activism declines once they get married and resumes when their kids grow up is 
normal. This might explain why parties hesitate to invest in women, same as employers hesitate 
before they employ single young women.‖ Parties do not compile statistics on the marital status 
of female members or the share of those who withdraw upon getting married in order to 
substantiate these claims.  
 Moreover, testimonies of heads of women‘s wings in war-origin religious and post-war 
civil-confessional parties, which have huge female membership, confirm that a high share of 
women in the rank and file are indeed married. More often than not, both wives and husbands are 
members in the same religious parties.
16
 However, what is not obvious is whether truly women‘s 
careers follow a life cycle path and whether this influences their leadership chances.
17
 The role of 
family responsibilities may provide partial explanation of the mismatch between female 
                                               
16  Scholars studying voting patterns within families also find that husbands and wives vote similarly. 
  




membership and leadership within parties but why is this gap much wider in religious than in 
secular and civil-confessional parties demands further investigation. I look for explanations in 
party religiosity, as well as in pluralism and democratic procedures. In this connection, a female 
activist in a pre-war secular party suggests in a normative manner that,  
The responsibility for this mismatch is a joint one between female officials and party 
leaders. Women should lobby for recognition and demand leadership. Rights are acquired 
not granted. Parties should introduce affirmative action measures, establish 
implementation mechanisms, and set a time frame for increasing women‘s share in 
leadership positions.  
 
These suggestions echo the scholarly arguments in drawing a political career path for women by 
linking female membership to their leadership chances. This scholarship maintains that women‘s 
participation at the grassroots is a stepping stone to leadership within parties and in public office. 
Scholars suggest that once women join parties at the lower ranks, they could directly increase the 
pressure for representation at higher levels (Lovenduski and Norris 1995).  Other scholars argue 
that the presence of women at higher levels and in leadership positions within parties‘ inner 
structures appears to reinforce female parliamentary representation. Kittilson adds that,  
…, women‘s participation inside the party as party activists at the local level, as 
organizers of intraparty women‘s groups, and as internal officeholders should buoy 
women‘s power in the party.‖ However, she concludes that, ―…parties with higher 
proportions of women activists will display correspondingly high proportions of women 
MPs. (Kittilson, 1997:5) 
  
She points to Putnam‘s law of increasing disproportions, which implies that, ―… the 
representation of women should be lower at higher organizational levels.‖ (Kittilson, 1997:13)18 
Hence, if this law is applicable, then the share of female leadership would always be lower than 
female membership as levels rise. The sizeable female membership (50%) in Hizbullah, a 
conservative religious party, does not translate into significant or meaningful share in leadership 
                                               
18   Robert D. Putnam. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse And Revival of American Community (New York: 




(7%). In this vein, the leader of a pre-war religious extremist party admits that, ―In Hizbullah and 
other Islamic parties we have an active and a large number of women in membership. You don‘t 
find that many in secular and leftist parties. It is true we don‘t have many women at the top, but 
so is the case in other parties.‖ This is a valuable admission on women‘s leadership in religious 
parties especially coming from a leader of an extremist religious party. However, in Tayyar, a 
post-war civil-confessional parties, the huge female membership (51%) produced a meaningful 
share in leadership (25%), which corroborates Putnam‘s law (2000) but also shows that as 
female membership expands leadership follows suit (H4).  
 Modern mobilization strategies, modalities and mechanisms employed by religious 
parties as well as by secular and civil-confessional parties explain the high female membership 
but cannot simultaneously explain party variation in women‘s leadership. Religious mobilization, 
in-kind and financial incentives explain why women, especially the poor and deprived, initially 
join religious parties. Financial incentives and religious convictions combined can explain a 
large part of the huge female representation in religious parties. The issue of ‗veiling for money‘ 
may also explain women‘s passive attitude towards leadership and subsequently their meager 
share in leadership positions in religious parties. Women accept to remain in lower-level 
positions, or rather do not complain or demand leadership positions, because they are captive of 
and want to sustain their source of livelihood. These women generally articulate minimal interest 
in politics, while conceding that politics is a man‘s turf and the society is not yet ready for 
women to play a major role in decision-making and political leadership. Women in religious 
parties appear to be content with the role that their male colleagues bestow upon them. Indeed, a 
female official in a post-war religious but tolerant party metaphorically but cynically describes 




men continue to lead and have authority over them, while they remain obedient and content 
followers.‖ In this vein, a female official in a post-war civil-confessional party in alliance with a 
powerful religious parties, observes that, 
The paradox today is that in Amal, women are the most involved in politics among other 
parties. They are present on the ground and at the grassroots. Their women are engaged in 
media politics and received awards as best TV hosts and anchor persons. However, their 
influence in decision-making remains negligible and does not go beyond middle level 
management. In Hizbullah, there is only one woman at the top. She does not wield power 
or influence nor can she be considered a decision-maker. 
  
In fact, this is not a paradox at all. Religiosity in Amal is lower than in extremist and conservative 
religious parties. It is a party with tolerant religiosity and has a higher share of women in 
leadership bodies (10%) than any other religious party, which supports the theory of party 
variation in religiosity.  
 Although female membership in most religious parties is sizeable, female officials are 
passive, lack political ambition, and are not assertive. They are not ‗activists‘ or agents of 
change, which is why throughout the dissertation, I refer to them as ‗officials‘ but less so as 
‗activists‘. Except for those in the tolerant religious party, Amal, women in other parties do not 
lobby, form pressure groups, or demand leadership positions. Women join religious parties out of 
conviction, but the huge membership is also associated with receipt of in-kind and financial 
incentives. Party elites influence how platforms are drawn and the intensity of religiosity on their 
agendas, which in turn reflects their attitudes vis-à-vis women‘s leadership, as discussed earlier. 
Therefore, the negligible share of women in leadership positions in religious parties is also a 
reflection of their political culture as ‗anti-women-as-leaders‘. This is in line with earlier 
scholarship, since several scholars find that religious parties do not advance women despite a 
sizeable share in rank and file (Basu 2005, Clark and Schwedler 2003). This ‗anti-women-as-




attitudes towards women‘s leadership, sheds more light into the mismatch between the high 
shares of women in membership and their infinitesimally low shares in leadership bodies.   
These interventions demonstrate the gap between theory and practice. Female membership 
in many religious parties does not matter for party leadership, as findings of scholars in Arab, 
non-Arab and even in consolidated democracies show. The higher shares of women in 
membership in extremist and conservative religious parties do not translate into comparable 
shares in leadership bodies. Even when women are in leadership bodies as in women‘s wings, 
they are ex-officio non-voting members and as such remain voiceless and lack influence in 
decision-making. The association between female membership and leadership in tolerant religious 
parties is more meaningful. In religious parties, financial incentives do not only explain the huge 
share of female membership but are also behind their meager shares in leadership bodies, which 
explains the mismatch between female membership and leadership, against expectations.
19
  In 
contrast, women in post-war secular a-religious and civil-confessional parties are more visible not 
only in membership but also in decision-making bodies, as reflected by the relatively higher 
shares of women in leadership bodies.  Therefore, female membership matters for their leadership 
in post-war secular and civil-confessional parties but not in religious parties. Party variation in 
religiosity can explain variations in women‘s leadership. Higher religiosity in religious parties‘ 
platforms can explain the low share of women in leadership bodies.  
In the following section, these qualitative findings are substantiated by quantitative tools 
of analysis to statistically support the relationships posited in the theory of party variation in 
religiosity.  
                                               
19  This phenomenon may be comparable to the inability of citizens to hold political representatives 
accountable because they receive handouts (viz., in rentier states) instead of paying taxes: a ‗no representation 
without taxation‘ in undemocratic polities. A similar phenomenon is found in party systems where representatives 




C. A Regression Model for Women’s Leadership in Political Parties 
 
The interview responses give good ground for inferring that religiosity is important for 
party culture and women‘s leadership chances. However, only multivariate analysis can inform 
us whether religiosity is still observed to have a significant effect on outcomes once we control 
for other party factors that are likely to affect women‘s advancement. The preliminary findings 
from the qualitative review chapters do not show which variables have more import on 
women‘s leadership, which only quantitative tools of analysis will reveal. This section shows 
the complementarity between the qualitative and the quantitative data in testing the theory of 
party variation in religiosity and women‘s leadership. In this section, I examine the influence of 
religiosity in party platforms on women‘s leadership. I conclude by estimating a model for 
women‘s leadership in political parties based on the case study of Lebanon.20   
This exercise covers 18 relevant parties that occupy at least one seat in any of the five 
post-war parliaments (1992-2009).
21
 I use this low threshold in order to include as many and as 
diverse parties as possible out of an almost 80 active parties, many of which are weak and fringe 
parties. Political parties are the unit of analysis. Women‘s leadership in parties‘ policy-making 
and decision-making bodies is the main dependent variable.
22
 Party variation in religiosity is the 
core explanatory variable. Other party-level characteristics hypothesized to affect female 
membership and leadership are democratic procedures in leadership transition and decision-
                                               
20  For the concepts of party religiosity and women‘s leadership employed in this dissertation, see chapter One. 
 
21   Parties are broken down along the civil war timeline into pre-war (before 1975) and war-origin plus post-
war parties (post-1975). Since ‗n=3‘ (small), war-origin and post-war parties are collapsed in one group. Parties are 
labeled by their religiosity into secular a-religious, confessional but civil secularists; and religious tolerant, 
conservative but not extremist, and extremist parties.  
 
22   Party variations in the shares of women on parties‘ electoral lists for parliament and for municipalities are 





making, as well as pluralism in composition of membership. Female membership is an 
endogenous variable which is also expected to influence women‘s leadership.23  
1. Examining party-level characteristics 
Encouraged by the supportive qualitative findings, I estimate a multivariate regression 
equation of women‘s leadership. I test the influence on women‘s leadership of religiosity, 
democratic procedures, pluralism, and female membership. Women‘s leadership, the main 
dependent variable, is operationalized by using percentage shares of women in policy-making 
and in decision-making bodies within the inner structures of political parties.   
Political parties are coded along a religiosity continuum of a five-point scale with a 
score of ‗1‘ for parties with highest religiosity (lowest secularism) and a score of ‗5‘ for parties 
with lowest religiosity (highest secularism).
24
 The labeling and coding of parties‘ religiosity is 
informed by content analysis of party platforms, as well as extensive consultations with party 
leaders, female activists, scholars and national experts on political parties in Lebanon. 
Democratic practices in parties‘ operating procedures are measured by transfer of leadership 
and decision-making processes in their inner workings. This variable combines both indicators 
and is operationalized, by assigning ‗0‘ to parties that do not employ democratic procedures in 
both indicators (transfer leadership and  decision-making); ‗1‘ those that employ one of the two 
indicators of democratic practices; and ‗2‘ for parties that employ both indicators of democratic 
procedures.  Pluralism denotes multi-religious composition of party membership as opposed to 
                                               
23  Female membership may be an intervening variable and may have indirect effects on women‘s leadership 
through party-age or pluralism or democratic procedures. This will be examined in the empirical section, but is not 
expected to have significant effects.  
 
24  I use ‗secularism‘ in the model instead of ‗religiosity‘ since the intensity of religiosity scale is in ascending 
order of secularisms from ‗1‘ lowest secularism to ‗5‘ highest secularism. This also shows that parties‘ platforms are 
composed of both religiosity and secularism components following the findings in the field research in Lebanon, 




exclusivity to a single sect. It is operationalized by dichotomizing the variable and assigning 
‗0‘ for parties of single sect membership and ‗1‘ for multi-religious membership.  
Female membership is expected to influence women‘s leadership, although it may not 
be a prerequisite for it. It is also influenced by democratic practices and pluralism. It is 
operationalized by using the percentage shares of women in total party membership in the 18 
relevant parties. Party-age is a proxy that captures party variation in political culture and 
distinct differences in party elites‘ attitude vis-à-vis women‘s leadership in the wake of the 15-
year civil war in Lebanon. Party-age is dichotomized by assigning ‗0‘ for parties established 
before 1974 or pre-war and ‗1‘ for war-origin and post 1975, thereafter post-war parties. 
Annex 6.1 to this chapter provides the list of parties and coding of various variables, for 
reference.     
2. Scatter Plots  
Scatter plots 6.1 to 6.4 (next pages) are visual descriptions of associations between the 
dependent variable, women‘s leadership, and each of the independent variables, religiosity, 
pluralism and democratic procedures, as well as female membership. Indirect effects are also 
considered. The diagrams provide initial verification of the theory and relevant hypotheses that 
this dissertation advances and indicate the full range of the data.  Plot 6.1 depicts a positive 
association between female leadership and secularism with an upward sloping regression line; or 
a negative association looking at this from the religiosity end of the continuum. Regressing 
female leadership on secularism, Pearson‘s coefficient (r = .62) denotes minimum dispersion 
around the estimated regression line, with secularism estimated to explain .34 (or 34%) of the 
variation in women‘s leadership across parties. Bivariate analysis confirms the strong influence 




(or religiosity falls) women‘s leadership will incrementally increase by 2.96 percent, with a 
statistically significant t-score.
25
      
Plot 6.1 Female leadership & secularism     Plot 6.2 Female leadership & pluralism 
Leadership= -.26 + 2.96 (secularism)    Leadership= 7.78 + 6.42 (pluralism) 
(r = .62; b= 2.96***; t=3.15)                (Diff. in means ‗0‘ =7.78 & ‗1‘ =14.2; t=2.23) 
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 The fact that pre-war a-religious secular parties, with a score of ‗5‘ on secularism and 
religiosity scale, have lower shares of women in their leadership bodies than expected does not 
violate the core hypothesis in the theory. Despite their lower religiosity, pre-war secular and 
civil-confessional parties, especially those with leftist tendencies like the Baath and the Syrian 
Social, lost clout and outreach, as they faced fierce competition from affluent and strong post-
war parties, notably Hizbullah and the Future. They failed to recruit more women not only 
because they employed traditional mobilization tools but also due to widened religious cleavages 
in the aftermath of the civil war. This led to shifting membership from pre-war secular to post-
war religious conservative and civil-confessional powerful parties, which reduced pluralism 
nationwide and openings for women‘s leadership as well. Moreover, pre-war civil-confessional 
parties like the Phalanges and National Liberals are entrenched in their own ways, more 
conservative and less hospitable to women‘s leadership than the modern ‗avant guardiste‘ post-
                                               
25  Scatter plot 6.1 depicts one leverage outlier, the post-war civil-confessional party Tayyar. Dropping this 
outlier does not affect the upward slope of the regression line. The influence of religiosity on women‘s leadership 




war stronger parties, like the Future and Tayyar. These findings support the hypothesis that 
women‘s leadership is higher in post-war than in pre-war parties (H5).  
 Scatter plot 6.2 shows the relationship between female leadership and pluralism. The 
coefficient (r =.48) denotes low dispersion around the regression line, with pluralism explaining 
0.24 (or 24%) of the variance in women‘s leadership, controlling for other variables. The 
bivariate regression coefficient (b = 6.42) is statistically significant.  More specifically, the 
difference in means between plural and non-plural parties (14.2 and 7.78, respectively) is 
statistically significant, which implies that we can reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
difference in means between plural and non-plural membership. Indeed, post-war civil-
confessional parties like Tayyar, Future or Tajaddod with plural membership have higher shares 
of women in leadership than other parties. Therefore, these results are statistically and 
substantively significant and consistent with the hypothesis that pluralism exerts a strong positive 
influence on women‘s leadership (H3). 
Plot 6.3 shows that the relationship between women‘s leadership and democratic 
procedures is in the expected direction with a coefficient of 1.96, but not statistically 
significant. This implies that, contrary to theoretical expectations (H2) and substantive 
justifications, the influence of democratic procedures on women‘s leadership is not 
established statistically. Parties with democratic procedures in either leadership transitions or 
decentralized decision-making have slightly higher shares in women‘s leadership than parties 
that are fully democratic. Moreover, parties with democratic deficits have comparable shares 
of women in leadership to those that are fully democratic. Therefore, the statistical and 




tally. This, however, should not imply that democratic process does not matter for female 
leadership. It is just not statistically significant.  
Plot 6.3 Female leadership & democracy Plot 6.4 Female leadership & membership 
   Leadership=8.43 + 1.96(democracy)   Leadership = 7.95 + .09(membership) 
















0 .5 1 1.5 2
democracy















10 20 30 40 50
f_mem
 
These results are substantiated in that the post-war civil-confessional parties with the highest 
shares of female leadership (viz., Tayyar, Wa‘ad, Tajaddod, Quwwat and Future), are marked 
by non-democratic leadership transitions but decentralization in decision-making. In contrast, 
the couple of religious extremist parties (viz., Jama‘a Islamiah and Jabhat El-‗Amal), that 
pursue due democratic process in leadership transitions but but not in decision-making, have 
no women in their leadership bodies.  
Plot 6.4 shows no discernable pattern for the relationship between women‘s 
leadership and membership. There is wide dispersion around the regression line, low t-score, 
a correlation coefficient which is not statistically significant, and a standard error that is 
double that of the coefficient. All this implies that we cannot safely reject the null hypothesis 
that there is no relationship between female membership and their leadership prospects. This 
statistical finding for the whole sample of 18 parties is not in the expected direction. But, this 
does not mean that female membership does not matter for leadership in all parties. This is 
most likely because of the presence of huge female membership in separate and segregated 




linear career path for women and instead re-directed women and ‗ghettoized‘ them in 
women‘s wings freeing the space for continued male-domination. However, the scatter plots 
and bivariate analysis of the relationship between female membership and leadership for 
parties that have less religious components in their platforms  (13 out of 18) and for parties 
that do not maintain women‘s wings (five out of 18), produces positive and statistically 
significant results, as anticipated.  This relationship is tight, significant and substantively 
important. Each one percent increase in membership is associated with one percent increase 
in leadership. However, since there are five parties that do not have wings, we are unable to 
estimate the full model for just those instances in which parties do not operate wings. For the 
more secular parties, however, the relationship is positive and significant, although less 
significant and the estimated marginal effect is smaller.   
The correlation matrix between the dependent and independent variables shows 
collinearity between the independent variables (see, Annex 6.3). Regressing each of the 
independent variables against all others, the mean variance inflation factors (VIF) ranged 
between 1.83 and 1.34, which does not seem to be problematic. However, this slight collinearity 
makes it more difficult to find a significant coefficient when these variables are incorporated 
together in a multivariate regression model.  Notwithstanding this, we are able to estimate 
significant coefficients for at least two of the posited explanatory variables, secularism and 
pluralism.  
3. A multivariate regression model for women‘s leadership in political parties 26  
 
The influence of religiosity and secularism on women‘s leadership stands out in terms of 
statistical significance of the coefficients. This finding provides robust support for the 
                                               
26  Because of the strong potential for heteroskedasticity in the error terms, the models were re-estimated using 
Huber-White standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity.  Results were qualitatively similar. The model 




hypothesis that as religiosity increases, the share of female leadership in parties‘ inner decision-
making bodies diminishes (H1). Table 6.3 reports the results from estimating a multivariate 
model for women‘s leadership based on the case study of Lebanon. In this model, female 
leadership is regressed on secularism, pluralism, democracy, female membership and party-age. 
The model estimated in this multivariate regression equation is as follows: 
Leadership = b0 + b1 (secularism) + b2 (pluralism) + b3 (democracy) + b4 (female 
membership) + b5 (party-age)  
 












Source: Official data from 
party administrators 







In table 6.3 presenting the estimated model, the predicted marginal increase in women‘s 
leadership of jumping one category on the secularism and religiosity scale is estimated at 3.47 
percentage points, controlling for other variables. However, rather than assuming that 
incremental changes between categories have uniform effects, the model was re-estimated using 
dummies for different sets of non-religious parties. Results are substantively similar.
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27  Dummy variables are created for secular and civil-confessional parties to replace secularism. This 












Democracy - 1.1112 
(2.1437) 




Constant (base) - 7.0099* 
(4.4637) 
N 18 









relationship between party religiosity and women‘s leadership produces a statistically significant 
t-statistic. At this level of statistical confidence (0.01), we can safely reject the null hypothesis 
that there is no relationship between women‘s leadership and degree of secularism in party 
platforms. The combined effect of the variables in the model produces an R
2
 which can explain 
0.75 of the variance and adjusted R
2
 at 0.65 (around 65%) of variations in women‘s leadership 
across political parties. This is also substantively significant since the lowest shares of women in 
leadership positions are in parties with highest religiosity like the Unitarian, Jama‘a Islamiah, or 
Hizbullah parties.  
With respect to democratic procedures, the coefficient is negative (-1.1), not statistically 
significant, and associated with high standard errors. These results imply that we cannot safely 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between women‘s leadership and 
democratic practices. This means that, controlling for other variables, the share of women‘s 
leadership drops by 1.1 units when parties move from non-democratic behaviour ‗0‘ to ‗1‘ for a 
single indicator of democratic procedures, either leadership transitions or decentralization in 
decision-making, or from ‗1‘ to ‗2‘ for all democratic practices. These counter-intuitive results in 
the regression model have substantive interpretations in the parties‘ political culture reflected in 
the attitude of party elites towards women‘s leadership.  
                                                                                                                                            
in religious parties, controlling for everything else. One model takes all independent variables, while 
another one drops party-age. Comparing the two models with dummies, we get much higher coefficients 
in regressing leadership on secular (5.7) and civil-confessional (6.1) parties than in model with only the 
coefficient on civil-confessional parties statistically significant. Their effect on leadership compared to 
religious parties is about the same judging by the closeness in magnitude of these two coefficients. This 
indicates that variations in leadership shares are less pronounced in the category of civil-confessional 
secular parties compared to religious parties. Hence, we can be confident in stating that secular and civil-
confessional parties are likely to offer women more chances in leadership than any other category, all else 
remaining equal. However, the adjusted R2   explains only 53% and 51% of the variance in leadership. This 
is lower than what the full model can do, when secularism as a whole was used. The advantage is that 
using the secularism categorical variable with a 5-point scale allows us to pick up the variations across the 




Women‘s leadership is highest in post-war secular and civil-confessional parties marked 
by democratic practices in decision-making but not in leadership transitions. In contrast, 
women‘s leadership is lowest in religious extremist parties, two out of three of which show 
democratic process in leadership transitions but not in decision-making.  These results lead us to 
infer that democracy, contrary to expectations, has no observed effect on enhancing women‘s 
leadership (H2). But, this should not be construed as the norm, since the work of many scholars 
and students of political parties, associates democratic practices with higher chances for women‘s 
leadership. In effect, three out of the only five parties that employ democratic procedures are the 
pre-war secular parties with leftist orientations (viz., Baath, Communist and Syrian Social). 
These are assigned lowest religiosity and have the highest shares of women in their leadership 
bodies amongst pre-war parties (see chart 6.4). Moreover, many of the post-war parties emerged 
from militarized and democratically deficient political institutions. This has influenced attitudes 
of party elites towards women. As such, candidate selection may be based on military male-
models rather than open, women-friendly or gender-sensitive, and democratic models. At the 
same time, these post-war parties found a niche in women and intentionally reached out to them 
as a marginalized group that could mobilize and assist them. These statistical and substantive 
results corroborate the findings from the qualitative analysis.   
Moreover, the positive coefficient on pluralism in membership implies that when parties 
move from non-plural membership (score ‗0‘) to a plural membership (score ‗1‘), women‘s 
leadership is predicted to increase by 3.1 incremental units. The coefficient of pluralism is 
positive and statistically significant.  Hence, we can safely reject the null hypothesis that there is 
no relationship between women‘s leadership and pluralism. This statistical finding supports the 




Examining the influence of female membership on women‘s leadership, while 
controlling for the other variables, produces negligible b coefficient (around 0.03) that is not 
statistically significant and high standard errors. Thus, the null hypothesis that there is no 
relationship between female membership and women‘s leadership cannot be safely rejected, 
which implies that female membership does not influence women‘s leadership.28  This is 
substantiated by the findings from qualitative analysis depicting a mismatch between huge 
membership of women in religious parties and their shares in leadership. The pattern or 
phenomenon that religious parties maintain large women‘s wings and huge female membership 
at the rank-and-file, but very few women in leadership positions, is not sui generis to Lebanon.
29
 
However, in post-war civil-confessional parties, it is observed that high levels of female 
membership are translated into more meaningful, albeit not matching shares in leadership, as per 
the law of increasing disproportions (Putnam 2000). This supports hypothesis (H4) that as 
female membership increases, the share of women in leadership bodies will increase, though 
disproportionately. The qualitative findings point to several post-war religious parties with high 
female membership but infinitesimal shares or none at all in leadership; while in post-war 
secular and civil-confessional parties (e.g. Tajaddod, Tayyar, Mustaqbal, Marada and Lebanese 
Forces), high female membership seems to translate into meaningful shares in their leadership 
bodies.  
                                               
28   Indirect effects of female membership on women‘s leadership cannot be large or statistically significant. As 
the model shows, the coefficient on female membership itself is not significant for the sample as a whole. Moreover, 
estimating a separate model for female membership produces only party-age as significant. Therefore, female 
membership cannot have significant indirect effects on women‘s leadership. Given this lack of significance, a path 
analysis is not conducted.   
 
29  As mentioned earlier, this has been observed in the USA in the 1950s (Skocpol 1992) and in 
conservative parties in Europe (Lovenduski) as well as in Islamist parties in South Asia (Basu, 1997) and in 
other Arab countries (Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, Yemen, Albania, Malaysia), besides Lebanon. 
Some scholars even argue that women‘s membership even at the rank-and-file matters to push for 
leadership positions which creates a critical mass of women for leadership and improves female 




Party-age is a rough proxy for unobserved changes in pre-war and post-war parties‘ 
strategies and their attitude towards women‘s leadership. Other variables in the model capture 
the effect of party-age on women‘s leadership. For instance, post-war parties are expected to be 
more plural and have more female members and higher representation of women in leadership 
bodies (H5). Party-age is negatively correlated with secularism, pluralism and democracy but 
positively correlated with female party membership and leadership (see, correlation matrix in 
Annex 6.3). The regression coefficient on party-age is positive with a high nominal magnitude 
of 6.99 and a statistically significant t-score. It is statistically significant. This is substantively 
also significant because post-war parties have higher shares in leadership and in membership 
than pre-war parties.  
Including party-age in the model is important in case there are some unobserved features 
(left out bias) of post-war parties that are also helping to drive the results. There is a need to 
control for party-age in the regression model, while fully aware that as a proxy, it does not fully 
capture variations in party strategies and behaviour towards women‘s leadership across pre-war 
and post-war parties. If party-age is dropped from the model, secularism remains statistically 
significant; while female membership becomes significant. The coefficient on pluralism is 
positive and in the right direction, but not statistically significant. However, democracy remains 
negative and statistically insignificant. This is re-assuring, especially of the importance of 
religiosity as an explanatory variable for women‘s leadership, but also that the omission of 
party-age from the model might introduce bias. 
30
   
                                               
30   If party-age is dropped, the model explains between four to eight percentage points less of the variations in 
female leadership than when party-age is incorporated. This implies that party-age does not capture much of the 
variation in women‘s leadership across parties. Dropping party-age from the model changes the magnitude of the 




Indeed, party variation in religiosity, continues to be the strongest explanatory variable 
for women‘s leadership in political parties. No matter how we change the specifications of the 
model, religiosity stands out as an explanatory variable for variations in women‘s leadership 
across parties, which a priori is a robust finding. This is reflected in statistically significant b 
coefficient for secularism at 3.47 in the estimated regression model, which means that we can 
safely reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between women‘s leadership and 
religiosity. This large regression coefficient is associated with small standard error of much less 
than half of their numerical values, which is very re-assuring. Moreover, the estimated 
coefficient for pluralism is predicted to be positive but is negative for democracy. This implies 
that pluralism enhances women‘s leadership, as hypothesized; whereas, democratic procedures 
and practices may not have a significant effect on leadership, at least not in Lebanon. In addition, 
the model is estimated to explain around 65 percent of variance in women‘s leadership. The 
results of this regression model strongly support the theory that party variation in religiosity is 
linked to women‘s leadership. As parties move one unit towards further secularism, women‘s 
leadership is likely to rise by close to four percentage points.  
Conclusions 
The first two sections in this chapter concluded the qualitative interpretation of findings 
on women‘s leadership in political parties in Lebanon. These findings support the hypothesis 
that as party religiosity rises, the share of women in their leadership bodies falls. Indeed, the 
average shares of women in leadership positions are lowest in religious extremist parties with 
highest religiosity and with plural and democratic deficits. They are highest in post-war secular 
and civil-confessional parties with lower religiosities, plural membership and democratic 




How do the qualitative and quantitative findings complement each other? What 
do the statements given by party leaders and female party activists and the data compiled 
from party administrators imply for the theory and hypotheses presented and tested in this 
thesis?  The findings support the theory of party variation in religiosity and women‘s 
leadership. Indeed, women‘s leadership is lowest in religious extremist parties and 
highest in secular parties.  However, there are other findings worth pointing out. 
First, religious parties may be willing to re-interpret religious doctrine when it is 
in their interest to do so. Second, religious parties use women to improve their public 
image for electoral purposes, because women are a symbol of the modern. Third, 
religious parties have huge female membership but minimal shares in leadership bodies. 
They fail to advance them to leadership positions or have visible representation in 
decision-making bodies. Fourth, party variation in elites‘ attitudes and political culture 
are shaped by party religiosity and serve as a barometer for women‘s leadership. Finally, 
female membership matters for party leadership relatively more in post-war secular and 
civil-confessional parties than in religious parties. It is translated into comparable shares 
in line with Putnam‘s law of increasing disproportions. In religious parties, however, 
there is mismatch between the sizeable level of female membership and their 
infinitesimal shares in leadership. This is explained by religious mobilization, other tools 
and mechanisms targeting women. These include financial, ‗money for veiling‘ 
possibilities, and in-kind incentives, which co-opt women into silence. Many leaders and 
elites in religious parties do not only invoke the Shari‘a and Al-Qiwama, but also the 




which block women from ascending to leadership positions.
31
 In a multi-religious country 
like Lebanon, attitudes of party elites who double as leaders of religious parties are 
decisive not only in interpreting the doctrine but also in setting political agendas and 
determining party religiosities, which in turn influence women‘s leadership. Coming 
from officials in some of the most powerful religious and affluent parties, these views 
carry weight since they indicate that such parties are unlikely to advance women to 
leadership bodies unless they transform and the intensity of religiosity in their platforms 
falls. These findings are robust and strongly support the theory of party variation in 
religiosity and women‘s leadership. These findings also explain the mismatch between 
women‘s high socio-economic profile and their low   political representation, the 
conundrum that motivated this dissertation. 
                                               
31   Dahlerup also argues that, ―The problem is not seen as the absence of women from the political institutions, 
but rather their intrusion. The argument is that political involvement will ruin the family, and who is going to take 






                                               
32  (DEM) stands for democratic procedures: This is a combined variable of leadership transitions and 
decision-making. (L) stands for leadership transitions, which is dichotomized by assigning ‗1‘ for parties that follow 
democratic transitions; and ‗0‘ for those that do not. (D) stands for decision-making, which is dichotomized by 
assigning ‗1‘ for decentralization or for parties which involve women in decision-making and ‗0‘ for centralization 
or for parties that do not involved women in decision-making.  
Annex 6.1   Political Parties: Coding by Party-Level Characteristics 
 
Political Parties 
(Listed in ascending 
order by party-age 






































Pre-War parties (Pre-1975) 
    L D DEM   
Communist Secular 0 5 1 1 2 1 1 
Syrian Social  - 
Al-Qawmi Al-Souri   
Secular 0 5 1 1 2 1 1 
Phalanges - Kata‘éb Civil-conf. 0 4 0 1 1 0 1 
National Bloc -Kutlah  Civil-conf. 0 4 0 1 1 0 0 
Renaissance – 
Ba‘ath 
Secular 0 5 1 1 2 1 0 
Progressive  Socialist 
–Takaddomi Ishtiraki 
Civil-conf. 0 4 0 1 1 1 1 
National Liberals 
Ahrar  
Civil-conf.  0 4 0 0 0 0 0 




0 1 1 0 1 0 1 
War & Post-War Parties (Post-1975) 
Hope – Amal Religious 
tolerant 
1 3 0 0 0 0 1 





1 2 0 0 0 0 1 




1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Democratic -Wa‘ad Civil-conf. 1 4 0 1 1 0 0 
Renewal Democratic 
-Tajaddod  
Secular 1 5 0 1 1 1 0 
Free Patriotic –
Tayyar 
Civil-conf. 1 4 0 1 1 1 1 
Lebanese Forces –
Quwwat 
Civil-conf. 1 4 0 1 1 0 1 




1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
Future  - Mustaqbal Civil-conf. 1 4 0 1 1 1 1 




Annex 6.2  
Theory of Party Variation in Religiosity & Women’s leadership 
 
Hypotheses on Female Leadership 
 
H1.  The share of women in decision-making and leadership bodies is likely to be higher in 
parties whose platforms reflect less religiosity (more secularism) than in those containing 
high religiosity (low secularism).  
 
H2. Parties employing democratic practices in their operating procedures, particularly in 
decision-making and transfer of leadership, are more likely to enhance women‘s leadership 
than parties that do not employ such practices.   
 
H3.  Parties with plural and inclusive membership, open to all regardless of religion or gender, 
are more likely to enhance women‘s leadership than parties with closed membership and those 
dominated by a single sect.  
H4.  The share of women in decision-making and leadership bodies is likely to increase as 
their share in party membership expands.  
 
H5.  The proportion of women in party membership and in leadership bodies is likely to be 
higher in post-war parties than in pre-war parties. 
 
  Hypotheses on Female Membership 
 
H2A. Parties employing democratic practices in their operating procedures, particularly in 
decision-making and transfer of leadership, are more likely to enhance women‘s shares in party 
membership than parties that do not employ such practices. 
H3A. Parties with plural and inclusive membership, open to all regardless of religion or 
gender, are more likely to enhance women‘s membership than parties with closed 
membership and those dominated by a single sect. 
 
Annex 6.3   Correlation Matrix (obs=18) 
                   |   Age     seclrsm   Plur  democracy    f_mem   f_lead 
     Age     |   1.0000 
     seclrsm |  -0.2961   1.0000 
        Plur |  -0.2039   0.6036   1.0000 
   democracy |  -0.4400   0.5700   0.6218   1.0000 
       f_mem |   0.6829  -0.3766  -0.1251  -0.3599   1.0000 
      f_lead |   0.3722   0.6182   0.4863   0.1887   0.1745   1.0000 
 
Source: Data compiled from party administrators and processed by author. See Annex 6.2 
for Party coding and operationalization.  Female Leadership (f_lead); Female 
membership (f_mem); Secularism (seclrsm); Pluralism (Plur); Democracy (Dem); Party-





Can Women Break Through?  
 
I conclude this dissertation with an epilogue that keeps open a research agenda on women 
in politics and their leadership prospects. In the dissertation, I pursue a level of analysis approach 
to women‟s leadership. I study women in political parties as the local entry level into their 
representation in public office at the national level. In the Epilogue, I explore whether women 
can break through into a political career at the local municipality level.  
In previous chapters, I examined the role of party religiosity in affecting women‟s 
leadership. I explored the extent to which religious components penetrate political agendas -- 
party religiosity -- as an explanation for variation in women‟s leadership across parties. In order 
to test the theory of party variation in religiosity, I use Lebanon as a particularly useful case-
study. During 2006-2009 field research, I employed structured and semi-structured interviews 
with party leaders and female party activists to compile information and an original dataset on 
women in parties. Information gleaned provides substantive and statistical support to the theory 
posited that as religiosity increases, women‟s shares in leadership fall.  
However, impressions gained during two rounds of interviews pointed to different but 
promising dynamics for women in municipal rather than in parliamentary elections. Nominations 
for municipalities are made by political parties in close consultation with local communities, 
particularly selections of candidates by dominant families, family networks, community and 
religious leaders. In contrast, parliamentary nominations are controlled by political parties as 
gatekeepers for recruiting, selecting and nominating candidates. These observations motivated a 
third round of interviews during the summer of 2009 in order to investigate  whether party 
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variation in religiosity also influences women‟s nomination on parties‟ electoral lists for 
parliaments and municipalities. Accordingly, I test the following hypotheses: 
H1B.  The share of female nominees on electoral lists for parliaments and 
municipalities is    likely to be higher in parties whose platforms reflect less religiosity 
(more secularism) than in those containing high religiosity (low secularism). 
H2B. Parties employing democratic practices in their operating procedures, 
particularly in decision-making and transfer of leadership, are likely to nominate more 
women on their electoral lists than parties that do not.  
H3B.  Parties with plural membership are likely to nominate more women on their 
electoral lists than parties with closed membership and those dominated by a single 
sect. 
H4B. The share of female nominees on parties’ electoral lists for parliament and 
municipalities is likely to increase as their share in party membership expands.  
H5B. The proportion of female nominees for parliamentary and municipal elections is 
likely to be higher in post-war parties than in pre-war parties. 
The Epilogue takes the research from the institutional party-level to the local municipal 
level of analysis. It moves beyond female leadership within political parties‟ inner structures to 
the logical “outcome”, notably party nominations for representation in public office. It explores 
whether party variation in religiosity is also an explanatory variable for variation in shares of 
female nominees on parties‟ electoral lists. The Epilogue poses the research question whether 
local municipal councils are a breakthrough for female representation in public office in 
comparison with national parliamentary councils. It is organized in three sections. Sections A 
and B examine female candidacy for national parliamentary councils in comparative perspective 
to local municipal councils, respectively. Section C presents the qualitative and quantitative 
analysis of findings, estimates regression models for female nominations on parties‟ electoral 
lists for public office, and responds to the question “Can women break through?” 
A. Female Parliamentary Nominations by Party Religiosity 
 Parliamentary elections in Lebanon are held every four years. There have been five 
rounds of elections in the post-war era starting in 1992. Political parties are not only conduits for 
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women‟s party leadership but are also gatekeepers by nominating them for public office. Ever 
since Lebanese women were granted suffrage rights in 1952, women who made it to parliament 
are those „garbed-in-black‟. Parties recognizing the merit of including on their electoral lists the 
widows, sisters, and daughters of assassinated, deceased or powerful political leaders have done 
so because these women are winners. These women invariably amass votes out of empathy, 
respect for lost leaders, or vote-buying, which undercuts gender-bias.  
Table E.1 Lebanon: Broad Categories of Female Candidates for Parliament 
(Cumulative 1992-2009, in percent) 
Category Candidates Winners 
Political parties’ sponsored ‘Women-garbed-in-black’  72.1 97.8 
Political parties 1.6 2.2 
Independent 21.3  0.0 





Source: Based on official statistics in www.nclw.org.lb; Lebanese Parliament, International Foundation  
of Electoral Systems (IFES), and calculations by author.  See also, table 2.5 in chapter Two.  
 
Table E.1 shows that, 72% of women candidates for parliament in the post-war period belong to 
the category of widows or dynastic member.  Moreover, this category accounted for almost all of 
the women candidates sponsored by political parties. In all parliamentary elections history, only 
one woman ever made it to parliament without being „garbed-in-black‟. All of the women 
nominated by parties became MPs, while none of those who ran as independents or from the 
women‟s movement won. This finding reinforces that parties are veritable gatekeepers for a 
parliamentary career.  
 Some party officials argue that the low share of women on parties‟ electoral lists is that 
women themselves do not come forward and are not interested in politics or in embarking on a 
political career. In other words, women‟s low parliamentary representation represents a positive 
choice.  However, judging by the fact that women comprise around 61% of voter turnout in June 
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2009 parliamentary elections, it seems unlikely that women are not interested in politics.  I have 
also shown earlier that a critical mass of qualified women for leadership is available in Lebanon. 
Table E.1 shows that, the women nominated for parliament by political parties enjoy a 100% 
success rate. Despite this, female parliamentary representation dropped from six to four or from 
5.9% in 2005 to 3.1% in 2009.  Given the availability of qualified women, and their past success 
in parliamentary elections, I  seek an explanation for their low level of representation in 
nominations by examining party variation in religiosity, democratic procedures and pluralism; 
and, how this affects party elites‟ attitude vis-à-vis women‟s nomination for parliament.  
 Data gathered from official government sources and party administrators is presented in 
chart E.1. This shows that the average share of female MP candidates is higher in electoral lists 
of post-war civil-confessional parties with lower religiosity than in religious extremist, 








































1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
 ('1' extremist, '2' conservative, '3' tolerant, '4' civil-confessional, '5' secular)
Chart E.1 Female Parliamentary Nominations by Party-Religiosity & Party-Age
 
Indeed, all six female MPs in 2005 and four in 2009 parliaments belong to and are nominated by 
post-war civil-confessional parties with lower religiosity. Religious extremist and conservative 
parties, whether Shiite or Sunni-dominated, never nominated women to parliament. Moreover, 
234 
 
even when a female enlightened Islamist mustered her courage to run as independent, the 
religious extremist party disclaimed her and nominated her husband, the founder and party 
leader. This forced her to withdraw, but she ran as independent in the next round and did not 
make it. Citing her daunting experience she stresses that,  
The party refused to nominate me. But, I borrowed money to pay for nomination fees 
and ran as independent. I wanted to make a statement and encourage other enlightened 
Muslim women to run for office. The Shari‟a and Al-Qiwama, which the clergy invoke 
and use as „fatwa‟, do not prevent women from leadership. It is the clergymen‟s 
interpretation of the doctrine that is hostile to women. In the Friday prayers at the 
Mosques, the clerics ran defamatory stories unworthy of holy men that I am violating 
the Shari‟a. They criticized my western-oriented political platform for stressing 
women‟s rights as human rights and gender equality. 
 
 In fact, the only one party with a tolerant religiosity level (Amal) that ever included a female 
candidate on its electoral list did so for purely strategic maneuverings. The female candidate is 
the sister of the then head of government and founder of a powerful post-war civil-confessional 
party (Future). She could not be included in her party‟s list because of the distribution of 
electoral districts stipulated in the electoral law, which is one of the shortcomings of the electoral 
law in force.  
 The electoral system in Lebanon is not that „women-friendly‟. It is a plurality/majority 
Block Vote (BV) electoral system with multi-member districts. This system has systemic 
limitations in which parties have no incentives to include women on their electoral lists. In BV 
systems, voters vote for candidates and not for parties, which raises the risk of gender-bias and 
electoral loss, especially because of open lists where they use as many or as few of their votes as 
they wish. The electoral law has no provisions or quotas for women, neither as shares nor as 





  Confessional quotas are the only quotas in place, by which the 128-seat parliament is 
split equally between Christians and Muslims and proportionally for sects within each group. As 
in other countries with electoral systems that are not women-friendly and where a dominant 
political culture makes parties hesitate in nominating women, improving female representation 
becomes a difficult endeavour (see, also Basu 2005). 
 All six female MPs (2005 parliament) interviewed see that extremist religious parties 
offer women the least chances in leadership, while parties with secular and civil platforms offer 
women better chances in leadership. In this vein, a five-time female MP and former minister 
suggests that, 
The debate is not about secular or religious parties, but about women taking men‟s seats 
in parliament. In general, parties prefer to nominate women (and men) who toe the line 
and are winners. However, religious extremist parties are strict in that women‟s 
leadership violates the Shari‟a. This happens in dogmatic parties that politicize Islam and 
use it to achieve their goals.  
 
A female official in a religious conservative party justifies why the party never nominated a 
woman to parliament in that, “Religious parties do not nominate women to public office because 
they are afraid that veiled women will not be accepted in the public sphere. This is what 
happened in Turkey. Moreover, our society is not ready for women in politics, especially not 
veiled women.” This is a lame justification, in my view, since one of the female MPs (from a 
post-war civil-confessional party) started wearing a head scarf since 2005 and is perfectly 
                                                             
1  In Block Vote (BV) systems, electors have as many votes as there are candidates to be elected. The 
candidates with the highest vote totals win the seats. Usually voters vote for candidates rather than parties and in 
most systems may use as many, or as few, of their votes as they wish. The best fit for female representation is to 
combine BV with a quota of reserved seats. Reserving a tier where only women can stand is guaranteed to elect as 
many women as the quota makes provisions for. Another combination with BV is „reserved seats best loser system‟, 
as the one used in Mauritius and Palestine for underrepresented groups, albeit not specifically for women. This 
combination works unless there are not enough women candidates. It gives parties incentives to field women 
candidates in order not to lose any seats to competing parties, as in the case of Jordan. (See, Drude Dahlerup 2006, 
www.idea.int; and The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), “2010 Municipal Elections in 
Lebanon” (www.ifes.net).  
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accepted and respected. Furthermore, Turkey‟s hostile version of secularism, being anti-religion, 
is not at all comparable to the existing cooperation between the state and religious authorities in 
Lebanon. However, parties with high religiosity are not the only group of parties that did not 
nominate women for parliament. Despite lower religiosity, plural membership, and democratic 
practices, pre-war secular parties also did not include women on their electoral lists. These 
egalitarian leftist parties lost political strength after the war. They are not affluent to buy votes in 
order to avoid gender-bias, and cannot afford risking the loss of one of the few seats they occupy 
in parliament by nominating women. Political strength is another element that parties consider in 




Statements of party officials also highlight the prevalence of patriarchy and cultural 
barriers in society. For instance, in the 2009 elections, two female MPs ceded their seats for their 
sons, although the daughter is more politically involved than the son. This led to the drop from 
six to four female MPs in 2009. Also, a female MP cites the reaction of a young educated woman 
to a proposal she made in this connection: “[I] encouraged the affluent daughter of Lebanon‟s 
former president to run for elections, but surprisingly her response was “Why? Are there no men 
in the family?” Similarly, the head of a women‟s wing in a pre-war religious extremist party also 
questions, “Why should I run if my husband is doing the job? If he is representing me, why 
should we compete?” These responses reveal that patriarchy reproduces itself and is reproduced 
by women who suffer from its consequences. In this context, a female chef de cabinet in a post-
war civil-confessional party offers the following analysis for the low female representation:  
                                                             
2  See, Duverger 1955; Beckwith 1986; Jenson 1982, Matland and Studlar 1996, Rule 1987, Inglehart 1977, 




Women tend to reproduce patriarchy within their own families by discriminating between 
their sons and daughters. They rarely support or vote for other women (see, Emily‟s 
List).
3
 They are reluctant to leave lucrative and financially remunerative business or 
professional careers for politics. Moreover, women do not always have the financial 
means to approach parties to nominate them, since parties expect remuneration in return. 
Even when these hurdles are overcome, women might still not opt for a political career as 
a matter of choice. 
However, this analysis highlights possible explanations for women‟s low representation focusing 
not on what motivates women to run but on what motivates parties not to nominate them. My 
concerns lie in explaining parties‟ attitude vis-à-vis women‟s candidacy for public office when 
women are willing, able and make the choice to run for a career in politics.  Another issue 
several party officials raise is that parties of high religiosity tend to overlook the Shari‟a when it 
is in their political interest to do so for strategic reasons. For instance, a member of the supreme 
council who is also an MP, states that,  
Hizbullah voted in favor of a parliamentary quota for women, which was proposed by our 
main allies. Unfortunately, it did not pass because the majority bloc is afraid that this will 
give the opposition bloc the upper hand in parliament.   
 
The fact that a party with higher religiosity votes favorably for a gender quota should not be 
construed as an indicator of the party‟s commitment to women‟s leadership. On closer scrutiny, 
it appears to be far more a show of support for a staunch political ally by employing rhetorical 
strategies to diffuse public impressions that the party is not „anti-women-as-leaders‟, even if this 
implies overlooking sacred Shari‟a tenets. Otherwise, we would have seen these parties introduce 
voluntary internal and electoral quotas for women, or have a higher share of women in leadership 
                                                             
3   The female respondent was brought up in the States during the civil war. She is familiar with Emily‟s list. 
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bodies or on their electoral lists, especially with a huge female membership. But, this is not the 
case. These parties will not promote women unless it is in their political interest to do so.
4
  
However, the controversy around a parliamentary quota for women is more of a 
demographic than a gender or patriarchal issue. In the 2009 parliament, there are twelve 
Christian-dominated and six Muslim-dominated relevant parties.
5
 The proposal to reserve 14 
additional seats for women did not pass because of considerations rooted in religious and class-
based cleavages. The overarching problem in Lebanon is that Muslims do not want Christians to 
have the upper hand in politics and Christians are fighting to protect their existence. No electoral 
change will be countenanced if it might upset the delicate balance between the religious blocs.  
In addition, cultural differences between Christian and Muslim women play a role in their 
political involvement. As scholars suggest that,  
Besides the influence on the party system and the government, it has been assumed that 
religion has special effects on the development of society. … It seems possible to 
demonstrate that different religions are coupled with differences in attitudes to the 
development of society. (Lane and Ersson, 1987:56) 
   
Empirical evidence shows that there are fewer Muslim than Christian female parliamentary 
candidates, which translates into lower representation. In fact, all post-war parliaments had more 
female Christian than Muslim MPs. Even a Muslim-dominated post-war civil-confessional party 
nominated a Christian female in its electoral list for 2009 elections. In the 2009 parliament there 
                                                             
4  Scholars report that in 1993 Yemeni elections, “…, conservative voices within Islah … questioned whether 
it was acceptable for women to vote because they would have to reveal their faces to a stranger to be photographed 
for their voter registration card. Aware of this potentially pivotal role female voters might play in elections, Islah 
officials urged the party‟s (elected) spiritual leader, ... - to issue a fatwa  stating that it was acceptable for women to 
be photographed in order to vote. They need to mobilize voters and win seats to enable the party to realize its goals, 
they argued, far outweigh other concerns.” (Clark and Schwedler, 2003: 300). The Yemeni religious extremist party, 
Islah, has huge female membership and are all veiled. 
  




are four female MPs: three Christians and one Muslim. In 2005 parliament, there were six female 
MPs: four Christians and two Muslims. Thus, if a quota of 14 additional reserved seats for 
women were to be approved, it is likely that more Christian than Muslim women end up in 
parliament. This may tip the confessional balance. 
These empirical findings are consistent with the hypothesis that as party religiosity rises, 
women‟s share on electoral lists fall. However, the reality is that only civil-confessional and war-
origin Amal nominated women to parliament in the five post-war rounds of elections. In other 
words, secular parties with lowest religiosity did not nominate women. The fact that pre-war 
secular parties did not nominate any women is attributed to their electoral weakness. Even if they 
wanted to – and I argue that they do – they cannot risk losing the limited seats they have in 
parliament by nominating women because of gender-bias, and the BV electoral system that is not 
„women-friendly‟.  Indeed, the share of female nominees on parliamentary electoral lists actually 
disappears for parties of highest religiosity (extremist and conservative), as well as lowest 
religiosity (pre-war secular). Thus, we have here a mixed outcome. Despite the fact that civil-
confessional parties with lower religiosity show highest female nominations, one is hard pressed 
to infer that maybe religiosity is not as significant for parliamentary elections as it was found to 
be for women‟s leadership. This will be determined in qualitative and multivariate analysis. 
However, maybe in municipal nominations the picture is more promising. The following section 
examines women‟s candidacy for municipal elections in comparative perspective to 
parliamentary elections.  
B. Female Municipal Nominations by Party Religiosity  
Municipal elections are held every six years, the last of which was in May 2010. Parties 
play a more modest role in municipal elections than they do in parliamentary elections. However, 
240 
 
this role is gaining momentum as they come to realize that municipalities are also a key for their 
electoral strength. Parties are forging strong ties with dominant intervention points within local 
communities, especially family networks, local community and religious leaders, particularly in 
smaller districts and rural areas. Data compiled from party administrators denote that ten out of 
the 18 relevant political parties nominated women in the last two rounds of elections in 2004 and 
2010. These include all three pre-war a-religious secular parties with leftist tendencies, only one 
pre-war civil-confessional party with progressive orientations, four post-war civil-confessional, 
one religious conservative but not extremist party, and a religious tolerant party. 
Comparing data on the last two rounds of municipal and parliamentary elections, one 
observes that, in absolute and relative terms, more women are running for municipal than for 
parliamentary elections (see, table E.2).  
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Parliamentary elections (2005) 











Municipal elections (2004) 











Source: Official site of the Ministry of Interior in Lebanon  www.moim.gov.lb; National Commission for Lebanese 
Women (NCLW), Third Report on implementation of the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), (Beirut: 2006); Marguerite El-Helou, “Women in municipal elections”, 
in Lebanese Centre for Studies, ed. 1999. Municipal Elections in Lebanon: Democracy in local communities 
(Lebanese Centre for Studies: Beirut); in Arabic; Marguerite El-Helou, “Women in 2004 municipal elections, 
(unpublished mimeograph of work in progress, 2009-2010).  Wafa‟ Dika Hamza, “Where are the Lebanese women 
in national decision-making?” An-Nahar daily (March 9, 2009).   
  
Competition in parliament is over 128 seats across 26 electoral districts, while in municipal 
elections it is over 11,424 seats in 969 municipalities. The rate of female candidacy was almost 
three times as high in the most recent municipal election than in the most recent parliamentary 
elections. This implies that parties are nominating more women in municipal than parliamentary 
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elections and that women, themselves, are more daring in running for municipal that 
parliamentary elections. Thus, in relative terms, the share of female nominees for municipalities 
doubled between 2004 and 2010 to 5.6 %, while the corresponding share for parliament was 
almost halved to 2% between 2005 and 2009. In fact, in February 2010 the Lebanese Cabinet 
approved a 20% quota for women in municipal councils. This boosted the share of women in 
parties‟ electoral lists during the campaign until the parliament killed the proposal just before 
elections in May 2010. However, its positive impact on boosting female nominations is reflected 
in a doubling of their share between 2004 and 2010. These findings are indicative that a window 
of opportunity is opening for women in politics in municipal elections.  
Tables E.3 to E.5 (next pages) present sex-disaggregated data on municipal candidates 
broken down by party, religious affiliation, and rural/urban divide, respectively.
6
 Table E.3 
shows that the share of female municipal candidates is relatively higher in rural than in urban 
districts.  
Table E.3 Municipal elections by gender and urban/rural divide (%) 
 
 Candidates URBAN RURAL Total 
Females 5.6 47.8 52.2 100.0 
Males 94.4 52.8 47.2 100.0 
TOTAL 100.0 52.7 47.3 100.0 
Source: Ministry of Interior, www.moim.gov.lb; estimates are based on official sex-disaggregated data by 
electoral districts. 
 
In smaller rural electoral districts like villages and remote areas, municipal lists reflect strong 
family networks and are candidate-centric supported by a local same-sect community including 
                                                             
6  Official data on elections are only available by gender and electoral districts from the Ministry of Interior 
and the Universal Center for Information (UCI) in Lebanon. Estimates for distribution of municipal candidates by 
rural/urban divide, religious affiliation and by political party are based on actual sex-disaggregated data by electoral 
districts. These estimates are computed on the basis of official zoning of electoral districts into urban and rural areas, 
majority religious sect dominating the district, and associated with parties that have a stronghold in electoral 
districts. This was done in close consultation with the National Elections Bureau in the Ministry of Interior, party 
administrators, and the UCI. 
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religious, community and party leaders. This ensures wider support for women candidates, based 
on their familial reputation, which encourages more women to run for municipal elections and 
entices parties to nominate them.
7
 A case in point is made by a female municipal candidate that, 
“Hizbullah did not actually nominate women but the party included on their lists those who are 
chosen by family networks and after consultation with community leaders.” Community support 
is paramount in municipal elections. This includes families, religious leaders and political 
parties, in that order. In larger electoral districts like cities and urban areas, municipal elections 
are as equally influenced as parliamentary elections by religious and class cleavages. In such 
large districts, where dwellers are of mixed religious denominations, confessional affiliation 
matters in nominations.  
Unlike the parliamentary law, municipal law is a non-confessional law. Municipal seats 
are not distributed by religious affiliation. This offers women more chances in nomination and 
success than in parliamentary elections. Further, municipal law works better for women than 
parliamentary law, since upon marriage women take up their husbands‟ sect, if different. This 
limits their chances in receiving support because voters do not consider that they belong to the 
community (see also El-Helou 1999: 433). Since seats in municipal councils are not earmarked 
by sect and smaller communities are homogeneous sect-wise, this issue does not arise. Another 
factor is that municipal law also follows the Bloc Vote (BV) electoral system like parliamentary 
law. However, in local elections, the BV system has the advantage of strengthening the 
development of political parties and encouraging cross-confessional voting as parties/candidates 
                                                             
7  This may not tally with the scholarship that larger electoral districts are better for female parliamentary 
representation than smaller districts (Dahlerup (2006), Norris and Lovenduski (1993), among others). See also, 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), “Interactive Overview of combinations of 
Electoral Systems and Quota Types”, www.idea.int/publications/designing_for_equality/dyntable.cfm  (updated 
September 7, 2007).    
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Table E.4 shows that more Christian than Muslim female nominees run for municipal 
office, while the opposite is true for men.
9
 This suggests that Muslim-dominated communities 
are more reserved than Christian-dominated ones vis-à-vis women‟s political participation.10  
  Table E.4 Municipal candidates by gender and religion (%) 
   
 Candidates  Christian  Muslim  Total 
Females 5.6 51.2 48.8 100.0 
Males 94.4 45.9 54.1 100.0 
TOTAL 100.0 46.1 53.9 100.0 
 Source: Ministry of Interior, www.moim.gov.lb; estimates are based on official sex-
disaggregated data by electoral districts. 
 
In this vein, a female activist in a civil-confessional party notes that, “Patriarchy is more 
prominent in Muslim than in Christian communities. In fact, there is a large margin of freedom 
for women in our Christian-dominated parties than Muslim-dominated ones.” She reports that in 
joint meetings, female members in Muslim-dominated parties fear of being blamed for 
neglecting their domestic duties if they stay late. She adds that, “If women in Hizbullah are 
called for an interview they have to obtain prior permission from the party leadership. We do 
not.” Indeed, I had to obtain prior permission to conduct my interviews with female officials in 
extremist and conservative parties.      
                                                             
8  The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), 2010, “2010 Municipal Elections in Lebanon” 
(IFES: Washington). 
 
9  Crude estimates also show that there were three times as much Christian as Muslim female candidates in 
1998 and twice as much in 2004 municipal elections (El-Helou: 1999, 425-426; and NCLW: 2004, 49; NCLW: 
2006, 50). 
  
10   As discussed earlier, it may be that different religions influence the behaviour of societies in different ways, 




Table E.5 provides sex-disaggregated data on distribution of female municipal candidates 
by party religiosity and urban/rural divide.   









Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Marada 4 7.8 92.2 0.0 100.0 7.8 92.2 
Syrian Social 5 7.0 93.0 0.0 100.0 7.0 93.0 
Communist 5 6.7 93.3 0.0 100.0 6.7 93.3 
Tayyar 4 3.5 96.5 3.5 96.5 3.5 97.5 
Baath 5 3.0 97.0 0.0 100.0 3.0 97.0 
Future 4 2.9 97.1 3.1 96.9 2.8 97.2 
Progressive Socialist 4 2.0 98.0 2.5 97.5 1.8 98.2 
Hizbullah 2 2.0 98.0 1.7 98.3 2.3 97.7 
Lebanese Forces 4 2.0 98.0 1.7 98.3 3.3 96.7 
Amal 3 1.1 98.9 1.1 98.9 1.1 98.9 
Total  5.6 94.4 2.6 97.4 3.0 97.0 
    Source: Ministry of Interior, www.moim.gov.lb ; and estimates based on official sex-disaggregated data by 
electoral districts.   
 
Data show that, on average, the highest shares for female nominations are by secular a-
religious and civil-confessional parties with lower religiosity, except for one outlier party 
(Lebanese Forces). It also shows that these parties which are marked by plural and democratic 
procedures are, in effect, nominating more women in rural than in urban areas. As mentioned 
earlier, the electoral base of pre-war secular parties with leftist a-religious platforms shrank 
amidst widening religious cleavages and shifting party memberships in the aftermath of the civil 
war. They found their niche in municipal elections, which exhibit different dynamics in that they 
cover numerous, smaller electoral districts, and compete over a larger number of seats than 
parliamentary elections. They quickly stepped in when stronger parties failed to accord 
municipal elections the same weight they do for parliaments. As such, local municipal elections 
offer pre-war secular parties another chance for regaining part of their lost foothold.  However, 
eight out of the 18 relevant parties did not nominate women. These include all three extremist 
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religious parties with the lowest religiosity score (1), and five civil-confessional parties (Kata‟éb, 
Liberals, Kutlah, Wa‟ad and Tajaddod) with religiosity score of (4). This implies that even in 
municipal nominations, extremist parties did not nominate women while conservative and 
tolerant parties -- with lower religiosities -- did.  
Another element is that by law, civil servants in public administrations including state 
universities or the army have to resign their posts within a specified period of time before they 
can run for elections.
11
 It is noteworthy to mention that the public sector including the army is 
the largest employer of men from poorer districts in North and South Lebanon. Therefore, in 
order for men to retain their tenure and privileges, their wives run instead, as a national elections 
expert informs that, “When men are not allowed by law to run unless they resign as civil 
servants, women‟s chances in getting nominated for municipal elections increase.”  These cases 
are more pronounced in the lower civil service echelons. This explains why the share of female 
municipal candidates is higher in rural than urban districts, despite religious, traditional and class 
considerations (see, tables E.3 and E.5). Furthermore, contrary to prior scholarship, we find that 
smaller electoral districts at the village level are better for female municipal candidacy than 
larger urban areas, as El-Helou (1999) also finds in studying 1998 municipal elections.
12
  
Chart E.2 shows graphically party variation in female municipal nominations. On 
average, pre-war secular and post-war civil-confessional parties of lower religiosity nominated a 
higher proportion of women on their electoral lists than conservative or tolerant religious parties 
                                                             
11   One of the seven female chairs of municipal councils had to resign from her tenured position to run for 
municipal elections. On the occasion of preparing for the 2010 round of municipal elections, she addressed an open 
letter to the President of the Republic proposing an amendment to this law. (As-Safir, 3 February 2010).   
 




with higher religiosity. In fact, extremist religious parties with the highest religiosity level did 
not nominate any women for municipal elections. Comparing current to previous rounds of 
municipal elections reveals that even religious conservative parties transform. In effect, in the 
1998 municipal elections, Hizbullah announced that they do not support female municipal 
candidates in their districts, unlike Amal that included women on their electoral lists (El-Helou, 
1999). In more recent municipal elections, however, and in the face of competition from other 
parties, Hizbullah has been willing to nominate a growing number of women.  Information from 






































1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
 ('1' extremist, '2' conservative, '3' tolerant, '4' civil-confessional, '5' secular)
Chart E.2 Female Municipal Nominations by Party-Religiosity & Party-Age
 
 Municipal elections differ from parliamentary elections in several important ways. One of 
the important elements relates to the influence of clerics at the small community level in the 
selection process of candidates. Interviews with female municipal candidates reveal that in 
conservative traditional villages it is necessary for party leaders to intervene with religious 
leaders to secure their support for female candidates. This collaboration among families, 
community leaders, clergymen and party leaders is indicative of how politics and religion work 
hand in hand in Lebanon. Therefore, support for female municipal candidates does not only 
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come from families and family networks but also from the community clerics who often hold 
more clout at the village level than they do in larger districts. Thus, political parties find it in 
their interest to collaborate with local communities in managing the municipal electoral process. 
If need be, they seek the support and intervention of the local communities‟ religious leaders for 
female candidates, aware that they are not the sole players in municipal as in parliamentary 
elections.  
 In this context, a female municipal candidate remarks that, “Support of the party is not 
sufficient at the municipal level. Families and the village community as well as the clergy are 
essential in the selection process and together with political parties they determine winners or 
losers, women or men.”  A case in point is that the husband of a veiled female candidate running 
for a „Mukhtar‟ post in a small conservative village posted his picture with “Vote for my Wife” 
as a show of family support.
13
 She won.  This way she did not antagonize the community and the 
clergy by posting her own picture.  Another example is offered by one of seven female 
chairpersons of a municipal councils who explains that,  
Since the community in villages is religiously homogeneous, or people belong to the 
same sect, the clergy have strong influence in municipal elections. For instance, the 
Sheikh in our Druze community was against women in politics. However, the party 
leader convinced him to support my candidacy for the local council as a service to the 
community. 
The party leader intervened because it was in the interest of the party to have a female 
representing the party in the village municipality. However, when parties disregard the 
communities‟ preferences, the consequences are not favorable. For example, a female candidate 
                                                             
13   The Mukhtar (mayor or official civil registrar) is a civil servant. They are responsible for all civil registers 
and lists of eligible voters based on official birth and death certificates. This is extremely important in elections 
because the Mukhtar can shift names from one electoral district to another, if need be, which can sway the results in 




from a religious tolerant party describes the strong resistance she faced from her community and 
the clergy in running for elections: “In our conservative village, the dominant families and the 
religious leader opposed nominating women and insisted on selecting men. However, the party 
disregarded the community‟s selection and nominated a woman, because the competing list has a 
woman. She did not win.” Another incident points to Lebanon‟s mozaique society, which is full 
of contradictions. A female municipal candidate was selected by a religious community in a 
conservative village although she is leftist. She cites that, “270 people signed a petition 
nominating me for the municipal council because of my contributions to the community.” She 
explains that,  
Hizbullah included me on their list because I have many supporters, despite my being a 
woman and a leftist. My inclusion on the party‟s list is good for competition because the 
other list also had a woman. This projects a modern and tolerant image of the party. The 
party also financed my nomination fees and my electoral campaign. 
 
 In effect, these incidents demonstrate the strength of family and community networks, 
especially the religious leaders, in municipal elections and how parties need to work in tandem 
with key community entities to ensure their electoral success. The importance of family networks 
in municipal elections, which are candidate-centric more than they „party-centric‟, cannot be 
underestimated. More often than not, especially in conservative villages, selection of candidates, 
women or men, has to run by both the dominant families and the clergy/religious leaders in these 
villages. These choices guide parties‟ nominations of winning candidates, women or men. Three 
issues stand out from these statements and lessons can be drawn, in general. First, this religious 
tolerant party (Amal) failed to secure the support of dominant community families and the 
clergy. Second, the party nominated women as a symbol of the modern in order to fight 
competition and amass the female vote. Third, this religious party was willing to overlook the 
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Shari‟a by nominating women, because this is in its electoral interest. These justifications give 
parties incentives to field women as municipal candidates in order not to lose seats to competing 
parties. This is not sui generis to Lebanon, as scholars find in local elections in Canada as well 
that, “…when at least one woman‟s name was officially placed in nominations for a local party 
candidacy, a female candidate was selected 73 percent of the time.” (Lovenduski and Norris, 
1993: 75). These scholars maintain that,  
…, there is a different „logic of choice‟ … parties have a rational incentive to present a 
„balanced ticket‟. With a list of names it is unlikely that any votes will be lost by the 
presence of women candidates on the list. And their absence may cause offense, by 
advertising party prejudice, thereby narrowing the party‟s appeal. (Lovenduski and 
Norris, 1993: 314-315) 
  
Hence, different dynamics are discerned between municipal and parliamentary elections 
vis-à-vis women‟s candidacy. Moreover, municipal councils hold many more seats than the 
parliament does. There are 969 municipalities and each council holds an average of 12 seats (in 
large districts up to 24 seats). Therefore, women‟s chances are greater in municipalities than in a 
128-seat parliament distributed proportionally among 18 confessions. Municipal law is non-
confessional while parliamentary law is. Family networks play a greater role in municipal 
elections especially in smaller districts where everyone knows everyone else than in 
parliamentary level. In larger districts and urban areas, female candidates have to have party 
support first and foremost especially if they come from minority religious denominations. More 
importantly, political parties maneuver strategically with family networks and the local 
community including religious leaders, while they play a solitary but more controlling and 
decisive role in parliamentary elections. The interaction between political parties and clerics also 
represents strategic maneuvering for parties‟ political interests. This has also been observed in 
Yemen where parties intervened with the clergy to issue a „fatwa‟ so that veiled women can 
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unveil to be photographed for voting purposes. Also in Jordan, the clergy intervened to support 
the nomination of a woman by an extremist party for parliament. Another case in point is the 
2005 „Mudawana‟ in Morocco where the women‟s movement allied with religious leaders to 
interpret the family law in favor of women. Thus “…, …while religion is part of the problem, it 
can also be part of the solution.” (Kristof 2010)  
In brief, women are running in municipal more than in parliamentary elections and are 
being nominated by competing political parties that have strong presence in smaller more than in 
larger electoral districts. There are two issues that can be drawn from interviewees‟ statements. 
One is about the opportunities for women at the municipal level and the second is about how this 
is bigger for parties with lower religiosity. With respect to women‟s opportunities, data shows 
that in villages where family networks have the upper hand, electoral lists are drawn by parties in 
close consultation with dominant family networks and religious leaders. Women are often 
included in parties‟ electoral lists to fight competition, amass electoral votes, and for the special 
contributions they offer local communities. This is especially significant since municipalities are 
increasingly being considered by political parties as the key first tier in developing electoral 
strength. Women now have higher shares in municipal than parliamentary nominations.  
However, some parties offer women more chances of getting nominated than others, and 
in the next section I examine which parties offer more support and open windows for women in 
municipal councils. I expect parties of lower religiosity to offer more chances. In fact, data show 
that secular and civil-confessional parties with lower religiosity had higher shares of women 
nominees on their electoral lists than conservative and tolerant religious parties with higher 
religiosity. Therefore, one may infer that municipalities augur well for women‟s leadership in 
public office and may offer women a window of opportunity for a career in politics. Is this the 
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expected breakthrough for women? The following section responds to this question and 
estimates a regression model for women‟s party nominations for municipal and parliamentary 
elections.    
C. Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of Findings  
As the previous sections show, data compiled from official sources and party 
administrators reveal that, on average, parties nominate more women for municipal than 
parliamentary councils, in absolute and relative terms. Statements culled from interviews with 
party leaders and female municipal candidates and/or council members substantiate these 
findings.
14
 For instance, a female municipal member from a religious party of tolerant religiosity 
succinctly summarizes the factors driving these results in that,   
Women‟s chances in municipal councils are higher than in parliament because of the 
larger number of seats available. Municipal elections are family-based and rely heavily on 
personal contacts and friends. Women are better known in smaller communities than 
larger cities, which is a less risky scenario for parties to nominate them. Women are 
nominated by parties to compete and to show that they are modern. Anyways, women fit 
more for social work in municipalities than in politics. Moreover, parliamentary 
representation carries more prestige, visibility, and financial remuneration than municipal 
councils. Therefore, parties nominate more men for parliament than women.  
 
Similar and additional factors comparing municipal to parliamentary female nominations are also 
raised by a municipal candidate from a post-war civil-confessional party, who provides the 
following analysis,   
In parliamentary elections, parties select candidates. In municipal elections, families 
select and parties nominate candidates. Municipal candidates do not need huge financial 
outlays, which is a major hurdle in parliamentary elections. Parties accord less 
importance to municipal than parliamentary elections. Hence, they nominate more 
women in order to appease them and their demands for advancement. Parties in 
conservative communities see that municipal service is more fitting for women since it 
                                                             
14  Interviews were conducted with female members and candidates in 2004 municipal elections, since the last 
round took place in May 2010 and field research was completed in summer 2009.    
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akin to community development, social welfare and voluntary work in civil-society. Also, 
women are less corruptible than men.  
 
1. Qualitative analysis of findings 
 
The comparative analysis by these two interviewees raises issues that call for in-depth 
exploration. More specifically, (1) women are nominated in municipal elections to fight 
competition with other parties; (2) women are a less risky scenario in municipal than 
parliamentary elections; (3) women fit more for municipal social work than parliamentary 
political office, including their less corruptibility; and (4) municipal work is a stepping stone for 
parliamentary representation. The following paragraphs address each of these factors separately.  
(a) Women are nominated in municipal elections to fight competition  
 Information collected from female municipal candidates reveals that in districts where 
there is no competition and electoral lists win by acclamation, women are rarely nominated. For 
example, a female candidate cites that in her village, “Hizbullah‟s list included 21 male 
candidates but not a single woman. There were no other competing lists. The list won by 
acclamation without elections.”  Another female candidate from a religious tolerant party notes 
that, “The party decided to nominate women on every municipal list to fight competition. 
Therefore, they nominated me for the village council since the opposing list had also a woman 
nominee.” Thus, when there are competing lists, women are invariably included, even in the 
most conservative villages. In effect, parties are consumed by “peer pressure” or “emulation” to 
match other parties. If this calls for drastic measures like overlooking traditions or the Shari‟a by 
nominating women to improve the parties‟ public image for strategic and electoral purposes, then 
so be it. In this connection, the leader of a pre-war secular party describes how this competitive 
setting works more for women‟s candidacy: 
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Hizbullah and Amal wield power in the South with its traditional and conservative 
communities. In such religiously committed settings, a-religious parties like the 
communist party are not well accepted. However, being the weaker party in the area, we 
allied with Hizbullah during elections. My wife ran on the joint parties‟ electoral list for 
the village‟s municipal council. This forced the competing list to nominate a woman on 
their list. 
This pattern is also observed in other villages. Similarly, a female candidate explains that her 
nomination by the pre-war secular a-religious party prompts the other competing religious parties 
to include women on their lists. Another testimony by a female candidate of a Christian-
dominated post-war civil-confessional party also describes how women are used as tools to fight 
party competition. She states that,  
My cousin drew up an electoral list against the opposing traditional one and invited me to 
join. The other   party in the village also invited me to join their list because they wanted 
to compete with a woman. I did not want a feud in the village, so I withdrew from 
elections. Therefore, the two lists did not include women and there are no women in our 
village municipality. 
    
These testimonies demonstrate that, in districts where there are competing parties, invariably 
there would be one woman on each electoral list. If one party includes a woman, the competing 
party follows suit. This bodes well for female municipal candidacy, especially in smaller 
districts. This pattern is also observed in the 1998 round of municipal elections in that, “… 
higher female candidacy is associated with more competition between parties.” (El-Helou 
1999)
15
 This is paradoxical. Party competition is sometimes associated with higher female 
municipal candidacy but lower parliamentary candidacy. This is especially the case for weaker 
parties (viz., pre-war secular parties) that risk losing precious parliamentary seats by nominating 
women. This mixed pattern is also observed by scholars studying parties and female 
representation in ten western democracies:   
                                                             
15   A similar survey may be undertaken for 2004 and 2010 municipal elections in order to explore whether 
such a pattern can be established. 
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Accordingly, does the nature of the party competition influence women‟s representation? 
It seems plausible to hypothesize, as Sainsbury suggests, that increased competition, 
combined with the growth of new parties, would provide more opportunities for women 
candidates. Yet once more the evidence is mixed, there is limited systematic research, 
and we need to take care to observe the complex interactions of political culture, the party 
system and the electoral system. … We can conclude that this would be a fruitful area for 
further research, to establish a systematic case, but we need to go beyond simple 
classifications of party competition, to see how party ideology and party organization 
also play a role. (Lovenduski and Norris, 1993: 319)  
 
These phenomena are depicted mostly in the South where weaker (judging by the number 
of seats in parliament) pre-war secular parties compete with stronger conservative and tolerant 
religious parties like Hizbullah and Amal. Therefore, including women on secular parties‟ 
electoral lists is strategic for fighting competition, which at the same time prompts Hizbullah and 
Amal to nominate women as well. This pattern is also observed in other parties. For instance, a 
leader of a post-war civil-confessional party admits that, “We nominate women on our municipal 
lists to show competing parties that we are also modern and women-friendly.” Including a 
woman on the party‟s ballot is also bait for the more hesitant voters in the district. Competition 
becomes keen when there are two female candidates. This implies that women are used to market 
the electoral lists of competing parties in municipal but not in parliamentary elections. This is 
more useful for weaker pre-war secular parties with leftist orientations who are effectively 
nominating a higher share of female municipal candidates than other parties (table E.5 and chart 
E.2). A similar behaviour is also observed by Kittilson, who finds that,  
…, smaller, weaker parties, which tend to be fringe parties, may be positively related to 
women‟s representation… Left parties are more likely to support women‟s candidacies 
than Right parties because Left parties espouse more egalitarian ideologies … Left parties 
may be more likely to see fit to support an underrepresented group, such as women… feel 
a need to be sensitive to groups traditionally excluded from the circles of power. 




These scholarly findings, which are based on research conducted elsewhere and more 
than a decade ago, add confidence to the conceptual framework and findings in this dissertation. 
What seems to explain this paradoxical phenomenon is that political parties use women to 
compete with other parties, improve their image and, more significantly, for strategic 
electioneering purposes.
16
 It is feasible at the municipal level, because, as several interviewees 
stress, nominating women for municipalities does not threaten male parliamentary incumbents. It 
does not take away their „acquired‟ privileges (financial and prestige-wise). Municipal seats are 
numerous, while parliamentary seats are limited.   
The above information demonstrates that fierce competition between parties may be both 
a blessing and a curse for women‟s leadership and their political career. However, despite few 
exceptions, more often than not and especially in smaller districts, competition among parties 
enhances female municipal candidacy. Political parties employ all means to serve their interests 
including nominating more women, building alliances with other parties, intervening with local 
religious leaders and collaborating with family networks to reach their goals. This information 
helps to explain variations in shares of female municipal candidates across parties as tables E.1 
to E.5 and charts E.1 and E.2 show. These preliminary findings indicate that municipalities can 
be a breakthrough for women‟s leadership. However, there are other factors that parties take into 
consideration, which may add clarity to the puzzle of women‟s political leadership.   
(b) Women are a less risky scenario in municipal elections 
                                                             
16   Clark cites the case of a religious party in Jordan nominating a woman for parliament to fight fierce 
competition, that, “…, [T]he IAF (Islamic Action Front) nominated Musini (a female member of Shoura Council) 
for purely strategic reasons, over the objections of party members who declared her candidacy „haram‟ (prohibited 
by Islam). … Musini‟s strong grassroots support in the city of Zarqa, a stronghold of IAF, made her a good bet to 
win a seat.” (Clark, 2004: 7).  
256 
 
Several party elites and officials stress that parties are always interested in minimizing 
the risks to their electoral strength. According to information culled, women seem to be a less 
risky scenario for parties in municipal than in parliamentary elections, especially in smaller than 
larger electoral districts. Women are better known in smaller districts. This enhances their 
chances in winning, which encourages more women to run in municipal elections and parties to 
nominate them. As a female candidate from a post-war civil-confessional party observes that, 
“Parties tend to nominate more women for municipalities than for parliament, because of the 
lower risk involved. Women are a winning ticket in municipal elections. They are well-known in 
the small community. Their nomination improves the party‟s public image.” To corroborate 
these views, a female municipal candidate who was running for the second time, admits that she 
was clearly at a disadvantage because she belongs to a minority religious denomination. Her 
nomination was risky to the party because she is not well known in the larger district. However, 
she only made it because she was nominated by a strong party, where the whole list was voted 
for without omitting any of the candidates. She argues that the party supported her for strategic 
competitive reasons and that,  
Nominating women for public office is in the interest of competing parties. However, it 
is less risky for parties to nominate women for municipal than for parliamentary 
councils, where every seat counts. Nonetheless, parties are realizing that municipal 
elections are essential for their parliamentary electoral base, and women are their 
winning ticket under severe competition. I predict that in the 2010 municipal elections 
parties will nominate many more women as an alternative to parliament, where women 
constitute a higher risk than municipalities. 
 
Indeed, her predictions materialized since the share of women in municipal elections doubled 
between 2004 and 2010, as shown earlier. However, other female interviewees argue along a 
different line that, “Families, friends and communities support women for municipal councils. 
Parties nominate them because there is less risk involved in nominating women for 
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municipalities than for parliament.” Therefore, parties recognize the merit of nominating women 
for municipalities because they are winners and constitute less risk, especially for weaker parties. 
Hence, this enhances women‟s chances and constitutes a window of opportunity for them in 
politics.  
(c) Women are more fit for municipal office and less corruptible than men  
Parties look at municipal elections as less politically important for their political and 
electoral strength than parliamentary elections. Moreover, parties see that municipal work falls 
under the rubric of social and community development more than hard core politics. A female 
former cabinet minister responds that, “Work in municipalities is not as politically oriented as 
parliamentary work. It requires closer contact with the community, which women do better than 
men.” As such, women fit more for municipal than parliamentary service.  
Municipal service is voluntary, and does not entail financial remuneration for members, 
except that the chair of the council receives a budget for projects and an allowance for public 
relations as long as he/she are in office. In contrast, parliamentary representation is more 
financially rewarding with lifelong salary and fringe benefits. This is more appealing to men 
since it carries lifelong prestige, as a female candidate of a religious tolerant party analyzes that, 
“First, municipal work does not have same visibility, clout or privileges like parliamentary work. 
Second, parties are appeasing women by nominating them for municipalities in response to their 
demands for leadership positions.”  
Another female municipal member explains that, “Municipal work is more fitting for a 
woman than parliamentary work. This is a man‟s world. Women work closer to the community, 
are patient, committed, deliver, and above all, are less corruptible.”  This may be true, but it is 
amazing that even women themselves consider that municipal service is social more than 
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political work and that women‟s place is not in politics. In this vein, another female municipal 
member remarks that, “Unfortunately, some women look at municipal service as inferior to 
parliamentary service. Women should realize that municipal work is as important especially in 
decision-making and community development.” Moreover, these statements highlight women‟s 
less corruptibility as a criterion for the choice of parties. But, I also think for the choice of the 
community too. Hence, a female municipal candidate from a post-war civil-confessional party 
also highlights women‟s special traits as attractive to parties and factor into their nomination 
choices in that,  
Women are patient, better negotiators, less corruptible, and closer to the community than 
men. By nominating women to municipal councils, parties are not only appeasing them 
in response to their demands for leadership, but are also guaranteeing that they will serve 
them well in parliamentary elections.  
Similar explanations are given by party leaders and female candidates attesting to the 
special contributions that women make to municipal work which also include their 
accountability, efficiency in discharging functions, lower level of risk-taking and their ability to 
meet serious community challenges. Several party officials explain the lower corruptibility of 
women by invoking their moral values in that, “Women in municipalities are less corruptible 
than men because of the strong value system they uphold. They are likely to succeed in 
municipal work more than men.” While this statement is judgmental and essentializes both men 
and women it also captures a widely-held perception.  
Nonetheless, other statements point with certainty to women‟s lower corruptibility 
especially in explaining why only seven women are elected as chairpersons of municipal 
councils (0.01%). Only four out of the seven female chairpersons are party officials. I 
interviewed all four of them in the third round of interviews conducted during summer 2009. 
Chairpersons of municipalities are either elected by the winners or the member who gets the 
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highest number of votes automatically becomes chair. In this respect, a female municipal 
member from a pre-war secular a-religious party cites the formidable challenges she faced within 
the council and from its male members after winning elections. She reports that she ran against 
all odds in a conservative religious village and highlights blocks barring women from chairing 
the council implicitly for control over resources: “Although I received the highest number of 
votes on the list, I was not elected chair of the council. First, because I am a woman and single; 
and second, because they do not want to relinquish the chair‟s funds to a woman who will have 
control over men.” In this respect, a female candidate in a pre-war secular a-religious party 
explains the link between the budget and corruption in that, “The budget for projects and public 
relations goes to the chair of the municipal council who is not accountable to anyone. Therefore, 
this opens a wide margin for corruption and explains why very few women are elected 
chairpersons of municipalities.” However, one of the female municipal council chairpersons 
explains how and why she was elected as chair:   
The villagers were convinced that because I am a woman, I will take their requests 
seriously and deliver. But, above all they believed that because I am a woman, there will 
be less corruption, which branded the previous chairman. They were confident that I will 
make a better chair. So, they voted for me.  
 
She stresses that in her second term in office, she had proved herself as a democratic chair and 
consults with all members on decisions pertaining to the council and to expenditures on projects. 
Furthermore, she opted to use all the funds allocated to the council for community development 




 Statements of interviewees also refer to the perception that women uphold higher values 
and are less corruptible than men, as this statement by a female municipal member from a pre-
war secular party demonstrates: 
As a secretary of the council, I sign all expenditures on education, health and public 
works sectors, after inspection. Unfortunately, I discovered that the specifications I 
signed for do not tally with the projects executed, disclosing disparities and kickbacks 
collected by the project manager. I refused to be party to corruption. So, I reported this 
to the Chairman, who was also corrupt. Women are less corrupt and more conscientious 
than men. This is why fewer women are elected chairs of municipal councils.     
In this connection, recent studies on corruption attest to the less corruptibility of women. Several 
scholars find that,  
…, even more significantly, current research suggests that women politicians are equal to 
or better than their male counterparts. Duflo and Topalova (2004), for example, find that 
women leaders provide more public goods for their villages than men, and that these 
goods are of higher quality. Women politicians are also less likely to take bribes. Dollar, 
Fisman and Gatti (2001) also find that, across many countries, higher levels of female 
representation in parliament bring lower levels of corruption. This suggests that not only 
are women leaders needed to reflect the policy preferences of women voters, but that they 




Also, recent scholarship, using men instead of women as the dependent variable, provides 
empirical evidence that, “…high political representation of women decreases corruption levels, 
suggesting that women are inherently less corruptible than men.” (Bjarnegard, 2008: 2).18  In 
fact, these statements essentialize women by placing them on a pedestal, which might not be true 
for all, men or women. However, this provides some justification for why parties are nominating 
more women for municipal than for parliamentary service.  
(d) Municipalities are a stepping stone for parliaments 
                                                             
17  Rohini Pande and Alexandra Cirone, “Women in Politics: Quotas, Voter Attitudes and Female 
Leadership”. (Policy Brief No. 10, Dubai School of Government, February 2009), 1-8 
  




Additional factors are raised by informants for parties‟ nominations of women for 
municipal councils. For instance, a leader of a pre-war civil-confessional party states that, 
“Municipal work allows women to gain political maturity and leadership skills, which are 
prerequisites for effective political careers.” One of the party elites in another pre-war civil-
confessional party also flags that, “Let us start in municipalities. If women succeed, then we will 
nominate them to parliament.” This is collaborated by another party elite in a religious tolerant 
party who also sees that municipal work is a stepping stone into the more complex work of 
parliaments and cites that,  
The party nominated one woman in each of the electoral lists, since work in 
municipalities is a stepping stone into parliamentary office. Women acquire the requisite 
skills and political experience for leadership through their work in municipalities. This is 
training. Women succeed in social, environmental and developmental work more than 
men. They are more dedicated and driven. Above all, women are less corruptible than 
men.  
Similar views are encapsulated in statements of other party leaders and elites, particularly of 
traditional pre-war civil-confessional parties as well as tolerant religious parties. These male 
views reflect a preference for a phased and gradual entry of women into politics before 
entrusting them with higher responsibilities in parliamentary positions. However, a female 
chairperson of the municipality in her village neatly summarizes how municipalities offer 
women a window of opportunity in politics:  
The village wanted me to run but I declined because I did not want to resign from the 
State University. In 2004, the Party nominated me as head of the list and I was elected 
chair of the nine-member council. The competing list had a woman but she did not win. I 
won with majority of votes because I was supported by the party leader, family, 
community and the clerics. Municipal service opens the door wide for an effective 
political career.  
 
In brief, parties justify why they are nominating more women for municipalities than for 
parliamentary councils by reference to a host of factors. These include the lower corruptibility 
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of women, the greater fit of women for social work, and the nomination of women a tool for 
fighting party competition. Statements based on information from interviewees explain and 
justify the higher shares of female nomination for municipalities than for parliaments. More 
significantly, parties consider that municipal work is a stepping stone for higher level politics in 
parliamentary office. In other words, this is a „levels of analysis‟ argument for a linear 
development in women‟s career in politics.  
Moreover, information culled from statements of interviewees and from data compiled 
also explains the higher shares of female municipal nominees. Indeed, pre-war secular and post-
war civil-confessional parties with lower religiosity, more plural and democratic procedures 
have higher shares of female nominees than in conservative and tolerant parties with higher 
religiosity, and plural and democratic deficits. These findings support the theory of party 
variation in religiosity and related hypotheses in that as religiosity falls, shares of women in 
municipal electoral lists rise. Furthermore, this evidence denotes that municipalities may very 
well be the window of opportunity for women in politics. The following paragraphs provide 
statistical support to these qualitative findings by estimating multivariate regression models for 
female municipal and parliamentary candidacy across parties.        
2.  Regression Models for Female Party Nominations to Parliament and Municipalities   
Out of the 18 relevant political parties covered in this case study, only four nominated 
women for parliamentary elections and ten for municipal elections. Scatter plot E.1 shows that 
all four parties that nominated women to parliament have a score of 4 on the secularism scale 
(i.e. show lower levels of religiosity). The bivariate regression produces coefficients and t-scores 
that are small in magnitude and are in the right direction, but are not statistically significant. This 
implies that a relationship exists between women‟s nominations and party religiosity, but it is not 
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significant. These four parties are all post-war civil-confessional parties with lower religiosity, as 
anticipated.  
Plot E.1      Plot E.2 
Female parliamentary nominees by party religiosity Female municipal nominees by party 
religiosity   
F-Nominees=.5493+.9736(secularism)   F-Nominees=-1.011+.8781(secularism) 















1 2 3 4 5
seclrsm













1 2 3 4 5
seclrsm
 
   
 Scatter plot E.2 also shows that parties with lowest religiosity nominated the highest 
shares of women in municipal elections. The bivariate regression produces a small but positive 
coefficient and a significant t-score, which implies that when parties move up on the secularism 
scale the share of women‟s nominations on parties‟ municipal list increases by less than one 
percent (0.88%).  This relationship is statistically significant, which means that we can safely 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between religiosity and female municipal 
nominations. The scatter plot shows one leverage outlier (Amal), a religious tolerant party with 
relatively lower religiosity (score 3) than the extremist and conservative parties. However, 
dropping this party from the bivariate regression does not change the slope of the regression line.  
 In the following paragraphs, a multivariate regression model for female nominations in 
parliaments and another one in municipalities are estimated. Table E.6 presents both models. In 
estimating the multivariate regression models of female party nominations for parliament and for 
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municipalities, I incorporate the same variables that influence women‟s leadership in political 
parties. These are religiosity, pluralism, democratic practices, female membership and party-age. 
This produces one model for parliamentary nominations and the second for municipal 
nominations.  
Table E.6   Regression models for female nominations for municipalities & parliaments 
 
 Female Party Nominations 
 For 































N 18 18 
Degrees freedom 12 12 
R
2 0.1882        0.7052 
Adjust R
2 -0.1501 0.5824 
F 0.56 < 3.11 5.74 >3.11 
Source: Official data from party administrators compiled and  
processed by author. ***P.01; **P.05; *P.10 
 
(a) Model 1: Female parliamentary nominations 
Regressing female nominations for parliamentary elections on secularism (religiosity), 
party-age, pluralism, democracy and female membership produces the following equation:  
Female parliamentary nominations = b0 + b1 (secularism) + b2 (party-age) + b3 
(pluralism) + b4 (democracy) + b5 (female membership)  
 
The statistical results in this model show that these variables poorly explain female parliamentary 
candidacy. The coefficients are not statistically significant, the t-scores are small, and the standard 
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errors are very high. Moreover, the model cannot explain a significant proportion of the variations 
in the shares of women‟s nominations across parties (R2 is .18 and the adjusted R2 is negative). 
The F-test for the model is not significant (0.56 is less than the critical value of the F-statistics is 
3.11), which means we cannot reject the null hypothesis. The negative coefficient on democracy 
is driven particularly by the level female nominations in the two religious extremist parties that 
are not plural, but internally democratic in leadership transitions, albeit not in decision-making. 
There are also parties that are plural and democratic in decision-making but not in leadership 
transitions (like Tayyar, Tajaddod, and Future), that are contributing to pluralism, which has a 
high coefficient (4.66), but not statistically significant and with a high standard error. It is very 
hard to estimate the effects of these institutional variables, when they are together in the model 
because they are highly correlated; for instance, secularism and pluralism (0.5852), secularism 
and democracy (0.5106), and, pluralism and democracy (0.6574). This is why the results of this 
model have to be interpreted jointly with the results of qualitative evidence and interview data. 
 On the substantive level, one war-origin religious tolerant party (Amal) as well as a pre-
war (Kata‟éb) and two post-war civil-confessional (Tayyar and Future) parties nominated women 
to parliament. The highest share of female nominees to parliament are by the civil-confessional 
parties with lower religiosity (score 4) than the religious tolerant party (score 3). These parties 
employ democratic process in decision-making and have plural membership despite their being 
dominated by a single sect. These results are in line with the theory but in statistical terms, the 
results as shown above are not significant.  Religiosity is borne out but is not statistically 
significant. This implies that this model cannot explain female parliamentary nominations. In this 
instance the estimated model does not show that the variables, religiosity, democracy, pluralism 
or female membership influence female parliamentary nominations, as the F-statistic showed. 
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This may be due to the small number of nominees. That is why we are not able to estimate the 
effects of the variables very well. This estimated model has neither predictive nor explanatory 
powers. The low share of female party nominations to parliament remains a puzzle and a bone of 
contention in civil society and the women‟s movement. The fact that around 61% of the voters in 
2009 elections were women means that women can sway election results. Electoral and 
parliamentary quotas have not been approved by the parliament despite petitions and lobbying by 
the women‟s movement. Explanations include other factors, especially political culture but also 
determined by women‟s own choice to pursue a political career, since a critical mass of women 
for leadership is certainly available, at least in Lebanon.  
(b)  Model 2: Female municipal nominations   
Regressing female party nominations for municipalities on secularism, party-age, 
pluralism, democracy and female membership produces the same regression model as the one 
estimated for parliamentary candidates.  The F-statistic (5.74 > the critical value 3.11) implies 
that we can safely reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients in the equation are not zero. The 
equation explains 58% of the variations in women‟s municipal nominations across parties. 
Overall, the coefficients on religiosity and female membership are small but in the right direction 
and the standard errors are small. The coefficient on religiosity is small in magnitude (.84) but 
positive and statistically significant, and so is the t-statistic.  This implies that we can safely 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between female municipal nominations and 
party religiosity. It means that as secularism improves by one score, the share of female 
nominations for municipalities will incrementally increase by almost one percentage point. This 
is substantively important since female nominations start at such a low level.  Female 
membership shows a significant t-statistic and a probability of less than .3% that b is zero under 
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the null hypothesis, or 99% confidence level, confirming the strength of the regression 
coefficient at .16. This means that there is a strong relationship between membership and 
nominations to municipalities. The coefficient on democratic practices is (2.12) and statistically 
significant with a t-score of 2.28, which confirms that there is a relationship between female 
nominations and democratic practices. Thus, the standardized regression coefficients on 
religiosity, female membership, and democratic practices show the relative strength of these 
variables as predictors in this model.    
These results are statistically and substantively significant. This is substantiated by the 
fact that, on average, the highest shares of female municipal nominations are in pre-war secular 
parties with lowest religiosity, plural membership and democratic practices. These parties had 
adopted a policy to nominate women on each electoral list starting in 2004 municipal elections 
and this ratio increased in 2010 because of the 20% quota for women in local councils. The 
parliament did not pass the 20% quota just before elections took place. In addition, competition 
between parties enhanced the share of female nominations on parties‟ municipal lists, especially 
in rural and small electoral districts. Religious parties (both conservative and tolerant) with high 
female membership also nominated women to municipalities, though with lower shares 
compared to secular parties, as expected. Therefore, the estimated model provides robust support 
to the theory of party variation in religiosity and variation in women‟s nominations for 
municipalities. Female municipal candidacy increases as party religiosity falls. It is also 
positively influenced by democratic practices and female membership.  
Conclusions 
The quantitative findings demonstrate the different party dynamics in female nominations 
for municipalities and parliamentary councils. These findings suggest that municipalities open a 
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window of opportunity for women to break through into politics. More specifically, municipal 
elections are family-centric, do not abide by a confessional quota and are not as controlled by 
political parties as parliamentary elections.  Party religiosity influences the share of women in 
parliamentary lists according to some interview accounts but is not found to have a statistically 
significant effect. Looking at the average percentage of women nominees across party families, it 
was found that secular parties with lowest religiosity (score 5) did not nominate women to 
parliament, while parties with higher religiosity, such as the civil-confessional (score 4) and 
religious tolerant (score 3) parties did.  The lack of female nominees from religious extremist 
parties is explained by their ultra-conservative stance towards the role of women in politics; 
while those from conservative religious parties are „anti-women-as-leaders‟ on religious and 
traditional grounds. Moreover, pre-war secular parties that are of lowest religiosity, democratic 
and plural are electorally weak and cannot fight gender-bias. They do not want to risk the loss of 
the one or two seats that they occupy in parliament by nominating women.   
In contrast, municipal nominations are family-centric and community-driven. Parties 
nominate women in close consultation with family networks, and community and religious 
leaders. Women are more encouraged to run in municipal than parliamentary nominations, 
especially in smaller districts. They are well known and receive great support because of the 
special contributions they make to community development and the perceptions that they are less 
corruptible than men. Parties nominate women to face competition from other parties. Weaker 
parties, like the pre-war secular parties find their niche in municipal elections and nominate 
higher shares of women than other parties do. They also have less to lose in municipal elections 
than they do in parliamentary elections, because of the larger number of seats available for 
competition. Religious conservative and tolerant parties nominate women in municipal and not in 
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parliamentary elections because they consider municipal work as social not political work. This is 
more fitting for women and does not violate the Shari‟a. In addition, several parties consider that 
municipal work is a stepping stone to higher level political leadership in parliamentary office. 
These factors enhance women‟s chances in municipal more than parliamentary nominations. The 
estimated model for female municipal nominations is substantively and statistically consistent 
with the theory of party variation in religiosity.   
 These findings show that more women run for municipal elections (in absolute and 
relative terms) than for parliamentary councils. Moreover, with a non-confessional municipal law 
and smaller electoral districts, women stand a better chance of winning. Consequently, municipal 
elections offer women more chances in leadership than parliamentary elections, especially 
because of a tripartite relationship between family networks, religious leaders and dominant 
political parties. Women are nominated by a wider variety of parties at the municipal level. More 
specifically, secular and civil-confessional parties nominate more women for municipal elections 
than religious conservative and tolerant parties, whereas, as theorized, extremist parties did not 
nominate any women at this local level. This strongly supports the theory of party variation 
posited in this dissertation that as party religiosity declines (secularism increases), women‟s 
leadership rises in decision-making bodies and on their electoral lists for parliament and 
municipal councils. The higher shares of female nominees in municipal councils attest to the fact 
that, despite party competition, municipal elections are more women-friendly than parliamentary 
elections. These provide the breakthrough and a window of opportunity where women can 
exercise rational choice if they wish to start on a political career.    
 In conclusion, there are four main justifications that substantiate a positive response to the 
question that the Epilogue poses: can women breakthrough? First, parties support women‟s 
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leadership when it is in their interest to do so even by overlooking traditions or Shari‟a. They 
often look at women as a symbol of the modern. Second, family networks, and community and 
religious leaders nominate more women in smaller electoral districts and traditional rural areas 
more than in larger cities and urban districts. Parties and the community recognize the special 
contributions that women make to community development and their less corruptibility than men. 
Third, parties see that municipal work is a stepping stone to parliamentary office. In fact, 
municipalities constitute a second-level entry point to political leadership after political parties. 
Parties nominate more women for municipal than parliamentary councils because this strengthens 
their foothold at the grassroots level. As such, municipalities constitute an additional 
electioneering mechanism akin to women‟s wings. Parties find more incentives to nominate 
women in for municipalities than for parliaments. Fourth, women muster more courage to run in 
municipal than in parliamentary elections. Therefore, municipalities are a window of opportunity 







The first wave of twentieth century feminism hit Lebanon during the 1950s.  It focused 
on the emancipation of women and suffrage rights as an entry point into their participation in 
national development. Yet, despite improvements in women’s educational attainments and labor 
force participation, their political participation lags behind their achievements in the professional 
realm. Gender gaps linger even after the subsequent waves of feminism, including the 
paradigmatic shift from ‘women in development’ to ‘women and development’ and now to 
‘gender and development’ focusing on gender mainstreaming for gender equality. The 
conundrum of the mismatch between women’s high socio-economic profile and their low 
political representation remains today and is the phenomenon that drives and motivates this 
thesis.   
This dissertation provided a new explanation for the observed low level of female 
representation -- one that departs from prior scholarship which looks to national-level variables 
including countries’ development levels, political regimes and electoral systems. Previous 
research also sought to explain female representation by considering the effects of culture and 
religion within societies; while this research pushes beyond the domestic level into a lower level 
of analysis, examining individual political parties. The dissertation advances a theory of party 
variation in religiosity to explain variation in women’s leadership across parties of varying 
religiosities and secularisms. It follows a multivocal understanding of religions in that there is a 
continuum of multiple religiosities and secularisms on party platforms that bear a varying 
influence on women’s leadership in parties’ decision-making bodies. The theory and related 





Political parties are the main vehicles for women’s leadership as gatekeepers. They 
recruit, select, promote, and nominate women to leadership and public office. Parties that are 
committed to gender equality take special measures to guarantee women’s advancement such as 
introducing voluntary internal and electoral party quotas to enhance female representation. 
Political parties are thus not just the prime mover in the theory of women’s empowerment that is 
advanced and tested here; they are also the unit of analysis. Religiosity, democratic procedures in 
leadership transitions and decentralized decision-making, pluralism by religious affiliation in 
membership, and female membership are explanatory variables for women’s leadership in 
parties’ inner bodies and on their electoral lists for public office. The qualitative analysis is based 
on structured and semi-structured interviews conducted over a period of three years (2006-2009) 
with party leaders and female party activists in 18 relevant parties. Information gleaned from 150 
interviews substantiates the conceptual framework of the role of party religiosity in women’s 
leadership. 
 The findings from both qualitative and quantitative data support the central role of 
parties in the political career advancement of women and the role of party religiosity in that 
process. Women’s chances in leadership are higher in parties with lower religiosity and plural 
membership. These conditions are forged with a ‘women-friendly’ political culture. However, 
despite attestations by many interviewees that democratic procedures (in leadership transitions 
and decentralized decision-making) influence women’s leadership, this is not borne out in the 
statistical analysis. One has to go beyond numbers to explain this. The democratic deficit, 
especially in leadership transitions in many parties, has its roots in the personalized pattern of 





patrons, in addition to war-lords and leaders of former militias. Many parties that emerged or 
consolidated in the post-war era fought in the 15-year civil war and had their own militias. The 
heads of these militias became the party leaders in the post-war period. Most of these party 
leaders tend to be autocrats, being former heads of militias where it is part of the trade to issue 
orders by dictat. Such authoritarian and dictatorial tendencies left their imprint on the attitudes of 
party elites towards the political role of women and on the status of democratic practices in many 
parties, but mostly in parties with theocratic platforms –albeit with few exceptions. Indeed, elites 
in extremist and conservative religious parties exhibit an ‘anti-women-as-leaders’ attitudes 
towards women and their political careers. These attitudes are more pronounced and entrenched 
when party leaders are also clerics entrusted with interpreting the doctrine and controlling the 
fate of women within these parties. As such, these ‘women un-friendly’ attitudes and regressive 
discourses, notably that ‘politics-is-men’s-business’, ‘women’s place is at home’, and Shari’a 
violations, perceptibly block women’s ascendance to leadership in religious parties in 
comparative perspective to secular and civil-confessional parties. Even when the formal 
procedures for leadership transitions are relatively open and formally democratic, political 
culture blocks women’s ascendance into leadership roles. Thus, there are formal procedures 
which are not in tandem with informal political culture in parties with theocratic agendas, which 
tend to bar women’s leadership in these parties.    
In addition, many parties maintain special women’s wings to mobilize women and serve 
as electioneering mechanisms. The majority of secular and civil-confessional parties recognizes 
that special women’s wings ‘ghettoize’ women and are not effective in creating a critical mass of 





or plan to do that. In contrast, religious parties rely heavily on women’s wings in mobilizing 
women at the rank-and-file level and to serve as electoral mechanisms, but fail to advance them 
to leadership positions. They reach out to women and are extremely successful in mobilizing 
them. They employ religious mobilization and particularly enticing financial and in-kind tools 
targeting especially poor and deprived women who tend to turn to religion as their salvation and 
promise of a better life. However, beyond promises of the afterlife, these parties do not advance 
women to leadership and control their contributions by limiting it to social instead of political 
tasks. Counterintuitively, this research shows that female officials in extremist and conservative 
religious parties are passive. They do not complain and do not demand to be promoted to 
leadership, reflecting the extent of control that such parties exert over women members. 
Nonetheless, this varies depending on party religiosity. Thus, in parties with tolerant religiosities, 
women resent their secondary status and are more vocal in demanding their rightful place in the 
party, unlike women in parties with extremist or conservative platforms. Indeed, they are not and 
are not suffering from false consciousness. The findings in this research show that women’s 
wings not only marginalize them but also reduce their activism in lobbying for leadership 
positions and their potential role as agents of change. Indeed, women’s wings should only be 
used as temporary mechanisms and must be led at the highest levels in order to ensure that 
women share in decision-making and gain political maturity equipping them for leadership 
positions.  
Therefore, what this dissertation clearly brings out is that many of the religious parties 
have vast female membership which does not translate into meaningful representation in 





that female membership matters for party leadership. While aware of Putnam’s law of increasing 
disproportions in all political institutions, this dissertation sought answers to this mismatch. In 
conservative religious parties (where deficits also exist in pluralism and democracy), women are 
almost invisible in leadership positions. In extremist religious parties with the highest observed 
levels of religiosity, women’s leadership is non-existent, despite the practice of periodic and 
regular leadership transitions in some of them. This is more pronounced in the Sunni-dominated 
extremist religious parties than in Shiite-dominated conservative and tolerant religious parties. 
The more openness to ‘Ijtihad’ of the Shiites than amongst the Sunnis with relatively more 
enlightened interpretation of the doctrine and jurisprudence (Al-Fiqh) works more in favor of 
women’s leadership. This is also seen from variations in intensity of religiosity that affects the 
share of women in leadership bodies, albeit smaller shares than in secular and civil-confessional 
parties. One may look at the tolerant religious party, Amal, to see glimpses of hope for women’s 
leadership among parties of similar religiosity. This attests to the multivocality of religions and 
how variations in religiosity positively influence women’s leadership.     
Consequently, notwithstanding some of these findings, one can still see light at the end of 
the tunnel for women’s leadership, even among religious parties. First, transformation in their 
platforms and religious goals is inevitable, based on precedent observations. For instance, 
Hizbullah’s ultimate goal for an Islamic state was tuned down in 1982 and also in 2009 on 
grounds of unseemliness in the light of the political scene. This continuous adaptation and 
modification of religious goals and components may reduce the intensity of religiosity – since 
the religious components on party platforms will change -- and as such will positively influence 





religion – by these party elites’ own admission-- is part of the problem, but, I argue, that it could 
also be part of the solution. It is really a function of who is entrusted to interpret the doctrine and 
how women-friendly and enlightened they are. Third, some religious parties look at women as a 
symbol of the modern, recognizing their value added to party image and performance, which 
implies that they may still promote them to leadership positions for these same reasons. Fourth, 
some religious parties are willing to overlook their conservative religious stance (e.g. invoking 
Al-Qiwama) against women’ leadership, when it is in their interest to do so. In this case a 
motivation premised on ‘the ends justify the means’ augurs well for women’s leadership, 
emulating successful experiences in other countries. So, why not in Lebanon?  
 The qualitative findings that are reported in chapters Three through Five enrich our 
understanding of the dynamics driving women’s political leadership. However, the quantitative 
analysis shows that party religiosity is also statistically significant as explanatory variable for 
women’s leadership. This allows for generalization and gives predictive power to the theory 
posited in this dissertation. (See summary table of findings).  




Religiosity & Secularism H1 Yes Yes 
Democratic practices (leadership transitions & 
decision-making) 
H2 Yes No 
Pluralism in composition of membership by sect H3 Yes Yes 
Female membership H4 No No 
Party-age [pre-war, war (1975-1990) & post-war]: 
proxy variable for political culture 
H5 Yes  Yes 
 
The dissertation concludes with an epilogue studying the possibility that municipalities 
present a window of opportunity and a breakthrough for women if they choose a career in 





in parliamentary elections. This case highlights that social cohesion at the smaller community 
level works well for women’s nominations in comparative perspective with social cleavages 
nationwide at parliamentary level. Municipal nominations reflect the modest role that parties 
play in the selection process as opposed to a more decisive and controlling role in parliamentary 
nominations. Parties work in close consultation with family networks, community and religious 
leaders in drawing nomination lists including women candidates, especially in smaller electoral 
districts. The findings from the field research show that when women bring into politics their 
personal attributes in terms of family and community networks, parties find it in their interest to 
nominate them on their municipal lists. Subsequently, women’s shares in party nominations are 
enhanced under conditions of party competition and as being a less risky scenario for parties than 
parliamentary elections. This is especially the case in pre-war secular and post-war civil-
confessional parties with lower religiosity. The Epilogue demonstrates that women are able and 
willing to break through into politics starting with the entry point in municipal elections and 
moving next to the national level. As several party leaders suggest, municipalities are a stepping 
stone into parliamentary representation. This augurs well for the future of women’s leadership. 
However, even if all these conditions are met, women’s involvement in politics remains a matter 
of personal choice as an optimistic female interviewee suggests that,  
I have confidence that women will make it to politics and in their political abilities and 
the special contributions they can make to political parties and politics per se. But, this is 
largely a matter of choice and particularly when they break this circle of fear from 
politics and summon their courage to compete for leadership, provided they are given the 
opportunity. 
   
 In general, parties require that women be 100% perfect and eligible for leadership 





these are only indicators for measuring women’s political leadership and representation. The 
desired outcome, however, should be effective leadership.  At present, it is observed that 
women’s legislative representation follows the pattern of the ‘women-garbed-in-black’, which is 
not sui generis to Lebanon, and which takes precedence over other qualifications and 
considerations in nominating women for public office. Moreover, parties must be enticed by 
incentives such as gaining electoral strength for nominating more women on their electoral lists. 
These incentives undercut voter and gender-bias.  
 The ambition behind this research is to make a contribution to feminist political science. I 
have attempted to do so through the original dataset collected on women in political parties and 
the comprehensive information on their inner workings. Party variation in religiosity explains 
variations in women’s leadership in the inner decision-making bodies of their political parties. 
However, I do not claim that joining political parties is a magical wand or formula for women’s 
empowerment and leadership. My theory is a necessary but not sufficient step for enhancing 
women’s leadership. This is also dependent upon women’s interests and preferences, but above 
all, freedom of choice in picking their own career path. This is why the dissertation calls for more 
in-depth research on women in politics with particular attention to building accurate, replicable 
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Institutionalization   
(Collect published materials: Charters, mission statements, by-laws) 
 
1. What is the year of establishment of the political party? 
2. How many branches nation-wide? 
3. How many seats did the party win in the parliaments of 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2005?  
4. What is the source of funding for the operations and activities of the party? 
 
Composition of membership by sex and religious affiliation  
 
5. What is the total number of members disaggregated by sex, if available? 
6. What is the religious sect-affiliation of members? 
7. What is the age bracket of members? 
8. What is the income bracket of members? 
9. What is the educational level of members? 
10. What is the family or feudal affiliation of members? 
11. How does one join the political party to become a member? Any application forms? 
Interview process? 
 
Women’s leadership in Political parties 
 
12. What is the total number of members in the executive committee?  
13.  Are there women in the executive committees? How many? What is the percentage 
of leadership seats occupied by women?   
14. How many women in parliament from the party? 
15.  Are there any women in decision-making and executive positions in the party?   
If so, where and in which committees?  
16. Are there specific references in the Charter of the Party to commitment to gender 
equality in recruitment, selection, nomination and election of women? 
17. Did you nominate any women members to run for elections at any time in the 
past four elections?  
18. Is there any internal gender quota for women to be members of decision-making and 
executive bodies in the party?  
                                               
1. During 2006-2009, this questionnaire was used to gather information on women in political 
parties from party leaders, senior advisers to leaders, administrators, female officials and activists, female 
MPs and cabinet ministers, political scientists and national experts. Officials of the following 18 ‘relevant’ 
parties were the main source of information: Islamic Action, Islamic Group, Unitarian, Hizbullah Party of 
God, Amal Hope Movement, Ba’ath Party of Lebanon, Communist Party of Lebanon, Syrian National 
Social Party, Kata’éb Phalange, Liberal Nationalist Party, National Bloc, Progressive Socialist Party, 
Tayyar National Patriotic Free Movement, Mustaqbal Future Movement, Tajaddod Renovation Party, 
Lebanese Forces, Marada Party, and Wa’ad. 
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19. Do you explicitly include and target women on your list for parliamentary or 
municipal elections?  
20. Did any of the women nominated make it in the elections?  
21. Is there anywhere in your by-laws any restrictions or encouragement for women to 
join as members in the party? 
22. Is there a chapter for women (women’s wing)? What are its TORs / activities/role? 
 
Quotas for women, leadership transitions, decision-making process 
 
23. Is there any internal gender quota for executive & legislative committees?  
 Is there any explicit quota for women to assume leadership in executive committees of 
the Party? If yes, what is the quota? And how does it work? 
24. Is there a quota for women on the electoral list for parliament? Explain  
25. Number and % share of party seats in last three parliaments?  
26. Share of women nominated by the Party?  
27. Share of women MPs by party (%)  
28. What is the process by which political party leaders are selected? By general 
elections, elections via executive committee, by succession or appointment, or by 
acclamation? What is the term of the leader?  
29. How are decisions taken?  Who is the decision-maker: the party leader, party elites, or 
by consultation and sharing?  
30. Did the party join the elections with an electoral list?  
31. Did the list include women? How many or % of women in electoral lists? How many 
won in the elections? Which years? 
 
Religion & Party Religiosity 
 
28. What role does religion play in the activities of the party?  
29. Are any of the goals of the party religious goals? i.e. does the party use politics to 
achieve religious aims? Does the Part have religious functions? 
30. Is the religious sect included on the membership application form?   
31. Is membership restricted to any religious sect?  
32. Do you pray daily?   
33. How many times per week do you go to church or Mosque?  
34. Do you practice all religious rituals?  
35. Why did you join the party? (i) Religious affiliation? (ii) ideology (iii) pressure to          
get a job (iv) elections (v) women’s rights (vi) other  
36. What were the challenges you faced? Did men support you?  
37. What are your views regarding internal gender quotas?  
38. Women’s wings: are they effective in mobilizing women and taking decisions? 
 
Attitudes vis-à-vis women’s leadership: Views of Female MPs & Candidates2 
                                               
2  Questions to women who ran and were elected to Parliament and those who did not make it (Based on 






39. Nomination process: main challenges in getting nominated by the party 
40. How did you become a candidate?  
41. How did you contest elections? 
42. How did you run the electoral campaign?  How did you mobilize support?  
43. Fundraising: What methods did you use to raise funds to run for elections, or to run 
and manage your campaign? Did the fact that you are a woman assist or hinder? If 
neither, did your financial situation or any other specific factor help? 
44. Campaign organization: Did you appoint women to help in running your election 
campaign? 
45. Media portrayal: Did women support you or vote for other men competing for the 
same seat? In your opinion, how did the media portray your candidacy as a woman? Was 
this different from men candidates? 
46. How do elected women progress and access leadership roles within their parties and 
in the parliament? 
47. How do women work together in politics? 
48. General observations: In your opinion, why didn’t other women run for elections? 
49. Religious affiliation 
50. Are you a member of the Political party?  
51. Do you serve in any executive committee in the Parliament?  
52. Did you run for office and did not win? Why didn’t you make it? What are the main 
reasons for failure? Will you try again? Explain.  
53. Is there a difference between men’s and women’s attitudes and perceptions regarding 
women in politics: in voting turnout; behaviour within parties; behaviour within the 
parliament? Explain.  
54. How do elected women progress and access leadership roles within their parties and 
parliament? 
Questionnaire for third round of interviews (summer 2009)   
Religion and culture, municipal elections, mobilization strategies & benefits 
    
1. Religion:  Is religiosity a barrier to women’s leadership in political parties, municipal and 
parliamentary elections? 
2. Family: Did family and domestic duties deter women’s active participation in political 
parties? 
3. What is the percentage of married women in total women’s membership in the party?  
4. Culture: Is culture (traditions and norms) a barrier to women’s leadership and their active 
political involvement? 
5. Municipal elections: Did the party nominate women in the last municipal elections? What 
is the percentage of women nominated and elected? 
6. Municipal elections: Why do women have more chances in winning in municipal 
elections compared to parliamentary elections? Are women less of a challenge to men in 
municipal than in parliamentary elections?  
7. Municipal elections: Why did women make it in the judicial and municipal bodies but not 
in the parliamentary and executive bodies, given the same cultural environment prevail? 
8. Mobilization strategies: Is there a difference in strategies used by the party before and 
after the civil-war?  
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9. Religious mobilization mechanisms: Do religious parties continue to employ pious 
women to conduct religious lectures in order to attract other women to the veil and to join 
religious parties?  
10. Religious mobilization tools: Is there financial remuneration for women to wear the head 
scarf or veil and to join the party? 
11. Women’s membership and leadership in religious parties: Why do women constitute half 
of the membership in Shiite religious parties, while their share in leadership positions is very 
low? Can this phenomenon be explained by the financial remuneration that women receive?  
12. Are political parties the main vehicle for women’s leadership? 
13. What are the characteristics of political parties that enhance women’s chances for 
political leadership? Do these factors include secularity and religiosity? 
14. Commitment to gender: Do party-related features like liberal and modern tendencies, 
tolerance, diversity, pluralism, and democratic practices enhance gender-awareness and women’s 
chances for leadership, while their absence decreases such chances? Do these factors lead to 
formal commitment to gender equality and non-discriminatory practices by political parties via 
adoption of affirmative action policies (e.g. internal and electoral quotas)?    
15. What type of parties provides women with more chances for leadership:  
religious/sectarian, secular/confessional-civil parties, or secular/pluralist-leftist? 
Information and data provided by party administrators 
Political Party    
Year of origin    
Type of party (describe) civil, 
religious, secular, national, leftist 
   
Leader (M/F)    
% of party seats in parliament  Year %  
% of party seats in parliament Year %  
% of party seats in parliament Year %  
Internal quota for women    
Electoral quota    
    
Total # of members in executive 
& legislative bodies  
   
Leader F/M of committee    
Total #  & % of women in 
executive and legislative bodies 
   
Female Nominees  %  












Positions of 150 Party Officials Interviewed during 2006-2009 
Party Leaders & Senior Advisers, Women in Leadership, Political Activists  
 
(6) Communist Party (leftist, pluralist) 
 
1. Vice-President of the Party (F) 
2. MP candidate and former member of Executive Council (F) 
3. Member of the Supreme Council (F) 
4. Member of municipality (F) 
5. Member of the Executive Committee (M) 
6. Head of women’s wing – now dismantled (F) 
 
(17) Syrian Social National Party (leftist, secular) 
 
1. Party Leader (M)  
2. Senior adviser to party leader (M) 
3. Senior member of the judiciary council (M) 
4. Chairperson of the supreme council of executives (M) 
5. Head of internal affairs (M) 
6. Chief of information and media (M) 
7. Senior adviser to leader and son of co-founder of party (M) 
8. Former chairperson of the supreme council (F) 
9. Daughter of assassinated founder of party and a political scientist (F) 
10. Head of women’s wing (F) 
11. Member of the supreme council (F) 
12. Member of the executive committee (F) 
13. Chair of environment committee (F) 
14. Former cabinet minister (F) 
15. Member of municipality (F) 
16. Member of Judiciary council (F) 
17. Municipal candidate (F) 
 
(8) Phalanges Kata’éb (Maronite-dominated) 
 
1. Executive Secretary of the party (M) 
2. Senior Vice-President (M) 
3. Senior adviser to President of the party (M) 
4. Member of Parliament (M) 
5. Member of 2000 and 2005 Parliament (F) 
6. Member of the politburo (F) 
7. Head of women’s wing (F) 
8. Member of the executive committee (F)  
 




1. Current Secretary-General (M) 
2. Former Secretary-General (F) 
3. Chairperson of the council (M) 
4. Member of the executive council (F) 
5. Member of the board (F) 
6. Member of the legal department (F) 
 
(5) Arab Ba’ath Party of Lebanon (leftist, plural) 
 
 1. Party leader (M) 
2. Senior adviser to leader (M) 
3. Member of the political bureau (M) 
4. Member of the executive Board (F) 
 
(9) Progressive Socialist Party (Druze-dominated) 
 
1. Vice-President, Member of Parliament (MP), & current minister (M) 
2. Senior adviser to the leader and chief of internal administrative & legislative affairs, 
(M) 
3. Member of the supreme council (F) 
4. Member of the executive council (F) 
5. Head of the women’s department (F) 
6. Head of the women’s federation --NGO (F) 
7. Delegate of the women’s affairs for political empowerment (F) 
8. Chair of municipal council (F) 
9. Chair of municipal council and head of federation of seven municipalities (F) 
 
(4) National Liberals Party (Maronite-dominated) 
 
1. Party Leader (M) 
2. Secretary-General (M) 
3. Head of media and information (F) 
4. Former head of women’s wing – now dismantled (F) 
 
(5) Islamic Group Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiah (Sunni, single-sect) 
 
1. Party Leader (M, clergy) 
2. Head of the women’s wing, wife of vice-President (F) 
3. Head of the social welfare and media sector (F) 
4. Religious counselor (F) 
5. MP candidate (F) 
 
(11) Hope Amal (Shiite, single-sect party) 
 
1. Party Leader (M) 
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2. Vice-President and Secretary-General (M) 
3. Head of women’s wing (F) 
4. Member of the political council (F) 
5. Member of the executive committee (F) 
6. Head of the central committee for women (F) 
7. Member of municipal council (F) 
8. Member of the executive committee (F) 
9. Head of the media sector (F) 
10. Former Chair of the women’s wing and current member of the political council (F) 
1. Member of municipal council (F) 
 
(13) Party of God – Hizbullah (Shiite, single-sect party) 
 
1. Senior political adviser to Secretary-General, member of the politburo, member 
of the supreme shoura council, Member of Parliament, & Minister (M) 
2. Official spokesperson for the Secretary-General of Party and head of research studies 
(M) 
3. Member of politburo (F) 
4. Head of the women’s wing (F) 
5. Vice-Chair of public relations (F) 
6. Member of municipal council (F)  
7. Head of media (F) 
8. Responsible for external relations, directorate for support of resistance and wife to an 
MP who is senior adviser to the leader (F) 
9. Municipal candidate (F) 
10. Municipal candidate (F) 
11. Municipal council member (F) 
12. Assistant-head of the media sector (F) 
13. Municipal council member (F) 
 
(3) National Secular Democratic Party Wa’ad  (Christian-dominated) 
 
1. Secretary-General (F) 
2. Member of the executive committee (F) 
3. Member of Parliament (M) 
 
(4) Unitarian Tawhid (Sunni, single-sect) 
 
1. Party Leader and secretary-General (M, clergy) 
2. Head of the women’s wing & wife of party leader (F) 
3. Responsible for the media (F) 
4. Religious counselor (F) 
 
(5) Renewal Tajaddod (Secular, plural) 
 
1. Secretary-General (M) 
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2. Senior adviser to President (M) 
3. Member of the executive board (F) 
4. Member of the legislative council (F) 
5. Member of the general assembly (F) 
 
(21) Free patriotic Movement Tayyar (Christian-dominated) 
 
1. Party Leader (M) 
2. Secretary-General for administrative affairs (M) 
3. Member of Parliament (M) 
4. Head of diplomatic and external relations (M) 
5. Official spokesperson for the party and member of the executive committee (F) 
6. Foreign press ‘attaché’ for the party leader (F)  
7. Head of women’s wing – to be dismantled (F) 
8. Head of social sector (F) 
9. Chef de cabinet of the leader (F) 
10. Head of outreach (Diaspora) and recruitment (F) 
11. Member of 2005 and 2009 Parliament (F) 
12. Head of finance sector (F) 
13. Liaison Officer with government institutions (F) 
14. Head of environment sector (F) 
15. Member of the consultative council and politburo (F) 
16. Head of the local and international media (F) 
17. Member of the executive committee (F) 
18. Chair of the research and studies department, former vice-chair of the executive 
committee and responsible for women’s mobilization in the party (F) 
19. Member of the party in charge of psychological wellbeing of members (F) 
20. Municipal candidate (F) 
21. Municipal candidate (F) 
 
(5) Lebanese Forces (Maronite-dominated) 
 
1. Party leader (M) 
2. Former party leader and MP in 2000, 2005 and 2009 (F) 
3. Chair of the women’s department (F) 
4. Member of the executive committee and head of the pharmacists sector (F) 
5. Coordinator of the medical and nurses sector (F) 
      
(3) Islamic Action Front Jabhat El-‘Amal (Sunni, single-sect) 
 
1. Party Leader (M, clergy) 
2. Head of the women’s wing and wife of party leader (F) 
3. Religious counselor (F) 
 




1. Senior Vice-President and Adviser to leader (M) 
2. Senior adviser to former assassinated leader (M)  
3. Head of professional associations sector (M) 
4. Head of youth sector (M) 
5. Coordinator of education sector and current Minister of Education (M) 
6. MP in 2000 & 2005 (F) 
7. MP in 1992, 1996, 2000 & 2005 and former Minister of Social Affairs (F) 
8. MP in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2005 & 2009 and former Minister of Education (F) 
9. Head of social sector and women’s department (F) 
10. Member of municipality (F) 
11. Sister of Vice-President of party and former Prime Minister (F) 
12. Member of municipality and head of the community development (F) 
13. Member of municipality in charge of social welfare projects (F) 
 
(4) Giants Marada (Maronite-dominated)  
 
1. Senior adviser to the leader (M) 
2. Spokesperson of the party and member of the political bureau (F) 
3. Head of the women’s wing in the North (F) 
4. Chair of the central women’s committees (F) 
 
(7) Scholars, national experts, and political activists    
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Annex 3   
Lebanon: Women in Political Parties 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
      
  
       
Communist 1924 0 1 1 1 1 2 5 16 11.2 0 6.7 1 0 
PPS 1932 0 1.6 1 1 1 2 5 20 13.1 0 7 1 0 
Phalanges 1936 0 6.2 0 0 1 1 4 10 4.2 12.5 0 
1 
0 
N-Bloc 1946 0 1 0 0 1 1 4 10 9.4 0 0 0 0 
Baath 1947 0 1 1 1 1 2 5 10 9.1 0 3 1 0 
Prog Soc 1949 0 4.7 0 0 1 1 4 25 7 0 2 1 0 
Liberals 1958 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 15 6.8 0 0 0 0 
Islm Grp 1964 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 30 0 0 0 0 0 
Hope 1975 1 6.2 0 0 0 0 3 30 10.9 0.5 1.1 0 0 
Unitarian 1982 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 30 5.3 0 0 0 0 
Hizbullah 1982 1 10.9 0 0 0 0 2 50 7.1 0 2 0 0 
Wa’ad 1991 1 1 0 0 1 1 4 20 17.8 0 0 1 0 
Renewal 2001 1 1 1 0 1 1 5 21 21.5 0 0 1 0 
Tayyar 2005 1 6.2 1 0 1 1 4 51 25 16.7 3.5 1 0 
Leb.Forces 2005 1 4.7 0 0 1 1 4 35 15 12.5 2 1 0 
Islm Actn 2006 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 30 0 0 0 0 0 
Future 2007 1 34 1 0 1 1 4 31 12.5 30 2.9 1 0 
Giants 2007 1 1 0 0 1 1 4 50 9.1 0 7.8 1 0 
      
  
       Column numbers & explanatory notes on coding of variables  
1. Party name  
2. Year of origin of political party (year established) 
3.  Party age: ‘0’ for pre-war (before 1975); ‘1’ for war-origin & post-war (after 1975) 
4.  % seats occupied by party in Parliament   
5. Pluralism in membership where ‘0’ is assigned for single-sect & ‘1’ for plural or multi-sect  
6. Democratic practices in leadership transitions: ‘0’ is assigned to parties that do not follow due 
democratic process and ‘1’ for those that hold periodic and competitive elections. 
7.  Democratic practices in decision-making: ‘0’ is assigned for centralized decision-making and ‘1’ 
for decentralized and democratic process 
8. Combined democracy score in transfer of leadership & decision-making: ‘0’ is assigned to parties 
that are democratically deficit in both indicators; ‘1’ for parties that employ democratic process either 
in leadership or decision-making; and ‘2’ for parties that are democratic in both indicators.  
9. Religiosity and secularism 5-point scale: parties are coded ‘1’ extremist religiosity; ‘2’ conservative 
but not extremist; ‘3’ tolerant religiosity; ‘ 4’ confessional but civil secularism; and ‘5’ a-religious & 
secular parties. 
10. Percentage share of female membership (in %)  
11. Percentage share of women in decision-making bodies (in %)  
12. Percentage share of female nominees on parties' electoral lists for parliament (in %) 
13. Percentage share of female nominees on parties' electoral lists for municipalities (in %)  
14. Internal voluntary party quotas where ‘0’ is assigned to parties not employing quotas; ‘1’ for those 
that have recommended; and ‘2’ for those employing quotas to increase women’s leadership 
15. Electoral quotas for women where ‘0’ is assigned to parties not employing quotas and ‘1’ for those 






Party Variation in Religiosity & Women’s Leadership  
 A Cross-National Perspective   
 
Introduction  
Political parties are gatekeepers. They recruit women as party members, select 
them for promotion to leadership positions, and nominate them as candidates for public 
office. As such, parties are the main vehicles for women‘s representation and political 
leadership. Nonetheless, average female parliamentary representation remains below 
parity worldwide.  In 2010, the global average for women as members in parliament 
stood at 19.1%, with wide variations across regions ranging between a low 10% for Arab 
states and a high of 42% in Nordic countries.
1
 This picture suggests that gender 
imbalances are still present, particularly in female representation. Indeed, parties vary in 
the extent to which they promote women to leadership positions in their executive and 
legislative decision-making structures, and nominate them for public office.   
In this Appendix, I advance a theory of party variation in religiosity to explain 
variation in women‘s leadership.  Party religiosity refers to the programmatic orientations 
in parties‘ agendas or the extent to which religious goals penetrate their political 
platforms. I argue that women‘s party leadership in decision-making bodies is 
endogenous to party-level characteristics, specifically the intensity of religiosity on party 
platforms. This in turn influences their inclusion in electoral lists and determines the 
outcome of female parliamentary representation, the most commonly invoked indicator 
for women‘s political participation. This paper introduces women‘s leadership cum their 
                                               
1  Rwanda is the only country that crossed the parity line with 56.3% female representation (see, the 





share in parties‘ legislative and executive inner bodies (politburos, supreme councils, 
executive committees, etc…) and as nominees on their electoral lists, as additional 
indicators. 
My argument departs from prior scholarship in several ways. First, I offer a 
theory of party-level variation in characteristics rather than country-level development, 
political regime, and electoral system or socio-cultural characteristics to explain variation 
in female leadership. Second, rather than conceptualizing a relationship between 
religions, such as Islam, Christianity or Judaism, and female representation and 
leadership, broadly defined, I develop an ordinal measure of religiosity based on the 
salience of religious components in party platforms. Third, I suggest a linear career path 
for women in politics, one that assumes upward mobility from party cadres to leadership 
in public office. Finally, I test this theory using an original cross-national dataset of 
women in 330 political parties of varying religiosities and secularisms across 26 Muslim, 
Christian and Jewish majority countries.   
This manuscript builds on a theoretical framework developed and tested on a 
single country case-study of Lebanon. Section A recapitulates the theory of party 
variation in religiosity and women‘s leadership setting out the testable hypotheses, the 
variables and their operationalization. Section B describes the dataset or the process of 
selecting countries for the three sub-samples as well as the methods of data collection and 
the coding process for testing the hypotheses. Section C and section D present the results 
of the estimated multivariate regression models for women‘s party leadership and 
nominations on electoral lists.  





My core hypothesis is that as religiosity on party platforms increases, the share of 
women in leadership bodies is likely to fall. Other party-level characteristics are expected 
to influence women‘s leadership and candidacy for public office. These include female 
party membership and affirmative action measures, particularly legislated and voluntary 
party quotas for women. This research takes political parties as the unit of analysis and 
looks for party variation in the share of women in (1) executive and legislative decision-
making bodies (e.g., politburos, supreme councils and boards, executive committees); 
and (2) electoral lists for parliament.
2
  
1.  Religiosity and Secularism
3
  
Previous scholarship suggests that some world religions (e.g. Islam, Catholicism, 
Hinduism or Judaism) have negative effects on women‘s representation and leadership. I 
extend this argument of religions in societies to political parties and argue that it is not 
religions per se but the intensity of religiosity in party platforms that affects outcomes for 
women‘s leadership. Religiosity is not a constant since there are different degrees and 
varying intensities within the Islamic world and elsewhere, where other religions are also 
dominant. I posit that a better predictor of female leadership -- rather than religions 
broadly conceived-- is the intensity of religiosity enshrined in party platforms (Sbaity 
Kassem 2011). This paper adopts a multivocal understanding of religions, which is 
extended from individuals to parties and implies a continuum of varying intensities of 
religiosities and secularisms. A religiosity scale honors and acknowledges the full realm 
                                               
2  I do not study outcomes, as in female representation, because their election to public office 
depends on the electoral system, voters‘ preferences and voters‘ turnout, which is not within the purview of 
political parties. 
 
3  Religiosity is used interchangeably with secularism to reflect that these are placed along a 
continuum of varying intensities of religiosities and secularisms. I look at this religiosity-secularism 
continuum in ascending order of secularism (from lowest ‗1‘ to highest ‗5‘), or highest religiosity ‗1‘ to 





of possible religiosities and may be more sensitive to capturing varying intensities in 
party platforms and their influence on women‘s chances for ascendance to leadership 
positions within party inner structures and on their electoral lists. Religiosity of parties, as 
observed in their political platforms, is the main explanatory variable for variations in 
women‘s leadership. I argue that as party religiosity falls, the share of women in 
leadership bodies and on electoral lists is likely to increase.  A party-level argument 
affects country-level explanations in that when the share of women in leadership bodies 
and as nominees improve, female representation in public office will be enhanced. This 
yields the following hypothesis:  
H1.  The share of women in decision-making and leadership bodies is likely 
to be higher in parties whose platforms reflect less religiosity (more 
secularism) than in those containing high religiosity (low secularism)  
 
2. Affirmative Action Measures: Quotas for women  
Quotas for women can be voluntarily introduced by parties to increase the share 
of women in parties‘ inner leadership structures (internal quotas) and/or on their electoral 
lists (electoral quotas). Or, they may be legislated quotas imposed on all parties with 
percentage shares or reserved seats for women to increase female parliamentary 
representation. The introduction of legislated or voluntary quotas for women has 
invariably resulted in increasing female representation at all levels, wherever employed 
uniformly and without internal resistance at the party level.
4
 However, quotas for women 
                                               
4   See, Norris and Lovenduski 1993, Norris 2000, Lovenduski 2005, Dahlerup 2006; Frechette, 






are only a temporary measure and must be introduced at all decision-making levels. This 
is specified at 30% in the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action.
5
   
Indeed, empirical evidence shows that quotas for women boost female leadership 
and representation, especially when combined with ‗women-friendly‘ electoral systems.6  
Many consolidated democracies, including the Nordic countries with highest female 
representation worldwide, have employed quotas for women as an interim measure to 
boost their share in parliament.
7
 The advocates of quotas stress that such measures do not 
only increase female representation but they also create a critical mass of women for 
leadership, which makes a difference in the long run for women‘s leadership in the 
political domain.  Voluntary party internal and electoral quotas for women are looked at 
as explanatory variables for women‘s leadership. These are within the purview of parties 
and may produce variation in women‘s shares in leadership or as nominees on party 
electoral lists. Legislated quotas which are imposed on all parties irrespective of their 
categorization do not cause party variation. However, this produces variation in the 
magnitude of women‘s shares on parties‘ electoral lists. Therefore, they are also 
considered. This yields the following hypotheses:  
H2.  Women’s shares in parties’ leadership bodies are more likely to increase 
in parties that employ internal quotas for women than in parties that do not.  
 
                                               
5
  See, Mona Lena Krook. 2005. ―Politicizing representation: Campaigns for candidate gender 
quotas worldwide‖, PhD dissertation, Department of Political Science, Columbia University. Fatima Sbaity 
Kassem, 1998. ―Building a common agenda in West Asia”, in Anita Anand and Gouri Salvi, Beijing! UN 
Fourth World Conference on Women (Women‘s Feature Service: New Delhi: India) ISBN 81-90 1005-0-5. 
 
6   Party list proportional representation (PR) electoral systems applied in large districts and 
combined with closed lists and rank-order rules for nominations (top-ranking, zipper quotas) constitute a 
proven formula for improving women‘s representation. See, Drude Dahlerup, 2006 and the International 
Institute for Democratic Electoral Assistance (IDEA) website  www.idea.int and www.quotaproject.org 
 
7   In these countries, the rank-ordering in which women are placed in electoral lists is also specified, 





H3.  Women’s shares on parties’ electoral lists are more likely to increase in 
parties that employ voluntary and/or legislated electoral quotas for women 
than in parties that do not. 
 
3. Female party membership 
 Female party membership is assumed to influence women‘s leadership. In 
studying factors that enhance female representation in Great Britain, Kittilson (1997) 
highlights the potency of women as actors and party activists and argues that women‘s 
party membership influences their share on electoral lists. However, parties may have 
huge female membership without corresponding levels of female leadership, as per 
Putnam‘s law (2000) of increasing disproportions. In this context, Basu remarks that 
―[i]ndeed in all South Asian countries, right-wing groups, often ethnic and religious in 
character, have enormous capacity to mobilize women‘s movements while undermining 
women‘s advancement‖ (2005: 35). This phenomenon has also been observed by other 
scholars studying Islamist and other religious parties.
8
 This is an important consideration, 
since most of these religious parties are essentially social movements with broad-based, 
grassroots constituencies, drawing in youth --women and men-- into their membership. 
Parties also recruit women for electioneering purposes and ghettoize them into special 
women‘s wings.9 Thus, different parties offer women different opportunities in leadership 
                                               
8   See, Hatem (1994), Brand (1998), Charrad (2001), Clark and Schwedler (2003) 
 
9
  See, Pippa Norris, ―Women’s Legislative Participation in Western Europe” in Sylvia Bashevkin, 
Women and Politics in Western Europe (Great Britain and USA: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1985); Joni 
Lovenduski and Pippa Norris, eds., Gender and Party Politics (London: Sage Publications, 1993); Anne 
Phillips, Politics of the Presence (Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press, 1995); Miki Caul Kittilson, 
1997, ―Women’s Representation in Parliament: The Role of Political Parties‖ Centre] for the Study of 
Democracy, Arizona State University, 1997); Laurie Brand, Women, the State and Political Liberalization 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).  Amrita Basu, Women, Political Parties and Social 
Movements in South Asia, in United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), paper 
No.5, (ISSN:92-9085-057-4), 2005; Teresa Sacchet, ―Political Parties: When do they work for Women?‖, 
UN-DESA/DAW Addis Ababa, 24 to 27 October 2005 (EGM/EPWD/2005/EP.10). See also, Brand 1994, 





(Basu 2005). In effect, female party membership may influence leadership but is not a 
match for it; nor is it affected by party religiosity as the findings of research has shown 
for women‘s leadership (Sbaity Kassem 2011).  
 Scholars also argue that as the share of women in party membership increases, 
their activism increases in political parties—which serve as the gatekeepers to political 
leadership-- they push for more women to assume leadership positions in the inner 
structures of political parties.
10
 Female activists are rewarded for their dedication, loyalty 
and contributions by being promoted to leadership positions in parties‘ inner structures. 
Once this critical mass is in decision-making positions, they lobby with party elites to 
include more women on their electoral lists, thus increasing women‘s chances of 
electability to public office.  Thus, a key variable in feminist analysis is female party 
membership and their level of activism at the grassroots. Therefore, consistent with this 
tripartite path, this paper posits that political parties constitute the first level entry point 
for female leadership into a political career. This level marks the first step in their upward 
mobility within party cadres and into public office. I dub this as the ‗linear career path‘ 
for women in politics. This research explores the congruence or a mismatch between 
female party membership and leadership, which yields the following two-pronged 
hypothesis: 
H4. (a) The share of women in decision-making and leadership bodies is 
likely to increase as their share in party membership expands; and (b) in 
turn, as women’s share in leadership bodies increases, their share in 
parties’ electoral lists for public office is likely to increase.  
 
                                               





B. The Dataset 
These four hypotheses are tested on a sample of 330 political parties of varying 
religiosities across 26 Arab and non-Arab Muslim, Christian and Jewish-dominated 
developing and developed countries in Asia, Europe and Africa. An original set of data 
and information on women in these parties is compiled which, to my knowledge, is not 
available anywhere else.
11
 I include ‗relevant‘ parties or those that have occupied at least 
one seat in any of the last three parliaments in their respective countries.
12
  In the 
following paragraphs, criteria for selecting countries to test this theory are laid out.  
Subsequently, the process of data collection and caveats is described.  
1. Selection of countries for the Arab, non-Arab Muslim-majority, Europe & Israel 
datasets    
The interest in the multivocality of religion(s), especially Islam, and how party 
religiosity influences female representation and leadership prompted the selection of 
countries which have Muslim, Christian or Jewish majority populations. It was not 
possible for time and cost constraints to cover all the countries in the world. The whole 
set of 49 Muslim-majority (over 50%) countries is considered and split between Arab and 
non-Arab countries into two sub-samples, which have a diversity of civil, national, 
secular and theocratic Islamic parties.
13
 Only countries that (1) allow political parties to 
                                               




 Sartori defines ‘relevant‘ parties as those occupying at least 3% of parliamentary seats (1976: 121-
3). In order to obtain more observations, this threshold is lowered for all parties included in this exercise.  
 
13  The 49 Muslim-majority countries (over 50% population) include 22 Arab countries ( Algeria, 
Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen plus the Palestinian 
Territories); and the 27 non-Arab Muslim-majority countries (Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, 





form, function and compete; and (2) hold regular elections are selected. This is largely 
determined by reference to comparative democracy scales prepared by credible sources 
like Polity IV and the Freedom House.   
Comparing the scores on freedom, political liberties and democracy scales for the 
last three consecutive years published by the Ted Gurr‘s Polity IV, the Freedom House 
Index (FHI), and the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2010 BTI produced 7 out of the 
27 non-Arab Muslim-majority countries. This is the whole set of non-Arab Muslim-
majority countries that meet the criteria set above. These include Afghanistan, Albania, 
Indonesia, Senegal, Turkey, Bangladesh and Bosnia-Herzegovina (see, Annex Tables A.1 
and A.2).  The same criteria are applied to the 22 Arab states, allowing parties to form 
and holding regular elections but lowering the threshold on democracy scores in order to 
cover more observations. This process yields the whole set of 13 Arab countries. 
14
 These 
include Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen, and Palestine.
15
  
                                                                                                                                            
Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan,  Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Tajikistan,  Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). Palestine is not an independent state. It is 
granted observer status in the United Nations, but is recognized as a full-fledged member of the League of 
Arab States.  The five European countries are the Stathis Kalyvas (1996) set for Christian democratic 
parties.  
 
14   Nine countries drop out: Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Libya, Sudan and 
Syria either do not allow parties to form and/or have ruling parties; or do not hold elections. Somalia is a 
failed state. Iraq drops out because of the state of anarchy that permeates the country since 2003, although 
parties form and elections are held. 
 
15  Comoros is the closest to being ranked as a ‗Free‘ country in the Arab region. For the past five 
years, it scored 3 on the FHI 7-point scale. Lebanon scored 3 until 1975 when the 15-year civil war broke, 
thereafter its ranking dropped significantly due to civil strife and presence of foreign armies on its soil 
affecting sovereignty. Since the beginning of the 21st century, when the Israeli occupation of the South 
ended and in 2005 when the Syrian troops left, its ranking has risen to 5. The United Nations accords 
Palestine an observer Status among its states members, however, the League of Arab States considers it one 
of its 22 member states. It is included in the Arab dataset, although it is not an independent state, because it 
allows parties to form and holds elections periodically with competing powerful religious and non-religious 





For comparative purposes, countries with Christian-majority populations and 
those that have Christian democratic and/or social parties are considered. In fact, all the 
countries in Europe and in Latin America, among others, have Christian-majority 
populations and many have Christian social and democratic parties. However, I take 
advantage of the well-defined and defended set by Stathis Kalyvas (1996) of five 
European countries with Christian democratic parties, and I add to that sub-sample Israel, 
as the only Jewish country. These include Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the 
Netherlands, which together with Israel constitute one sub-sample with Christian 
democratic and Jewish parties that are relevant and strong.
16
  
Including these cases enriches the analysis in two ways. First, it makes the case 
that religious parties do not necessarily equate with high religiosity parties. For instance, 
the European Christian parties are low on the religiosity scale and high in female 
representation at both the party and country levels, which offers leverage in comparative 
perspective. Second, it permits assessing if high religiosity -- where it is pervasive -- 
always translates into low female representation. Christian democratic parties in Europe 
have been traditionally religious parties, but transformed overtime. Religion remains an 
identity and is retained in the title, but their platforms have no religious components.  
These six countries offer a valuable comparison: the countries are developed democracies 
and use ‗women-friendly‘ electoral systems combined with voluntary party quotas. 
However, in the recent past these countries have employed legislated quotas for women 
on a temporary basis, and are more developed and advanced democracies, as well as more 
peaceful, compared to countries in the other two datasets. The ―Christian‖ parties in the 
                                               
16   Chile and Venezuela in Latin America also have prominent Christian parties. These and other 
existing countries have not been included in this cross-national comparison due to time and cost 





European countries have shed their religiosity overtime, at a time when party religiosity 
in some Arab and non-Arab Muslim-majority countries appears to be on the rise. This 
cross-national comparative review engages with the scholarship that Muslim-majority 
countries differ widely in the status of women and political empowerment than countries 
belonging to other religious affiliations.
17
  
I am aware that these countries are at different levels of development, have 
different political regimes, employ different electoral systems, and belong to different 
cultures and have different religious affiliations, which may raise some criticism in as far 
as comparability is concerned.  In order to account for this, I use country fixed effects in 
estimating the regression models for women‘s leadership and candidacy, which hold 
constant these variables within each country. Moreover, I am guided by scholars like 
Laurie Brand (1994) and Brian Barry (2000) who see that such comparisons across 
societies and cultures are permissible. Further, the United Nations and other international 
research outfits conduct global comparisons across different development, political and 
electoral systems. Prior explanations for female representation, while these are generally 
supported by existing patterns, cannot fully account for variations across countries of the 




                                               
17
  Anne Schuster cites, ―With the attacks of September 11 and the murder of the Dutch filmmaker 
Theo Van Gogh, the public fear of Islam has led to a rethinking of the relationship between state and 
church in the Netherlands.‖ (Kennedy and Valenta 2006, in Schuster 2007: 4). See also, Alfred Stepan and 
Graeme B. Robertson. 2004. ―Arab, Not Muslim, Exceptionalism‖, Journal of Democracy (Volume 15, 
Number 4, October 2004) pp. 140-146. See also, Norris and Inglehart 2004, Clark and Schwedler 2003, 
Steven Fish, 2002, among others.  
 
18  These variables are operationalized as follows: political regimes are dichotomized by assigning ‗1‘ 
for those countries that scored between +6 and +10 on the Polity IV scale for democracies, and ‗0‘ for all 
others. Electoral systems are dichotomized by assigning ‗1‘ for List PR systems and ‗0‘ for all others; and 





2. Data Collection: Process and Problems 
During 2007-2010, national consultants in each of the 26 countries selected for 
inclusion in the dataset were engaged to collect data and information on women in 
‗relevant‘ political parties. These local researchers were provided with a letter of 
introduction explaining the research project and its objectives.19  Data and information 
from official and primary sources are compiled by conducting structured interviews with 
party officials and party administrators based on a questionnaire (see, Annex). This 
include party-age, programmatic orientations and goals, voluntary internal and electoral 
quotas for women, seats and share by party in the last three parliaments, and shares of 
women in party membership, leadership bodies, and as nominees on parties‘ electoral 
lists for parliament.  
Published data on women in political parties, worldwide, are scarce and often 
times, if available, obsolete, as for instance in some European and few Arab countries. 
The process of data collection is hampered by the paucity of sex-disaggregated data in 
parties‘ inner structures, especially on female membership in some non-Arab Muslim 
countries. Data on female membership are missing for five out of the seven countries in 
the non-Arab Muslim-majority dataset, namely Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Indonesia, Senegal, and Turkey; and for some parties in Israel. Data on composition of 
                                                                                                                                            
on women‘s leadership and nominations, these are incorporated in the regression equations given above. 
The results on the secularism variable are unaltered neither in direction nor in statistical significance, which 
strongly support the theory of party variation in religiosity. See, Annex A.4 for scatter plots (Graphs A.14 
to A.16) showing the relationship between women‘s leadership, political regimes, electoral systems and 
types of electoral lists. 
 
19 A wide network of connections, having served in the United Nations for 35 years, facilitated the 
identification of national consultants. These were all researchers, university professors, political scientists, 
feminists, and scholars. A letter of introduction addressed to all parties facilitated the collection process. 
The author personally compiled data on Lebanon, as a single case-study to test the theory of party variation 





membership are not available because there are no membership rolls or is classified 
information in some religious extremist parties. Women comprise 10% of parties‘ 
membership in Egypt, 2% in Yemen, and 8% in Lebanon, compared to an average of 
10% worldwide (Shtay, 2004: 144). Data on female membership in major parties in 18 
western democracies and Japan date back to 1992 (see, Annex Table A.3).  
To my knowledge, data on women in politburos, executive committees, supreme 
decision-making councils, and other legislative and executive leadership bodies within 
the inner structures of political parties  is not available anywhere.  Moreover, unless 
electoral quotas are in place, whether party-wise or legislated, there are no data available 
on female nominees by party. This was compiled for all 330 parties, wherever it was 
possible to do so although it may not have been readily available.    
3. Operationalization and Coding Variables 
The proportion of women in leadership and decision-making bodies of parties and 
in electoral lists, the two independent variables, are compiled and used to measure female 
leadership and candidacy for public office.  
The core explanatory variable, religiosity, is operationalized by first labeling the 
330 political parties into broad generic categories according to their political agendas, 
then coding them according to the intensity of religiosity on their platforms. This coding 
is based on self-identification by party officials and administrators and extensive 
consultation with local researchers and the author who also consulted with scholars and 
national experts on political parties in countries in the three sub-samples. This transparent 







 This process is based on (1) self-identification and self-location by party 
administrators, and (2) reviewing their programmatic orientations and goals by local 
researchers and proposing the labeling of parties into generic broad groups. 
Subsequently, parties are coded from lowest secularism ‗1‘ (highest religiosity) to highest 




Female membership is operationalized by collecting data on the percentage shares 
of women in membership of parties that are ‗relevant‘.  The tripartite relationship 
between female party membership, leadership and nominations to public office – 
women‘s linear career path -- is examined in comparative perspective and tested at the 
country and sub-regional levels. Lastly, legislated and voluntary internal and electoral 
party quotas for women are dichotomized by assigning ‗1‘ for parties that apply these 
quotas and ‗0‘ for those that do not.   
C. Regression Models for Women’s Leadership in Political Parties 
  Bivariate regressions establish a positive relationship between women‘s 
leadership and party religiosity for all 26 countries in the sample, as well as for each of 
the regional sub-samples separately. However, because some countries may have as few 
as four relevant parties while others go up to 25 parties in parliament, a ‗country-by-
country‘ bivariate regression is undertaken to ensure that no single country is driving the 
results. This produced eight out of the 26 countries for which the null hypothesis could 
not be rejected that religiosity does not affect women‘s leadership. A relationship 
between women‘s leadership and party religiosity could not be established in the 
                                               
20  The process of labeling and coding parties in the case study of Lebanon informed the cross-





following countries: Kuwait (n=6) and Mauritania (n=6); Albania (n=5), Bosnia-
Herzegovina (n=12), and Senegal (n=9); and in Germany (n=6), Belgium (n=8), and 
Israel (n=16): where ‗n‘ is the number of relevant parties.  
Female leadership & secularism  
 
 Graph A.1 Cross-national (26 countries)  Graph A.2   Arab countries (13 ) 
Leadership= -.30 + 4.11 (secularism) ***   Leadership= .59 + 3.13 (secularism) *** 
(t= 6.52; r
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 These bivariate relationships are presented graphically in charts A.1 to A.4. 
Linear bivariate regressions produce ‗r‘ correlation coefficients between .36 and .37 and 
‗b‘ bivariate regression coefficients which are statistically significant, with t-statistics 
between 3.14 and 6.52. This implies that we can safely reject the null hypothesis that 
there is no relationship between secularism and women‘s leadership with 99% certainty. 
Estimating these bivariate relationships using a nonlinear regression equation produces 
closely similar results. 
21
 
In 18 out of the 26 countries in the three datasets, one can observe a significant 
relationship between religiosity and female party leadership. Moreover, in the eight 
countries for which a relationship could not be established, the estimated coefficients are 
always positive, as hypothesized, albeit not significant. This implies that the relationship 
                                               
21   Chart A.1 (r2 = 0.1271 vs. 0.1184); chart A.2 (r2 =0.1372 vs. 0.1224); chart A.3 (r2 =0.1358 vs. 
0.1393); and chart A.4 (r2 =0.1338 vs. 0.1291). However, the equation that explains a larger proportion of 





between women‘s leadership and party religiosity, which is observed in the majority of 
countries, is never disconfirmed in any individual country.  
    Graph A.3 Non-Arab Muslim countries (7)   Graph A.4   Europe & Israel (6) 
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The bivariate regression for female leadership on internal quotas for women is not 
robust as hypothesized. The t-statistic is 3.62 with ‗r‘ coefficient of .2073 (r2 =0.043) 
denoting wide dispersion around the regression line, and ability to explain very little 
(4.3%) of variance in women‘s leadership. Nonetheless, the positive coefficient is 
reassuring since it shows that when political parties start applying internal quotas 
(dichotomized variable) women‘s leadership is predicted to increase. In fact, the 
difference in means is significant (14.6 against 22.6). Therefore, the null hypothesis can 
be safely rejected that there is no relationship between women‘s leadership and internal 
quotas.   
Graphs A.5 show that the relationship between female membership and party 
leadership is significant and that the null hypothesis can be rejected with 99% certainty 
                                               
22   The Trots of Netherlands (TON) party is a one-woman party, or 100% female membership and 
leadership. TON was founded by the former female minister, Rita Verdonk, after she resigned from the 





level.  The t-score is strong at 10.69 and there is little dispersion around the regression 
line.  
Graph A.5   Female leadership & membership (26 countries) 
 
Leadership= 2.25 + .63 (secularism) ***     Leadership= -9.60 + 9.20 (log secularism) *** 
  (t=10.69; r
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Running the bivariate relationship by estimating a nonlinear regression and comparing it 
with a linear regression produces the two graphs shown above with different r
2 
and fits.  
There is one outlier party, TON of the Netherlands. The reported results are very similar 
when we account for the presence of this outlier party by incorporating a dummy variable 
in the regression on which Graphs A.1 and A.4 are based.  
These results encourage further statistical analysis and the estimation of a 
multivariate regression model incorporating female party leadership, secularism 
(religiosity), voluntary internal party quotas for women, and female membership:  
Female leadership = a + b (secularism) + b1 (internal quotas) + b2 (female 
membership) 
 
I estimate four OLS regression models, each of which includes country fixed effects. 
Model 1A covers all 26 countries and model 1B covers 19 countries, excluding the seven 
non-Arab Muslim-majority countries. Model 2 covers the 13 Arab countries and Model 3 





Kalyvas set of five European countries to which Israel is added.  The dataset for the 
seven non-Arab Muslim-majority countries is affected by missing values on female 
membership in 83 out of the 98 relevant parties. It is likely that the 83 parties for which 
female membership is missing may differ in systematic ways from the 15 parties for 
which full data are available. Hence, given the concern that missing values are not ―at 
random‖, the small sample cannot be taken as fully representative of party behaviour in 
the non-Arab Muslim-majority countries.  Therefore, Model 1B is estimated without non-
Arab Muslim countries because of missing data on female membership for that sub-
sample.  
The regression results in Model 1B show that the estimated coefficients on 
secularism, internal quotas and female membership are in the same direction and 
significance as in Model 1A.  For similar reasons, Model 3 for the non-Arab Muslim-
majority cases is estimated by dropping the female membership variable. Although this 
raises the risk that the coefficients on the remaining variables are affected by bias from 
missing variables, it means that the model is estimated on the full set of parties from this 
country grouping. The estimated coefficients for the model with female membership are 
different in magnitude, direction and level of significance from Model 3, with 
membership dropped.   
All models are run with country fixed effects in order to check how the slope 
coefficients on the other explanatory variables would behave. This is especially important 
since the 26 countries do not only have different levels of development, political regimes 
and electoral systems, but also different religious affiliations and cultures with varying 





sub-sample have a higher level of development and, clearly, a different political culture 
than the Arab or non-Arab Muslim-majority sub-samples. The results are produced in 
table A.1.  
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Indonesia    12.6729*** 
(.74215) 
 
Senegal    18.7386*** 
(1.1804) 
 
Turkey    4.4862*** 
(.3599) 
 
Bangladesh    5.7295*** 
(1.0009) 
 
Bosnia-Herzegovina    8.5259*** 
(1.1003) 
 

































  12.1147*** 
(1.0602) 




  -1.7452* 
(1.0909) 










N 185 170 116 98 54 
Degrees freedom 163 150 102 89 45 
R
2 0.6747 0.7129 0.4556 0.3494 0.8985 
Adjusted  R
2 0.6328 0.6766 0.3862 0.2910 0.8805 
F-Test  16.10 19.61 6.57 5.98 49.80 
 
Source: Official data compiled by national consultants from party administrators and processed by author.  
Clustered standard errors are reported. ***=P.01; **=P.05; *=P.10 
 
1. Secularism and Religiosity  
 The results in all models show that there is a positive relationship between 
religiosity and women‘s leadership. This relationship is robust and statistically significant 
in the large majority of countries covered in this exercise, particularly in the Arab and 
non-Arab Muslim-majority sub-samples. In Model 4 covering the five European 
countries and Israel, the relationship is positive and in the right direction but the 
coefficient is not statistically significant. Nonetheless, these results imply that we can 
safely reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between women‘s leadership 
and party religiosity. The results of the multivariate analysis in model 4 do not change 
even if we account for the one outlier party, TON in the Netherlands that has an all-
female membership and leadership collapsed in one person.  
 Models 1A and 1B show that the regression coefficient of secularism on female 





religiosity scale, women‘s leadership is estimated to increase by between 3.1 and 3.7 
percentage points, respectively, as hypothesized (H1). Similar strong regression 
coefficients with statistical significance in all other models are shown, except for the 
European model. The highest coefficient (4.4) is depicted in Model 2 for the Arab 
countries and the lowest (2.2) in Model 3 for the non-Arab Muslim-majority countries. 
This is really a reflection of the differences in the extent to which religious goals 
penetrate parties‘ agendas in each of these subsamples. This also explains why the 
coefficient in the European sub-sample is weakest compared to the other two sub-
samples. Thus, a different picture emerges in Model 4 covering the five European 
countries and Israel.  Although the coefficient on secularism is positive, as anticipated, it 
is not statistically significant.
23
 In substantive terms, while there is not much variation 
within the sample, this behaviour may also be attributed to the less salience of religion in 
politics, at least in the five European countries. This observation is supported by the Fox 




2. Voluntary internal party quotas for women:  
The multivariate regression models produced positive and large in magnitude 
regression coefficients on internal quotas in all models, which attest to the impact of 
                                               
23
 The results of the bivariate regressions of women‘s leadership on party secularism and religiosity 
in Belgium, Germany and Israel show that the null hypothesis could not be safely rejected. However, strong 
and statistically significant coefficients are seen in Austria (r =.8941) with a strong t-score of 3.46; and 
Italy (r = .4473) with a t-score of 2.12, both have statistically significant regression coefficients. In the 
Netherlands (r = .4531) with a weak t-score of 1.52, but it is statistically significant.  
 
24  The overall separation of religion and state in 2001 averaged for Western democracies (18.99) 
and for the Middle East and North Africa including Iran and Israel (49.44). The t-score is statistically 
significant at less than .001. See, Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler. 2005. ―Separation of Religion and 
State in the Twenty-First Century: Comparing the Middle East and Western Democracies‖ Comparative 
Politics (April 2005), p. 326; and Jonathan Fox. 2006. ―World Separation of Religion and State Into the 21st 





affirmative action measures on women‘s leadership.25 These coefficients are statistically 
significant in Models 1A and 1B as well as for the non-Arab Muslim-majority sub-
sample, with fixed effects by country. In Model 1A, the coefficient is 5.19 and is 
statistically significant. This implies that as parties start employing voluntary internal 
quotas, women‘s leadership will increase by over 5 percentage points.   
Model 3 does not control for female membership since this variable is dropped 
due to missing data. The estimated coefficient is 16.58 and is statistically significant. This 
implies that as parties start employing voluntary party internal quotas, the marginal 
increase on women‘s leadership is estimated to increase by close to 17 percentage points. 
It should be note that despite the theoretical association between women‘s leadership and 
voluntary party internal quotas, the coefficient of internal quotas on women‘s leadership 
in the Arab and European models are not found to be statistically significant, although 
these are in the hypothesized direction. This may be attributed, particularly in the Arab 
sub-sample, to the seriousness with which parties commit to gender equality, but also to a 
lagged effect of enforcing quotas. Also, this may be due to absence of sufficient variation 
especially in the European and Israel sub-sample. Data compiled show that 50 out of 330 
parties, around 15 % of the sample, have such voluntary internal party quotas in place. 
Some parties have recommended but not yet implemented internal quotas. In fact, 33 
parties in the European plus Israel and the non-Arab Muslim-majority sub-samples 
employ internal quotas, while 17 parties belong to the Arab sub-sample (of which ten 
parties in Lebanon have made recommendations but have not yet put them in force). 
                                               
25  Since global databases on quotas (viz., International IDEA) exclude internal party measures, this 
information was also collected from party administrators.  I am not aware that this may be available or 





These results support the hypothesis (H2) that, once voluntary party internal quotas are 
introduced, the share of women in leadership bodies will increase.    
3.  Female party membership  
In the models that incorporate female membership, the regression coefficients are 
positive and statistically significant, although they are small in magnitude. These results 
support the hypothesis that female party membership enhances female leadership (H4). In 
Model 3, female membership is excluded because of missing data in four out of seven 
countries in the dataset, as explained earlier.
26
 The findings of studies covering parties 
with religious platforms in the Muslim-majority sub-samples show that these parties have 
sizeable levels of female membership confined in special women‘s wings, but very few in 
leadership positions (Basu 2005, Sbaity Kassem 2011). Nonetheless, the predicted 
marginal increase in female leadership is by less than one percentage point for one unit of 
increase in female membership. Although this increase is relatively small, it supports the 
overall thrust of the hypothesis. The regression coefficient is highest in the European and 
Israel dataset, albeit still less than one percentage point. These results have also 
substantive significance and support the assumption that female membership enhances 
women‘s chances in leadership in political parties by creating a critical mass of women.27 
Therefore, as hypothesized, female membership can partially explain variation in 
women‘s leadership across different parties. These results provide initial support for a 
                                               
26   We are not sure that the lack of data is random or whether the estimation of the relationship, with 
just 15 parties in the non-Arab Muslim dataset, may not be valuable as a guide to the whole group since 
these parties may not be representative. The probability that the missing data on female membership may 
have produced unsatisfactory statistical results cannot be ruled out. The number of observations jumped 
from 15 to 98 by excluding female membership and the estimated coefficients for secularism and internal 
quotas turned positive and statistically significant. 
 
27   In this connection, the findings of a case-study testing this theory in Lebanon show that higher 
female membership, particularly in parties with high religiosity, is not translated into higher shares in 





linear career path of women in politics, which is expected to be fully supported by results 
from multivariate regressions estimating a model for female parliamentary nominations 
in the following section.  
Finally, Model 1A explains 63% of variation in female leadership, while Model 
1B with fewer observations can explain a slightly larger amount of variation (by five 
percentage points). However, Model 1A covers more countries -- 26 compared to 19 
countries --, produces statistically significant coefficients, as well as ability to explain a 
large amount of the variance in women‘s leadership. This implies that the missing data on 
female membership, which is taken care of in Model 1B, does not change the overall 
results. Thus, Model 1A is superior to Model 1B. 
The above statistical findings provide strong support to the theory of party 
variation in religiosity and women‘s leadership and related hypotheses. These results 
point to the influence of party religiosity, voluntary internal quotas, and female 
membership on women‘s leadership in parties‘ decision-making bodies. More 
specifically, the results of the multivariate regression models establish that as secularism 
in parties‘ political platforms increases, female membership expands and as parties start 
employing internal quotas, the proportion of women in parties‘ leadership bodies 
increases accordingly. These results are generalizeable, given that the sub-samples 
represent the whole sets of Arab and non-Arab Muslim-majority countries, which meet 
both criteria of allowing parties to form and holding periodical elections. This is also 
applicable to the sub-sample of the five European countries with Christian democratic 
parties and Israel, as the only country with Jewish parties. The estimated model for 





for the non-Arab Muslim sub-sample can explain 35%, leaving a lot of the variance 
unexplained. The model for Europe and Israel, however, explains almost 90% of the 
variations in female leadership, notwithstanding the limited variation within this sub-
sample and the results of fixed effects estimation.  
D. Regression Models for Female Nominations to Parliament 
   
The share of female nominees on parties‘ electoral lists for public office is 
invariably influenced by legislated and voluntary party electoral quotas for women. It is 
also influenced by women‘s shares in party membership (as activists) and in leadership 
bodies (critical mass). I expect party variation in religiosity and secularism to partially 
explain variations in female nominations to public office.  
Graph A.6       Graph A.7  
Female nominations & secularism  Female nominations & membership 
Nominations= 2.88+ 2.86 (secularism)*** Nominations= -.52 + .55 (membership)*** 
(t= 3.31; r
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Graphs A.6 to A.10 (next page) show the bivariate relationship between female 
nominations and each of these variables for the 26 countries. In all these graphs there are 
three outliers reporting 100% female nominations, notably, two parties in Senegal (viz., 
Alliance for Progress and Justice and the National Patriotic Union), and the Trots of 





 The reported results are very similar when we account for the presence of these 
outlier parties by incorporating dummy variables in the bivariate regressions on which 
Graphs A.6 to A.8 and A.11 to A.13 are based. The linear are compared with nonlinear 
regressions and are found to explain more of the variance in female nominations. These 
graphs show high t-scores and positive coefficients, which are statistically significant. 
This implies that there is a relationship between female nominations and each of the 
independent variables, as hypothesized (H1 to H4). The results are given here below. 
Graph A.8      Graph A.9 
Female nominations & legislated quotas Female nominations & electoral quotas 
          Nominations= 11.74 + 4.89 (L-quotas)***  Nominations= 12.32+ 16.37 (E-quotas)*** 
        Diff. in means (11.74 & 16.63); (t=2.24) Diff. in means (12.32 vs. 28.69); (t =4.81) 
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This overall picture may differ across the three sub-regional samples as graphs A.11 to 
A.13 for female nominations and leadership show. However, in all three sub-samples, the 
influence of female leadership on nominations is established and statistically significant. 
These graphs show high t-scores and statistically significant bivariate coefficients for 
Europe and Israel dataset, explaining 69% of the variance. For the non-Arab Muslim sub-
sample, the t-score is small and so is the magnitude of the coefficient, although it is 
positive, which denotes that an association exists between women‘s nominations and 
their share in parties‘ leadership bodies. In the Arab sub-sample, while the t-statistic is 
high and the coefficient is statistically significant, this bivariate relationship explains less 





      Graph A.10 All 26 countries   Graph A.13 Europe & Israel (6) 
Female nominations & leadership 
 Nominations= 3.54 + .65(leadership)***         Nominations = 6.15 + .83 (leadership)*** 
             (t = 9.92; r
2
 = .2614)       (t=11.89; r
2
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               Graph A.12   Arab countries (13) Graph A.13 Non-Arab Muslim countries (7) 
Nominations = .99 + .26 (leadership)***          Nominations = 3.73 + 5.70 (log leadership)** 
(t= 3.40; r
2
 = .0864)                          (t= 1.93; r
2
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These positive results encouraged further analysis. The five explanatory variables are 
incorporated to estimate a model for female nominations by political parties. This 
produced the following multivariate regression equation:  
Female nominations = a + b1 (secularism) + b2 (female membership) + b3 
(female leadership) + b4 (electoral quotas) + b5 (legislated quotas) 
 
Fixed effects by country are used as dummies in estimating multivariate regression 
models for female parliamentary nominations for all 26 countries as well as for the Arab, 
non-Arab Muslim-majority and Europe plus Israel sub-regional samples. The results are 
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Yemen  -41.4426*** 
(7.2411) 
   
Albania 16.6059*** 
(1.2530) 
    
Indonesia    16.933*** 
(1.5930) 
 
Senegal    4.5529** 
(1.8227) 
 
Bangladesh    -9.1768*** 
(2.0608) 
 








































  13.9980*** 
(2.9008) 




   










N 179 164 110 90 54 
Degrees freedom 156 143 96 80 43 
R
2 0.8288 0.8536 0.5279 0.3702 0.9157 
Adjusted  R
2 0.8046 0.8331 0.4640 0.2993 0.8962 
F-test 34.33 41.68 8.26 5.22 46.74 
 
Source: Official data compiled by national consultants from party administrators and processed by author. 
Clustered standard errors are reported;   ***=P.01; **=P.05; *=P.10 
 
The fixed effects regression models estimate female electoral nominations as a 
function of religiosity (secularism), female membership and leadership, legislated and 
electoral voluntary party quotas for women. What emerges is that the coefficients on 
secularism are positive but small in magnitude (less than one percentage point) in all 
models, except in Model 4 for the Europe and Israel sub-sample where it is negative. 
However, the coefficient on secularism is statistically significant only in the Arab sub-
sample with a higher magnitude (1.12). The negative coefficient on secularism in model 
4 may be explained by the fact that there is really not much variation observed across 
these countries in women‘s leadership and nominations, except in Israel. In addition, 
these results may be due to the lower dominance of religion on politics in Europe 
compared to the Muslim-majority countries, as the Fox RAS index indicates (see, 
earlier). Therefore, the overriding factors of more statistical significance for female 
parliamentary nominations may be the size of female party membership and party 
leadership more than religiosity and secularism per se in that model.  The coefficient on 
female membership is positive and significant, as expected, in all models except for the 





only in the full model but not in any of the sub-regional samples, although it is positive 
but small in magnitude. This implies that the influence of leadership on nominations is 
not that strong.  
The coefficients on legislated quotas in all models are large and statistically 
significant, except for the Arab countries model where it is negative but statistically 
significant. The coefficients on electoral party quotas are positive and large for the full 
models and statistically significant, as expected. However, while it is statistically 
significant for the Arab sub-sample, it is negative. This may be explained by the less 
popularity of these quotas in the Arab countries. Data collected from party administrators 
and from the IDEA quota project show that 33 (10%) out of the 330 parties across 26 
countries apply voluntary electoral quotas for women. These belong mostly to the 
European and Israel sub-sample, except for Belgium. In contrast, with the exception of 
few parties in Albania and few Arab countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia), none of 
the parties in the Arab and non-Arab Muslim-majority countries employ voluntary 
electoral quotas for women.  
It is hard to compare the three sub-samples for obvious reasons of coverage. 
However, the results of how much of the variance in female nominations each model 
explains are reported. Models 1A and 1B produce strong and statistically significant 
coefficients, as hypothesized. Model 1A covering all 26 countries can explain over 80% 
of variations in female nominations, while Model 1B can explain slightly more (83%) of 
the variance but covers fewer countries (19).  In Model 1A, the coefficients on female 
membership and leadership are positive and small, but statistically significant. This 







 Positive, large and statistically significant coefficients on electoral and legislated 
quotas are depicted for Models 1A (26 countries) and 1B (19 countries). This implies that 
as soon as affirmative action measures are introduced by parties and adopted by 
governments female nominations will automatically increase (by around 6 and 42 
percentage points, respectively). The F-tests indicate that the fixed effects by country are 
consistently jointly significant. Model 1B explains almost the same proportion of the 
variance (three more percentage points) in female nominations than model 1A. However, 
Model 1A covers more countries (26 versus 19) and more data points. This implies that 
the missing data on female membership did not affect the results in Model 1A, since the 
coefficients are statistically significant in both models. Therefore, Model 1A with all 
countries is superior to the one with lesser countries.   
Model 2 for the Arab sub-sample can explain 46% of variations, while Model 3 
for the non-Arab Muslim countries, with missing female membership explains around 
30% of variations in female nominations. The results in models 2 and 3 for the Arab and 
non-Arab Muslim sub-samples point to positive but small coefficients on religiosity, 
which is statistically significant for the Arab sub-sample but not for the non-Arab sub-
sample. Similar results are borne for female leadership, which show positive but small 
coefficients but statistically not significant for both sub-samples. The Arab model 
explains 46%, while the non-Arab model explains around 30% of the variance in female 
nominations across parties. However, the results in these two models with respect to a 
                                               
28   Running the regression model with interaction of female membership with female leadership for 
all models did not produce significant results. The model with interaction of female leadership and 
membership is not an alternative. Employing the Chow test, shows that the null hypothesis cannot be safely 
rejected in a model with interaction, since it did not result in an increase in the amount that the regression 
equation can explain in the model for all countries combined. Therefore, we infer that these models with 
interaction between membership and leadership do not explain a statistically significant additional 





linear career path for women in politics are not borne out. There is no clear link between 
women‘s membership, leadership and nominations, as hypothesized. In the Arab sub-
sample, the coefficient on female membership is positive but small. This reflects the 
situation in parties with higher religiosity where there is huge female membership and 
absence of a critical mass of women for leadership, as an outcome of ‗ghettoizing‘ 
women in women‘s wings (Sbaity Kassem 2010). However, once a critical mass of 
women is attained, such a linear career path becomes plausible. This is especially the case 
in the sub-sample of non-Arab Muslim-majority countries, where the coefficients on 
religiosity and female leadership, albeit positive but are not statistically significant. This 
augurs well for a career path in politics.    
In comparative perspective, the results in Model 4 do not denote a positive 
association between female nominations and religiosity, given the lesser salience of 
religiosity in parties‘ platforms. Moreover, what also stands out in this model is the 
strong coefficient (20.5) on legislated quotas, which is statistically significant, leaving no 
doubt that as soon as parties start applying legislated quotas for women, female 
nominations are estimated to jump by close to 21 percentage points. This regression 
equation can explain up to 90% of variations in women‘s leadership in the dataset for 
Europe and Israel. It supports the tripartite relationship between female party 
membership, leadership and nominations, the linear career path for women in politics. 
This relationship is both statistically and substantively significant in the dataset for 
Europe and Israel. It is also borne out for the full Model 1A, the 19 countries‘ Model 1B 







This Appendix advances a new explanation for women‘s leadership by positing a 
theory of party variation in religiosity to explain variation in women‘s leadership within 
parties under different political regimes and electoral systems, but also under the 
influence of different religions. Some scholars studying the Arab region argue that it is 
religion (Islam), authoritarian regimes, women-unfriendly electoral systems, or political 
culture, which most strongly produce the gender gap in female leadership and 
representation.
29
 This paper controls for the influence of Islam on female representation 
by showing that even in countries with Muslim-majority populations, one sees variations 
and wide disparities in female leadership. This cross-national research was only possible 
after compiling an original dataset of women in 330 political parties across 26 countries 
in Asia, Africa and Europe. This is an original dataset, which as far as I am aware is not 
available elsewhere. It constitutes a nucleus for a future research project to build a global 
database on women in political parties akin to those of the IPU on women in parliaments, 
or the IDEA on gender quotas, which are valuable to feminists and students of political 
parties.  
The findings from the cross-national comparative exercise provide strong 
empirical support for the hypothesis that women‘s chances in leadership are lower as 
religiosity in political parties rises and secularism in their political platforms diminishes, 
and vice versa. The quantitative examination of the influence of secularism on women‘s 
leadership produces results that have high statistical significance for the pooled sample of 
                                               
29 See Alfred Stepan and Graeme Robertson, ―An Arab More Than Muslim Electoral Gap?‖  Journal 
of Democracy (14 July 2003); Daniela Donno and Bruce Russett, ―Islam, Authoritarianism, and Female 
Empowerment: What are the linkages?‖ World Politics 56 (July 2004), 582-607; Fish, Steven. ―Islam and 





26 countries. This relationship is especially significant for the Arab and non-Arab 
Muslim-majority countries, but not the Europe and Israel dataset. Furthermore, the 
multivariate regression results also show that internal quotas for women have a strong 
influence on women‘s leadership in the non-Arab Muslim-majority dataset, since many 
parties in these countries employ such affirmative action measures, while fewer parties 
covered in the Arab countries do. Many parties look at women as a ‗symbol of the 
modern‘. They may not be seriously committed to gender equality, but do so for window-
dressing and public consumption, or to enhance their image for electoral success. They 
also employ rhetoric and strategic maneuverings when it is in their interest to do so. 
However, parties‘ platforms transform overtime -- even those with religious platforms -- 
and their religiosity levels may decline. This augurs well for women‘s leadership in these 
parties signaling the presence of a light at the end of the tunnel.  
Lastly, the results in the full model of 26 countries denote the presence of a 
tripartite relationship between female party membership, leadership and nominations. 
The findings in the Europe and Israel sub-sample support the expectation that female 
membership and activism within parties increases the share of women on party electoral 
lists. Moreover, the share of women in leadership bodies has a positive but not 
statistically significant influence on female nominations. These results indicate that 
women‘s political leadership pursues a linear career path. More precisely, an increase in 
women‘s party membership -- as activists -- creates a critical mass of women for 
leadership, as shown in the leadership model. In turn, women in leadership bodies 
become agents of change and a pressure group within political parties as they lobby for a 





findings augur well for the future of women in politics. Women can make a breakthrough 
into leadership positions with lower party religiosity, women-friendly electoral systems 
and a gender-sensitive political culture. Once a critical mass of women is created that 
imposes itself in parties‘ inner structures and lobbies for a bigger share in the political 
















Combined Polity scores32 





(10 most to 1 least)  
Arab countries (hold elections periodically & allow parties to form and compete) 
Comoros 3 +9 n.a. 
Kuwait 4 -7 4.68 
Djibouti 5 +2 n.a. 
Lebanon 5 +7 6.25 
Morocco 5 -6 4.05 
Jordan 5 (6 in 2009) -3 4.02 
Yemen 5 (6 in 2009) -2 4.23 
Palestine N.A. 5 (6 in 2009) n.a n.a. 
Bahrain 5 (6 in 2009) -7 4.42 
Algeria 6 +2 4.37 
Egypt  6 -3 4.22 
Mauritania 6 -2 3.63 
Tunisia 7 -4 3.78 
Non-Arab Muslim-Majority Countries (electoral democracies) 34 
Indonesia 2 +8 7.00 
Senegal 2 (3 in 2009) +7 6.30 
Mali 2 +7 7.15 
Albania 3 +9 7.55 
Turkey 3 +7 7.65 
Sierra Leone 3 +7   5.39 
Niger 3 (5 in 2009) -3 6.25 
Bangladesh 4 (3 in 2009) +5 6.05 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 4 -66 (special values)  6.50 
                                               
30  FHI is a 7-point scale which measures freedom as indicated by political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL). 
Countries whose combined score on political rights and civil liberties, average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered ‗Free‘, 
3.0 to 5.0 ‗Partly Free‘, and 5.5 to 7.0 ‗Not Free‘.   
 
31  Polity IV does not include Palestine, because it is not recognized as an independent state. Data on Brunei, 
Maldives and Kosovo are not available in Polity IV Country Time Series 1800-2009.   
 
32   The "Polity Score" captures the regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (least 
democratic) to +10 (most democratic). Autocracies are assigned scores from (-10 to -6), democracies (+6 to 
+10), and all regimes in-between (-5 to +5). The combined Polity score is computed by subtracting ―autocratic‖ 
score from ―democratic‖ sore: +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).    
 
33
  Bertelsmann Stiftung, Transformation Index BTI 2010. Transformation Index 2010   www.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de.  Data on Comoros, Djibouti, Maldives, Brunei and Palestine are not available. DEM= 
Democracy Status which is a composite complex index (e.g. No interference of religious dogma; Political 
participation; Free and fair elections, Civil Rights; Stability and Social Integration; Political and Social 
integration; Party System, etc…). 
 
34  Sierra Leone, Niger and Mali do not qualify for inclusion in the dataset, despite their ranking. Due to 
frequent outbursts of violence, political instability and rampant corruption, and claims of fraudulent elections in 
Niger and Sierra Leone, comparativists including Alfred Stepan, argue that these do not fit the criteria of free and 









(1 most free to 7 not free) 
Polity IV (2006-2009)
 36 
Combined Polity scores37 




(10 most to 1 least)  
European countries (Kalyvas set of Christian democratic parties) and Israel 
Netherlands 1 + 10 n.a 
Belgium 1 +10 n.a 
Germany 1 + 10 n.a 
Austria 1 + 10 n.a 
Italy 1 + 10 n.a 
Israel 1 + 10 n.a 
                                               
35  FHI is a 7-point scale which measures freedom as indicated by political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL). 
Countries whose combined score on political rights and civil liberties, average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered ‗Free‘, 
3.0 to 5.0 ‗Partly Free‘, and 5.5 to 7.0 ‗Not Free‘.   
 
36  Polity IV does not include Palestine, because it is not recognized as an independent state. Data on Brunei, 
Maldives and Kosovo are not available in Polity IV Country Time Series 1800-2009.   
 
37   The "Polity Score" captures the regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (least 
democratic) to +10 (most democratic). Autocracies are assigned scores from (-10 to -6), democracies (+6 to 
+10), and all regimes in-between (-5 to +5). The combined Polity score is computed by subtracting ―autocratic‖ 
score from ―democratic‖ sore: +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).    
 
38
  Bertelsmann Stiftung, Transformation Index BTI 2010. Transformation Index 2010   (www.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de).  Data on Comoros, Djibouti, Maldives, Brunei and Palestine are not available. DEM= 
Democracy Status which is a composite complex index (e.g. No interference of religious dogma; Political 
participation; Free and fair elections, Civil Rights; Stability and Social Integration; Political and Social 






Annex Table A.2 Female MPs by Democracy scores, Electoral systems, & Quotas for 
Women 



















Arab Countries (allow parties to form & hold elections) 
Tunisia 27.6 Parallel Closed   No Yes -4 
Mauritania 22.1 TRS Closed % No -2 
Djibouti 13.8 PBV Closed Seats No +2 
Palestine/N.A. 13.0 Parallel Closed % No n.a. 
Jordan 10.8 SNTV Open Seats No -3 
Morocco 10.5 PR Open Seats Yes -6 
Kuwait 7.7 BV Open No No -7 
Algeria 7.7 PR Closed No Yes +2 
Lebanon 3.1 BV Open No No +7 
Bahrain 2.5 FPTP Open No No -7 
Egypt 1.8 TRS Open Seats No -3 
Yemen 0.3 FPTP Open No Yes -2 
Comoros 3.0 TRS Open No No +9 
Other Arab Countries (do not allow parties to form & hold elections, except Iraq) 
Iraq 25.2  PR Closed % No -66 
UAE 22.5 N Open No No -8 
Sudan 25.6 FPTP Closed Seats No -4 
Syria 12.4 BV Open No No -7 
Libya 7.7 N Open No No -7 
Somalia 6.8 N Open Seats No -77 
Oman 0.0 FPTP n.a No No -8 
Qatar 0.0 N n.a No No -10 
Saudi Arabia 0.0 N n.a No No -10 
Non-Arab Muslim-Majority Countries (over 50% Muslim population) 
Senegal 22.7 Parallel Closed % Yes +7 
Indonesia 18.0 PR Closed % No +8 
Albania 16.4 MMP Closed % Yes +9 
Turkey 9.1 PR Closed  No Yes +7 
Other Non-Arab Muslim-Majority Countries (unstable polities that hold elections & have parties) 
Bangladesh 18.6 FPTP Open Seats No +5 
Afghanistan 27.7 SNTV Closed Seats  No -66 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
16.7 PR Open   % Yes -66 
European Countries (Kalyvas set of Christian democratic Parties) & Israel (the Jewish State)  
Netherlands 40.7 PR Closed/ord
ered 
No Yes  +10 
Belgium 39.3 PR Closed % Yes +10 
Germany 32.8 MMP Closed No Yes +10 
Austria 27.9  PR Closed No Yes +10 
Italy 21.3 PR Closed/blo
cked 
No Yes +10 
Israel 19.2 PR Closed No Yes +10 
 
Source: For data on suffrage rights of women in Arab countries see, Fatima Sbaity Kassem, ed.  2006. Status of 
Arab Women Report 2005: History of Women’s Movements in the Arab World, (United Nations: New York). For 





Classification of 186 countries, (www.ipu.org) November 2010; for electoral systems and quotas: the International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral, Assistance (IDEA), Global Database of Quotas for Women 
(www.quotaproject.org), as well as for Palestinian Occupied Territory data (update November 2009). Electoral 
system acronyms: List (PR) proportional representation;  FPTP First Past the Post; BV Bloc Vote; MMP Mixed 
Membership Proportional; Parallel systems; PBV Party Bloc Vote; STV Single Transferable Vote; SNTV Single 
Non-Transferrable Vote; TRS Two-Round Systems; N (no electoral system in place). Polity IV combined 
democracy scores are for democracies (+6 to +10); autocracies (-5 to -10); and other regimes (+5 to -4).  
Coding: open lists (0), closed lists (1); PR (1), all other electoral systems (0); Democracies from +6 to +10 (1), all 
others (0). 
 
Annex Table A.3 
Female membership in parties of advanced industrialized countries, 1992 
 










































































































































Graph A.14 Female leadership & political regimes 
Leadership= 12.6648 + 6.7782(democracy)*** 
Difference in means (12.66; 19.44); (t=4.15; r
2 
=0.0558) 
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Graph A.15 Female leadership & electoral systems 
Leadership= 14.3572 + 4.0428(PR systems)*** 
































Graph A.16 Female leadership & electoral lists 
Leadership= 11.9378 + 6.7599(closed lists)*** 





















































open lists closed lists
Not PR PR Not PR PR
 (Polity IV scores: Democracies (+6 to +10), non-democracies (all others)
Chart A.1 Female nominees by political regimes, electoral systems & electoral lists
non-democracies democracies
 
The share of female MPs in a datatset of 80 countries, or the whole universe of Muslim-
majority and the OECD countries, is regressed against these countries‘ GDP/Capita, 
political regimes, and electoral systems. The satistical results support the argument that 
explanations of female representation based solely on either of these three theories do not 
fully explain varaitions perceived across countries or parties within these countries. These 





Appendix 2  
Data on Women in Political Parties in 26 Countries 

















National Liberation Front   
  
4 
     National Rally for Dem. 
  
4 
     El-Islah (MRN/MI) 1999 
 
1 
     HAMAS 
 
9.8 1 1 
 
10 15 20 
Workers’ Party (PT) 
  
5 1 
    National Front (FNA) 
  
4 
     El-Nahda 1990 
 
3 
     Renewal (PRA) 
  
4 
     National Entente (MEN) 
  
4 
     Front of Socialist Forces  
  
5 
     Rally for Culture & Dem RCD 
  
5 
     Movement for Dem MDA 
  
5 
     Arouch Citizens 
  
5 
     Islamic Salvation (FIS) 
  
2 
      
BAHRAIN 
National Democratic Wa'd 2001 0 4 1 0 25.9 15.4 16.7 
National Conciliation 
Alwefaq 2001 42.5 1 0 0 10 9.3 0 
National Dem. Rally  2001 0 5 0 0 23.3 9.5 0 
Islamic Action Society 2002 0 2 0 0 25 7.3 0 
Dem. Progressive Tribute 2001 7.5 5 0 0 11.3 19.6 1 
Arab Islamic Center 2002 0 3 0 0 28 0 0 
National Islamic Forum 2000 17.5 3 0 0 30 16.3 0 
Islamic Fundament  Al-
Asalah 2002 20 1 0 0 9.8 0 0 
Islamic Shoura 2002 5 3 0 0 14.8 0 1 
 Constitution Al-Meethaq 2001 10 4 0 0 40 23.5 4 
National Dem. Solidarity  2002 2.5 5 0 0 25 27.6 0 
N. Free Thought 2002 0 4 0 0 60 47.8 0 
N. Constitutional Solidarity 2002 0 4 0 0 32.4 37.5 0 
N. Brotherhood 2003 0 3 0 0 34.8 0 0 
Islamic Line 2007 0 3 0 0 44.1 15.8 0 
Islamic Alliance Rabitah 2002 10 3 0 0 28 0 0 
N. Justice Movement 2006 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 





















Convention for Renewal  
  
5 0 0 
   Camp  Autonomous Islands 
   
0 0 
   Anjouan Popular 
   
0 0 
   Democracy & Progress 
  
4 0 0 
   Democracy Front 
  
1 0 0 
   Forces for Republican  
  
2 0 0 
   Forum Nat. Redress 
   
0 0 
   Citizens of Republic  
  
4 0 0 
   N. Front of Justice  
  
4 0 0 
   Socialism & democracy 
  
5 0 0 
   N. Rally for Development 
  
5 0 0 
   Conservative UDC 
  
2 0 0 
   Green PV 
  
5 0 0 
    
DJIBOUTI 
Peo   People’s Rally Progress 1979 74 5 0 0 25 9.1 10 
Restoration & Democracy 1991 18.5 5 0 0 25 17 4 
N. Democratic  PND 1992 3.1 5 1 1 35 25.9 0 
Social Democratic PSD 2002 3.1 4 0 0 33.3 0 0 
Union of Reform UPR 2005 1.5 4 0 0 19.5 7 0 
 
EGYPT 
Egypt 2000 2001 0 4 0 0 15 8 0 
Egypt Youth 2005 0 5 0 0 1 12.1 0 
Democratic Generation 2002 0 5 0 0 12 10 0 
Egypt Labor Party 1933 0 5 0 0 9 0 0 
Democratic Peace Party 2005 0 5 0 0 0 10 0 
Democratic Front Party 2007 0 5 0 0 10 28.6 0 
Social Justice Party 1993 0 5 0 0 10 4.3 0 
National Democratic Party 1978 68.5 4 0 0 13 6.9 6 
Free Republican  2006 0 5 0 0 5 4.3 0 
Constitutional Party 2004 0 4 0 0 5 10 0 
Egypt Arab Social Party 2004 0 5 0 0 10 6.7 0 
UMMA Party 1983 1 4 0 0 10 7.7 0 
People Democratic Party 1992 0 5 0 0 10 10 0 




















Democratic Unionist Party  1990 0 5 0 0 11 11.1 0 
Liberal Socialist Party 1976 0 5 0 0 1 9.1 3 
Progressive National Unionist 1977 1 5 0 0 2 10.5 5 
GREENS 1990 0 5 0 0 10 14.3 2 
New WAFD 1978 1.3 5 0 0 9 18.8 8 
Conservative party  2006 0 4 0 0 10 8.3 0 
Solidarity  Party 1995 0 4 0 0 3 6.7 0 
Young Women Egypt 1987 0 5 0 0 10 13.3 0 
Muslim Brotherhood 
 
19.4 2 0 0 30 0 1 
 
JORDAN 
National Constitution NCP 1997 10 4 0 0 0 25 2 
Jordanian Life JLP 2008 0 5 0 0 34 30 0 
N. Direct Democratic NDDM 1997 0 4 0 0 40 10.7 0 
Jordanian National Party  2007 0 5 0 0 40 39.3 0 
Democratic Popular Unity 1993 0 4 0 0 14 9.1 0 
Arab Baath Progressive 1993 0 5 1 0 29 12.9 0 
J. Arab Baath Socialist 1993 2.7 5 0 0 14 0 0 
Message Party 2002 0 4 0 0 25 18 1 
Communist of Jordan 1993 0 5 0 0 37 17.1 0 
J. Democratic Unity Front 2007 0 4 0 0 18 9.5 0 
Prayer Dua'a Party 1993 0 3 0 0 35 13 0 
People’s Democratic HASHD 1992 0 4 0 0 37.5 14.6 0 
Muslim Center Party  2001 0 2 0 0 17 0 1 
Islamic Action Front  1992 5.4 1 0 0 10 7.5 0 
 
KUWAIT 
Salafi Movement 2001 16 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Islamic Constitutional HADAS 1992 2 2 1 0 20 25 0 
Shi’ites Movement  2003 14 3 1 0 59.8 36.4 0 
Popular Coalition  1999 10 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Democratic Forum 1991 8 4 0 0 11.1 12.5 0 
Democratic Alliance 2003 8 4 0 0 40 20 12.5 
         



















Republican for Renewal 
ADEL 2006 8.42 5 0 0 35 21.4 50 
Rally Democratic Unity RDU 1995 2.1 5 0 0 10 35.5 50 
Popular Union Progress APP 1991 7.36 4 0 0 14 2.7 14.28 
  TAWASOL 2007 4.21 2 0 0 8 17.2 0 
  Union of Progress Forces 
UFP 1995 6.31 5 0 0 22 46.7 33.33 
 
MOROCCO 
Socialist Union People 
Forces 1975 11.1 5 1 1 
 
22.2 3 
Independence  1944 16 2 0 0 
 
18.2 3 
Progress & Socialism 1974 5.2 5 0 0 
 
20 2 
Democratic Forces Front 1997 2.8 5 0 0 
 
15.4 5 
People’s Movement 1959 13.2 5 0 0 
 
12 5 
N. Rally of Independents 1978 11.7 2 0 0 
 
8.6 0 
Constitutional Union 1983 8.3 1 0 0 
 
0 0 
National Democratic  1981 2.5 3 0 0 
 
16.1 2 
Justice &Development 1967 14.5 2 0 0 
 
9.1 1 




Development 2002 0 5 0 0 
  
4 
Moroccan Liberal Party 2002 0 4 0 0 
  
6 
Covenant Party AL‘Ahd 2002 0 5 0 0 
 
18.2 1 









Palestinian People Party 1981 1 5 0 0 30.4 25 20 
Pal. Liberation PLO  FATAH 1965 33 4 0 0 41.7 13 18 
Arab Liberation Front 1979 0 4 0 0 6 0 5 
Islamic Resistance HAMAS 1989 56 1 0 0 57 0 19 
Pal. National Initiative  2003 1.5 4 0 0 25 25 11 
Third Way  2005 1.5 4 0 0 35 0 20 
Democratic Front for Lib. 1973 1 5 0 0 42 25.9 8 
Popular Front for Lib. 1967 2 5 0 0 40 16 25 
Freedom & Independence 2005 0 4 0 0 9 9 5 






















Dem. Constitutional Rally 1920 80.4 5 1 0 28.6 31.1 26.65 
Democratic Union 1989 3.7 4 0 0 20 7.8 4 
Renewal Ettajdid Movement 1993 1.6 4 0 0 20 7.5 0 
Socialist Democrats  1978 7.4 4 0 0 24 2.2 8.3 
Popular Union Party 1973 5.8 5 0 0 
 
12.9 17.4 
Liberal Social Party 1988 1 5 0 0 40 44.9 10 
Progressive Green Party 2006 1 5 0 0 35 7.2 0 
Democratic Progressive 1988 0 3 0 0 35 1.8 0 





General People’s Congress 1982 80.6 5 1 0 21 12.8 0.3 
Yemen Socialist Party 1978 2.5 5 0 0 15 9.2 2.9 
 Congregation for Reform 1992 15.8 1 0 0 27 4.7 0 
Nasserite People’s Org. 1962 1 4 0 0 7 8.6 1.6 
 
NON-ARAB MUSLIM-MAJORITY COUNTRIES 
ALBANIA 
Socialist Party 1991 30 5 1 0 18 25 30 
Democratic Party 1990 40 4 1 0 15 12.5 3 
Social Democratic Party 1991 5 4 1 0 3.2 30 20 
Social Mov. for Integration 2004 3.5 5 1 0 28.3 14.3 30 
Republican Party 1991 7.8 4 0 0 na 0 3 
 
AFGHANISTAN 
Islamic Party 2005 12.8 1 0 0 2 2.8 5.9 
Islamic Society 1957 13.6 2 0 0 5 0 19 
Social Democratic Party 1965 6 4 0 0 3.3 6 20 
Islamic Unity Wahdat 1989 2.8 2 0 0 30 15.7 34.2 
National Solidarity 2004 1 4 0 0 30 12.3 0 



















Comprehensive Dem & Dev 2005 1 4 0 0 20 19.1 8 
Solidarity Hambastagi 2004 1 4 0 0 30 30.4 7.4 
National Dev. Taraqi Melli 2004 1 4 0 0 30 14 16 
 
BANGLADESH 
Awami League 1949 76.7 4 0 0 
 
9.2 5.3 
Nationalist Party 1978 10 2 0 0 
 
3.8 3.9 
Jama’at-e-Islami 1941 9 1 0 0 
 
0 0 
Jatia Party Irshad 1986 9 3 0 0 
 
0 4.2 
Communist Party 1948 1 5 0 0 
 
14 5.4 
Jatiyo Shomajtantrik Dal INU 1972 1 4 0 0 
 
14.9 0 
Workers Party  1992 1 5 0 0 
 
4.8 0 
Liberal Democratic LDP 2006 1 2 0 0 
 
3.3 0 
Bangladesh National BJP-NF 2001 1 3 0 0 
 
3 50 
Islamic Unity Front (Oikya) 1990 1 1 0 0 
 
0 0 
National Party (Manju) 1999 1 3 0 0 
 
10.9 0 
Jatiya Samajtantrik -RAB 1999 1 4 0 0 
 
1.8 2.3 
Krishak Sramik Janata 1999 1 4 0 0 
 
16.9 0 
National Awami 1957 1 4 0 0 
 
3.5 0 
Gono Forum 1993 1 4 0 0 
 
9.9 8.9 
Bikalpa Dhara 2006 1 2 0 0 
 
3.3 6.4 





Social Democratic SDP BiH 1990 10.5 5 1 0 
 
29.5 38.6 
Alliance Ind. Social Dem.  1990 17.5 5 0 0 
 
17.4 37.5 
Democratic progress PDP 1999 3.5 5 0 0 
 
13 40 
Dem. People Community 1993 1.8 5 0 0 
 
20 34.8 
Dem. People League 2000 1.8 5 0 0 
 
0 38.8 
Patriotic Party BPS  1996 1.8 5 0 0 
 
0 37 
People’s Radom 2000 1.8 5 0 0 
 
18.8 37.2 
Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina 1996 15.8 4 0 0 
 
26.3 36.6 
Croatian Dem. Union 1990 10.5 4 0 0 
 
9.8 41 
Croatian Dem. HDZ 1990 1990 3.5 4 0 0 
 
17.2 35.7 
Serbian Democratic Party  1990 5.3 4 0 0 
 
0 40 
























United Development Party PPP 1973 6.6 1 0 0 
 
8.1 27 
Democratic Struggle PDI-P 1999 16.8 4 0 0 
 
11.1 35 
National Mandate PAN 1998 8.2 3 0 0 
 
12.5 31 
Crescent Star PBB 1998 2 1 0 0 
 
0 33 
Nation Functional PKPB 1998 1.5 2 0 0 
 
0 30 
Nahdatul Ummah PPNUI 1998 1.1 3 0 0 
 
34.9 30 
Functional Groups GOLKAR 1964 19.1 5 0 0 
 
16.1 31 
National Awakening PKB 1998 5 3 0 0 
 
20.7 34 
Democratic Party PD 2001 26.4 5 0 0 
 
17.1 33 
Prosperous Justice PKS 2002 10.2 2 0 0 
 
5.3 37 
Reform Star PBR 2002 2.6 3 0 0 
 
0 40 
Prosperous Peace PDS 2001 2.4 5 0 0 
 
26.3 33 
Vanguard PELOPOR 2002 1 5 0 0 
 
6.7 37 
Great Indonesia Gerinda   2007 4.6 5 0 0 
 
18 30 
People’s Conscience Hanura 2007 3 5 0 0 
 
28.6 30 





Democratic Party PDS 1974 87 5 0 1 
 
18 21 
Alliance Progress Forces AFP 1999 boycott 5 0 1 
 
26 boycott 
Socialist Party PSS 1948 boycott 5 0 1 
 
23 boycott 
Union Dem. Renewal URD 1998 boycott 5 0 1 
 
24 boycott 
Dem League – Labor LD/MPT 1981 boycott 5 0 1 
 
14 boycott 
A-Jef Dem. & Socialism AJ/PADS 1981 2 4 0 0 
 
30 0 
National Dem. Rally RND 1981 boycott 5 0 0 
 
29 boycott 
Reform Social Dev. MRDS 2000 1 3 0 0 
 
28 0 
Coalition WAAR-WI 2007 2 5 0 0 
 
12 0 
Rally for People RP 2002 1.3 3 0 0 
 
28 0 
Alliance Progress Justice JEF JEL 1995 1 5 0 0 
 
18 100 
Independence & Work PIT 1981 boycott 5 0 0 
 
19 boycott 
Gainde centrist Bloc BCG 1991 boycott 4 0 0 
 
0 boycott 
Conv. Dem. & Patriots CDP/GG 1992 boycott 5 0 0 
 
0 boycott 
Coalition TAKKU 2007 2 5 0 0 
 
33 0 
National Patriotic Union/TEKKI 2007 1 5 0 0 
 
33 100 






















Socialism & Dem Benno Jubel 1996 1 3 0 0 
 
35 0 
Patriotic Rally Jammi/Rewmi 1995 0 5 0 0 
 
11 0 
Social Democratic Jant-Bi  2000 1 5 0 0 
 
44 0 





Justice & Dev. AKP 2001 62 4 0 0 
 
15 11.3 
Republican People’s CHP 1923 17.8 5 1 0 
 
11.1 10 
Motherland ANAP 1983 1 4 2 0 
 
8 16.6 
Democratic Left DSP 1985 2.4 5 0 0 
 
20 9 
True Path DYP 1983 1 4 1 0 
 
8.6 0 
National Movement MHP 1969 12.7 4 0 0 
 
5.2 7.8 
Democratic Society DTP 2005 3.6 4 1 0 
 
40.9 14.9 
Freedom & Solidarity ODP 1994 1 5 1 0 
 
50 31.6 
New Turkey YTP 2002 1 2 0 0 
 
0 0 
Grand Unity BBP 1993 1 4 0 0 
 
7.2 0 
FELICITY 2001 1 2 0 0 
 
1.9 0 
Islamic Virtue FP 1998 1 3 0 0 
 
0 0 




EUROPEAN COUNTRIES & ISRAEL 
AUSTRIA 
Social Democrats SPO 1988 31.1 5 0 1 40 42.4 40 
Austrian people’s OVP 1983 27.9 4 0 1 30 20.4 30 
Green Alternative DieGRU 1986 10.9 5 1 1 50 54.6 50 
Freedom Party FPO 1949 18.6 4 0 0 0 0 0 
Alliance for Future BZO 2005 11.5 4 0 0 25 21.1 0 
  
BELGIUM 
Socialist Party French PS 1978 13.3 5 1 0 35 27.8 50 
Green Party ECOLO 1980 8 5 1 0 50 35 50 
Reformist Movement MR 2002 15.3 5 0 0 44 40 50 
Flemish Liberals  OpenVld 1992 12 4 1 1 30 25 50 




















National front French FN 1985 1 4 0 0 
  
50 
Flemish Liberals Spirit & SPA 2001 9.3 5 1 1 39.9 33 50 
 
ITALY 
People of Freedom 2007 43 4 1 0 33 20.4 22.2 
Democratic PD/DLULV 2001 35 5 1 1 25 26.7 28.4 
Forward Italy Forza 1994 20.8 4 1 0 20 22.9 18.3 
National Alliance Alleanza 1995 11.4 5 0 0 16 3.4 16.2 
Communist Refoundation 
PRC 1991 6.3 5 0 1 44 34.3 30 
Union Christian & Centre 
UDC 2002 5.9 2 1 1 12 8.6 5.9 
Christian Dem. Auto. 
DCA/PSI 2005 1 2 0 0 10 7.1 3.6 
North League Lega Nord 1991 9.5 4 0 1 28 10 20 
Democratic Left DS 2007 3.2 5 0 1 50 50 40 
Italy of Values dei valori 1998 4.3 4 0 0 20 7.7 7.4 
Socialist & Radical RN 2007 3.3 5 0 0 36 18.7 14.3 
Communist PdCI 1998 2.7 5 1 0 28.6 14.3 11.8 
Federation of Greens Verdi 1990 2.4 5 0 1 40 50 28.6 
Popolari Udeur PPI 1999 1.7 2 0 1 15 0 14.3 
Misto-M-Linguistiche 
 
1 4 0 0 10 0 0 
Movement Autonomies 
MPA 2005 1.3 2 0 0 5 0 0 
Misto Republ. Liberals M-
RLR 2007 1 5 0 0 15 7.1 25 
Misto La DESTRA 2007 3.5 4 1 0 13 10 25 
Socialist for Constitution SDI 2007 1 5 0 1 10 0 0 
Republican PRI 1895 0 5 1 0 13 5 0 
 
GERMANY 
Liberal Democratic FDP 1948 15 5 0 0 22.8 20.3 22.54 
Christian Social Union CSU 1945 7 4 0 0 18 24.4 31.74 
Christian Dem. Union CDU 1950 31.2 4 0 1 25.5 29.7 35.15 
Social Democratic Party SPD 1863 23.5 5 0 1 31.1 37.3 37 
Communist Party DieLink 2007 12.2 5 0 1 37.7 45.5 45.81 






















Christian Dem. Appeal CDA 1980 27.3 3 0 0 33 43 36 
Labor Party PvdA 1946 21.2 5 1 1 38 63 46 
Socialist Party SP 1972 16.7 5 0 0 41 37 40 
Freedom & Democracy 
VVD 1948 14 5 0 0 28 33 33 
Party of Freedom PVV 2006 6 4 0 0 
 
0 20 
Green Left GL 1990 4.7 5 1 1 46 71 47 
Christian Union CU 2001 4 2 0 0 27 25 41 
Democrats D66 1966 2 5 0 0 30 50 28 
Animal Welfare Party PvdD 2002 1.3 5 0 0 
 
29 67 
Reformed Political Party 
SGP 1918 1.3 1 0 0 
 
0 0 
Trots of Netherlands TON 2007 1 4 0 0 100 100 100 
 
ISRAEL 
KADIMA 2005 23.3 5 0 0 
 
23.3 23.3 
LABOR 1968 10.8 5 1 1 43.2 27.6 22.7 
LIKUD 1973 22.5 4 1 1 
 
20 21.4 
SHAS 1984 9.2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Israel Beytenu 1999 12.5 4 0 0 
 
30.8 30.8 
National Union Mafdal 1999 3.3 1 0 0 
 
16 8.7 
Gimla’ey Israel GIL 1999 0 5 0 0 
 
11.5 11.5 
Torah & Shabbat Judaism   1992 4.2 1 0 0 0 
 
0 
Meretz 1992 2.5 4 1 1 48.4 51.1 33.6 
Shinui 2007 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 
United Arab List Raam-Tal 2006 3.3 4 0 0 
 
6.1 6.1 
Dem. Peace & Equality 
Hadash 1977 3.3 4 0 0 
 
23.5 23.5 
N. Democratic Alliance 
Balad 1995 2.5 4 0 0 
 
13.3 13.3 
N. Religious Habeit 1956 2.5 1 0 0 
 
11.8 11.8 
Echad 2005 0 5 0 1 0 0 0 
Israel Ba’alia 2003 0 5 0 1 0 0 0 





Column contents & explanatory notes on coding of variables  
 
1. “prtynme”: party name   
2. “yrorgn” :Year of origin of political party (year established) 
3. “seat%pmt”: seats occupied by party in current  or last parliament (in %)  
4. “seclrsm”: Religiosity and secularism 5-point scale, where parties are coded „1‟ extremist 
religiosity; „2‟ conservative but not extremist; „3‟ tolerant religiosity; „ 4‟ confessional but civil 
secularism; and „5‟ a-religious & secular parties. 
5. “I-quota”: Internal voluntary party quotas where „0‟ is assigned to parties not employing quotas; „1‟ 
for those that have recommended; and „2‟ for those employing quotas to increase women‟s leadership 
6. “E-quota”: Electoral quotas for women where „0‟ is assigned to parties not employing quotas and 
„1‟ for those employing quotas for women to increase their share on electoral lists.       
7. “f%mem”: Percentage share of female  membership (in %)  
8. “f%lead”: Percentage share of women in decision-making bodies (in %)  






List of National Consultants 
Mona Fadhel (Bahrain), researcher, author, gender expert 
Fatouma Hadji Djaffar (Comoros), researcher, Ministry of Women 
Amina Said Chire (Djibouti), Professor of Political Science, Djibouti University 
Nahed Nassr (Egypt), researcher, gender expert 
Raedah Farahat (Jordan), Jordanian National Committee for Women 
Lubna Al-Kazi (Kuwait), Professor of Political Science, Kuwait University 
Ely Cheikh Ould Aghailass (Mauritania), Director of Research, SVA 
Idriss Lagrini (Morocco), Professor of Political Science, Mohammed Fifth University 
Mohamed Saadi (Morocco), Former Minister of Social Affairs 
Mohamed El-Ghali (Morocco), Professor of Political Science, Mohammed Fifth 
University 
Sabah Ikhmayees (Palestine), Ph.D. Candidate, Bethlehem City University 
Boutheina Gribaa (Tunisia), Regional Adviser, UN-INSTRAW/CAWTAR 
Rashida Hamadani (Yemen), Chairperson, National Commission for Women 
Jeta Katro (Albania), Professor of Political Science, Tirana University 
Hamid Awaludin (Indonesia), Former Minister of Social Affairs 
Ihsan Ali Fauzi (Indonesia), Chief Researcher, Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina, Jakarta 
Selly Ba (Senegal), researcher and political activist 
Penda Mbow (Senegal), University Professor 
Serpil Cakir (Turkey), Professor of Political Science, Istanbul University 
Alten Ayken (Turkey), researcher and scholar, Istanbul University 
Zakir Hossain (Bangladesh), Chief Executive, Nagorik Uddyog (NGO) 
Mirjana Penava (Bosnia-Herzegovina), researcher, gender expert 
Palwasha Hassan (Afghanistan), Country Director, Rights and Democracy 
 
Ulrike Felber (Austria), Austrian Parliamentary Administration 
Olaf Boehnke  (Germany), Senior Program Officer, Aspen Institute of Berlin, Staff 
Researchers 
Marina Adrianopoli (Italy), M.A. Human Development, Food & Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) 
Michele Pecora (Italy), Development Economist, World Food Programme (WFP)   
Christian DeClercq (Belgium), Agricultural Economist, Researcher   
Mirte Postma (Netherlands), researcher, gender expert 
Hanna Lerner (Israel), Professor of Political Science, Tel Aviv University 
Noa On (Israel), graduate & research assistant, Tel Aviv University   
